Paradigms of postmodern presentism: towards the chicana decolonization of the imaginary by Campo Ramírez, Elsa del
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
FACULTAD DE FILOLOGÍA 
© Elsa del Campo Ramírez, 2017 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
Paradigms of Postmodern Presentism: Towards the Chicana 
Decolonization of the Imaginary 
Paradigmas del presentismo postmoderno: hacia la 
descolonización chicana del imaginario 
MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTORA 
PRESENTADA POR 
Elsa del Campo Ramírez 
DIRECTORA 
Carmen Méndez García 
Madrid, 2018 
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
 
PROGRAMA DE DOCTORADO EN ESTUDIOS LITERARIOS 
 
Facultad de Filología  
 
 
 
  
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
Paradigmas del presentismo postmoderno: Hacia la descolonización 
chicana del imaginario 
 
Paradigms of Postmodern Presentism: Towards the Chicana 
Decolonization of the Imaginary 
 
  
MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR 
 
PRESENTADA POR 
  
Elsa del Campo Ramírez 
 
Directora 
 
Carmen Méndez García 
 
Madrid, 2017 
  
 
© Elsa del Campo Ramírez, 2017 
 
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
  
Programa de Doctorado en Estudios Literarios  
 
Facultad de Filología 
 
 
 
 
PARADIGMAS DEL PRESENTISMO POSTMODERNO: 
HACIA LA DESCOLONIZACIÓN CHICANA DEL IMAGINARIO  
 
PARADIGMS OF POSTMODERN PRESENTISM: TOWARDS THE 
CHICANA DECOLONIZATION OF THE IMAGINARY 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL  
 
Presentada por: 
 
Elsa del Campo Ramírez 
 
 
Dirigida por: 
 
Dra. Carmen Méndez García 
 
Madrid, 2017 
  
  
  
 
Programa de Doctorado en Estudios Literarios  
 
Facultad de Filología 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
PARADIGMAS DEL PRESENTISMO POSTMODERNO: 
HACIA LA DESCOLONIZACIÓN CHICANA DEL IMAGINARIO  
 
 
 
PARADIGMS OF POSTMODERN PRESENTISM: TOWARDS THE 
CHICANA DECOLONIZATION OF THE IMAGINARY 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
Tesis Doctoral presentada por  
 
ELSA DEL CAMPO RAMÍREZ  
 
Para la obtención del Grado de Doctor 
  
  
ACKNOLEDGEMENTS 
 
People tend to assume a doctoral dissertation is a strictly individual task, a mission one 
accomplishes solo. Well, yes and no. It is true that the major bulk of work is done by the 
mentee, but an enabling and nurturing environment and, specifically, the appropriate 
individuals must also accompany in all those moments of manic inspiration and overwhelming 
tedium that, more often than not, encompass the process of creation. Unfortunately, they cannot 
read books for you, no matter how concerned they may be by the puffiness of your eyebags, 
but they can, and they do, in fact, help in many other ways that need proper ascertaining. These 
people’s contributions, even if frequently invisible, may become as indispensable as one’s 
coffee maker and persistence. I understand those who prefer to go without acknowledgments 
at the beginning of their dissertations, but my personal experience and several situations I have 
undergone during this time make it impossible for me to hand in these pages without 
recognising and adequately thanking all those individuals who have somehow made it possible. 
So, here it goes. 
First, thanks to my advisor, Carmen Méndez, who, perhaps following the commands of 
her Trekkie spirit, is one of those cherished professors for whom students are actually a priority; 
and who has consistently sacrificed her time and most likely her mental health in order to 
provide me with valuable help and guidelines, the most meticulous corrections I have ever 
witnessed, and endless assistance. I deeply appreciate her constant support and kind-
heartedness at every stage of the whole process, and her patience when guiding me throughout 
all the confusing paperwork. And my Lord of the Flies T-shirt, of course, which I still wear.  
Thanks also to the University of California Los Angeles, for allowing me the honour of 
spending a whole research year at the Chicana/o Studies Department to become more 
acquainted with a culture that, up until then, I had exclusively been able to access through 
books. Only when I was there, and certainly with the aid of the most attentive of mentors, was 
I capable of finding the true (and ultimate) focus of my thesis. Special thanks to Profe (prof. 
Alicia Gaspar de Alba), to prof. María Cristina Pons, prof. Roberto Chao Romero, prof. Abel 
Valenzuela, prof. Reynaldo Macías, prof. Maylei Blackwell, prof. Rafael Pérez Torres, and to 
my dear Ellie Hernández, for unwearyingly and kindly teaching me to face reality from a 
different perspective, and to acknowledge all those instances where my internalised racism and 
my privileged position were preventing me from understanding how sex and gender cannot be 
disengaged from the colour of one’s skin. Thanks also to Kendy Rivera, for being always so 
eager to listen to what I had to say, not minding how stupid it might sound, and treating me as 
an equal despite her obviously superior intellect. 
I am eternally grateful to my mother, for her blind faith and her limitless belief in my 
aptitudes, for supporting me emotionally and economically, and for taking so many sacrifices, 
always with a smile in her face, to invest in my personal, academic, and intellectual formation. 
Absolutely none of this would have ever been possible without you, Mum, so all of this I owe 
it to you. Gamsahabnida, Oppa, too, for your undeniable contribution in this respect. 
Special thanks to Enrique, too, who up to this date can take pride (?) in being the only 
one to have attended each and every congress and seminar I have participated in and who has 
followed my progress ever since I started. I would like to thank him for his relaxation tips 
before speaking in public, for reminding me that this was all for a reason (and that I should not 
step onto the stage biting the papers I am supposed to read), and for unquestioningly believing 
in me. And, of course, thanks to Willy, for keeping me focused and mentally stable despite the 
ordeal these past few years have been for both of us at so many levels and in so many aspects. 
Thanks for those well-deserved pints, those tons of Kinder Bueno chocolate bars when in a 
slump, your relentless backing, and your unpaid proofreading sessions.  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Mum,  
who saw as her responsibility  
what for me has been a privilege. 
 
 
To Willy and Enrique, 
for being always there.  
  
 
 PARADIGMS OF POSTMODERN PRESENTISM: TOWARDS THE 
CHICANA DECOLONIZATION OF THE IMAGINARY 
 
 
Resumen………………………………………………………………………………1 
 
Summary…………………………………………………………………………...…5 
 
0-Curtain Up: Introduction…………………………………………………….……9 
 
1-The Weight of the Present: Some Theoretical Questions……………………..…25 
 
 1.1-New Historicism, Cultural Materialism and Presentism………………….………28 
 
1.2-Presenting Presentism: In search of a definition………………………….……....44 
 
1.3-Illustration: Margaret Atwood’s “Gertrude  
      Talks Back”…………………………………………………………………...….54 
 
2-Origins and Misconceptions: Delimiting Presentism……………………………61 
 
2.1-Origins……………………………………………………………………..……..63 
 
2.1.1-Postmodern Influences on Presentism………………………………….64 
2.1.1.1-This Delusion We Call Reality…………………………..…...67 
  2.1.1.2-This Shattering We Call the Subject……………………….....70 
2.1.2-Pulling the Leash: Limiting the Scope of Presentism……………….…..72 
2.1.2.1-Quite Postmodern, but not Quite…………………………..…73 
2.1.2.2-The Loyal Subject in the Realm of Fiction………………...….74 
 
2.2-Misconceptions………………………………………………………………......82 
 
2.2.1-The Disdainful Misconception: Presentism  
          is Inherently Uncritical……………………………………………...…84 
2.2.2- The Unilateral Misconception: Presentism  
          is only work-reader oriented…………………………….………….….89 
 
2.3-In Need of a Better Definition: Presentism and Aesthetic 
      Materialism…………………………………………………….………………....96 
 2.3.1-Presentism and Close Reading…………………………………….……98 
 2.3.2-Presentism and the Social Aesthetic……………………………..……101 
 
3-Presentism and the Decolonial Imaginary……………………………………...109 
 
3.1-The Recovery of the Serpent God: The Chicano  
      Movement and Chicana Feminist Theory……………………………..………...112 
 
3.2-Postmodernism and the Chicana/o Movement……………………..…………...126 
 3.2.1-Fragmentation, Alienation and Minorities………………………….…131 
 3.2.2-Postmodern History vs. Herstory………………………….............….135 
  
3.3-Coyolxauhqui’s Daughters and The Decolonization  
      of the Imaginary……………………………………………………………....…141 
 
3.4-“Sound and Fury” or, Are Presentism and the Decolonial 
      imaginary Compatible?.........................................................................................149 
 3.4.1-Presentism is not mere Revisionism………………………………......153 
 
4-The Spatial Turn of Presentism…………………………………….…………...159 
 
4.1-Against Unidimensionality: Presentism is not 
    only temporal……………………………..………………………………………161 
 
4.2-Globalization and Decolonial Studies………………….……………………….169 
 
4.3-Spatial Decolonization and Presentism………………………..………………..172 
 
5-“Not to Either State Inclined:” Alicia Gaspar de Alba’s  
Sor Juana’s Second Dream……………………………………………...............…183 
 
5.1-Some Preliminary Questions About the Phoenix  
      of Mexico……………………………………………………………………..…185 
 
5.2-How to Build a Proto-Feminist, Lesbian Character  
      Through Space……………………………………………………………….….200 
 5.2.1-The Social Cage: The Nun in a Convent……………………………...205 
 5.2.2-The Corporal Cage: Woman’s Body,  
          Woman’s Restrictions…………………………………...………….…209 
 5.2.3-The Emotional Cage: Lesbianism in  
       Pandora’s Box……………………………………………………….…..211 
 
6-Helena Maria Viramontes’s Their Dogs Came withThem……………………...219 
 
 6.1-Archetypical Women in the Chicano Cultural Imaginary……………....222 
 
 6.2-Presentism in Viramontes’s Their Dogs Came with Them……………...233 
  6.2.1-The Use of History for Neo-Colonial  
         Denunciation……………………………………………….....234 
6.2.2-The Use of Space for Displacement  
         Denunciation…………………………….………...………….249 
 
7-Curtain Drop: Final Conclusions…………………………………………….…265 
 
Bibliography….………………………………..……………………………….….281 
 
  
[1] 
 
 
Paradigmas del presentismo postmoderno: Hacia la descolonización 
chicana del imaginario 
 
RESUMEN 
 
De acuerdo con el Oxford English Dictionary, se entiende por presentismo la tendencia 
a interpretar hechos pasados desde una perspectiva actual. Esto, en el campo de la crítica 
literaria equivaldría a estudiar obras clásicas (y no tan clásicas) utilizando parámetros y valores 
propios de nuestros días que no coinciden, en la mayoría de los casos, con aquellos imperantes 
en el momento en que dichas obras fueron publicadas. El concepto de presentismo, si bien no 
demasiado extendido, parece haber ganado popularidad durante los últimos años gracias, en su 
mayor parte, a los académicos Hugh Grady y Terence Hawkes, ambos influenciados por la 
escuela de Frankfurt y el materialismo cultural. En sus obras Shakespeare, Machiaveli & 
Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from Richard II to Hamlet (Grady, 2002) y Shakespeare in 
the Present (Hawkes, 2002) ambos teóricos establecen las bases del presentismo, 
considerándolo una escuela de crítica literaria que surge como respuesta a las aproximaciones 
neo-historicistas y el impacto del materialismo cultural y del neo-formalismo en el campo de 
la teoría durante la década de 1980, si bien no necesariamente en directa oposición. Como 
punto de partida para la teorización del presentismo se da la premisa esencial de que es 
imposible acceder al pasado de forma puramente objetiva, y que todo análisis de una obra 
literaria ha de hacerse, irremediablemente, a través de una visión enfocada y matizada por el 
presente. Sin embargo, esta tesis bebe de académicos como Cary DiPietro, que admiten que la 
escuela presentista se encuentra aún en una etapa temprana de desarrollo, y requiere una 
definición más precisa que entronque con el materialismo estético. 
A lo largo de estas páginas, por tanto, me desviaré de los fundamentos básicos 
establecidos en torno a la idea de presentismo para defender que a) el presentismo ha de ser 
entendido como una herramienta para el análisis literario y no como una escuela; y que b) el 
presentismo no debería ser directamente asociado con el materialismo cultural del que sin duda 
deriva, sino con teorías relacionadas con el esteticismo y dinámicas de la recepción, con 
quienes quizá guarda más relación. Los motivos que me llevan a tales conclusiones tienen que 
ver con aquellas características indisociables del concepto de presentismo como son el 
anacronismo y el aspecto ideológico. Si se acepta que el presentismo es ineludiblemente 
anacrónico, queda preguntarse por qué determinados textos, a pesar de haber quedado 
completamente obsoletos en términos de contexto cultural, siguen siendo trascendentes hoy en 
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día. Por otra parte, asumiendo que el presentismo filtra los textos y creencias del pasado a 
través de la actualidad, es lógico pensar que determinada ideología hará las veces de tamiz. 
Esto no equivale a decir que el presentismo ha de ser asociado a una ideología concreta, sino 
que todo autor/lector/crítico establecerá necesariamente unas pautas ideales específicas a la 
hora de llevar a cabo un análisis presentista. En vez de adorar el pasado como quien lo observa 
a través una vitrina, lo que se pretende es “actualizarlo,” ubicando la relevancia no en el 
contexto que rodea el acto creativo del texto, sino en el de la acogida del mismo. De ahí la 
necesidad de aludir a teorías estéticas y de la recepción sin que el presentismo pierda tampoco 
su enfoque materialista.  
Una vez redefinida esta herramienta en los términos expuestos, el objetivo último de 
esta tesis es relacionar dicha visión del presentismo con determinados proyectos 
descolonizadores efectuados dentro de la teoría feminista chicana. Para llevar a cabo tal fin he 
tomado como base principal a la historiadora neo-marxista Emma Pérez y su obra The 
Decolonial Imaginary (1999), que anima a la revisión del papel de la mujer en la historia a 
través de un imaginario cultural e histórico descolonizado, si bien esto último es más un 
proyecto que una realidad. Así pues, sin perder de vista el enfoque meramente literario que 
tendrá esta tesis, en el cual reincido a menudo, mi propósito principal es analizar cómo ambos 
conceptos: el de presentismo, propio de la postmodernidad, y el de la descolonización del 
imaginario, propio de teorías postcoloniales chicanas, podrían confluir. O, en concreto: cómo 
podría el presentismo facilitar estos intentos de descolonización del imaginario llevados a cabo 
dentro del campo de la teoría feminista chicana.  
A fin de demostrar que el presentismo se acopla bien a proyectos descolonizadores de 
la supremacía asociada a la raza, el género, y/o la orientación sexual, se dedicará la última parte 
de esta tesis al análisis del presentismo en dos obras extraídas del corpus feminista chicano 
donde se puede distinguir un claro intento de descolonizar el imaginario histórico a partir de 
una obra de ficción. Así pues, por una parte, incluyo un breve estudio de la obra Sor Juana’s 
Second Dream (1999), de Alicia Gaspar de Alba, donde se reescribe la figura de la poetisa y 
erudita Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz desde la homosexualidad; y por la otra, analizo Their Dogs 
Came with Them (2007), de Helena María Viramontes, donde el presentismo se lleva a cabo 
no sólo en términos temporales, sino también espaciales.  
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Paradigms of Postmodern Presentism: Towards the Chicana 
Decolonization of the Imaginary 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Presentism is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as the tendency to interpret past 
events from a present-day perspective. Translated into the field of literary criticism, presentism 
means studying past works according to current values and parameters which do not match, in 
the majority of cases, those prevailing at the time these texts were published.  The concept of 
presentism, though not excessively extended, seems to have gained popularity during these 
past years, thanks, for the most part, to academics Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes, who in 
their works manifest the influences upon them exerted by the Frankfurt School and cultural 
materialism. In Shakespeare, Machiaveli & Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from Richard 
II to Hamlet (Grady, 2002); and Shakespeare in the Present (Hawkes, 2002) both theoreticians 
lay the foundations of presentism, which they consider a school of literary criticism arising as 
a response to the new historicist approaches and the impact of cultural materialism and new 
formalism in the field of theory during the 1980’s, though not necessarily in direct opposition. 
Presentism is thus based on the premise that it is impossible to study the past from a perspective 
other than the current one, and that any analysis of a past work must be carried out with a focus 
unavoidably framed and delimited by the present. Yet, this dissertation also follows scholars 
such as Cary DiPietro, who admits that the presentist school is still in an early stage of 
development and that it requires a more precise definition, perhaps linking to theories of 
aesthetic materialism. 
Throughout these pages, I will thereby deviate from the basics established around the 
notion of presentism to defend that a) presentism must be understood as a tool for literary 
analysis, and not as a school; and that b) presentism should not be directly associated with 
cultural materialism, from which it undoubtedly derives, but with theories connected to 
aestheticism and dynamics of reception, with which it might be more related. The reasons 
driving me to these conclusions are related to those inextricable constituents of presentism, 
such as anachronism and the ideological aspect. If we accept that presentism is unavoidably 
anachronic, then one cannot but wonder why some texts, though utterly outdated in terms of 
their cultural context, are still meaningful nowadays. On the other hand, assuming that 
presentism analyses texts and beliefs from the past through the filter of the present, it is logic 
to presume that certain degree of ideology will always serve as the strainer. This does not entail 
that presentism must be linked to a concrete ideology, but that every author/reader/critic will 
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establish specific ideological patterns when carrying out a presentist study. Rather than 
worshipping the past through a display cabinet, presentism aims at ‘updating’ it, focusing not 
on the context surrounding the creation of a text, but on that of its reception, hence the need to 
relate presentism with aesthetic theories without losing its materialist perspective. 
Once presentism has been redefined in the above-mentioned terms, the final objective 
of this dissertation will be to relate that perspective of presentism to some decolonial projects 
undertaken in the field of feminist Chicana theory. The main source for my study has been new 
Marxist historian Emma Pérez and her work The Decolonial Imaginary (1999), which 
encourages a revision of women’s role in history through a culturally and historically 
decolonised imaginary, even though this is more a goal than a reality. Therefore, without losing 
the purely literary scope this dissertation has, which I often emphasise, my main objective is to 
examine how both notions: presentism, characteristic of postmodernity, and the decolonization 
of the imaginary arisen in the context of Chicana decolonial theory, could merge. Or, rather, to 
examine how presentism could facilitate these Chicana feminist attempts to decolonise the 
patriarchal and hegemonic imaginary.   
In order to demonstrate that presentism links well with projects aiming at the 
decolonisation of the supremacy attached to race, gender, class, and/or sexual orientation, the 
final two chapters of this dissertation will be dedicated to the analysis of presentism in two 
novels picked from the Chicana feminist corpus, where a clear attempt to decolonise the 
historical imaginary through fiction can be distinguished. For that purpose, I will include a 
brief study on Alicia Gaspar de Alba’s Sor Juana’s Second Dream (1999), where the figure of 
poet and scholar Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz is rewritten in terms of homosexuality; and Helena 
María Viramontes’s Their Dogs Came with Them (2007), in which presentism is carried out 
not only in temporal, but also in spatial terms.  
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The conservatism of traditional English [studies] lies primarily in two main areas: first, 
its promotion of the author-subject as the individual origin of meaning, insight, and 
truth; and second, its claim that this truth is universal, transcultural and ahistorical. In 
this way, English affirms as natural and inevitable both the individualism and the world 
picture of a specific western culture, and within that culture the perspective of a specific 
class and a specific sex. In other words, a discipline that purports to be outside politics 
in practice reproduces a very specific political position. (Belsey 82)1 
 
In her essay laying the ground for cultural historicism, Catherine Belsey (1996) 
questions two problematic assumptions underlying the field of English studies, which posit that 
a) the ultimate meaning of a literary work lies in its author’s intentions (disregarding or 
diminishing the role that text and reader play in the interpretative process) and b) that there is 
a universal truth (and, consequently, ahistorical, and independent from language and culture) 
to which scholars should aspire. These two common conventions have eventually led to the 
imposition of a Western standard on literary interpretation (white, male, English-speaking, 
heterosexual, and middle-class) that too often marginalizes dissenting voices from the canon 
due to their non-conformity to artificial literary standards. Trying to extricate from that pattern 
that tends to canonise only a narrow selection of writings, my dissertation revolves around 
social (rather than individual) reception theories applied to postcolonial motives present in the 
literature from minority movements, all mediated and related through the notion of presentism. 
Hence, this study develops the concept of presentism, which could be easily and 
simplistically defined as the interpretation of texts from the past according to present-day 
attitudes. Presentism as a notion, subscribing to the Cambridge Introduction to Postmodernism, 
could be considered to be an effect of the Postmodern era. The idea of presentism, however, 
far from being ground-breaking, has been in existence for a long time, though frequently 
unacknowledged, and more than often dismissed, if not scornfully despised. Much of the 
derogation associated to this notion has to do with the polysemy the word encompasses, which 
confers it a slightly different though yet similar meaning depending on the field in which it is 
uttered. Thus, in a philosophical sense, presentism alludes to the outdated and practically 
obsolete belief that only the present time exists, something the scientific community has tended 
                                                          
1 This dissertation follows the eighth edition of the Modern Language Association (MLA) formatting and style guide, which 
echoes the increasing mobility of texts and aims at being more intuitive, rather than prescriptive. Among its most outstanding 
features, information about place of publication and media type are no longer considered necessary, punctuation has been 
simplified, and information about the source has been kept to the basics. 
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to observe with both scepticism and condescendence, and that was virtually debunked with the 
appearance of the Special Theory of Relativity (1905).  
In a historical sense, presentism has been used, at least since the 1930’s, to refer to a 
particular kind of anachronism in which the historian, perhaps due to incompetence, perhaps 
to absent-mindedness, contaminates the past by introducing an aspect only existing in the 
present. Examples of this kind of anachronism are not only visible in history books, but seem 
to apply to any cultural manifestation. Thus, it is possible to see instances of presentist 
anachronism in films like Back to the Future (1985), where a young and over-excited Marty 
McFly plays a Gibson ES-345 electric guitar at a school dance happening in 1955, when in fact 
this particular model was invented three years after the events portrayed take place.  
Inaccuracies may be more outrageous in historical films supposedly depicting real 
events. For example, the kilt that Mel Gibson wears so proudly in his 1995 film Braveheart 
was a garment not invented until the 16th century, two centuries after the real William Wallace 
died. Likewise, the character Maximus Decimus Meridius in Ridley Scott’s 2000 Gladiator is 
often nicknamed “The Spaniard,” when it is highly unlikely that any ancient Roman would use 
that word, being as it is that the word Spaniard started to be used in the 15th century, and it 
comes from the Old French “Espaignart” (Oxford English Dictionary). The correct term 
instead, should have been “The Hispanic,” which is never used in the film. These illustrations 
make allusion to little objects and arguably irrelevant minutiae which presence does not 
coincide with the moment in which the stories occur. But it could nonetheless be argued that 
these details do not affect the final effect of the movie, and they constitute, rather, secondary 
particulars that only alter the plot and the characters superficially, if they alter it at all. The 
difference, of course, is that, even when allegedly portraying real events and figures, in most 
cases these filmic examples are (arguably) not intended to teach us history: they are merely 
there to entertain, to provide us with audio-visual pleasure; and the story shown, despite being 
(freely) based on true events, has little interest in accuracy and correctness.  
Were a history book (or a documentary, to maintain the visual communicative medium) 
to narrate William Wallace’s story, and portrayed him as a humble, low-class highlander with 
an Australian accent, dressed in woollen clothes and painting half his face blue before going to 
war, much in the Picts fashion, more than one historian would scream blue murder. This is 
because the effects of filling films and documentaries/history books with presentist 
anachronisms are completely different. The situation is worsened when the anachronism 
contaminating the historical medium is not an object, such as a guitar or a piece of clothing, 
but a whole concept or a moral concern. For instance, for many years same-sex friendships 
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were often labelled “romantic friendships,” or “passionate friendships.” Though physical 
proximity was accepted (in acts that would involve from holding hands to actual kissing) but 
no sexual intercourse was, presumably, involved, it is hard to come up with an updated 
equivalent to describe this kind of relationship from our current perspective. Thus, when 
dealing with particular texts from a specific age it becomes extremely complicated to draw a 
line separating sensual, yet platonic desire between individuals of the same sex from 
homosexual tendencies.  Examples of romantic friendship abound in the field of literature as 
in that of history: in the Bible, it is stated that Jonathan loved David “as his own soul” (1 Samuel 
18; 1), and, during his funeral, David corresponds by saying: “Your love to me was more 
wonderful than the love of women” (2 Samuel 1:26); yet homosexuality is otherwise heavily 
condemned in the sacred scriptures. On the other hand, president Abraham Lincoln held a 
lifelong friendship with Joshua Speed that would be considered at least ambiguous according 
to current standards.2 Present day historians can thereby be hampered by these examples, for it 
is hard to distinguish whether these declarations of unconditional love hide sexual 
relationships, whether they show instances of homosexuality of which those involved were not 
entirely aware, or whether we are just witnessing a particular kind of same-sex friendship no 
longer existing in our times (Peterson, “Eternal Debate”). However, to openly claim that 
Lincoln was a homosexual, or bisexual, on account of his close relationship with another man 
would be highly controversial, and even incur in presentist anachronism, for the idea of 
homosexuality that is held nowadays is completely different from the idea maintained in their 
times, and the kind of intimate relationships that romantic friendship and homosexuality 
involve may not be comparable.  
So far, a significant point has become palpable already: the consequences of presentist 
anachronism in art and in the discipline of history are not the same. This is easily explained by 
the fact that history and historiography are disciplines that aim at objectivity, and therefore they 
are seriously disturbed when the events and/or notions described are not concomitant with the 
moment and place in which these occurred. In literature, as in any other artistic discipline, such 
as that of cinema, objectivity is not, in principle, at the centre of the work, unless we are dealing 
with works that also aim at showing “the truth”; a truth, in any case, that must be mentioned in 
quotation marks, for the existence of such truth in art is deeply and problematically arguable, 
as I will try to show later on in this dissertation.  
                                                          
2 Read, for instance, Charles B. Strozier’s Your Friend Forever, A. Lincoln: The Enduring Friendship of Abraham Lincoln 
and Joshua Speed. Columbia UP, 2016. 
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In the field of literature and literary theory, presentism is defined as the interpretation 
of texts from the past according to present day anxieties, or the “tendency to see the past 
through the eyes of the present” (Curti 3). Presentism thus conceived is a school started in 
England by Frankfurt scholars Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes in 2002, though antecedents 
of it can be found in works from these authors which date back as early as 1996.  Though also 
clearly related to new historicist studies and postmodern theory, presentism keeps its most 
outstanding commonalities with cultural materialist studies, which is considered for some as 
the “British version of new historicism” (Egan, Shakespeare and Marx 86). I agree with 
Kiernan Ryan (1996), however, when he states that it is difficult to pin down cultural 
materialism and new historicism, and perhaps, they should be understood as two dominant 
tendencies inside the same critical continuum occupied by a variety of different options and 
positions (x-xi). Nevertheless, what is true is that cultural materialists, as opposed to many new 
historicists, deem the culture from the present to be as equally important as the cultural 
manifestations from the past, to the extent that this past can be brought to bear productively on 
our current political quandary, as Allan Sinfield (1992) concludes in his Faultlines: Cultural 
Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading (7-9). Cultural materialism is thus politically 
involved and actively committed to challenge the present through the dissident potential of past 
texts. Because one of the key tasks for cultural materialists is to provide the disenfranchised 
with a voice (Ryan xv), it is understandable that presentism may also be injected with potential 
for ideological struggle. The concomitant ideology immersed in presentism, manifested 
through the anxieties that are made relevant in a given analysis of a past text, might also explain 
why presentism has come to be so popular among some minority groups. At this point, it is 
clear that this dissertation will have a clear political orientation towards the empowerment of 
marginalised groups through the analysis of literary works. It must be stated, though, that 
despite some ideas which could be extracted from my final conclusions, I do not believe 
literature to be an inherently progressive force, but I do trust in its potential to be 
transformative. 
Presentism has been bitterly criticized by scholars who see it as an indicator of the 
critic’s ignorance and unprofessionalism. This dissertation is aimed at proving that prejudice 
wrong, even if we agree that instances of uncritical presentism do exist. A more insightful 
distinction between the effects of anachronism in literature and in history will take a 
considerable number of pages of this dissertation. On the one hand, it is important to bear in 
mind that the cataloguing of texts into literary and historical documents is not always easy. 
Adding to this difficulty, the blurring between fiction and history, with epitomes such as E. L. 
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Doctorow, while perhaps a logical consequence of the postmodern paradigm, raises concern 
for historians such as Gordon Wood, who laments the way in which writings from the past are 
sometimes studied completely disengaged from their historical context for present-minded 
goals (87). Presentism cannot be disengaged from the anachronism it unavoidably entails, but 
this anachronism, far from being a drawback, can be purposeful and productive of meaning. 
Still, precisely because presentism and anachronism are inseparable, presentism might do well 
in keeping away from those disciplines grounded on the quest for objectivity, like that of 
historiography, and might benefit from sticking exclusively to literature.  Having said this, the 
fact that a critic willingly ignores some historical aspects does not necessarily make his/her 
study less valid, provided that the presentist focus is overtly expressed so as to avoid confusion 
regarding what kind of criticism one may expect from said study. Presentist analyses quite 
often prove prolific, although this productivity must be understood more in a creative, rather 
than in a purely informative or depictive way.  
Simultaneously, since the notion of presentism I defend throughout this dissertation 
surely differs in many features from common, traditional definitions of this concept, I see a 
need to allow some space for the discussion of what I consider several misconceptions often 
attached to the presentist idea. First, I will try to show that presentism should be understood as 
a tool for literary analysis, rather than as a school of thought, a discipline, or even a movement. 
The reasons that drive me to make this claim are later on explained in depth, but for now it will 
suffice to say that presentism is not valid for just every kind of literary criticism, nor is it 
applicable to all works, cultures and periods. I will also try to show that, though defenders of 
presentism like Marshall Brown or Gregory Tomso limit their view to a work-reader oriented 
kind of presentism, where critics apply their current anxieties to texts from earlier periods, 
presentism can also be deliberately effected by an author when rewriting the past into the 
present for ideological purposes, as both case studies included in this dissertation (Alicia 
Gaspar de Alba’s 1999 Sor Juana’s Second Dream: A Novel, and Helena María Viramontes’ 
2007 Their Dogs Came with Them) will demonstrate.  
I am not as naïve as to ignore the fact that presentism, even if limited to the scope of 
literature, still makes the discipline of history susceptible of becoming a tool easily manipulated 
for certain kinds of political agenda. Interestingly, Wood blames proselytes of new historicism 
for such deeds by stating:  
The new historicism wants to deconstruct the past in order to show us that all the values, 
all the institutions, all the canons, all the truths, and all the texts by which we live our 
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lives are simply imprisoning fictions that were created by some people in the past 
(usually white males) for self-serving purposes. (92) 
 
Of course, Wood is here referring to the radical poststructuralist scepticism influencing 
the new historicist notion that historical truth is a social construct. For each conflict, there are 
at least two sides of the story, and normally the vision of the victors is the one that prevails and 
is transmitted as certain. Rather than unveiling the verities concerning what happened at a given 
moment, new historicists aim at showing how power relations operating at a specific time 
create the truths that are afterwards perpetuated by history. In that sense, disciplines and 
analytical tools such as cultural materialism and presentism could be considered to be more 
honest, at least because they openly disclose the ideology underlying their studies. That is 
perhaps the reason why some excluded and/or marginalized sectors of society find in 
presentism a tool to challenge the official vision of history that relegates and subjugates them.   
Though presentism has manifested itself widely and productively in the criticism of 
Renaissance drama (Keenan 40), it is in the studies deriving from disenfranchised minorities 
like women studies and queer theory that it has become perhaps best accepted. The way 
different critics approach how homosexuality pours through Shakespeare’s sonnets (when, as 
already stated, same-sex desire as it is now conceived did not have the same connotations than 
it did in 16th century England) or some feminist readings of Biblical narratives3 would 
constitute valuable and remarkable examples of how presentism has been embraced by sexual 
and gender minorities. Many reasons help explain why presentism has tended to be so 
successfully accepted by these disenfranchised movements. One possible explanation might be 
related to the appearance of cultural studies in the 1980’s, from which presentism clearly 
drinks. According to Andrew Hadfield (2012), cultural studies appeared with the ultimate goal 
of allowing space for those voices at the margins (25). Anne Baynes Coiro and Thomas Fulton, 
in their introduction to Rethinking Historicism from Shakespeare to Milton (2012) suggest that, 
even though cultural studies (and their interest in race, gender, class, etc.), are now intricately 
related to new historicist accounts and their engaged contextualizing has resulted in a “fuller 
understanding of the past” (2), their primary apparition, more disorganized and de-
contextualized, resulted in presentist illustrations of the past: “twenty-five years ago, the call 
                                                          
3 See for instance Ilana Pardes’s Countertraditions in the Bible: A Feminist Approach (Harvard UP, 1992); Luise Schottroff 
and Marie-Theres Wacker’s edition of Feminist Biblical Interpretation: A Compendium of Critical Commentary on the Books 
of the Bible and Related Literature (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012); or Esther Fuchs’s Feminist Theory 
and the Bible: Interrogating the Sources (Lexington Books, 2016). 
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to consider race, class, and gender in Renaissance literature was dismissed by some as well-
intentioned, but hopelessly presentist” (2). Though the inclusion of presentism in queer and 
women’s studies has also come with some understandable criticism,4 the truth is that it has 
attracted many adepts among members of these movements, such as Evelyn Gajowski, Julia 
Reinhard Lupton, or William Stockton, to name but a few. 
Unfortunately, even if some worth-noticing examples may easily come to mind (such 
as perhaps the depiction of Mr. Rochester’s mad wife, who happens to be a Caribbean creole, 
in Jean Rhys’s 1966 rewriting of Jane Eyre’s story, Wide Sargasso Sea, or some analyses based 
on the figure of Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest) the absence of presentism in 
postcolonial studies is to be pointed out. The reason may be quite simple: eventually, when 
referring to gender and sexual studies in academia, we are often referring to women and queer 
studies in Western academia, a still predominantly hegemonic institution in terms of class, race, 
and ethnicity. Eventually presentism appeared in the context of cultural materialist studies 
effected in England, and to this day it is still carried out by mainly white scholars, irrespective 
of their gender and sexual orientation. It appears as if race and class were the ultimate bulwark 
to be knocked down, the last privilege to be challenged in academic literary studies. And this 
is precisely one of the eventual goals of this dissertation, namely, to prove that presentism is a 
perfectly valid tool for postcolonial readings.  
 It has been noted by scholars such as Lesley Wylie (2009) that the term postcolonial 
studies seem to engulf all minorities’ strife against cultural hegemonic patterns of economic, 
social, and/or sexual oppression, without dwelling on specifics of each racially oppressed 
group, as if all minority cultures were analogous or could be consistently reviewed according 
to the same procedures and notions (4-5). As it will be argued in this dissertation, one of the 
flaws of some European theorists may be that they have tended to analyse the “Other” 
exclusively in terms of opposition to the “I,” thus grouping together all these referents that fall 
into the category of otherness without really focusing on the particulars and/or the differences 
these cultures keep with one another. As Raymond Rocco (2006) puts it:  
The notions of “difference,” or “plurality” and of the “other” remain primarily 
abstractions… The pluralism that is acknowledged by the postmodernists as 
constitutive of reality is situated above the realities of power and privilege, and the 
difference that they celebrate is rarely acknowledged to be rooted in the structures of 
                                                          
4 For instance, Robyn Wiegman (2002), following Jane Newman, advocates for keeping a coherent separation of temporalities 
to avoid seeing women’s struggle as a linear progressive force which would otherwise simplify the ordeals and recesses the 
movement has been subject to since its inception (12-13). 
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inequality, of class and racial and gender divisions that sustain that difference in its 
material and real manifestations. (409)  
 
I intend to avoid the overgeneralization that comes when enclosing all minority cultures under 
the same umbrella. Therefore, my study will be limited to the specifics of Chicano studies and, 
within it, Chicana (lesbian) feminism and decolonialism,5 trying to confine to their own 
rhetoric, their own analytical tools, and their own theories. I apologize in advance for all those 
moments in which I may have not stuck to this objective. 
As happens with most social identities: a Chicano is not born; a Chicano is made. The 
Chicana/o identity normally encompasses all those citizens of Mexican descent born and/or 
residing in the United States, but, because not all Mexican-Americans are Chicanos (nor all 
Chicanos are of specifically Mexican descent), what they must infallibly share is political 
awareness. The Mexican-American community in the US has been displaced and disentitled at 
least since the signing of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (which stated that all 
territories formerly belonging the Northern Mexico would be incorporated to United States 
territory), and since then many of them have felt excluded from all legal, economic and 
educational spheres of society by a ruling white majority. It is not surprising, then, that during 
the 1960s, in the aftermath of what is now known as the Civil Rights Movement, Chicanas/os 
developed their own nationalist movement with which they struggled for social and economic 
equality: the Chicano Movement. Thereupon, due to the difficulty of establishing a clear 
separation regarding not only the priorities and goals to be established, but also who can belong 
to the movement and who must be left out, both the movement and its members’ identity have 
been in a constant process of re-evaluation and redefinition. 
Much division and disapproval has emerged from inside the movement, especially for 
those who feel alienated from what they consider a deeply patriarchal and homophobic mindset 
which envisions Chicanos as the perfect embodiment of the “Macho” that objectifies women 
and denies their sexuality. By being relegated to the role of sexual partners and mothers, many 
Chicanas have voiced their discontent regarding their agentless role in the movement, the 
silencing of their voices, and the subjugation of their desires.  At the core of this dissatisfaction 
with the Chicano movement there lies a strong corpus of Chicana scholars who have theorized 
                                                          
5 Without going too deep in an otherwise blurring and intricate field, I ascribe to Emma Pérez’s notion that postcolonialism is 
a utopian future that we still have not reached. Since we are still moving in a neo-colonial world, I prefer to talk about 
decolonization, emphasizing the fact that it is still a process, rather than a reality. Thus, even though some postcolonial scholars 
will be mentioned in this paper, from now onwards I will always refer to decolonization instead of postcolonization. 
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for long about what being Chicana really means, and who struggle to regain an agency long 
denied without renouncing their Chicanicity.  
Within this corpus of Chicana feminist writers and scholars, there is one prominent 
figure that occupies a distinguished position throughout this dissertation. This figure is Chicana 
Marxist historian and writer Emma Pérez, and her 1999 work The Decolonization of the 
Historical Imaginary. In it, Pérez claims that the female presence in history needs to be 
recovered, but since women were eradicated from official accounts of history, this recovery 
must be effected through the historical imaginary. In that sense, I defend in this dissertation 
that presentism, understood as a tool for exclusively literary evaluations, becomes a strong ally 
in the fight for the decolonization of the cultural and historical imaginary that has ignored and 
suppressed Chicanas’ presence, desires, and activities in the past.  
Pérez follows a long tradition of postcolonial theory focusing on the effects that 
colonialism entails for the native people’s psyche, with epitomes such as Frantz Fanon and 
Roland Barthes. To that tradition, she adds poststructuralist views concerning how an objective 
truth is unattainable, following theorists like Michel Foucault, but also historians like Peter 
Novick and Hayden White. In that sense, she adopts a revisionist agenda that emphasizes the 
fact that history has been shaped by the conquerors, and, consequently, has traditionally 
nullified the vision and experience of those who were subdued. It must be considered, though, 
that poststructuralist’s radical scepticism risks evolving into complete relativism, destroying a 
discipline such as history which, by definition, aims at a better understanding of the world. 
Because of these reasons, I agree that presentism should be avoided in historiography, while it 
might become a rather valuable tool in the literary sphere.  
Though I will try to establish a clear-cut line between history and literature, the truth is 
that this separation, especially when ideology and politics enter the equation, proves to be a 
much more complicated issue, and the limits of this division sometimes become confusingly 
blurry. In this sense, the writings of Emma Pérez become highly problematic, for when she 
talks about the decolonization of the imaginary she is ultimately referring to the imaginary 
attached to what she considers the hegemonic, heteronormative and patriarchal canon of history 
that has survived until our days. Still, even though some historical events and figures will 
occupy a significant part of this dissertation, I will always address them from strictly literary 
terms, regardless of how much attached to history these characters or facts may be. History will 
serve, then, more as a background for the kind of literary study I will develop through these 
pages; but this does not entail, at all, that any historiographical recovery is intended. Though 
addressing contemporary concerns (women’s rights and desires and/or neoliberalist oppression 
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could serve as examples) to texts from the past, I will not focus on retrieving a truth, but on 
revealing how a white, heteronormative and hegemonic Western ideology immersed in the 
cultural imaginary is challenged and deconstructed through (and always inside) the realm of 
narrative. What I mean by this is that I am not trying to reconfigure the past in order to speak 
an often unacknowledged truth, but, on the contrary, to analyse how several aspects of the past 
are portrayed in literature nowadays for ideological purposes. The ideologies expressed by a 
given author, on the other hand, may or may not entail “truths” (if we acknowledge that this 
notion exists and/or can ever be known), but, because they are expressed in written form, they 
articulate the author’s reality and experience. 
Regarding the theoretical framework of this dissertation, I have tried to maintain an 
interdisciplinary approach, much in the fashion of cultural materialism and new historicism, 
from which most of my viewpoints depart. I have also preferred not to focus on specific schools 
or movements but, rather, on individual thinkers, even if sometimes the scholars I mention hold 
opposing views. One of the reasons that compels me to act like this is that presentism is 
normally included in the fields of new historicism and cultural materialism, which are not seen 
as homogeneous disciplines, but rather, as an association of independent scholars with 
somehow similar views, even if they often dissent in the methodology applied and/or the 
outcomes obtained. This dissertation also happens to focus primarily on somehow problematic 
theoreticians who either are difficult to ascribe to one particular school, as happens with Michel 
Foucault, whom Clifford Geertz once described as a “nonhistorical historian, an anti-humanist 
human scientist, and a counter-structuralist structuralist” (qtd. in Dreyfus and Rabinow xviii); 
or cannot be fully included in any field, as with postmodern historian Hayden White. Due to 
the impossibility of describing some scholars’ ideas in rigid, absolutist terms, and due also to 
the diversity of interpretations that I consider many of their texts offer, I have preferred not to 
centre my study on a particular field or theorist, but rather, to focus on the notion of presentism 
first, and then relate it to notions and ideas that were being expressed in the field of theory at 
the time presentism began gaining notoriety, regardless of who the scholars enunciating them 
might have been.  
The theoretical part of this dissertation develops in the realm of new historicism and 
cultural materialism, following ideas started by I. A. Richards and Raymond Williams. Special 
attention is given to creators of presentism Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes, but also to Cary 
DiPietro and Evelyn Gajowski, who are currently developing the scope and confines of this 
concept. Regarding notions of time, the end of periodization, and the fragmentation of the 
postmodern subject that ultimately influence the appearance of presentism I rely mainly on 
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classic postmodern theorists Fredric Jameson, Jean Baudrillard and François Lyotard; but also 
on postmodern historian Hayden White. Similarly, for notions of language, narrativity and the 
inaccessibility of the truth that reinforce the use of presentism in literary analyses I am very 
much indebted to poststructuralist thinker Michel Foucault and his coetaneous and former 
master, Louis Althusser.  
Conversely, concerning Chicana feminist writers, I could not go without heavily relying 
on Gloria Anzaldúa. Even though Cherríe Moraga is also mentioned, her presence in this 
dissertation is not as substantial as that of other Chicana scholars such as Chela Sandoval, 
Yvonne Yarbro-Bejarano, Maylei Blackwell, Ellie Hernández and Mary Louise Pratt. 
However, no one occupies a major role throughout these pages as Emma Pérez does, for her 
work is what ultimately helps insert presentism in the field of literary decolonization that 
constitutes the thesis statement of this dissertation.  
Because I am aware that I make allusion to many terms that may constitute a novelty, I 
have tried to structure this dissertation in independent chapters that build upon the previous 
ones, following a progressive line where new information organically adds up. Two case 
studies will also be provided, to see how all the theory examined applies to literary examples. 
In Chapter 1 I proceed to define and describe presentism, from its inception in 2002 to the latest 
debates regarding how to approach this notion. I will begin with a brief analysis on the main 
schools for critical analysis since the 1940’s till now, paying special attention to new 
historicism and cultural materialism, from which presentism derives. After providing a 
hopefully proper explanation of what presentism is and what it entails, I will end this section 
by showing what could be considered a presentist depiction of Hamlet’s Gertrude in Margaret 
Atwood’s short story “Gertrude Talks Back” (1994).  
Because, as previously stated, the vision held of presentism in this dissertation does not 
fully coincide with what is normally understood by it, Chapter 2 aims at explaining the 
plausible origins of presentism and solving some general misconceptions attached to this 
notion. Through this section I will try to discredit the idea that presentism constitutes a novelty 
in literary studies, that is a tool only at the reader/critic’s disposal, or that it aims at substituting 
new historicism in the theoretical field. On the other hand, though clearly related to British 
cultural materialism, I will analyse some postmodern notions affecting current perspectives on 
time and on the subject, which also (and maybe better) help explain why the present currently 
plays a role so significant in the field of literary theory. It must be stated that I will always refer 
to the American branch of Postmodernism, as it will later help me relate to Chicana/o theory, 
which eventually appeared in the same geographical (and perhaps even conceptual) area. 
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Bearing in mind the relevance that presentism seems to be acquiring in the field of literary 
interpretation, I will finish this chapter by addressing social studies and theories of reception, 
trying to find a better definition of presentism that allows us to divorce it from history and 
historical relevance, and to approximate it to theories of the aesthetic and of reception. 
Chapter 3 will be dedicated almost entirely to offer a brief, though hopefully complete 
description of the Chicano movement, paying special attention to the historical-political 
moment in which it appeared, the ideals embraced by its spokespeople, and how it has evolved 
since first enunciated. Changing the scope from male leaders to female activists, a digression 
will be effected to analyse the main goals and standpoints brought about by Chicana feminist 
theoreticians, in order to properly understand and adequately address Emma Pérez’s theory of 
the decolonization of the imaginary. Finally, the kind of decolonization that Pérez promotes 
will be linked to notions of presentism formerly introduced, to see if a common ground for both 
notions can be found and how presentism may affect and/or implement decolonial aspirations.  
The theoretical part of my dissertation will end with chapter 4. Here I will address the 
common assumption that presentism is only affected by time, whereas I personally believe the 
spatial realm of presentism should also be credited. Though considerably shorter than the other 
chapters, I still believe it was necessary to analyse presentism in terms of space, since, in part 
due to globalization, Chicana/o decolonization is necessarily carried out spatially as well as 
temporally; and thus it becomes utterly necessary to address the spatial features included, and 
quite often unacknowledged, in presentism. 
For my first case study, provided in Chapter 5, I will provide a presentist analysis of 
Alicia Gaspar de Alba’s 1999 Sor Juana’s Second Dream, a pseudo-biographical novel which 
fictionalizes the life and works of Mexican nun and scholar Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz. In spite 
of the lack of information available regarding the events surrounding Sor Juana’s life, her 
sexual orientation has been strongly debated in academia, with experts such as Octavio Paz 
claiming that her homosexual tendencies answered to an excess of libido resultant from 
idleness. Gaspar de Alba, however, offers the reader her personal vision of Sor Juana by 
depicting her as a lesbian, perfectly aware of her condition, and a victim to political and 
religious plots in convoluted 17th century Mexico. By decolonizing the patriarchal homophobic 
imaginary through what I deem a presentist reconstruction of the events, Gaspar de Alba is thus 
able to reconstruct Sor Juana’s plausible desires and needs in a time where these desires were 
not considered to exist. 
The second case study in Chapter 5 will be dedicated to Helena Maria Viramontes’s 
2007 novel Their Dogs Came with Them, which introduces the reader in the life of four female 
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characters in a partly destroyed Latino slum in East Los Angeles. Using the Conquest of 
Mexico as a metaphor (or rather, using Miguel Leon-Portilla’s translation of the Aztec account 
of the conquest of Mexico), Viramontes addresses ideas of colonialism understood in present 
day terms by pointing out at the instances of neocolonialism taking place daily. Because this 
neocolonialism exerts its policy of discrimination and disenfranchisement in both spatial and 
temporal ways, presentism needs to address both features in order to successfully carry out its 
decolonial ends.  
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In Patrick Süskind’s novel Perfume: The Story of a Murderer (1985) the reader 
witnesses a curious phenomenon: at some point the third person narrator of the novel states: 
“God didn’t make the world in seven days, it’s said, but over millions of years, if it was He at 
all. Savages are human beings like us…and the earth is no longer round like it was, but flat on 
the top and bottom like a melon” (59). This speech creates some interruption in the course of 
events, since the reader is taken from the comings and goings of a character born in the 18th 
century to the scientific discoveries carried out with the help of technologically advanced 
satellites (such as the actual shape of planet Earth)6 which call into question the doubtful 
truthfulness of the Bible owing to biological evidence. Those are current thoughts, ideas and 
pieces of knowledge that belong to the 20th and 21st century reader and not to the story which, 
up to that point, is being narrated. Because of this interruption, readers return to their 
temporality and their current knowledge of the world, so when they finally resume the 
narration, this knowledge and present day attitudes may (consciously or unconsciously) be 
applied to the text being read, whether relevant or not. Though apparently one could be 
witnessing an example of temporal anachronism, perhaps it would be more suitable to refer to 
this particular instance in terms of presentism. 
This chapter is aimed at providing, if not a satisfactory definition, at least a set of 
guidelines regarding the notion of presentism. Since the word presentism includes a variety of 
meanings which apply to different areas among which philosophy and history are included, it 
must be already stated that throughout this dissertation I will stick to a very precise idea of 
presentism restricted to the area of literary studies and always applied to literary works. Still, a 
brief study concerning the relationship between history/historiography and literary theory is 
needed, as it will serve me to put presentism in context, namely, new historicism and cultural 
materialism, which constitute presentism’s theoretical ground. In order to show how 
presentism works, I will offer ad an example a presentist vision of the character of Hamlet’s 
Gertrude, effected by Canadian feminist author Margaret Atwood.  
Yet, since the notion of presentism seems inescapably and detrimentally linked to 
history, I would like to depart from that orientation by following scholar Cary DiPietro when 
he states that perhaps a better definition of presentism is needed; one which links it to the 
aesthetic and to theories of reception (Jelic 25). Thus, the last section of his chapter is aimed at 
                                                          
6 The Earth is now known to be flattened on the poles, creating an oblate ellipsoid rather than a sphere, something which 
Newton already deduced with his laws of universal gravitation and motion (Lowrie 44), but which has only been proved after 
the appearance of satellites. 
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showing that, as Cary DiPietro suggests, perhaps the current definition of presentism, if not 
flawed, is still incomplete and might need some additions that often pass unnoticed and which 
link it more to material aestheticism than to new historicism and temporal notions. In order to 
do this, though, I deem it necessary to dedicate a relatively brief section to the analysis of some 
postmodern notions that, to my view, have contributed enormously to the appraisal of 
presentism in the literary and critic panorama. The object of this slight digression is to show 
that presentism owes as much to postmodernity as it may owe to historical notions; and thus, 
even though formulated in the field of new historicism (and its arguably British counterpart, 
cultural materialism), and despite the bad reputation presentism has held in the field of 
historiography, there are many issues accounting for presentism’s recently gained popularity 
that little or nothing have to do with notions of history and/or objectivity but, rather, with 
materialism and the aesthetic. 
 
1.1-New Historicism, Cultural Materialism, and Presentism 
The field of literary theory is as intricate as it is exciting and its practise has traditionally 
been considered to trace back to the 4th century BC with Aristotle and his Poetics. Though in 
Europe the study of literature and the methods for reading it began to be systematized during 
the Romantic period (Eagleton 18), it is commonly agreed that it was not until after Ferdinand 
de Saussure developed the structuralist method in the 1950’s and 1960’s that the 
professionalization and formalization of modern literary theory, already begun by the new 
criticism and formalist schools, started to take off (Rice and Waugh 15). However, due to the 
limitations of space in this dissertation, I will begin the theoretical framework departing 
directly from Renaissance studies in the 20th century. I have chosen to do this because 
presentism ultimately appears in the context of new historicism and cultural materialism, both 
of which have tended to focus their studies in the field of the Elizabethan period.7 Thus, I will 
directly address the first instances of literary criticism from which presentism draws or against 
which presentism reacts.  
One of the first analyses on Renaissance drama in general, and Shakespeare’s plays in 
particular, was already carried out by A. C. Bradley in 1904 with his work Shakespearean 
Tragedy, which has been praised for constituting one of the first serious attempts at criticism 
of Elizabethan drama (Parvini 10), and which consists mainly of the study of the personalities 
                                                          
7 Despite this tendency, Kiernan Ryan (1996) has pointed out that, contrary to popular belief, new historicism and cultural 
materialism are not stuck in Renaissance studies (ix). 
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of the different characters. Still, it has since its publication earned many detractors who have 
accused Bradley of being too imaginative, as he often fantasized about the characters’ life 
outside the play. He was also dispraised for notably falling into anachronism, since he would 
read Shakespeare according to the standards of the Victorian society to which he belonged, 
rather than to those of Shakespeare (Parvini 12). Interestingly, decades before the term 
appeared in literary circles, what most critics were accusing Bradley of was precisely of being 
presentist in his studies, reason why Bradley might be considered one of the first unintentional 
theoreticians of this presentism, or at least, one of its first practitioners. 
Six years later, in 1910, Ernest Jones added psychoanalytical theory to the analysis of 
Shakespeare’s characters started by Bradley; but it was not until G. Wilson Knight’s 1930 
Wheel of Fortune that a more systematic approach to Shakespeare and his works was taken. By 
then Ferdinand de Saussure’s theories of structuralism had already taken hold of literary theory, 
and formalist studies of Shakespeare also began to appear all across Europe. In England, L. C. 
Knights’s 1933 “How Many Children Has Lady Macbeth?” and Carolyn Spurgeon’s 1935 
Shakespeare’s Imagery and What It Tells Us constitute, perhaps, two of the most prominent 
examples of the formalist trend. Knights favoured close reading and textual analysis over what 
he considered Bradley’s uncritical and sometimes even invented approach to the characters’ 
life inside and outside the text (Parvini 13). Spurgeon, on the other hand, set herself the task of 
drawing “from the material of a poet’s images definite information about his personality” (12). 
In the United States, formalism was soon relegated by new criticism during the 1940’s 
and 1950’s. New criticism was a movement deeply influenced by British scholar I. A. Richards, 
who was concerned with the form and linguistic structure of texts, but who added to the 
structuralist postulates an aesthetic component, as will later be seen. Interestingly, following 
Richards, the new criticism school in the United States sought to produce, as far as possible, a 
purely objective reading of a text, but ignored almost all about the aesthetic component of art 
which was one of the pillars to Richard’s theory.  
Simultaneously, adding to the differences that were already palpable between the 
critical theory done in the United States, more conservative and abstract, and the one effected 
in United Kingdom, already more materialist and with a clear social component, the historicist 
critical approach also began to take momentum. A tradition tracing back to at least the 17th 
century, and “recurring at different times in different forms” (Hamilton 3), historicism posits 
that, in order to properly understand a literary work, it is essential to understand the socio-
political context surrounding its composition and the biography of its author. Subsequently, 
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during this revival of historicism in the 1940’s historicist analyses reverted to the historical 
framework and the conditions circumscribing both the artist and his/her work. 
Neema Parvini, in Shakespeare and Contemporary Theory (2012), mentions as an 
example of historicist approach E. M. W. Tilliard’s The Elizabethan World Picture (1943) and 
Shakespeare’s History Plays (1944) (16). In these works, Tilliard tried to demonstrate how 
Shakespeare’s plays were a reflection of their time and place; a premise that Tilliard used as 
starting point to claim that, if a critic could establish the socio-political context and beliefs of 
the Elizabethan society, (s)he could automatically understand Shakespeare and, by association, 
his plays. Although now widely discredited for his alleged reductionism, Tilliard’s ideas were 
well received in Britain, where they clashed with more formalist approaches, while in the rest 
of Europe and the United States formalism continued to have a well-established hegemony in 
the field of literary criticism. Still, Tilliard’s reception in Britain might prove that, at least since 
the late 1940’s, scholars in the United Kingdom have tended to prefer a more materialist, 
sociological approach than that of their counterparts in the United States. This materialism 
should be understood, from a historical point of view, as the methodological approach to 
history first enunciated by Karl Marx which posits that social relations are circumscribed to 
definite economic patterns of production and exchange that structure societies’ life and thought. 
When attempting to delineate the scope and goals of historicism, the effort turns out to 
be more intricate than one might originally expect. This is due, mainly, to the polysemy 
encompassed by the term. A polysemy, in any case, which is not always addressed; the 
meanings of historicism sometimes even alluding to completely oppositional concepts, which 
complicate theorization. On the one hand, historicism may refer to any sort of historical method 
based on teleological philosophies of history, elaborated mainly by Hegel, Spengler and 
Toynbee (Pieters 23). However, it has also been used to denominate a particular branch of 
positivist historiography developed in Germany during the 19th century (Veseer 182). 
Historicism, in this sense, searches the contextualization of all human thoughts and activities 
without moral judgment and is closely related to notions of cultural relativism first developed 
in the field of anthropology by Claude Lévi-Strauss (Hoover 355). This second meaning of 
historicism, which adheres to Jameson’s definition of it as “our relationship to the past, and our 
possibility of understanding the latter’s monuments, artefacts, and traces” (“Ideological 
Analysis of Space” 3-4) is the one I will use throughout this dissertation. The origins of 
historicism are to be found in the debates regarding whether it was possible to retrieve truth 
from historical accounts which originated in the 19th century, following German positivist 
historian Leopold von Ranke’s “noble dream,” namely, that historical events should be told 
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“wie es eigentlich gewesen,” which has generally been translated as “how they really/actually 
happened” (Clark 9). Early historicists, then, driven by a positivist attitude, believed objectivity 
was reachable, which eventually translated into a reductionist perspective which made them 
simplify history into a single, standardized vision that left no space for marginal voices (Pieters 
22). 
Parvini gathers all the above-mentioned examples to propose three major paths in the 
study of Shakespeare’s plays during the first half of the 20th century. First, psychoanalysis 
would directly relate to Bradley’s study of characters and their pulses and motivations. Second, 
the work started by Spurgeon, Knights and Wilson Knight (and what could be considered a 
conservative reading of I. A. Richards) would eventually lead to the American new criticism 
which dominated the field of Shakespeare’s studies for two decades, starting in the 1940’s. 
Finally, the ideas set out by Tilliard and other components of old historicism would eventually 
become the starting point for new historicists and cultural materialists, even if they found in 
Tilliard’s allegedly simplistic view a source for criticism rather than an inspiration (Parvini 
19). In fact, already in 1961, A. P. Rossiter’s Angel with Horns challenged Tilliard’s 
complacency in assuming that Shakespeare accepted the prevailing ideology from Tudor 
England without ever questioning it. Wilbur Sanders and Moody E. Prior, among others, soon 
ascribed to this theory.  
It is commonly accepted that new historicism appeared in the field of literary criticism 
in the 1980’s. Though traditionally attributed to Stephen Greenblatt, there were precedents 
already published in the late 1960’s and 1970’s, such as Roy Harvey Pearce’s Historicism Once 
More (1969), Wesley Morris’ Toward a New Historicism (1972), and Michael McCanles’s 
“The Authentic Discourse of the Renaissance” (1980) (Ryan xiii). Greenblatt, nonetheless, 
coined the term in his 1982 introduction to The Power of Forms and the Forms of Power in the 
Renaissance, which is now considered the manifesto of the movement (Sharma 1). New 
historicism appeared as a three-way oriented response to new criticism (or formalism) 
developed between the 1930’s and 1960’s on the one hand, against the poststructuralism 
developed in France (and popular in the United States since after World War II), and against a 
kind of historicism that some academics like William Wimsatt, Jr., Cleanth Brooks or René 
Wellek considered outdated (Hoover 356). As happened with the term “historicism,” the 
meaning comprised by the label “new historicism” has also been subject to at least two variants. 
One of these variants, which could be considered specific, or more theoretical, is formed by all 
the collection of works associated to the journal Representations (Hamilton 140). With a corpus 
consisting mainly of historians, art historians, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists and 
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literary critics, Representations works from the premise that the artistic practice is a communal 
activity, and analyses the way in which social institutions and structures of power are reflected 
in art and language. The other variant, more general or practical, is formed by all those works 
evaluating the relationship between literature and history, which has been deeply influenced 
by poststructuralist theory developed by figures such as Michel de Certeau, Jean-Jacques 
Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, among others (Veeser 182). When discussing 
new historicism in this dissertation, I will always refer to this second meaning. 
New historicism, as opposed to (old) historicism, was sustained by the following 
beliefs: 
-Historical stages were not reducible to one single political option but, rather, to 
multiple, competing ones. Not only that: subject to a more pessimistic and relativistic attitude, 
new historicists denied that truth in history could be found, for truth, rather than a universal 
notion, reflected the power relations operating at a given time (Hoover 356). 
- Despite Greenblatt’s preference for cultural history, it was generally believed by new 
historicists that literary and historical knowledge have similar value, since both are products of 
language (Hoover 362). New historicism also assumed that the truth of events was dependent 
on the time in which they occurred, an idea which, carried to the extreme, could lead to 
solipsism for then, nothing but that what happens in our temporal immediacy could be proved 
to exist. 
Old historicists believed that, because each culture was a consequence of its socio-
historical circumstances, no ethical evaluation was possible, for each society had to be assessed 
according to their own standards and values (Hoover 358). Some theorists, however, were 
displeased by the idea of falling into moral relativism, something that Hans-Georg Gadamer 
had already tried to avoid by suggesting in his 1960 Truth and Method a hermeneutics based 
on the consensual agreement over a text’s meaning.8 New historicists proposed that meaning 
is consensually agreed by a community, and that this meaning may vary from one culture to 
another. In fact, according to audience reception theory, interpretations may differ from 
member to member, even if they belong to the same society, for the individual’s gender, 
experiences, expectations, ethnicity, etc., will affect his or her final understanding of a text or 
an event (Hoover 357). 
                                                          
8  However, the term consensus might be misleading, for it does not entail any group agreement, but, rather, a formal one 
which consists of the alteration and renovation of both interpreter and text’s given assumptions in what is called a “fusion of 
horizons,” to unravel the issues presented by that text (Warnke 107). 
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New historicism soon followed the trend of the anti-humanist tradition, as its 
theoreticians normally rejected what they considered an essentialist belief that there is a 
universal human nature and that human beings share innate traits and characteristics.9 Instead, 
they defend that all behaviour is cultural (Parvini 48), and because the human being is seen as 
a social construct, so are (wo)man-made creations and artistic manifestations. New historicists 
consider texts to be culturally-dependent, and believe that any given literary text is actualised 
in cultural conditions. Interestingly, Rajani Sharma (2014) claims that, though usually 
conceived as a response to new criticism and its exclusive emphasis on the text, new historicism 
has leaned towards a poststructuralist methodology, even if only by assuming that scientific 
objectivity, when applied to literature, is an unreachable as well as a naïve pretention (2). It is 
not strange, then, that new historicism has strongly relied on poststructuralist theoreticians such 
as Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser.10 
At this point it would be worth mentioning that there is no agreement as to what new 
historicism exactly entails for, as happens with cultural materialism, it has never formed a 
homogeneous movement. New historicism consists of a crucible of diverging, and sometimes 
opposite, positions (Parvini 97). Conventionally, as Edward Pechter has noted, new historicism 
is directed towards the placing of events in the context in which they were generated, but at the 
same time it engages with audience reception theories aimed at interpreting texts according to 
the way they convey the political views of a given audience (Hoover 361). In fact, among the 
contributors for the development of this movement (besides French poststructuralists, which I 
have already mentioned) there are Marxist critical theory and individual self-declared leftist-
branch scholars (such as Kark Popper, Frederic Jameson, or Richard Rorty). In particular, 
scholars belonging to the fields of feminist theory, ethnic, gay and/or decolonial studies,11 or 
                                                          
9 Although there is no universal definition of humanism, Kate Soper, in her 1986 Humanism and Anti-Humanism, explains 
that humanism tends to refer to the anthropocentric and secular approach to the study of humanity’s disciplines, which has 
been under attack by anti-humanists from the 19th century onwards, on accounts of its alleged “mythologization” of 
humankind and its pretension to offer a rational and scientific understanding of what humanity means (Soper 11). Despite 
being a cornerstone in positivist thought, humanism has been challenged from many theoretical standpoints. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, for instance criticized the irony in humanists’ self-declared atheism and their pursuit of truth and scientific progress, 
which for Nietzsche elevated the category of reason and human thought to the status of divinity (Soper 13). The structuralist 
thinking developed in France after World War II saw the dismantling of the individual subject into a signifying convention 
with figures such as Roland Barthes and Lévi-Strauss, who proclaimed the “‘dissolution’ and ‘death’ of man” (Soper 12). 
Finally, traditionally-deemed poststructuralist thinkers such as Foucault and Derrida continued with the problematization of 
humanist thinking by emphasizing the error of considering meaning as a category independent from the language in which it 
is enunciated, and self-evident to the speaker (Soper 17). 
10 There is a notorious disagreement concerning whether or not Althusser and Foucault could be considered structuralist or 
post-structuralist thinkers. Althusser, although critical of many aspects of French structuralism, has commonly been regarded, 
with some clarifications, as a late structuralist (Assiter 293); whereas Foucault, particularly in his later works, is normally 
addressed as a poststructuralist (Mills 28), or as a proto-poststructuralist (Raunig 94) philosopher. 
11 As already explained in the introduction, I will stick to the term “decolonial,” rather than the more commonly used 
“postcolonial” due to the (in my view, misleading) connotations the prefix post- draws. 
[34] 
 
rather, all those academics whose line of study develops around what Raymond Williams 
coined as “cultural materialism,” have been praised by new historicists for providing a different 
kind of approach to the re-historicizing of literature (Porter, 747). In fact, some new historicists, 
like Howard Horwitz in “‘I Can’t Remember:’ Skepticism, Synthetic Histories, Critical 
Action” (1988), believe that one of the goals of the new historicist movement is, precisely, to 
use literature for political awareness and social change (812). Indeed, it would not be too bold 
to claim that there are substantial differences between the new historicist analyses carried out 
in the United States and those coming from the United Kingdom, and that one of the most 
outstanding differences derives, precisely, from the degree of political involvement 
characterizing theoreticians from one or the other field.  
New historicists in the United States follow mainly the path developed by French 
philosopher Michel Foucault, who understands history as a very particular kind of discourse, 
that is, the discourse of power, giving little space for insurgence, for it is impossible to rebel 
against power if this is no longer attached to a physical entity: “Power is everywhere, not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere (“The History of 
Sexuality” 93). Consequently, in general, American new historicists are mostly concerned with 
the way in which literary texts evidence the existence of power relations, from which they also 
derive (Pieters par. 4). The type of new historicism carried out by scholars in the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, is more oriented towards cultural materialism, being the ideas of 
Louis Althusser (specially through its reading by Raymond Williams, who coined the term 
“cultural materialism”) one of its main influences (Parvini 64). Both Louis Althusser and his 
former pupil and later on contemporary Michel Foucault were philosophers who changed the 
way literature had been approached until that moment. Of particular interest are their main 
views concerning ideology and history, which might be worth summarizing due to the 
significant impact these signalled in the field of new historicism and cultural materialism. 
In 1969 Louis Althusser, a Marxist historian, follower of Gramsci and with a strong 
French structuralist influence (Parvini 65), published “Ideology and the Ideological State 
Apparatus.” In this essay, Althusser claimed that Marxism’s belief in a revolution soon to come 
had been and would be a total failure because workers lived under the illusion of being free 
while completely (and worst of all, willingly) at the service of the capitalist ideology. That is, 
according to Althusser the problem was that workers were convinced of having an autonomy 
which they actually lacked, and performed the social functions dictated by the neoliberalist 
state believing they did it by choice (Parvini 65). Althusser thus defined ideology as “the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 162), and 
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claimed that submission was mainly apprehended through the indoctrination received at 
schools, the Church, families, the media, etc. Althusser named these institutions for the 
subjection of the individual the “Ideological State Apparatus” (ISAs) and defended that the 
illusion of choice was the ideology’s foremost tool of repression (Parvini 67). His theory, 
however, was heavily criticized by scholars like John Higgins for being too repressive (how?) 
and for depriving individuals of practically all their autonomy. As Parvini complains: “If all 
ideology has the function of reproducing ‘the state’ (i.e. the dominant ideology), it is impossible 
to see how its subjects -as the products of that state- can enact change” (71).  
Another relevant notion is Althusser’s theory regarding his vision of history. In Reading 
Capital (1968) Althusser posited that history was not to be seen as a continuum but, rather, as 
a series of unconnected ruptures or, rather, as a “series of presents” (Parvini 73). Additionally, 
Banu Bargu (2012) offers a thrilling analysis of one of Althusser’s most important 
incorporations to the field of philosophy: the theory of aleatory materialism, which was 
formulated in the last decade of his life, during the 1980’s, and contradicted in some ways his 
previous works by providing “a new ontology based on chance” (88). According to this theory, 
reality is produced by the casual, spontaneous deviation and encounter of atoms but, because 
this encounter is the product of chance, no constructive meaning can be extracted from the 
interaction of these particles. Reality and materiality are conditions a posteriori, that is, they 
follow the atoms’ encounter, but never precede this clash: 
Because the advent of the world is the result of a chance encounter, which, without 
reason, cause, or telos, brings about enduring collisions and combinations among 
atoms, aleatory materialism begins with the mere acceptance of accomplished fact (fait 
accompli) as the result of an encounter that lasts. It theorizes knowledge of the world 
through facticity…The givenness of the world eliminates the search for an ultimate 
origin, prefiguration, or transcendence; instead, it recognizes the radical contingency of 
the world. (Bargu 89) 
 
Althusser shows a reality (and, by association, a history) based on contingency rather 
than on agency: events are generated more by a matter of chance than by logical consequences 
of previous acts. If one is to understand history according to this pattern, then there is no sense 
in recurring to it in order to ponder on a better understanding of the world based on a 
comparison between the way things went in the past and how they are going now, because it is 
not possible to talk about ‘logical’ aftermaths or to extract an origin or a starting point from a 
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historical incident whose effects are to be noticed now, nor to draw conclusions as to where 
history is heading.  
According to this theory, history should not be analysed then in terms of teleology, for 
meaning can only be extracted once these events have taken place, bearing in mind that their 
existence is a product of a casual swerve which could not have been foreseen or inferred, but 
that may seem –or not- perfectly logical once they have happened. But, as a baffled Oedipa 
Maas in Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 (1965) sadly realizes, it may not always be 
easy to make sense out of a reality sustained by chance rather than by logic, or to find a logical 
reason as to how or why things occur when existence is based on coincidence and accident. 
The only thing left for us to do is to examine the consequences that events bring once these 
have taken place, in a desperate quest for a meaning that is absent: “this is a history that lacks 
meaning –though never our attempt to make meaning” (Bargu 90). 
French poststructuralist philosopher Michel Foucault also influenced the field of 
literary theory immensely with his personal interpretation of history. By claiming that there is 
no linearity in the evolution of history, Foucault defended that any dialectic between past and 
present is an illusion (Hamilton 116), being the will to power the only possible connection 
existing between them two. For Foucault history is what transpires from the differences (as 
well as the similarities) arising from different epistemes, which he defines as each period’s 
discursive regulations of what can be known at that given time (Hamilton 117). However, 
rather than progressing to an integral understanding of the past, each new episteme reorganizes 
its entire discursive sphere and creates its own object of study, and because it is not possible to 
define a linearity or discursivity between consecutive epistemes, nor to establish a logical 
analogy between their disparities or resemblances, history is denied any possibility for 
consistency.  
For Foucault there is no such a thing as a unified truth at the disposal of people’s 
interpretation, so what keeps epistemes in place, then, are not relations of meaning, but 
relations of power, emanating from discursive practises that reinforce and challenge 
hierarchical relations; yet, as Foucault says: “History has no meaning though this is not to say 
that it is absurd or incoherent” (Power/Knowledge 114). This coherence in history (understood 
as cause and effect), however, seems to be based, paradoxically, on arbitrariness, for the only 
possible correlation between past and present is structured around “disruptive local intensities 
of power [that] escape the regimen of truth” (Hamilton 121); which deny any historian the 
pretence of objective theorizing about the past. What changes, then, is the way power is 
exercised and institutionalized: it is the variations in the epistemic organization of power 
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structures what makes us distinguish between past and present and what reorganizes what is to 
be considered the truth in the new episteme, yet no truth can ever be liberated from any system 
of power, because truth is already power. Similarly, in his Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), 
Foucault claims that, traditionally, history had been committed to finding relations (be them of 
causality, antagonism, determination, etc.) between facts and events, thus linking moments in 
a historical continuum (7). However, with the compartmentalization of history into separate, 
even if interconnected epistemes, this historical linearity is broken. Because a chronological 
study of history is no longer sustainable, and in order to fill in the gaps produced by the 
discursive practices that conform knowledge, Foucault proposes an archaeology of history as 
alternative, which seeks to understand facts not in a diachronic sequence, but inside the 
parameters of the episteme in which they function: “archaeology… does not imply the search 
for a beginning; it does not relate analysis to geological excavation. It designates the general 
theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence… 
Archaeology describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive” (131). 
Still Foucault’s archaeological project aims at detaching the power of truth from the social, 
cultural and hegemonic spheres in which it operates at a given time. For Foucault objectivity 
is a chimera, but even if it were not, the historical project would still be invalidated, since 
historians are unable to disengage themselves from power in order to make it the object of their 
critique (Hamilton 123). 
The similarities between Althusser and Foucault can be easily established: on the one 
hand, both believe that history is discontinuous, established through a sequential line of 
ruptures (what Foucault terms epistemes). On the other hand, both philosophers claim that 
ideology is internalized by the subject in a more or less conscious way and that the individual 
is subject to the invisible power structures operating at each time. Parvini, however, sees a 
remarkable ideological difference between Althusser (whom Parvini sees as a late structuralist) 
and his former disciple Foucault, whom Parvini considers the first poststructuralist (83). 
Whereas Althusser’s notion of ideology is rooted on material conditions, for it needs physical 
institutions to support, encourage and ultimately exercise power (namely, the ISAs); for 
Foucault power is strictly ingrained in discourse and removed from all physicality: “Althusser’s 
concept of ideology… is specifically materialist, whereas Foucault’s concept of power is purely 
discursive and dispenses altogether with the material ‘base’” (103). I have slightly digressed 
into these two authors (Foucault and Althusser) because later on they will prove relevant in the 
distinction between the practise of new historicism carried out in the United States and the one 
developed in the United Kingdom, where presentism ultimately arises. 
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Because new historicist and cultural materialist’s vision of history and reality have been 
shaped, to a greater or lesser extent, by (post)structuralist thinkers such as Althusser and 
Foucault, it might not be too bold to consider both schools as belonging to the postmodern 
realm. As Amy J. Elias declares in “Faithful Historicism and Philosophical Semi-Retirement” 
(2011):  
The first [n]ew [h]istoricist studies thus followed through on the self-reflexive 
postmodernization of the past implicitly necessary if one were to practice Foucault’s 
discontinuous genealogy: if the past has no teleological connection to the present, and 
epistemic shifts construct their own paradigmatic language frames with which to 
describe (and disguise) reality and power relations, then there really are no grounds for 
us to understand the past at all. (Elias 32) 
 
 Understandably, because of new historicism’s engagement with postmodern theory 
and its subsequent scepticism towards the knowledgeability of the past, it has often not been 
welcomed by the discipline of history and historiography. Pérez Zagorin (1999), using Keith 
Jenkins’s The Postmodern History Reader (1997) as a base for his critique, sees postmodernism 
as an “amorphous concept and a syncretism of different but related theories” (5) characterized 
by its inconsistency and its misinterpretation of previous theories (7). Though Zagorin’s 
analysis is deep and extensive, we could divide his criticism in two main aspects of postmodern 
historical theory, related first, with its questioning of the sole idea of truth and the possibility 
of reaching objectivity (or anti-realism), and second, with what he calls narrativism, namely, 
the idea that reality is shaped by language (instead of the other way around) and, allegedly, 
cannot exist outside it. 
In his collection of history books’ reviews The Purpose of the Past (2008) historian 
Gordon S. Wood comments: “The claim that we historians are telling the truth is what 
distinguishes us from fiction writers” (109). Like Zagorin, the question Wood is here 
addressing is related, on the one hand, to the irretrievability of the past, or the doubtable 
existence of an objective ‘truth’ the historian can grasp; and, on the other, to the role of 
historians inside a paradigm nowadays infused with a poststructuralist scepticism which seems 
to relegate them to the role of “fiction writers” (109). Wood understands part of this shift as a 
consequence of the historiographical change of approach occurred during the 1960’s in the 
United States, in which the influence of social studies on history pushed many historians into 
focusing their research on “ordinary folk and marginal people” who had traditionally been 
ignored from official accounts of history (2) instead of focusing on major events that changed 
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the state of affairs for entire nations and cultures. For Wood, it was precisely in the decade of 
the 1980’s that many historians started to incorporate ideas from French poststructuralists such 
as Derrida and Foucault, particularly their scepticism concerning the conventional and accepted 
ways of doing research (4). And this new adopted disbelief was, precisely, what, according to 
Wood, eventually became highly damaging for the discipline of historiography, since it led to 
the suspicion that the notion of “an objective past which can be reached by the observer” was 
a mere chimera, dangerously driving historiography into the risk of deriving into a sort of 
fiction, as epistemologically (in)valuable as narrative (5). Still, putting the blame completely 
on poststructuralism would underestimate the scope of a debate whose precedents can already 
be found in the 1930’s with figures such as Carl Becker and Charles Beard (5) and even traced 
back to 19th century positivism in Germany.  
Though it is commonly accepted that the search for pure objectivity in the field of 
historiography started with historian Leopold van Ranke’s famous moto of writing history as 
it really happened, the true roots of this quest may have originated in a rather different 
institution. Peter Novick (1988), for instance, leans on Georg Iggers’s claim that the German 
term “gewesen,” at the time it was used by Ranke, also meant ‘essentially,’ a meaning which 
this word has now lost. Had Ranke used this expression as Iggers suggests, then his 
historiographical project would be far from what is now considered to be, for there is a huge 
difference between dealing with the historical past in terms of reality and doing it in terms of 
essence, which, for Novick, might have been Ranke’s original intent (28). Subsequently, for 
Novick there was a mistranslation and, accordingly, a misconception of what Ranke’s ideal of 
historical empiricism meant. Therefore, what was considered a discipline by the German 
academy was transformed into a ‘science’ by the American Historical Association (24-25). 
Novick explains this misunderstanding on the basis that the American Historical Association 
(from now on AHA), founded in 1884 and whose statutes, particularly those regarding the 
objectivity question, strongly relied upon European (and, more specifically: German) currents 
of thought (21), did not bear in mind neither the problematic translation of some terms and 
notions (25), nor the gap existing between American and European historicism and their 
divergent evolution:  
Despite the time that many American historians spent in Germany there was little 
understanding among them of the great gulf that separated the German and the Anglo-
American cultural and philosophical contexts… [Ranke’s] “wie es eigentlich gewesen” 
was read as meaning that truth was accurate representation –the merest common sense 
in the English-speaking world, but a view not held in Germany since Kant. (31) 
[40] 
 
 
Yet, regardless of whether it is Ranke or the AHA the one to blame, what remains true 
is that during the second half of the 19th century the notion arose that, in order to be taken 
seriously, every field of knowledge worth studying had to be turned into a science and analysed 
according to scientific parameters. History could, and should thereby become a discipline 
aiming towards objectivity, and the figure of Leopold van Ranke and his “noble dream,” 
became preeminent (Clark, 9). During the following years, debates concerning the future of 
American historiography held by the American Historical Association apparently drew 
American historian Theodore Clarke Smith to make a division according to which scholars 
could only belong to two different groups: a ‘noble’ one which followed and aimed to Ranke’s 
ideal of objectivity in history, and a second one which did not (Beard, 74), and by implication, 
had to be ‘ignoble.’ This declaration was aimed at dissidents like Charles Beard, who in his 
1935 answer essay “That Noble Dream” pointed at the potential fallacy enclosed in Ranke and 
his followers’ aspiration by way of five propositions: 
-First, Beard doubted that the past was real, for its existence was intricately and 
indivisibly attached to the mind of the observer. 
-Second, Beard claimed the impossibility of ever reaching and knowing this past.  
-Third, Beard was quite sceptical that historians could leave behind their own notions 
of history, politics, religion, sex, philosophy, etc., when approaching the past. That is, for Beard 
historians, as any other human being, could not isolate themselves from their own biological 
and socio-cultural background in order to approach historical evidence in an ‘uncontaminated’ 
way. 
-Fourth, Beard distrusted the notion that history responded to a cause-effect dynamic 
that historians could reach and understand, 
-and fifth, Beard claimed that history could not be approached wholly intellectually or 
purely rationally (76). 
Taking all these assumptions as the background for his critique, Beard concluded that 
the notion of historical objectivism “was intellectually and philosophically defunct” (Clark, 
14). Similarly, historian J. H. Plumb, in his 1969 The Death of the Past, understood this ‘past’ 
as “memory or heritage, what he called the ‘created ideology’ –the ‘mythical, religious, and 
political interpretations’ –with which humans have sought to sanctify their societies” (qtd. in 
Wood 7). Plumb made thus a distinction between the abstract notion of ‘past,’ which the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines as everything “having existed or taken place in a period 
before the present,” and the cultural and political imaginary with which human societies have 
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permeated their notion of this past. Consequently, since the notion of history is contaminated 
with many other socio-cultural and ideological issues, its study becomes far more complicated. 
Zagorin is also aware of the relativism shaping the discipline of historiography that developed 
from the 1930’s onwards regarding the possibility of objectivity in the quest for human 
knowledge. However, Zagorin claims that, despite the questions proposed by figures such as 
Charles E. Beard and Carl L. Becker, and their certainty that Ranke’s ideal was unattainable, 
at no point did they diminish the discipline of historical practice, nor did they lose their faith 
that a proximity to objectivity was reachable (1). The debate came to an end when Peter Novick 
(1985) concluded that, though unachievable, objectivity was still a regulatory principle around 
which the discipline of history should develop (Zagorin 2). 
Still, not only did postmodernism attack the discipline of history on account of its futile 
attempt to approach reality in a purely unbiased way: the language with which history is written 
was also questioned. According to poststructuralists like Joyce Appleby, Jane Caplan or 
Derrida, reality does not exist outside language, for it is through it that human beings build 
reality (Zagorin 7). Zagorin sees this idea as a misreading of the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
who claimed language was arbitrary, but who nonetheless never abandoned realism, nor did he 
ever claim that reality does not exist independent from linguistic descriptions of it (8). The 
problem this idea entails, according to Zagorin, is that the way history was narrated also started 
to be distrusted. In fact, Hayden White (1980) defends that real events cannot speak, they can 
only be (8), and it is the historian the one who gives them a voice, so to speak. White criticized 
those historians who dismissed the narrative method for writing history, assuming that 
describing historical events through narration might incur into historical error or give history 
the shape of a literary text, when, always according to White, the narrative mode was, indeed, 
the only way we have got to describe past events. For White history and fiction, because both 
need language to be formulated, acquire the same cultural value, criticizing that: “arisen in the 
wake of structuralism is the idea that narrative should be considered less a form of 
representation than a manner of speaking about events” (“The Value of Narrativity” 7). White 
seems to conceive of the historian as a kind of fiction plotter, forced not only to present events 
by means of a coherent narrative with a beginning, a middle, and an end, but also to choose 
among the different literary genres at hand in order to present the story. This is what Zagorin 
calls “the narrativist thesis” (Zagorin 17). For Zagorin the narrativist thesis not only 
undermines the discipline of history by assuming that readers are unable to distinguish between 
historical and fictional texts (18), but also over-estimates the role of narrative (21). 
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It must be stated, though, that the “narrativism” to which Zagorin alludes in his essay 
has nothing to do with the idea of narrativism held by new historicists; or, rather, that both 
Zagorin and new historicists use the same word to refer to different, though somehow related, 
notions. Zagorin sees narrativism as the attempt to fictionalize history and give it the same 
value than literature because both are created by language. Jürgen Pieters (2000), however, 
sees narrativism as one of the two methodological options, together with the heterological one, 
chosen by new historicism (which she, by the way, calls “postmodern historicism”). Inspired 
by Frank Ankersmit, she defines the narrativist method as:  
a historiographical practice whose descriptions and interpretations of the past are 
characterized by an “absolute accuracy,” yet which is conscious throughout of the fact 
that historical descriptions and interpretations can in no way equal the object (the past 
itself) which they take as theirs. (Pieters 24) 
 
That is, the purpose of the narrativist method consists of grasping the heterogeneity of 
the past, while also taking into consideration the subjectivity of the historian, who not only 
dialogues within the past (listening to the many, conflicting voices it englobes) but also with 
the past (for the historicist scholar cannot exclude himself/herself from the equation) (25). 
Pieters considers this model to be discursive, influenced mainly by the archaeology and the 
genealogies12 of Michel Foucault. 
For Zagorin, however, the narrativist thesis is related to the way some postmodern 
thinkers eliminate the distinction between historical and fictional narratives, thus preventing 
historiography from the possibility of asserting any kind of true-value for its depictions of the 
past (17). Zagorin condemns that the postmodern overestimation regarding the value of 
narrativity13 “rules out the referentiality of historical discourse and collapses the difference 
between fact and fiction” (18) and that, even if both history and literature use language to be 
formulated, any skilled reader will be capable of distinguishing between them both, eventually 
accusing White of falling into constructionism (19). One of the main dangers Zagorin sees in 
the over-simplification or reduction of history to fiction is that, if historical facts are all 
derivations of discourse, then past events can be emplotted in any way the historian might fancy 
                                                          
12 First developed in his 1975 Discipline and Punish, and borrowing from Nietzsche, Foucault’s notion of genealogy consists 
of an analytical approach to history that emphasizes how a given system of thought is transformed and given new use according 
to the demands of power. In words of J. G. Merquior (1985): “Genealogy casts light on the pragmatism of history, on the 
human capacity to pour new wine into old cultural bottles” (101). 
13 Though still an open concept, by narrativity Hayden White (and, consequently, Perez Zagorin) means the activity of 
reporting historical facts in a narrative form (White, “The Value of Narrativity” 6). 
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(20). Eventually, if postmodern visions of history defend that there is an unattainable truth, and 
that any account of the past becomes a fiction, it could easily be derived that there is no truth 
whatsoever, which might lead into saying things such as “the Holocaust did not happen”. As I 
will explore later, postmodernism’s influence on new historicism (and, particularly, in 
presentism) cannot be denied, but the scope of this influence should be restricted.  
New historicism has been widely criticised from its postmodern influence on the one 
hand, which denies it any aspirations towards objectivity; and its poststructuralist influence on 
the other, which ultimately risks transforming history into another form of fiction. However, 
new historicism was originally envisioned as a modernization of a historicism which was now 
aware of the role of the historian’s subjectivity and entrapment in their own socio-cultural and 
ideological paradigm. Moreover, said premise eventually lead into the bearing into account of 
those perspectives from marginalized individuals whose point of view had originally been 
erased from official accounts of history.  
On the other hand, the relationship between new historicism and cultural materialism 
has not yet been established, and there are diverging opinions as to how to consider them. As I 
previously mentioned, new historicism should not be understood as a unanimous, 
unidirectional perspective, for that would simplify the varied perspectives that scholars hold of 
this discipline, which definitely affect its categorization. John Brannigam, in New Historicism 
and Cultural Materialism (1998), admits that new historicism and cultural materialism are, in 
some ways, “fully intertwined” and have often appeared together in anthologies and other 
critical works (19-20). In fact, for some scholars, such as Richard Wilson and Richard Dutton 
(1992) and Jean Howard (1986), both entailed the same practise, the only difference being that 
they were developed in different areas. Thus, new historicism would be the practise carried out 
in the United States, being cultural materialism its counterpart in the United Kingdom. It is 
true, though, that Howard did acknowledge that some disparities were beginning to become 
evident which needed further consideration (qtd. in Brannigan 20).  Yet, as Brannigan and 
many other authors such as Peter Erickson (1991), Faith Nostbakken (1993) or Kiernan Ryan 
(1996) (to name but a few), defend, though both disciplines share many commonalities, there 
are nonetheless obvious discrepancies which could account for their study as different 
movements altogether: “There were a variety of factors in British culture and in the British 
academy which led to the separate genesis of cultural materialism, and which placed cultural 
materialist critics in separate, although not dissimilar, circumstances and interpretive positions” 
(Brannigan 20). 
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The new historicism developed in American soil tends to be more focused on 
establishing the power relations reflected by and at the same time producing the literary text. 
The branch of new historicism developed in the United Kingdom, however, has been 
historically more influenced by notions of cultural materialism (based on new Marxist 
criticism), and thus more ideologically/politically oriented. Academics from this school hold 
the opinion that any literary analysis or criticism, whether or not it finds its object in the past, 
has to be relevant in the present (Pieters 2000). That is, whereas the American branch of new 
historicism, principally influenced by Foucault, stresses the impossibility of rebellion, the 
British section,14 following William’s reading and critique of Althusser, stresses the possibility 
for change, and, thereby the value that a given text keeps in the present.15 It is precisely thanks 
to this emphasis on the political stance of literary analysis in present-day debates held by 
cultural materialists that the school of presentism was brought into debate by Frankfurt scholars 
Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes.  
 
1.2-Presenting Presentism: In Search of a Definition 
American new historicism has engaged in productive relations with postmodern 
historiographers such as Hayden White, decolonial theorists such as Edward Said, and critical 
ethnologists such as Clifford Geertz (Middeke et al. 207). Theoreticians like Louis Montrose, 
however, claim that the historicist panorama in the United Kingdom is less unified and more 
oriented towards testing different kinds of materialist criticism (feminist theory, queer studies, 
decolonialism, etc.) than to studying texts from the Renaissance period (Thomas 24). Yet, as 
Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (1985) already stated, the potential for subversion 
“cannot be guaranteed a priori, independent of articulation, context, and reception” (13), thus 
involving not only the author responsible for this subversion, but also his/her surroundings -
either the one englobing the text at its creation, or the one in which it is received- which allows 
for this rebellion; and the reader who, ultimately, participates from this subversion by absorbing 
the principles it entails. Interestingly, revision of past texts under a new light has over the past 
decades given more potential for subversion to the reader/critic (who ultimately stands at the 
                                                          
14 By “British” I am here referring to the one from the United Kingdom, not explicitly to Great Britain. 
15 Though I am, indeed, more inclined to see new historicism and cultural materialism as two separate entities, and partly due 
to the difficulty in demarcating their differences, I sometimes use both terms indistinctively, but always in cases where the 
differences existing between new historicism and cultural materialism do not entail significant changes potentially damaging 
for my study. Conversely, whenever the political stance (where, in my view, the main divergence between them two resides) 
of cultural materialism is relevant for my analysis, I will specify to which practise I am actually referring. 
[45] 
 
end of this subversive chain) than to the primary responsible, that is to say, the authors, 
emphasizing the power of subversion in its reception rather than in its creation.  
It is this constant fluidity in the processes for assigning meaning to texts that literary 
artefacts undergo over the years what encourages Terence Hawkes to introduce present 
interests as the gears supporting this mechanism of literary reconsideration and resistance. As 
opposed to the new historicist branch developed in the United States, Louis Montrose defends 
that the emphasis of the United Kingdom’s tradition lies on “the uses to which the present has 
put its versions of the past” (Veeser 183). This attitude is prompted by the drive to disengage 
polemical classical texts from the suppressive ideologies that used them to reinforce their status 
quo, for which a neglect of objectivity must be encouraged. Hence, any reflection on the past 
necessarily requires historians to become aware of their a priori assumptions and desired 
expectations, a cognizance which accordingly “magnif[ies] their contemporary force and 
significance” (Hamilton 143). This approach has been popular among disenfranchised sectors 
of society, the traditional Other opposing the hegemonic power, being feminist, queer, and 
decolonial readings at the forefront in this line. 
Meanwhile, some theoreticians such as Stephen Greenblatt warn against the allegedly 
political initiative that the revision of previous impositions brings, claiming that, contrary to 
the end of subjection, we are now trapped by another kind of tyranny: that of the present 
anxieties marked by the needs of a neo-liberalist market, from which the historian seems unable 
to detach.  Thus, “the right of any discourse or interpretation to undermine a received hegemony 
colludes with market economics” (Hamilton 146). In this line, Hamilton warns that new 
historicism (a term with which he also encompasses cultural materialism), despite its decolonial 
claims, also colonizes by decontextualizing a text and transposing its original ends to the 
historian’s intentions (148). Perhaps at the core of this disapproval there lies a fear of the lack 
of interpretative limits to the critic’s power, an accusation to which presentism has often fallen 
prey. 
Presentism is a concept with different, though somehow related, meanings depending 
on the field where it is enunciated. Thus, in philosophical terms, presentism, according to the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is the belief that only present objects exist 
(Stanford.edu). Presentism thus appears as the opposite alternative to eternalism, which Lisa 
Judith Leininger, in A Defense of Classical Eternalism (2004) defines as the belief that all 
points in time (that is, past, present, and future) exist ontologically, being past and future 
objects as real as present ones, even if they are not present now (5-6). This dissertation, 
however, is concerned with the historiographical (and, eventually, literary) meaning of the 
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term, which is to be understood as the interpretation of the past with a present-day mindset. 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary mentions that the first time this word is known to have been 
used was in 1923. However, already in 1920 Austrian writer and avant-garde artist Raoul 
Hausmann published his “Manifesto of PREsentism,” in which he rejected both past and future 
and advocated for the instantaneity of the ‘now’ and ‘here’: “Let’s get rid of all the old 
prejudices, the prejudice that yesterday something was good or that tomorrow it will be better 
still. No! Let’s seize each second today” (164). So, at least in the aesthetic and artistic 
panorama, the term was already used in the beginning of the 1920’s.  
Conversely, The Oxford English Dictionary informs that presentism was first cited in a 
historiographical sense in 1916, even though the word had been in circulation since the 1870’s 
(Moorthy and Jamal 27), and defines the term as “the uncritical adherence to present-day 
attitudes, especially the tendency to interpret past events in terms of modern values and 
concepts” (oxforddictionaries.com, my italics). This notion of un-criticality that the definition 
highlights, however, gives an idea of lack of rigor and superficiality which, in my view, 
epitomizes a biased opinion held mainly by historians, which is eventually transmitted by the 
Oxford English Dictionary lexicographers. The reason for this pejorative definition of 
presentism is that The Oxford English Dictionary is ultimately and exclusively addressing the 
notion of presentism in a historical/historiographic sense. That is, during the first half of the 
20th century the term was commonly used to refer to a particular kind of anachronism in the 
field of history which consisted of the contamination in the past with elements of the present. 
Historian David H. Fischer (1970) uses the word “presentism” to refer to this particular kind 
of anachronism, which he defines as fallacy of nunc pro tunc, a Latin expression meaning “now 
for then” (137). Hence, the idea of presentism has survived in the common imaginary as exactly 
that, the adulteration and corruption of the historical past by a careless and ignorant mind.  
Though the use of presentism in the field of history and historiography may eventually 
result in unprofessionalism and error, in other disciplines by contrast, like that of literature, 
presentism might prove productive. Yet, it seems as if presentism were a practice ineludibly 
devoid of any criterion or measure. Though it cannot be denied that some people use it without 
any discretion, presentism, as I will try to show throughout this dissertation, is more than the 
mere anachronistic observance of a decontextualized past, as some are determined to believe. 
Still, it may be important to emphasize that there are different ways of approaching a text, 
focused on diverse factors, such as the framework, the anxieties of each period, or even the 
presumed intention of both the author when writing said text and/or of the reader when 
interpreting it. It is by no means my purpose to promote the use of presentism in all the different 
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schools of literary criticism, which would be preposterous, but neither am I in favour of 
rejecting it without contemplating the possibilities it may offer as an alternative way of 
approaching the literary text. By addressing presentism as a technique for literary interpretation 
which is slowly but firmly gaining followers, some might think that I aspire to introduce 
presentism as “the new kid on the Shakespearean block” (Helen Moore 22), pushing those 
schools16 which have come to precede it into the background. Something like that seemed to 
happen when cultural materialism became the latest trend in literary theory during the 1980’s, 
throwing shade to institutions such as that of formalism and, more specifically, new criticism, 
which had practically monopolized theory up until then. Far from appealing to these ends, I am 
more inclined to see presentism as an option co-existent with other schools, with no intention 
whatsoever of correcting previous flaws, but rather, of offering an appropriate respond to a 
current dynamic established in the field of interpretation by which everything is subjected to 
the present gaze. The fact that presentism constitutes an alternative to other approaches does 
not mean that cultural materialism and/or new historicism need to disappear from the critical 
panorama. Quite the contrary, it is precisely through the existence of a wide spectrum of 
instruments and devices that critics find enriching and multiple ways to address literature. Not 
only that, throughout these pages I will try to demonstrate that, in fact, presentism should not 
be understood as a school, but as an instrument, which nullifies any potential threat it could 
pose for other disciplines. 
Unfortunately, the definition provided by The Oxford English Dictionary seems to 
accept the use of this tendency as long as it is never ascribed to the academic sphere; and thus 
restricted to circumstances where accuracy is not relevant. Regardless of the reasons its 
detractors may have to discredit this practice, the fact that a well-respected and prestigious 
dictionary already demeans and trivializes the term is, at the very least, noteworthy. For this 
reason, I prefer to subscribe to the definition provided by Ewan Fernie, who developed the 
notion of presentism in his 2005 “Shakespeare and the Prospect of Presentism,” and described 
it as: 
a strategy of interpreting texts in relation to current affairs which challenges the 
dominant fashion of reading Shakespeare historically. Where new historicism 
                                                          
16 I refer to new historicism and cultural materialism indistinctively as schools and as movements, attending to the polysemy 
these words seem to encompass. Since not even scholars from both fields agree as to whether consider them one or the other, 
I have also preferred not to use capital letters whenever talking about new historicism and cultural materialism, even if I 
sometimes (though not always) see these terms capitalized.  
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emphasizes historical difference, presentism proceeds by reading the literature of the 
past in terms of what most “ringingly chimes” with “the modern world. (169) 
 
Despite its more than fourteen years of existence since first mentioned in the field of 
literary theory, Cary DiPietro and Hugh Grady (2013) admit that the application of the term 
“presentism” continues to be confused with its original (historical) meaning that links it to 
naïve anachronism (3). The term presentism that applies to this dissertation, however, appeared 
for the first time in Hugh Grady’s The Modernist Shakespeare (1991), though in his 1996 
Shakespeare and the Universal Wolf: Studies in Early Modern Reification, presentism was 
already used to allude to all critical methods that recognized the influence of the present on the 
interpretation of past works (Di Pietro and Grady 7). However, it was not until 2002 that Grady 
and his colleague Terence Hawkes, both theoreticians from the Frankfurt School, published 
two books, Shakespeare, Machiaveli & Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from Richard II to 
Hamlet, and Shakespeare in the Present, in which they laid the foundations of what would later 
become the presentist movement (Parvini 138).  
Presentism is built upon the principle of inaccessibility of a virtually unadulterated past. 
In his 2002 work, Shakespeare, Machiaveli & Montaigne: Power and Subjectivity from 
Richard II to Hamlet, Hugh Grady stated that the past as we know it is merely an illustration 
(2) of events to which we no longer have any access, and thus, it becomes impossible to 
understand this past beyond our present-day perspective: “[the past] is merely a representation 
whose real value lies in its ability to reflect and clarify our various present-day cultural 
transformations” (Stevens 136). In order to support his theory Grady relies on Benedetto Croce 
and his statement that all history is contemporary history (Croce 19), and on Theodor Adorno, 
from whom Grady borrows the notion of ‘enigmaticalness,’ which appears in Adorno’s book 
Aesthetic Theory, culled from drafts and published posthumously in 1970. Enigmaticalness 
could be understood as a quality inherent to artistic pieces, which demands our comprehension 
but at the same time eludes it (Sakoparnig 159). Thus, because of art’s resistance to ‘true-value’ 
interpretations, Grady believes that the reader/critic is forced to reinterpret the work once and 
over again, as long as changes in culture, conventions, and language continue to occur 
throughout generations (“Hamlet and the Present” 141-142).  
 On the other hand, in what could now be considered the manifesto of presentism 
(DiPietro and Grady 7) Shakespeare in the Present (2002) Terence Hawkes claims that it is 
impossible to know the past unless it is through the intervention of the present, because that 
idealized notion of an unmediated past simply does not exist (2). Consequently, the past is 
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unknowable, first because history (and therefore its study) privileges power structures 
(Gajowski 11), or rather, building on Foucault: the historical discourse that prevails is the 
discourse of power, for it is victors who write it. But also, on the other hand, our accounting 
for real, objective facts is always biased: “we do the perceiving. Facts and texts, that is to say, 
don’t simply speak, don’t simply mean. We speak, we mean, by them” (Hawkes 3). The reason 
Hawkes gives for this is that, whenever a transcendental event takes place, we can no longer 
go back to texts the same way we did before (4). One outstanding example of this has to do 
with the fact that, after the Holocaust, we can no longer contemplate The Merchant of Venice 
in the same way (Mangan 149), not even those of us who had not still been born when it 
occurred.  
DiPietro and Grady insist that presentism was never designed to establish a clear critical 
methodology, but was conceived either as an umbrella term under which to include diverse 
contemporary critical tendencies, as long as all of them were aware of the contamination of the 
present inherent to any interpretative attempt (3-4). Though now two critical anthologies have 
been published (Presentist Shakespeares, edited by Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes in 2007; 
and Presentism, Gender, and Sexuality in Shakespeare, edited by Evelyn Gajowski in 2009), 
bibliography on the subject of presentism suggests that the term became popularized during 
the mid-1940’s and 1950’s, its appearance exponentially increasing from then onwards, as can 
be seen in the following Google Ngram Viewer, which is a search engine that offers diagrams 
of frequency of any set of comma-delimited items by using a yearly count of n-grams17 found 
in printed sources dating from 1500 to 2008. The following Google Ngram reflects the 
percentage of books published in English in the United States regarding the subject of 
presentism from 1800 to 2008: 
                                                          
17 In the field of probability and computational linguistics, an n-gram is a model which establishes a contiguous sequence of 
n items collected from a given corpus of speech acts or texts. 
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 Though the Ngram does not make distinctions between the different meanings applied 
to the word (Is it presentism, the philosophical theory? Presentism as synonymous to 
anachronism in the field of history? Does it have another meaning not included in the first two 
examples?), it can be seen that, already in 1937, 0’0000001344% of the books published in the 
United States alone dealt with or mentioned the issue of presentism. However, in 2008, the 
percentage increased to a 0’0000092468%. The results alone might not seem too impressive, 
unless we bear in mind that in a time range of 71 years (that is, from 1937 to 2008) the 
percentage of English publications in the United States which mention the “presentist question” 
has increased in 6,780%. Even if a relatively high proportion of those publications are oriented 
towards the philosophical sense of presentism, still the ongoing interest in the subject during 
the last half century is worth mentioning.  
The diagram also shows a sudden rise in 1983, where presentism seems to have 
rocketed. Since the philosophical theory of presentism had already lost supporters after the 
theory of General Relativity was accepted by the Physics Community in 1920 (and its 
resurgence in 1960) (Saunders 281-282),18 I am inclined to believe that, at least from the 1980’s 
onwards, publications have had to do more with presentism in its historiographical sense than 
with any other meaning the term might have coined during its one hundred years of existence. 
At this point, though, it might be important to emphasize that, even though presentism 
seems to be a new way of approaching literature from past times developed during the 
                                                          
18 Philosophical presentism, though outdated, is still alive as a hypothesis and still generates an important number of supporters. 
Also, some philosophers, such as Mark Hinchliff in his 2000 essay “A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting,” believe 
that presentism can actually fit the Special Theory of Relativity. 
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Postmodern period, the truth is that it is far from being something new. DiPietro (2013) for 
instance, goes as far as claiming that Shakespeare himself was presentist in his illustrations of 
the past in plays such as Titus Andronicus (1594): “The play’s representation of a classical past 
thus showcases the irreducibility of the present; and so it constitutes an instance… of 
Shakespeare’s own [p]resentism” (13). For DiPietro, the multiple anachronisms provided by 
the playwright’s depiction of the Roman past reflect the analogies existing between this and 
the Elizabethan present, hampering a “unified” idea of Rome (13). Grady (2013) provides a 
similar example in his own analysis of Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra (1606), in which 
Plutarch’s narration is reinvented using a Machiavellian logic of power and manipulation (175). 
Similarly, Evelyn Gajowski, in the introduction to Presentism, Gender, and Sexuality in 
Shakespeare (2009), implies that feminist and queer scholars have long been negotiating their 
relationship with the present, though not necessarily addressing presentism in their analyses. 
In fact, presentism has been particularly well accepted by theorists from queer and 
gender studies. Queer studies, or LGBT studies, like other minority movements, use the 
marginal (in this case, sexual marginality) to deconstruct the normativity disclosed by 
heterosexuality and to analyse homophobic discourses constructed by culture (Culler 145-146). 
The term “queer” was adopted by members of gay studies associated with movements for gay 
liberation, turning a common insult into an insignia (102). Gender studies, or feminist theory, 
is more a space for debate than an organized school, in which theorists, intellectuals and 
activists fight for a space for representation of women’s experiences and equality, and who aim 
at criticizing the heterosexual matrix that organize identity in terms of opposition between male 
and female (140). When stating that a reader in the 1990’s approaches Hamlet with different 
expectations from those of a contemporary to Shakespeare, Culler includes the addition made 
by feminist criticism, which wonders whether there would be a difference in interpretation if 
that reader was a woman (64). Would there be any difference at all, as well, if the reader was 
a homosexual or queer?  Presentism offers the possibility of reading things differently, focusing 
rather on the perspective of our days (which is not limited to a unique discourse), than on an 
analysis oriented towards the utopic unveiling of meaning in the past. Utopic, again, because 
reaching the past objectively is a delusion, even if we agree, as previously seen, that some 
discourses may come closer to some kind of truth than others. As Gabriel Egan (2013) 
indicates:  
Presentism has become a way of doing literary criticism by explicitly evoking the 
present concerns that motivate a desire to reread old literature…to discover resonances 
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that it could not have had for its first audiences or readers, because these only became 
possible as a consequence of what happened between then and now. (39) 
 
In that sense, presentism is important because it offers the non-normative and non-conforming 
perspective of those minority discourses who have often been dismissed and even erased from 
history. Thanks to presentism sexual and gender minorities have found yet another way to 
express their frequently neglected point of view.  
On the other hand, presentism links well with the idea history as envisioned from a 
structuralist/poststructuralist perspective. As previously explained, following both Althusser 
and Foucault, history (understood as the passing of time) is not to be seen as teleological or 
continuous, but rather, as a set of consecutive but independently organized epistemes that deny 
history’s causality, or the possibility of foreseeing what the future holds according to how 
things have developed in the past. Carried out to the extreme, this vision of the past entails that 
truth does not exist, for what connects historical epistemes is not logic, but discourses of power, 
which are never objective. What new historicism and cultural materialism showed, borrowing 
from Althusser’s aleatory materialism and Foucault’s vision of history as discourse of power, 
is that in previous periods literary criticism over classical and Renaissance texts (that is, works 
from the past) were often used to reinforce a concrete status quo that repressed dissenting 
voices, reason why new historicist claims were perhaps so well accepted by scholars from queer 
and women studies. 
 So far, the similarities linking presentism and the cultural materialist background from 
which it emerges seem clear, for cultural materialism engages with questions of power relations 
between dominant and subordinate cultures and the possibilities for subaltern resistance against 
racial, ethnic, homophobic and sexist patterns that are characteristically (though not 
exclusively) present in literary artefacts (Sinfield, Literature, Politics and Culture xxxiv). If 
presentism has been embraced by different minorities to offer alternative readings to texts in 
which their presence had previously been obliterated, the similarity between both notions is 
such that some could argue that presentism and cultural materialism are, indeed, the same thing. 
Bearing in mind the political stance that (at least the British branch of) new historicist studies 
seem to encompass, a first distinction between cultural materialism and presentism -seen as a 
school of thought by academics Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes- should be articulated. This 
distinction lies precisely around the latter’s inspiration by audience reception theories, which 
will later be analysed. Hence, whereas cultural materialism focuses on the study of literature 
according to the social and political context in which texts were received at the time they were 
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generated; presentism focuses on the study of literature according to the socio-political context 
of the present (Parvini 139). The premise for both schools is the same, what changes is the 
temporal framework in which texts are analysed: in cultural materialism and new historicism 
what is taken into account is the context of the author and the text, in presentism what matters 
is the context of the reader/critic, which emphasizes the reception theories that influence the 
movement without abandoning completely the cultural materialist perspective in which 
presentism was conceived. 
On the other hand, I am more inclined to think of presentism as a tool for literary 
analysis rather than as a school of theory. One of the reasons why I think that presentism works 
better as an instrument is that, in this way, the ultimate consequences of its relativistic scope 
would become restricted to particular instances, instead of aiming towards universalizing 
concepts. As previously seen, Pérez Zagorin bitterly criticized the anti-realistic and narrativistic 
characteristics of new historicism that so deeply had damaged the domain of history writing, 
namely, the notion that objectivity cannot be reached, and the idea that it is language the one 
that shapes reality. These features, distinctive of new historicism, would, by derivation, be also 
applicable to presentism if we understood it as a theoretical discourse, and would transform  
presentism into a threat to the disciplines of history and historiography. However, if presentism 
were restricted to particular exercises of literary texts (either while writing or while reading 
them), this threat to objectivity-seeking disciplines would disappear. In addition, because 
presentism is closely akin to cultural materialist theory, analyses which focus on how a text is 
eventually relevant according to present-day attitudes serve a political purpose. Presentism is 
thereby not aimed at disclosing what makes a particular work pertinent per se. Presentism is 
oriented, instead, to analysing what elements make it significant today, which might imply that 
those works which have lost their immediate relevance are no longer worth studying, regardless 
of the value these texts might entail for other literary schools or even other disciplines. It is true 
that a diachronic study of how relevance and meaning given to literary works has evolved 
throughout the years could be stablished, but such a study would not be presentist, for 
presentism is not concerned with how something was experienced in other periods, and those 
analyses which are not concomitant with our contemporary concerns, according to a presentist 
logic, are of limited interest. Understanding presentism as a literary school would entail that, 
once works had lost relevance with regard to the concerns of our own time, they would not be 
worth analysing anymore, which is not at all the case. Quite on the contrary, I strongly disagree 
with those who believe that the fact that a text might have lost its usefulness for a presentist 
analysis necessarily entails that the work has lost its value. Literature may still be enjoyable 
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and pleasurable without conveying anything of particular utility, the same way that not all 
literary texts admit a presentist analysis equally well. Assuming that presentism is a school of 
thought would otherwise relegate all literature to strictly utilitarian ends, by which it would 
only be useful as long as it served a purpose to its readers and critics at a particular moment. 
Hence, I prefer to see it as an analytical tool, thus applicable only to some texts, and at a specific 
time, but not at all valid for the whole literary range, nor tending to universal, standardizing 
goals. That is, despite common trends that usually depict presentism as a movement or a school 
of thought, I see it more as an instrument, for it is neither indistinctively applicable to all texts 
and periods, nor is it useful when dealing with works of art that prioritize form over content. 
I would like to close this section with what could be considered a presentist portrayal 
of an apparent irrelevant, though somehow notorious character from one of Shakespeare’s most 
examined plays: Hamlet. I am referring to the main character’s mother, Gertrude, and how both 
her role in the play and her personality are envisioned and depicted by feminist writer Margaret 
Atwood in her short story “Gertrude Talks Back” (1992). This analysis will help me show with 
a practical example how presentism can be put to practise, while indirectly showing how 
successful it may be when inserted in the field of feminist studies, where, as previously 
mentioned, it has become enormously successful.  
 
1.3-Illustration: Margaret Atwood’s “Gertrude Talks Back” 
Generally speaking, the scholarly fields that most rapidly accepted the principles of 
presentism (even before the notion was first enunciated as such, which demonstrates that 
though the notion is relatively recent, its praxis has long existed) are those more or less deeply 
related to cultural materialism, like queer theory, Marxist studies and feminist criticism.  
First appearing in Europe during the late 19th century, Western feminism is considered 
a collective (and contested) noun which comprehends a series of political and social 
movements and ideologies aimed towards the elimination of women’s political, social, and 
economic subordination (Hawkesworth 26). Though the agenda of feminist activists is not 
restricted to a single goal, it is consensually agreed that feminist claims are not only material, 
but also intended to challenge gender asymmetrical relations and women’s inferior status in 
society (Hawkesworth 10). Feminist theory is the expansion of feminism into the discourses of 
disciplines in the Humanities, such as anthropology, history, philosophy, literature and/or 
psychoanalysis, since the struggle for women’s liberation has also been portrayed through 
abundant as well as diverse cultural and artistic manifestations. In the introduction to the 
anthology The Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare (1983) scholars Carolyn 
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Ruth Swift Lenz, Gayle Greene and Carol Thomas Neely claim: “Feminists assume that women 
are equal to men but that their roles, more often than men’s and in different ways, have been 
restricted, stereotyped, and minimized; their aim is to free women from oppressive constraints” 
(3). Consequently, of particular interest to feminism are the different rewritings (or rather, re-
conceptualizing) of many female characters appearing in William Shakespeare’s tragedies, 
where this suppression of the feminine power is more obvious: “women in the tragedies almost 
invariable are destroyed, or are absent from the new order consolidated at the conclusions” (6).  
The traditional portrayal of the figure of Gertrude, for instance, in Hamlet (1599/1602) 
has received considerable attention by many feminist scholars. It must be pointed out that, 
because Western feminism is a concept in circulation only from the past two centuries onwards, 
it is only now, judging from our present-day values, that we can consider the depiction of 
women, at least in that particular play, to be sexist. In fact, because the traditional explanation 
and description of those characters that have survived until our days have typically portrayed 
them as weak, hysterical and evil, it is the self-entrusted task of some scholars to revision those 
customary interpretations and offer a different, presentist version of these female characters 
from a feminist perspective. 
In her 1980’s essay “A Heart Cleft in Twain,” Rebecca Smith defends that the vision 
that Shakespeare offers of Hamlet’s mother is that of a stereotyped woman, but that this 
stereotype is from a different nature to that typically depicted in films such as those by Grigory 
Kozintsev (1964) and Lawrence Olivier (1948). According to Smith, the few indications that 
can be drawn from Gertrude’s presence on the stage show her as a malleable, unimaginative 
and docile woman whose only goal is to please both her husband, Claudius, and her son (206-
207). This loyalty is taken to the extreme in her death, when she warns her son that the wine 
has been poisoned but still does not accuse Claudius for that (201). This image of the loyal and 
spiritless queen is quite far from the image of a lustful, opportunist and manipulative viper that 
has endured in the cinematographic representations of this play (194-195).  
Gertrude, as Smith emphasizes, is a good wife, whose loyalty is divided between her 
son and her new husband, whom she tries to protect. One of the problems is that, as Pilar Cuder 
Domínguez (2003) explains, in the sources that served Shakespeare as an inspiration, 12th 
century Saxo Grammaticus Historiae Danicae and 16th century Belleforest’s Histoires 
Tragiques, Gertrude’s compliance in Claudius plot to murder Hamlet’s father are clear, but 
Shakespeare’s version is more obscure and ambiguous concerning Gertrude’s level of 
implication in her first husband’s assassination (Cuder Domínguez, “Portrayals of Women”). 
It is not clear in Shakespeare’s Hamlet up to what point she is accomplice in Claudius’ plot, 
[56] 
 
and even though she ascertains some guilty feelings -those “black and grained spots” in her 
soul (Shakespeare 3.4.90)- at no moment is it ever explained what she feels guilty for. It is not 
clear, also, whether she is guilty of adultery before re-marrying, and interpretations on this 
subject are varied, as they are all plausible. Professor Dover Wilson (1951), for instance, 
categorically affirms that King Hamlet’s Ghost’s categorization of Gertrude as an “incestuous, 
adulterate beast” (Shakespeare 1.5.41) must necessarily allude to something else than her over-
hasty marriage with Claudius. Wilson explains that, when this sentence is uttered, dawn is 
approaching, which means that the Ghost is promptly to vanish and thus will not spend his 
precious time explaining something Hamlet already knows. Instead, the Ghost must have been 
referring to Gertrude’s adultery before his own death (293). Baldwin Maxwell (1964) has also 
taken the Ghost’s speech in act I as indicative of Gertrude’s infidelity: “do not the last three 
lines [in Hamlet’s father discourse] suggest a violation of the marriage vows?” (238). At the 
opposite end of the scale, critics such as John Draper (1934) or Carolyn Heilbrun (1957) 
believed Gertrude to be innocent of unfaithfulness.  
It is true, on the other hand, that Gertrude appears throughout the play as a highly-
sexualized character, but it must not be forgotten that she is most often described by other 
characters, and that the play is narrated through the eyes of his unstable and somehow sexually 
obsessed son, who tends to eroticize the figure of her mother.19 There is no depiction of how 
she looks like or how attractive she is other than Hamlet’s ambiguously spiteful comments. 
Smith’s essay serves to emphasize how the vision of Hamlet has prevailed over Gertrude’s own 
words and actions; how the male, distorted gaze has transformed her into a completely different 
kind of woman. Already in his 1930 The Wheel of Fire, Wilson Knight warned the reader not 
to be deceived by Hamlet’s distorted vision through which his story is played out: “In our 
attempt to see with Hamlet’s eyes, we are prepared to regard Claudius as the blackest of 
criminals, Gertrude as an adulteress, Polonius as a fool, and Ophelia as a deceit and a decoy” 
(46-47). Inverting more traditional views that tend to regard Claudius as the villain of the play 
and Hamlet as its tormented hero, Knight described Gertrude as an “affectionate mother” 
whose tenderness is overshadowed by Hamlet’s feelings of disgust and nausea towards her 
(47).  
                                                          
19  The Oedipal reminiscences in the figure of Hamlet have been extensively studied, starting perhaps with, but not limited to 
Ernest Jones’ “The Oedipus Complex as an Explanation of Hamlet's Mystery: A Study in Motive”, first published in The 
American Journal of Psychology in January 1910. See also Adelman, Janet. Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin 
in Shakespeare’s Plays, Hamlet to The Tempest. Routledge, 1992; or Reinhard Lupton, Julia and Kenneth Reinhard. After 
Oedipus: Shakespeare in Psychoanalysis. Cornell UP, 1993. 
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Together with those visions of Gertrude as an over-sexualized, mischievous character, 
between the late 1920’s and 1950’s depictions abounded that tended to portray Gertrude as a 
submissive, naïve and even stupid woman, incapable of agency and certainly lacking in 
loquacity. In 1924 Agnes Mackenzie scornfully condemned Gertrude of being stupid and 
shallow, comparing her to a docile animal and concluding that “she would have made a very 
lovable cat or dog” (224). Additionally, A. C. Bradley, in his Shakespearean Tragedy (1949) 
describes Gertrude as “very dull and very shallow,” firmly comparing her to a sheep in the sun 
(167); and in 1937, H. Granville-Baker, though more kind in his remarks, also stressed 
Gertrude’s passivity and lack of opinion throughout the play (227). This is not to say that there 
have not been dissenting voices against an overall negative interpretation of the queen. Carolyn 
Heilbrun, in her 1957 essay “The Character of Hamlet’s Mother”, insists that lust could be 
considered Gertrude’s only sin, a flow which somehow overshadows those instances that 
account for the queen’s strong-mindedness, intelligence and talent for succinct and acute 
speech. Heilbrun’s essay was bitterly attacked in 1964 by Baldwin Maxwell, who heavily relied 
on Gertrude’s subordinate appearance on stage and the simplicity and unawareness shown on 
her scarce interventions (be them linguistic or physical) to claim that Hamlet’s mother was, 
instead, characterized by her ignorance, her quietness and a total submission to her husband 
Claudius. As Maxwell points out, during the Closet Scene (Act III, Scene 4): “the question 
which she, contrite, puzzled, and helpless, addresses to Hamlet as he prepares to leave, ‘What 
shall I do?’, illustrates the lack of initiative, and independence which mark her throughout” 
(241).  
In the light of these diverse, though equally damaging, interpretations of Gertrude, in 
1992 Canadian and feminist writer Margaret Atwood published her collection of short stories 
Good Bones, which included a four-page long story to what could be considered an example 
of presentist revision aimed at dis-identifying the figure of Gertrude from both the sensual 
temptress and the selfless, solicitous mother and wife that she has tended to be seen as. In 
“Gertrude talks back” Hamlet’s mother owns a direct, straightforward speech, free from 
flourish and lacking in that urging necessity to constantly please his son by saying whatever he 
may want to hear. There is no shame and definitely not repentance in Atwood’s characterization 
of the queen, who at some point states: “Go get yourself someone more down-to-earth. Have a 
nice roll in the hay. Then you can talk to me about nasty sties” (11). 
The story is now presented through Gertrude’s eyes, and not through Hamlet’s. Cuder 
Domínguez states: “it is a one-sided dialogue, Gertrude’s voice being the only one we 
hear/read. Thus, Atwood turns the tables and gives Gertrude the articulateness she lacks in the 
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play” (“Portrayals of Women”). This is important because in the play she normally stays silent, 
or is removed from the scene when men are dealing with important matters. Thus, either she is 
physically absent from the action, or she is present in it but compelled to remain silent, being 
allowed to speak by Hamlet only if it is to confess her guilt or express repentance. Atwood, 
however, presents us with a Gertrude that not only refuses to remain speechless but whose 
discourse takes over all the action; Hamlet is, on the other hand, the one who has to stay silent, 
his speech subdued to a noticeably absence in the story. Atwood thus recovers in her story the 
silenced voice of the Other that has long prevailed in Shakespeare’s figure of Gertrude. Not 
only that, but her discourse is defiant and challenging: “Whereas in Shakespeare’s play she 
responded in no way, here she vindicates Claudius and disparages the elder Hamlet” (Cuder 
Domínguez, “Portrayals of Women”). 
Gertrude’s monologue not only serves her to support her new husband, or ridicule 
Hamlet’s father; she also indirectly shows her son as a spoiled only child, short-tempered and 
prompt to tantrums: “No darling, I am not mad at you. But I must say you’re an awful prig 
sometimes…Some days I think it would have been better for both of us if you hadn’t been an 
only child” (Atwood 11). Reading Atwood, we do not have the image of an ardent temptress 
seen from the eyes of an emotionally unbalanced son with a possible Oedipal complex; but the 
image of a snob and impertinent child seen from the eyes of her slightly annoyed mother. Cuder 
Domínguez sees this as a de-sacralization of Hamlet through the use of irony and a re-
contextualization in the quotidian, which brings as a consequence “the dismissal of guilt, and 
correspondingly, a rejection of his [Hamlet’s] (male) construction of her [Gertrude’s]” 
(“Portrayals of Women”). 
In Atwood’s story Gertrude is now a confident woman: her decision to marry Claudius 
is hers ultimately, and no-one else’s, while she describes her previous marriage to Hamlet’s 
father as dull and boring. She enjoys her sexual freedom, but not in a dirty and lascivious way:  
Your dad just wasn’t a whole of fun. Noble, sure, I grant you. But Claudius, well, he 
likes a drink now and then. He appreciates a decent meal. He enjoys a laugh, know what 
I mean? You don’t always have to be tiptoeing around because of some holier-than-
thou principle or something. (10) 
 
Gertrude’s portrayal could be considered up-to-date in the sense that she enjoys 
freedom as a woman unthinkable at the times when Shakespeare’s play was written: she is 
confident, assertive, and conscious of her right to choose who she wants to stay with, and how 
to use her body the way she pleases, in contrast to Hamlet’s prudishness: “And let me tell you, 
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everyone sweats at a time like that, as you’d find out if you ever gave it a try. A real girlfriend 
would do you a heap of good” (11). Not only that, Gertrude’s way of speaking is also brought 
into the present by means of its informality and its contemporaneity. 
In Atwood’s revisionist portrayal of the Queen of Denmark, she is the voice of reason 
whereas Hamlet is childish and possessive, apparently still trapped in an Oedipal stage which 
underlies his obsession with the honour and decorum of her mother. His accusations concerning 
her mother’s licentiousness are dismissed by her without giving it any importance whatsoever: 
“you can excuse that in a young person, they are so intolerant” (11). Though Hamlet’s speech 
is not included in Atwood’s story, it should be read in conjunction with Gertrude’s answer, for 
it is Hamlet’s scornful attack on her mother during the Closet Scene that sets Atwood’s story 
into motion. When contrasted, it is easy to see how what is now perceived as Hamlet’s 
(arguably) flamboyant diction in the original play strikingly clashes with Gertrude’s everyday 
style, sounding flourished, pompous and completely out of date. Since the contrast is so strong, 
Gertrude’s discourse proves much more powerful and efficient in the de-sacralisation that 
critics such as Harold Bloom20 have contributed to effect of Hamlet’s figure, thus bringing the 
character back to Earth. Hence, Hamlet’s affected and embellished cries in Shakespeare’s play:  
Look here, upon this picture, and on this, 
The counterfeit presentment of two brothers. 
See, what a grace was seated on this brow- 
Hyperion’s curls; on the front of Jove himself (3.4.53-56) 
 
are rapidly terminated by her mother’s: “Yes, I’ve seen those pictures, thank you very much” 
(9). The de-sacralisation of Hamlet is completed when the queen confesses she originally 
intended to call him George (a rather common English name), lamenting the bullying her son 
had to endure when he was a child because of his rather sophisticated name: “The other kids at 
school used to tease the life out of you. The nicknames! And those terrible jokes about pork” 
(9). Atwood’s vision of Gertrude could thereby be considered presentist in the way this 
character is brought into the present through both her attitude and her speech; empowering her 
in the sense that she no longer feels any kind of guilt for her actions, nor does she consider she 
has to give any account for her deeds. She is confident, and becomes the voice of maturity and 
reason. Hamlet, on the other hand, remains stuck in that highly sacralised and almightily lauded 
pedestal where he has been placed though history, represented in his beautified but nonetheless 
                                                          
20 Read Bloom, Harold. Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (1998), or Hamlet: Poem Unlimited (2003). 
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ridiculous speech which now makes him look preposterous in his snobbishness, and childish 
in his demands. As Cuder Domínguez concludes: “she writes a non-canonical revision of the 
canonical reading of the text. In a way, she is asserting Gertrude’s right to be lustful, and 
denying Hamlet/Shakespeare the power to pass judgment on her” (Cuder Domínguez).  
It could be suggested, then, that Margaret Atwood subjects Gertrude to a presentist 
revision, in which Shakespeare’s famous character is brought to current times to finally offer 
her point of view, breaking with the imposed silence and passivity which seems to have 
traditionally been imposed on her. Thus, through a stratagem that more than one could consider 
presentist, Atwood retrieves a minor character from a canonical play to infuse it with current 
feminist concerns regarding agency and women’s right to speak for themselves. Gertrude’s 
discourse exercises female empowerment by challenging and ridiculing the traditional analyses 
of this character that have established her as an evil, ambitious and lustful mother on the one 
hand, and/or as an unwitty, submissive and naively complacent wife on the other. A character, 
in other words, whose role in Hamlet has conventionally been subjected to a male, disdainful 
view which has presented her as a licentious, treacherous woman unable to repress her most 
basic instincts, when there are no unquestionable indicators of such behaviour in the original 
play. Presentism, as seen through Atwood’s example, could be understood as a tool for 
ideological reconceptualization of literary figures or events in the struggle for women’s 
equality. I must sturdily reinforce this idea of presentism as an instrument for political struggle, 
an idea which will be otherwise repeated constantly throughout this dissertation. For now, it 
will suffice to say that the practice of presentism relates almost invariably to ideologically 
charged instances of literary texts oriented towards the fight for equality in the realm of many 
social marginal groups. However, in order to reach this conclusion, first I must make a halt to 
debunk some misconceptions commonly associated to presentism and analyse the place 
occupied by presentism in the realm of Postmodernity, and how postmodern notions of time 
and, most specially, on the fragmented and alienated subject, eventually allow for the 
transformation of presentism into a political weapon.  
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This chapter is ultimately aimed at providing a broader as well as sharper definition of 
what I understand for presentism, which, as has probably become clear already, deviates 
considerably from the descriptions provided by official anthologies. Yet, in order to offer a 
consistent explanation, I must detail the steps I have followed throughout the process, which I 
have divided into three separate blocks. First, I will take a close look into some postmodern 
features that, in my view, have powerfully induced the advent of presentism in academic 
debates, or at least, have notoriously influenced its recently acquired notoriety. Next, I will try 
to discredit some of the most common attacks conducted against presentism, which in my view 
have contributed to its perhaps undeserved unpopularity among scholars. Only when these 
misapprehensions have been examined will I be able to address the last and final section of this 
chapter, where I will relate presentism to theories of reception and aestheticism, the ultimate 
goal being to extricate presentism from the cultural materialist and new historicist logic which, 
arguably, reduce the potential scope for presentism in literary interpretation by connecting it 
too closely to the disciplines history and historiography. 
 
2.1-Origins  
According to Terry Eagleton in his 1996 The Illusions of Postmodernism, one of the 
characteristics of postmodernism is the scepticism felt towards classical notions of truth, 
objectivity, (wo)men’s capacity for reason, grand narratives or ultimate explanations about 
doubtfully universal concepts (vii). It is not surprising, then, that a notion like presentism, 
sustained by the assertion that truth and objectivity are a chimera, gained notoriety in the 
aftermath of postmodernism’s peak of popularity. Because presentism, as we have seen, 
appeared in the realm of cultural materialism, it has automatically been associated to 
poststructuralism, for poststructuralist claims concerning language and deconstruction have 
regularly been used as tools for cultural materialist analyses. However, there are other notions 
arisen in the context of postmodernity that might better account for the popularity gained by 
presentism in the past two decades. It must be stated that it is not clear whether postmodern 
features affect presentism directly or if presentism has inherited them through a common 
denominator, in this case, cultural materialism. Nonetheless, the fact that postmodernity has 
predisposed the appearance of cultural materialism does not necessarily entail that presentism 
should also echo this dynamic, which is why a proper analysis regarding how some of the 
premises articulating presentism reflect postmodern traits may be necessary.  
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2.1.1-Postmodern Influences on Presentism 
Some people could point to the apparently slight relationship existing between the 
American branch of postmodernism and the ideas prompted by two scholars from the United 
Kingdom. Augustine Atabor (2014), for instance, claims that postmodernism, though 
principally developed in the Americas, derives mainly from French and German theorists 
(rather than British ones) and that, as opposed to the European branch of postmodernism, which 
tends to be more sceptical (probably due to Heidegger and Nietzsche’s influence in the 
movement), American postmodernism is often more positive, focusing, rather on political 
action and the end of dogmatism (55-56). It could also be suggested that the Western world is 
globalized enough as to presume a high degree of contact between these two intercontinental 
poles, which may have eventually resulted in mutual influences and points of connection or 
junctures. The fact that many American postmodern theorists, such as Brian McHale, Linda 
Hutcheon, or even Fredric Jameson, thoroughly rely on French theorists such as Baudrillard, 
Derrida, Foucault, or even Barthes, attests to these transatlantic relations.  Still, this might not 
suffice to explain why, then, a theorist like Hugh Grady, whose work develops in the area of 
the Frankfurt School, has included presentism inside the postmodern aesthetic, alleging that 
postmodern anti-essentialist inclination has, since the 1980’s, invigorated a return to 
Shakespeare’s plays to thematize notions of fragmented and decentred selves (Shakespeare, 
Machiavelli, and Montaigne 8).  
For Peter Hohendahl (1991), however, Critical Theory constitutes a strong force in the 
definition of American postmodernism, particularly in its relationship to Marxist Theory: 
“During the 1980’s, the appropriation of Critical Theory in the United States, through its 
contact with other theoretical traditions, has (successfully, I believe) resituated the Left within 
the American discourse” (220). According to Hohendahl, Critical Theory entered the American 
discourse in the 1960’s through the works of Adorno and Benjamin, which were used to 
reinforce the project of Western Marxism and its emphasis in the need for marginal social 
groups to engage in radical interventions (199). In Marxism and Form (1971), Fredric Jameson 
tried to fuse the voices of Adorno and Benjamin with those of Lukács and Sartre to adapt 
Critical Theory to the American21 context of the period. This project had a double focus: on 
                                                          
21 I am aware that the adjective “American” alludes to any inhabitant of the American continent and, therefore, using it as a 
synonym for the people in the United States is remarkably reductionist. However, since there is no proper demonym for the 
inhabitants of that nation, I will sometimes use “American” as a gentilic for the United States.   
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the one hand, to provide Marxist literary criticism with a more refined model mediating the 
relationship between the social and the aesthetics; and on the other, to counter the growing 
influence of Althusserian Marxism brought forward by Eagleton (Hohendahl 200). It has to be 
noted, though, that the return to the ideas of Adorno and Benjamin has little to do with the 
historical moment of their writings, and that their theories in the United States were upgraded, 
rather than merely accepted (209). For starters, Adorno kept a rather conservative 
understanding of culture as the canonical tradition in terms of an autonomous aesthetic realm, 
and his focus on close reading of masterpieces of the high-culture tradition was largely ignored. 
What emerges in his adaptation by the American New Left22 and new historicists are his ideas 
that a) the autonomy of culture is not absolute but mediated through social conventions and 
institutions, and that b) there is a dialectical relationship between high and mass-culture. (210). 
Understanding then, that in the American postmodern debate “the legacy of Critical Theory 
comes into play in various and contradictory forms” (213-214), the association between 
postmodernism in the United States and Grady’s notion of presentism is far from irrational.  
Grady is not the only one to directly associate presentism with postmodernism; in 
“Commentary: ‘With no Particular Place to Go’” (2008), Hayden White comments: “Jameson 
himself identifies globalization (a kind of late capitalism) with postmodernism (the cultural 
equivalent of late modernism) and suggests that postmodernism is irredeemably ‘presentist’ 
and therefore inherently anti-historical in its basic orientation” (734), thus making a straight 
connection between this concept and the paradigm to which it presumably belongs. However, 
there is a detail that might be necessary to point out at this stage. Eventually, all talks 
concerning the origins of presentism go back to postmodern notions of time and the way we 
interpret the past or account for it, namely, history. Yet, I would not like presentism to be 
associated with historiography in this dissertation, since I think that, in general terms, 
presentism should be disengaged from the process of history-making. As will be seen in this 
section, postmodern views on history and the unreachability of truth eventually come to a dead 
end of extreme relativism, where reality is in the danger of being assumed to be made up. This 
loophole of total scepticism towards reality confronts and even denies our own experiences of 
the world and/or those accounts that we hold to be self-evident, generating an intellectual and 
                                                          
22 Beginning in 1962 with a group of student activists who gathered at Port Huron with a view to “set forth an agenda for a 
generation” (McMillian and Buhle 3), the American New Left was a movement principally influenced by the critical sociology 
of C. Wright Mills, French existentialism, notions of participatory democracy developed during the Civil Rights Movement, 
and the Beat Generation. Broadly associated with the hippie movement and anti-war protest movements, the American New 
Left engaged in social reforms dealing with women’s liberation, gay rights, and multiculturalism. The movement was short-
lived, however, as it soon became unable to reconcile the diversity of opinions and internal divergences which soon affected 
it, and was clearly unprepared for the backlash coming from government repression and established culture (4).  
[66] 
 
dialectical paradox from which it is almost impossible to get out. Thus, postmodern views on 
history and historiography occupy a preeminent space in this dissertation, but only to explain 
how presentism came to be, since its theorization started in the field of history, understood as 
a specific case of anachronism marked by the contamination of the past by the present, though 
it later spread to other areas of knowledge. Regarding the imprint left by the philosophical 
branch of presentism (which posits that only present time is real) on debates concerning the 
objectivity question, I personally believe that a proper analysis regarding this issue would lead 
to a digression too long as well as unrelated to the main topic of this dissertation to dedicate it 
more than these few lines. Nevertheless, what interests me is how well can presentism be 
explained with some postmodern notions that no doubt might have affected and influenced 
Grady and Hawkes when first developing their new school of thought. Therefore, even if I 
particularly see presentism more as a tool than as a theoretical discourse, postmodernism helps 
understand why presentism may have become an instrument so valuable in our times, even if 
only from a literary perspective. 
Though presentism, as previously stated, was a term already in use in the context of 
historicist debates and historiography ethical standards since at least the early 20th century, it 
might be thanks to the paradigmatic shift towards postmodernity that its increased popularity 
from the 1980’s onwards can be explained. The eventual move from modernity’s23 optimism 
regarding science and knowledge towards scepticism regarding assumptions on objectivity and 
progress helps support presentist claims regarding the past and how it is historicized. Thus, the 
interest aroused by presentism in these past decades, despite its long existence in the field of 
historiography and critical theory, can be better explained through some postmodern aesthetic 
and philosophical features that sustain its formulation.  
There are at least two main postmodern concepts that insert presentism into the 
postmodern paradigm. The first one has to do with the way reality is conceptualized in 
postmodernity, which connects directly to notions of time and its conflation. Subsequently, the 
distinction between past and present becomes blurred and history turns into the interpretation 
of a simulacrum of reality, an imitation, but never of a real fact, entailing that all historical 
narratives or accounts of the past are presentist by nature. The second one hast to do with the 
fragmentation of the subject and his/her alienation in a world governed by third wave 
                                                          
23 I am referring here to Paul Hamilton’s notion of modernity, seen as a post-Romantic period which conceives knowledge as 
progressive, objective and in a process of advancement thanks to technology. 
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capitalism.24 Cognitive mapping and the subject’s positionality becomes the individual’s last 
alternative to make sense out of the world, and presentism appears here as a tool helping the 
subject become an agent of his/her own reality by reshaping his/her past according to his/her 
present anxieties.  
 
2.1.1.1- This Delusion We Call Reality 
Already in his 1988 essay “Simulacra and Simulations” Jean Baudrillard showed how 
the effects of a neoliberalist market, its expanse thanks to globalization, and the rapid advance 
of technology have resulted in existence becoming ‘virtual’ rather than real, which he 
summarized under the term “simulation” (166-167). In “In the Shadow of the Millennium” 
(1998) he posits that “History…ends with the information and the creation of the instantaneous 
event” (“Shadow of the Millennium”). That is, the fast development of new technologies, high-
speed tools, and virtual realities have resulted in both instantaneousness and ubiquity; and this 
immediacy of virtuality has eradicated the perception of the “real movement of history” 
(“Shadow of the Millennium”). We are now caught up in a real (instant) time which has 
destroyed the illusion of chronological history because the current subjects cannot deal with 
such a notion in their contemporary life: “the linear progression of modernity and technological 
innovation is broken. The long thread of history has become an inextricable knot” (“Shadow 
of the Millennium”). Because events, according to Baudrillard, can no longer be experienced 
in reality (since they must be produced in real time), the sense of history, or rather, of a linear 
perception of time that delimitates the distance between past and present, disappears, and it is 
replaced by simulacra, which lack in historical significance, (if we understand history in a 
positivist, or even a modernist way, namely, as progression). This brings, as a conclusion, the 
end of History as a Grand Narrative, as François Lyotard claimed in his book The Postmodern 
Condition (1979).   
Due to the blossoming of technologies in the context of advanced liberal capitalism, 
Lyotard defends that knowledge has stopped being an end in itself to become a commodity, 
valuable only as long as it is profitable:  
                                                          
24 Following industrial capitalism characteristic from the 19th century, and the corporate capitalism during the first two thirds 
of the 20th century, Jameson claims that capitalism has reached a third (or late) phase, distinctive of a post-industrial society 
which is governed by the consumer market, and in which the effects of new technologies and globalization have led to the 
internationalization of capital markets (Postmodernism 35-37). Some theoreticians, such as John Ehrenreich in his Third Wave 
Capitalism: How Money, Power, and the Pursuit of Self-Interest Have Imperiled the American Dream (Cornell UP, 2016) 
refer to these phases of capitalism as “waves,” a term which was first coined by Alvin Toffler in his The Third Wave (Bantam 
Books, 1980). 
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The question (overt or implied) now asked by the professionalist student, the State, or 
institutions of higher education is no longer "Is it true?" but "What use is it?" In the 
context of the mercantili[s]ation of knowledge, more often than not this question is 
equivalent to: "Is it saleable? (51) 
 
The contemporary postmodern culture and has brought the discrediting of and the 
incredulity towards the narratives of legitimation supporting both science (which aims towards 
truth), and society (which aims towards justice) characteristic of the previous and now outdated 
period, to which Lyotard refers as “modern” (xxiv). If these discourses, which previously 
legitimated the knowledge upon which our rationalization of reality and the world are based, 
are now seen as reductionist and incomplete, it is to be expected that not only is the cognisant 
subject impeded to know, but also, the totalising truths encompassed by these metanarratives 
and expressed through language are no longer universal, but partial and heterogeneous, and 
thus can no longer be trusted. Thus, while “in science truth and meaning are coterminous” 
(White, “Reflections on ‘Gendre’” 870), in the realm of the Humanities this assumption is no 
longer valid because both the truth and its meaning are considered social constructs. Since, 
according to Lyotard, “scientific knowledge is a kind of discourse” (Lyotard 3), it is reasonable 
to believe that science will also be affected by this increasing incredulity towards discourse, 
since it needs of narrativity in order to be enunciated and legitimized. Because science is also 
a discourse, it is (as all narratives are) legitimized by the power conferred to it by the audience 
who listens to it and transmits it (23). The crisis of narratives, thus, inevitably reflects a crisis 
of certainties and the significances attached to them, once they have been delegitimized.  
Fredric Jameson also posits that late capitalism has had a deep influence in decreasing 
our perception of time up to the point where any attempt of periodization seems useless. 
Postmodernism, then, marks this “end of temporality,” which he defines as a “dramatic and 
alarming shrinkage of existential time and the reduction to a present that hardly qualifies as 
such any longer, given the virtual effacement of that past and future that can alone define a 
present in the first place” (“End of Temporality” 708). It could be said, then, that presentism is 
the result of our current cultural period, which emphasizes our impossibility to distance 
ourselves from this ‘real time’, marked by ubiquity and instantaneousness. It is not surprising, 
then, that in the introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism (2004), Steven 
Connor states:  
One definition of postmodernism might be: that condition in which for the first time, 
and as a result of technologies that allow large-scale storage, access, and reproduction 
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of records of the past, the past appears to be included in the present, or at the present’s 
disposal, and in which the ratio between present and past has therefore changed. (10) 
 
The fact that presentism is so popular nowadays may be related to the importance that the 
present time plays in the postmodern paradigm. It does not mean it is immune to change, nor 
that it is right or wrong, but simply that presentism’s current relevance is, in a sense, logical, if 
we bear in mind Jameson’s postulate that the historical tendency of late capitalism is, precisely, 
“the reduction to the present” (2003, 717). 
Simultaneously, the end of grand narratives in general and of history in particular entail 
a crisis of faith in an objective ‘truth’, understood as something independent from individuals’ 
subjectivity. Inspired by M. J. Sandel, Kenneth J. Gergen (1996) believes that there is no longer 
something like “an autonomous agent as the source of moral action” (120). That is, there is no 
such a thing as an individual who can act beyond the moral dictates prescribed by society, for 
without society to deliberate on what is moral and what is not, this individual lacks in moral 
discernment (120). Gergen arrives to the conclusion that “if all that is internal is an installation 
of the social, then there is no action that can reflect a state of pure agency” (121) and, therefore, 
no way to distinguish between the authentic and the inauthentic: “for all actions would be 
inauthentic by virtue of their origins in the artificial tissues of the social” (121). Accordingly, 
there is no ‘truth’, truth is another social and deeply rooted convention (121). And because 
truth is a convention, historiography’s search for the ontological (or at least objectively 
acceptable) truth of the past is eventually transformed in the postmodern paradigm into the 
search of a standardized, socially accepted vision of reality that will necessarily satisfy the 
majority, but eradicate, silence and ignore a vast minority.  
Concepts relating to the lack of depth, superficiality and simulacrum emphasize the 
rupture with the circularity of history, because space and time are no longer seen as natural, 
and what was once perceived as an organic genealogy has become a collection of images and 
projected illustrations which have effaced the idea of past as referent (Jameson 2001, 18). This 
effacement should not be understood only as a breaking with the barrier that separates the past 
from the present and consequently, as a blurring of their differences, as some critics, such as 
Jerome Kroll and historian J. R. Pole (Wood 9) have posited, but also as an acknowledgement 
that ultimately history occupies the place it does because society makes it so: it is the 
acceptance that the value of history depends on what society may want to make out of it.  
If we accept that not only is the past unattainable, but that its recollection is the result 
of a standardized resolution, then from a postmodernist logic any attempt to understand how a 
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particular literary work was received when first shown to the public could be, in all respects, 
as utopic as it is irrational, a postulation that clears the ground for presentist allegations that 
only the present time is relevant. Thus, if under a historicist mindset, proper of the modernist 
period, unadulterated objectivity was the ultimate goal to achieve, under postmodernist 
principles that stress the urgency of now and the collapse of old modes of history presentism 
finds the perfect boost for flourishing.  
 
2.1.1.2- This Shattering We Call the Subject 
It is logical that postmodernism, thanks to its notion of ‘real time’ which breaks with 
the traditional circularity and perception of time and chronology, eventually supports and even 
justifies the practice of presentism. However, there is another notion which characterizes 
postmodernity (or can be explained by postmodern ideas), which might also influence 
presentism, even if not in a direct, straightforward way. I am referring here to ideas of the 
fragmentation of the individual and his/her feelings of alienation. Presentism may become a 
useful tool to (presumably) give agency to a paralyzed, fragmented individual, trapped by 
his/her situatedness in the present, that is, the way that the individual’s identity is shaped (and 
confined) by the specific socio-cultural and geographical setting that frames his/her existence, 
which also incapacitates him/her for action.  
For Fredric Jameson (1991) postmodernism announces the death of the modernist 
“autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual” (15), which has now been engulfed by 
the bureaucracy that systematizes the capitalist world. A reality shaped by simulacra and virtual 
reality has led to a sense of profound alienation. This is, at least, one of the conclusions to 
which Felix Geyer (1996) arrives in his edited work Alienation, Ethnicity, and Postmodernism: 
“the world of simulacra and of virtual reality tends to be an alienated world” (xiii). However, 
it must be pointed out that the postmodern kind of alienation to which I am referring here differs 
thoroughly from the classical paradigms of alienation, though this does not entail that the latter 
model has disappeared, as it will be later seen. Geyer indicates that the notion of postmodern 
alienation emerges neither from marginalization or maladjustment, nor from lack of choices, 
but, on the contrary, from an excess of freedom, if we understand this freedom as an “overdose 
of unmanageable environmental complexity” (xiii). As a consequence, the subject is incapable 
of choosing among all the options at hand. Because our sense of time and space in 
postmodernity has been so deeply affected and has rendered us powerless, the subject feels 
irredeemably lost and disoriented. In other words: the end of history as a grand narrative has 
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influenced in, participates from and at the same time is a result of the fragmentation of the 
individual; by which the self feels inauthentic, inconsistent and decentred (Fuat Firat 205).  
According to Jameson, for the postmodern fragmented subject, the only way to make 
sense out of a confusing and paralyzing reality is through what he calls “cognitive mapping.” 
In his 1983 essay of the same name, Jameson defines cognitive mapping as the tool that, as 
Althusser’s concept of ideology, stresses the gap existing “between the local positioning of the 
individual subject and the totality of class structures in which he or she is situated, a gap 
between phenomenological perception and a reality that transcends all individual thinking or 
experience” (353). Jameson understands cognitive mapping as the way in which we “map our 
individual social relationships to local, national, and international class realities” (1991, 52), 
which becomes a necessary step for developing resistance to a reality’s unrepresentable totality 
that nullifies and fragments the individual. Cognitive maps, thus, would help the postmodern 
subject to better understand the confusing and ungraspable realities produced by global 
capitalism (C. Sandoval 29). 
According to Carlos Gallego (2014), the concept of cognitive mapping was used in the 
discipline of social sciences since the 1940’s, and refers to the mental maps that individuals 
create when configuring and storing their information and knowledge of space (21). However, 
Jameson reassigns the term from an Althusserian perspective, in which cognitive mapping 
would work similarly to ideology, “providing the individual with a sense of his/her situatedness 
in the larger network of social relations” (22). Cognitive mapping would then consist of an 
extrapolation of spatial analysis to the realm of our social and historical moment (1990, 353) 
For Gallego, the main characteristics of cognitive mapping are a) that it is flexible, in the sense 
that it can adopt and/or change according to any new information received (27); and b) that 
even if aiming towards completion and totality, cognitive mapping remains, necessarily, 
inaccurate and never accomplished (22-23). 
Jameson believes that, during postmodernity, our capacity to act and function has been 
neutralized owing to our spatial and social confusion (1991, 54). Therefore, cognitive mapping 
becomes an essential feature of any instance of ideological art, for it is through cognitive 
mapping that individual and collective positioning is achieved, from which political action can, 
then, emerge. Logically, Gallego reads cognitive mapping as “a type of epistemological praxis 
that precedes political action” (29). Thus, perhaps at this point it would not be too bold to claim 
that the power that presentism confers to the reader could be understood also as a strategy to 
provide an otherwise alienated subject with an agency (s)he lacks. That is, presentism might 
be understood as a tactic that provides the reader with a perhaps illusionary tool for agency in 
[72] 
 
a world dominated by uncertainty, solitude, alienation, and the impossibility of conceiving a 
ubiquitous and virtual reality which escapes traditional paradigms of knowledge. This is 
achieved thanks to the fact that, for a subject trapped in the alienation derived from Althusser’s 
notion of aleatory materialism in history, presentism allows us to play with our situatedness in 
the present. However, this impression of agency may remain in the realm of the ideal: it is, 
debatably, not real, for it makes the reader believe in his/her own agency when interpreting 
texts, without openly acknowledging that the reader, and therefore his/her interpretation of 
texts, is also immersed in the intricate web of relations that constitute the discourse of power. 
It is logical that a technique like presentism (or, at least, its theorizing) has arisen during 
the postmodern period, bearing in mind the ways its theoretical paradigm affects our current 
understanding of the present world and its past. The appearance of this analytical tool is thus 
closely related to questions dealing with the end of grand narratives, including history, on the 
one hand, and with the notion of ‘real time’ on the other, both of which challenge the traditional 
circularity and chronology of our conception of history. Conversely, the fragmentation of the 
individual and his/her alienation from the world, also explained by postmodern notions, have 
provided presentism with an ideological purpose directed towards the empowering of an 
otherwise lost and helpless individual through his/her self-positioning in a disengaged spatial-
temporal reality. This might explain why Ewan Fernie states that “Grady’s and Hawkes’s 
presentism specializes in the very ‘situatedness of the critic in the present’” (175). Yet, the fact 
that the theorization of presentism is intricately connected with postmodernism does not mean 
that its practice is limited to the same scope since, as previously mentioned, presentist readings 
might have been done since the beginning of literature. However, it is only now that presentism 
seems to have received closer attention by theoreticians and has been recognized critical value. 
What might constitute a novelty, then, is the postmodern views influencing the way we now 
read into the past.  
 
2.1.2-Pulling the Leash: Limiting the Scope of Presentism  
Before going any further in my views of presentism as an empowering weapon arisen 
in the aftermath of postmodernity and its disabling of the subject, there are some aspects that 
must be constrained, and the possibilities that presentism may offer in ideological struggle 
properly contained to very particular and restricted instances. For instance, some people could 
accurately point at the fact that I seem to constantly allude to history and historiography in 
order to sustain and support the use of presentism when I have already stated that, in my view, 
presentism should stick to literary works. The case study of Alicia Gaspar de Alba’s Sor 
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Juana’s Second Dream, provided in chapter 5 proves that sometimes it is hard to distinguish 
between literature and history, especially when several historical events are dramatized in an 
otherwise purely fictional text. Notwithstanding that presentism, more often than not, 
intermingles with disciplines that little or nothing have to do with literature, I feel compelled 
to stress that what I call literary presentism always entails anachronism in a higher or lower 
degree, and is also inevitably supported by the awareness that the past is unreachable. But 
whereas these two elements of anachronism and the inescapable contamination of the past need 
to be debunked by the disciplines of history and historiography, they might result not only 
useful but even desirable in the field of the arts. Grady and Hawkes have mainly been criticized 
by historians on the one hand and new historicists on the other, and, logically, quite often they 
need to deal with historical tools and a particular notion of temporality in order to counteract 
those attacks. Still, their praxis of presentism is always restricted to Shakespeare’s plays. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the limits on the scope of presentism is an important point that 
would benefit from further explanation, which I proceed to offer in the following lines. 
 
2.1.2.1-Quite Postmodern, but not Quite. 
One must be careful when applying postmodern views on time to other disciplines in 
the humanities, particularly when dealing with history and historiography. Simplifying what I 
already explained on previous pages, the postmodernist blurring of past and present derives 
directly from simulacra, the effect of technologies in the market in our culture and conception 
of reality and, ultimately, to the scepticism felt towards grand narratives, history included. 
When summarizing the postmodern view on the field of historiography, Gertrude Himmelfarb 
(1997) defines postmodern history as the presumption that there is no absolute, total truth, and, 
consequently, no partial, contingent truths either (160), thus breaking with the modernist 
paradigm that still wanted to believe in the existence of an objective object, even if it was 
impossible to reach.  
Emphasizing the idea that there is no unbiased truth out there would not only transform 
history into fiction: pointing out at the unavoidably political orientation of any allegedly 
impartial narration of facts might be interpreted as inviting historians to be creative, rather than 
descriptive. Understandably, many Marxist historians see in postmodern interpretations of 
reality the perfect excuse for pointing out at the bias in traditional history, to cry instead for the 
rights of those who have traditionally been neglected a place in official accounts of the past. 
During the past decades, the propagation of relative, fractional histories with a focus on the 
race, class, gender, and/or sexual orientation of the historian(s) has been noteworthy. These 
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partial cultural stories often give a preeminent voice to previously marginalized perspectives 
that were once erased from the historical canon, which was built by those in power. However, 
using postmodern views on history to justify the proliferation of different histories is a 
potentially harmful strategy.  
Himmelfarb notes that this multicultural proliferation of subjective histories eventually 
“pluralize and particularize history to the point where people share no history in common –no 
‘generic’ history, as it were – [up to the point of denying] the common (generic) humanity of 
all people.” (170). But not only that: if we assume that all fictions are equally valid because 
there is no truth out there to validate some over the others, then all of them are likewise invalid, 
and all possibility for subversion remains theoretical. That is, attempts at decolonizing the 
official version of history by supporting this subversion on the possibilities granted by the 
postmodern conception of history as another kind of fiction does exactly that: transform 
alternative histories into fictions, with no authority whatsoever in the historiographical field. A 
blind and complete surrender to Postmodern radical scepticism towards objectivity eventually 
benefits those privileged by traditional accounts of history, for it nullifies any cultural and 
historical emergent alternative on account of a presumed lack of truth that invalidates them 
even before these partial histories come to be formulated. It is true that previously marginalized 
communities can now elaborate their own version of history, but postmodern views on that 
history (paradoxically, the same that helped them be enunciated in the first place) immediately 
suppress any hint of authority they might aspire to.  
If one assumes that objectivity is an unattainable ideal and the past cannot be reached, 
the fact that one adopts a different perspective to approach the accepted version of history is 
not going to make a revisionist attempt “truer,” regardless of how ‘fair’ this new approach may 
seem according to a present-day mindset. Thus, postmodernity might not be useful to validate 
historical decolonial instances, but it is important to perceive its influence on the emergence of 
cultural studies, as it is relevant in order to understand the postmodern premises that supported 
and encouraged the appearance of notions like presentism. Hence, all postmodern notions here 
considered must be recognized merely as stimuli prompting out the recently-acquired 
popularity of presentism, rather than as validating arguments to support its current incidence 
in theoretical debates.  
 
2.1.2.2-The Loyal Subject in the Realm of Fiction 
On July 26, 1990, then graduate student Kenneth Steele founded an electronic network 
to foster discussion and exchange of ideas dedicated to William Shakespeare and the 
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Renaissance period. SHAKSPER: The Global Electronic Shakespeare Conference25 was 
originally conceived as an academic online international seminar that, already in 2009, counted 
with more than 1200 members from 65 different countries and from multiple backgrounds, 
such as scholars, professors, undergraduates, actors, poets, etc. (Cook 105). It is precisely in 
this online platform for the dissemination and discussion of Shakespeare plays where one of 
the first mentions to presentism in its literary sense were made. In fact, it became the topic used 
for the first roundtable organized in 2007, moderated by Hugh Grady (117). However, as Cook 
laments, the roundtable was not as successful as its editor had envisioned, for discussion soon 
became controlled by academic and non-academic members who challenged the premises 
presentism offered instead of engaging in the theoretical issues that presentism puts forward 
(118).26  Most of the observations provided by new historicist supporters often showed concern 
towards the problematic relationship between past and present, the possible blurring of their 
differences, and the need for awareness in the field of literary criticism regarding the context 
surrounding the text and its reception in order to avoid anachronisms. Similarly, many 
dissatisfied historians claim that considering the past with our present-day standards may lead 
to anachronisms and erasing of historical differences (Kelly, “Whitwashing”), to 
oversimplification (Kroll 370) or even to making us feel ourselves morally superior (Hunt, 
“Against Presentism”). Perhaps, then, a distinction should be made between historical 
presentism, envisioned as a particular kind of temporal fallacy; and literary presentism, which 
is to be understood as a tool for literary analysis that consciously addresses the past through 
the eyes of the present.  
Though itself a polysemic word, literary presentism should not be conjoined with 
historiography, not because by doing so presentism endangers the objectivity sought by that 
discipline, but, simply, because both fields should be kept unrelated. The problem is that Grady 
and Hawkes offered their personal interpretation, or rather, reinvented the meaning of a term, 
that of “presentism,” which already existed in historiographical debates and was used rather 
pejoratively as an instance of temporal anachronism. Thus, we find theoreticians from different 
backgrounds, history and literature, using the same word to allude to different things, often 
leading to misunderstandings. In fact, even if Grady and Hawkes refer to history and history-
making to support their personal use of presentism, they always focus their presentist analyses 
                                                          
25 For more info about this platform, see Cook, Hardy M.  “SHAKSPER: An Academic Discussion List.” Borrowers and 
Lenders: The Journal of Shakespeare and Appropriation. 2.2. (2006), or "Behind the Scenes with SHAKSPER: The Global 
Electronic Shakespeare Conference."  (College Literature 36.  1 (2009): 105-20).  
26 To access the roundtable discussion on presentism, go to http://shaksper.net/archive/2007/252-december/26012-presentism-
sp-1416476557. 
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on Renaissance plays; that is, they limit the scope of presentism exclusively to literary analysis. 
However, to claim for a separation between literature and history proves to be a rather arduous 
work to do in the postmodern reality.  
As previously mentioned, Eagleton describes postmodernism as a movement mainly 
characterized by its mistrust towards social sciences’ claim for objectivity. This radical 
scepticism is similarly displayed in different philosophies of history arising during this period 
that readily contradict or invalidate more traditional accounts in which presentism was 
condemned. As previously seen, Althusser’s concept of aleatory materialism, as well as 
Foucault’s notion of archaeology and eventualisation, exemplify a vision of the past and of 
reality that would support and even accept the anachronisms brought upon by presentism in a 
historiographical context, for eventually in the shortening of the distance between past and 
present, the present becomes a limitation to our own experience (Takács 875). This is not to 
say at all that Foucault could be considered an unappreciated presentist. For Foucault the 
present was never the centre from which to develop his historical perspective, nor was in the 
present that things and objects were attributed intelligibility. At the core of his theory, Foucault 
intended to break with what he considered an artificial link between the past and the present by 
defamiliarizing both (Takács 879-880). What I mean is that, thanks to Foucault’s and others’ 
questioning of conventional approaches to history, presentism found a way to flourish.  
However, even though in the postmodern paradigm, characterized by its inquisitiveness 
regarding classical notions of truth) and reason (Hicks 20), the premise of the existence of 
objectivity is challenged and ultimately invalidated, to praise postmodern theoreticians on 
accounts of their incredulity towards gran narratives would ignore a long tradition of debates 
held in academy since at least (if not before) Leopold von Ranke’s project of critical historical 
science, at the beginning of the 19th century. On the other hand, postmodern historiographer 
Hayden White also makes an interesting contribution that should not be overlooked. The 
scholar claims that those who defend the ontological vision of history27 fail to acknowledge the 
different meanings and consequently, the diverging connotations, that the signified of history 
has had over time (730). In an essay published in 2009, White sets the example of Greek ancient 
history, which is inherently impregnated with mythology, philosophy, drama and rhetoric, as 
the works developed by Herodotus and Thucydides prove. It is precisely because of this 
intermingling of now separate disciplines that for us their approach might not seem to be 
                                                          
27 By ontological history I refer to the way history is periodically altered by the appearance of new notions and objects which 
derive from a shift in the patterns of reasoning. For more information, read Ian Hacking, Ian. Historial Ontology. Harvard UP, 
2004.  
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‘correct’ (if that word can be used in this context) for current standards. This sort of perception 
would fail to acknowledge that, in fact, this perception comes powerfully influenced by the 
strong, non-permeable categorization of the different disciplines that conform the branch of 
humanities at present, which complicates the understanding that, in Ancient Greece, 
“historiography” was a mélange of all those discourses (868-869). This instance stresses how 
different visions of ‘history’ can and do vary in different periods and places. Because what 
history is and how it must be studied fluctuates as societies do, it could be suggested then that 
History (in capital letter because I am here referring to the field of study), and therefore the 
conceptualization of the past, does not belong to the realm of the natural, but to the realm of 
the cultural. If one adds to this Baudrillard’s idea of simulacra and the appearance of technology 
and large storage devices in an era of globalization, then one finds out that, as White points 
out, “history” and our conceptualization of it, must have necessarily undergone variation.  
Subsequent debates concerning the presumed impartiality of history and the quest for 
neutrality in this field would, in part, lead to the dismissal and despise of those accounts of the 
past that were intricately contaminated by the historian’s present perspective, for, as has been 
previously seen, it is the alleged ‘objectivity’ of history what is eventually attacked. However, 
the main objections to Ranke’s principle were not at first oriented towards the historian’s 
(in)capacity to be objectivity, but rather, towards whether the truth of the past was even 
reachable. In other words: the first debates originating from Ranke’s statement did not focus 
on the historians’ impossibility to disengage themselves from their spatial-temporal frame, but 
on the impossibility to retrieve the past in a purely objective form, since what survives from it 
has been recovered from incomplete accounts and fallible memories. 
Surely the assumption that history is reassessed from incomplete remains, together with 
the realization that records of the past offer a rather biased view where the dominant perspective 
prevails, were already debated in the 19th century. In fact, these deliberations, when carried out 
in the context of the postmodern paradigm, certainly accelerated the appearance of the cultural 
history, in which, rather than preeminent individual figures changing the course of a nation, 
“the poor, the oppressed and the silent” became the new focus of attention (Wood 260). 
Cultural history is described by Wood as “meditative and self-reflective” (226) for it often 
provides more information about the historian than about his/her object of research: “if 
Marxism was the ism dominating the historical perspective during the 1960’s, multiculturalism 
and structuralism became the ones taking control during the 1980’s” (265).  
The postmodern paradigm has thereby unleashed the advent of vital changes that have 
tested not only the methodology and epistemological approach of historiography, but also the 
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conceptual foundations upon which the traditional discipline of historiography had risen, up to 
the point where disputes concerning the plausibility of recovering the past unaffected might be 
pointless. In his Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (1978), for instance, 
Hayden White, following Claude Lévi-Strauss, insists that facts, rather than provided, are 
carefully selected by historians, who “choose, sever and carve them up for narrative purposes” 
(55). Understandably, from this precept one could infer that, if historical facts cannot simply 
be recollected, the questions that historians formulate when starting their investigation 
somehow (though not completely) determine both the range and the perspective of these facts, 
which is something E. H. Carr (1961) already pointed out: “the facts only speak when the 
historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order 
or context” (11-12). In contrast, though historian Gordon Wood reluctantly admits both the 
irretrievability of the past and how the perception of this past is unavoidably contaminated with 
our present concerns, still he defends that “the present should not be the criterion for what we 
find in the past” (10), for even if some degree of anachronism in history is unavoidable, still a 
good historian should try to elude it as much as possible (39). That is, our present should not 
contaminate how we approach our past, even if this proves an impossible task, for it is our 
present conditions and views on the world which shape the historian’s perspective and interests. 
For history to exist, one needs to believe that it is not just another kind of fiction (even if it is 
formulated like that) and that there are some approaches more serious than others. But still, one 
also needs to understand that our vision of the past is irredeemable shaped by our circumstances 
in the present, and thus anachronism cannot be completely avoided. 
Though ideally aiming towards impartiality, there have been instances, however, in 
which a historical event has been judged and often condemned according to present day moral 
standards. Unsurprisingly, historians have alluded to these judgments in terms of presentism. 
One example of this could be provided by one episode in the history of the slavery in the 
Southern territories of the United States which still concerns historians, usually referred to as 
the Jefferson-Heming’s controversy. The argument of this dispute holds that Thomas Jefferson, 
one of the key Founding Fathers of the United States, had an affair with one of her slaves, Sally 
Heming’s, allegedly fathering at least one child with her. Complaining that the evidence 
provided for such an allegation (mainly, a DNA analysis) is highly inconclusive, and that such 
a speculative accusation is the result of academic opportunism and irresponsible scholarship, 
William Hyland, in his In Defense of Thomas Jefferson (2009), states:  
Like many critical studies of historical figures, the Jefferson-Heming’s debate is 
fundamentally flawed due to ‘presentism.’ By taking Jefferson’s statements out of 
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context and judging him by present-day standards, several historians have 
misinterpreted evidence to indict Jefferson. ‘Presentism’ has plagued this controversy 
by its inability to make allowance for prevailing historical conditions. (5) 
 
Hyland borrows the term from David N. Mayer (1988) and claims that this device 
“presumes that the historical past can be judged by the contemporary standards of the present” 
(159-160).28 Consequently, Hyland understands presentism not as a way of approaching or 
understanding history but as a way of morally condemning historical figures or events 
according to our present-day attitudes. That is, not only is Hyland questioning the use of 
presentism when analysing history, but he also understands the term as a criteria to evaluate 
events (and it seems, always in a pejorative manner) instead of as a tool to interpret them. 
Hyland understandably manifests his reluctance to accept an ethical judgment that, due to the 
diverging codes and ideologies of two temporal periods, is deemed inadmissible, and thus 
accuses presentism of anachronism and tendentiousness. Gordon S. Wood (2008), building 
upon Rebecca West’s arguments, had already observed the previous year that, once injected 
with politics, history stops being a reliable source: “when politics comes in the door, truth flies 
out of the window” (308). In Defense of Jefferson is exactly what its title proposes: a 
vindication of a historical figure made according to the evidence provided by the available data. 
But a defence (or an attack) is ultimately a moral judgment, which needs to be strongly based 
on empirical confirmation to be valid. Since I am not a historian, I do not esteem myself capable 
of judging whether history can be categorically ‘confirmed.’ What I most certainly do believe 
is that presentism is not the most reliable tool when attempting to sanction a fact, simply 
because it does not confirm anything: it just interprets it from a present perspective, 
acknowledging that this interpretation may be quite different from previous ones effected in 
the past.  
Conversely, there are as well situations in which a strictly literary text (and not a 
historical one) has been wrongfully accused of being presentist, when in fact the aspects being 
criticized are unrelated to presentism. In 2011, editor Hillary Kelly bitterly censured the edition 
of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn made by Alan Dribben, where terms such as nigger 
and injun were substituted by ‘slave’ and ‘Indian’ respectively in order to avoid political 
incorrectness, instead of explaining in a footnote that those terms, even if they did have the 
                                                          
28 In a previous note in the same book he adds the adverb “wrongly,” thus making a value judgment on account of presentism’s 
partiality. 
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derogatory connotation they still carry nowadays, were used by people not completely 
conscious of this pejorative undertone. Kelly feared that presentism might “lead to a severely 
distorted perception of history” full of anachronisms, where differences between periods and 
times were erased (newrepublic.com). Her idea parallels those of Jerome Kroll (2007) when he 
states that:  
Among the major problems of presentist history are those of oversimplification, of 
setting up a straw horse to make the contrast between past and present even greater and 
cleaner than it otherwise appears, and of taking a particular text… totally out of context 
while reading into the narratives the lessons we think it is important to learn. (370)  
 
What Kelly is ultimately refuting are the (arguable) decisions of an editor concerning 
the erasing of particular words in a novel which might be offensive to some individuals due to 
their inherent predicament according to present day standards. However, even if Kelly refers 
to these changes as examples of presentism, a close look might show that presentism is 
unconnected to the example she is using to reject it. Kelly’s instance could not be considered a 
kind of presentism because the decision being questioned is a matter of current perspectives on 
ethics, while presentism should be, strictly, a tool for the interpretation of literature, without 
changes effected in the work being analysed, but on the interpretation made of it. In other 
words: presentism should be strictly limited to interpretation, and thus it should not incur in the 
altering of the content of canonical texts, whatever the reason underlying those modifications 
may be. In a historiographical sense, though, Kelly might be right in using the term presentism, 
for what she is ultimately disapproving of in Dribben’s edition of Huckleberry Finn is the 
anachronisms produced. As Kelly points out, by changing derogatory terms by more 
euphemistic ones that were not used at the time the novel was written the work becomes 
anachronistic. Kelly sees that the editor is substituting expressions from the 19th century with 
common euphemisms in the 20th century, and thus she concludes that, because the present is 
“contaminating” the past, it must be presentism. Kelly is not to be blamed for using the term 
presentism in that sense when she is only engaging with a long line of historians and new 
historicists who have traditionally referred to it in derogatory terms when dealing with temporal 
anachronism.29 Interestingly, perhaps Dribben’s motivation to substitute pejorative words in 
                                                          
29 See for instance Jean E. Howard, following historian Dominick LaCapra, in her “The New Historicism in Renaissance 
Studies” (published in English Literary Renaissance, vol. 16, 1986, pp. 13-43), David Scott Kastan in Shakespeare after 
Theory (Routledge, 1999), or Robin Headlam Wells in “Historicism and ‘Presentism’ in Early Modern Studies” (published in 
The Cambridge Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1, 2000, pp. 37-60).  
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Twain’s famous novel was prompted by a desire to approximate the reader to the way 
Huckleberry Finn was read when first published, in 1884, when nigger and injun, though 
undoubtedly scornful, were not as stigmatized words as they are today. Finding those 
expressions in written form might shock the current reader, whereas they were significantly 
commonplace in 19th century United States. Perhaps in his ambitions to recreate a more genuine 
reading experience, Dribben is sacrificing literary integrity for historical accuracy, in which 
case we might have to refer to Dribben’s decision in terms of updating, rather than on terms of 
temporal anachronism (of presentism, if preferred). 
Leaving aside whether Dribben’s decisions were appropriate or not, my attack is not on 
the presumed objectivity (and thus untouchability) of the history contained in literature, but on 
the right of an editor to modify in any way the authors’ choice of words that (s)he finds more 
suitable for his/her novel, even if these are pejorative, racist, or derogatory in any kind of way. 
Perhaps part of the dialectical problem between historians and new historicists on the one hand, 
and pro-presentist critics on the other, might simply be that they use the same term, 
“presentism,” but they do not agree on what it means or entails, nor do they apply it to the same 
field (history or literature). For critics Allen Dunn and Thomas Haddox (2011), for instance, 
presentism and anachronism are interchangeable synonyms used to allude to “historical 
transgressions,” both in the realm of history and of literary interpretation (121). In his Regimes 
of Historicity (2015), however, French historian François Hartog means by presentism the 
omnipotence and omnipresence of the present time, “a present characterized at once by the 
tyranny of the instant and the treadmill of an unending now” (xv). Thus, whereas Dunn and 
Haddox use presentism to refer to a concrete action, for Hartog it alludes to a far more abstract 
entity symptomatic of what he considers a crisis of temporality (xix).30 Nevertheless, if we 
agree that Dribben’s choice results in anachronism, there is still ample field to discuss whether 
this anachronism is disastrous or not.  
In my view, the consequences of anachronism in the discipline of history and in that of 
literature are totally different, and thus, to some extent, both fields might benefit from staying 
separate whenever presentism is concerned. It is true, moreover, that the boundaries between 
present and past might become blurred with presentism, but these boundaries where already 
blurred, particularly after the emergence of postmodernism and its notions of hyper-reality and 
deflation of both time and space. That is, the alleged indistinctiveness of different time periods 
                                                          
30 Hershel Parker (2012) makes an detailed and thoughtful study on the evolution of the negative as well as positive 
connotations attached to the word presentism in his “Presentism in Melville Biography”, which can be found on Melville 
Biography: An Inside Narrative. Northwestern UP, 2012, pp. 251-264. 
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achieved through presentism is not a result of this tool per se, but rather, of the ideological and 
philosophical moment in which we are immersed, which affects all fields of knowledge and 
thought, literature included. Hence, whereas presentist analyses can be effected in literature to 
use the temporal distortion constructively and purposely, as I will try to show, the 
condemnation of presentism, regardless of the field in which it is uttered, is not going to erase 
a blurring between past and present that was already there before authors such as Grady and 
Hawkes engaged with it. In fact, DiPietro complains that it is precisely through presentism that 
the distance between an irretrievable past and our present becomes clear (10-11). 
Perhaps presentism, or what many authors refer to as “indiscriminate anachronism,” 
might be instead a conscious political weapon: in a presentist analysis what matters is not the 
context leading several characters to behave or think the way they do, but how these actions 
and thoughts portrayed in a text become useful and valuable for readers in the present. The aim 
is, therefore, materialistic: presentist analyses, with their consequent anachronistic 
reinterpretation of canonical works, can eventually lead to a change of our preconfigured 
notions of the world. This is an idea to which I will return on section 3 of this chapter. However, 
before doing that, I believe it necessary to dedicate an independent section to continue with the 
confutation against some commonly accepted premises regarding presentism. So far, I have 
insisted that presentism should be understood as a tool for literary analyses (rather than a 
movement or a school), which necessarily encompasses anachronism and subjectivity as part 
of its concomitant characteristics. I have also insisted that it should always be addressed in 
literary terms. Yet, these are not the only attributes of presentism that need to proper 
ascertainment to arrive to a better understanding of what this device, as conceived in this 
dissertation, really is and what are the limits to its scope. Because criticism against presentism 
tends to repeat the same patterns and address the same issues, I believe it necessary to discredit 
some frequent so-called crimes that the notion of presentism invariably seems to imply, though 
not necessarily to perpetrate. 
 
2.2-Misconceptions 
As the reader surely knows, The Crucible is a 1953 play by American playwright Arthur 
Miller in which some historical events and figures from the Salem trials are partially 
fictionalized and presented as a metaphor for the McCarthyism era and the witch-hunt against 
communist sympathisers. In 1985 E. Miller Budick, following David Levin, complained that 
the play lacked in artistic profundity because its constant historic inaccuracies made Miller 
unable to satisfactorily portray 17th century sensibilities: “Miller's Crucible, it would seem, 
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fails to reach the social, historical, and (therefore) moral depth of a great work of art, because 
it cannot imaginatively conjure the world that it pretends to describe” (535). Though many 
interpretations can be made as to why the author chose the Salem trials as analogy to the 
experiences felt by him and other artists and intellectuals during McCarthyism, it seems rather 
plausible that Miller just rewrote and dramatized a real event in order to mirror these past 
experiences, upon which a moral consensus has already been established, to the author’s 
contemporary problems, too temporally close to Miller as to extricate himself from them to 
judge them (536).31 However, as Miller Budick complains, the play is neither just about 
proclaiming a moral verdict, nor about providing a mere analogy; and history works more as 
an anachronistic aesthetic device than as an end in itself: “history is for Miller precisely what 
enables us to resist the demon of moral absolutism” (536). Because inaccuracies abound in The 
Crucible (it is highly unlikely that John Proctor ever engaged in a sexual illicit relationship 
with then 11-year-old Abigail Williams, for instance), historical precision cannot be expected 
to be the ultimate goal of the play. Rather, history appears more as an artistic device, a vehicle 
serving Miller to introduce a current situation from his perspective, which is why it might not 
be too bold to claim The Crucible as an irredeemable presentist work. For example, Proctor’s 
adulterous relationship with Abigail, and the temporal distance separating these characters 
settled in Puritan Massachusetts from their 20th century audience help set a moral dilemma 
whose complexities can only be grasped by current spectators: “how can John Proctor or any 
man believe in his own possible redemption, knowing what he does about the nature of his 
sexual, sinful soul? Our distance from Proctor's dilemma may enable us to understand levels 
of complexity which Proctor cannot begin to acknowledge” (540). Hence, because witnesses 
of Proctor’s suffering and frustration sympathize with a character whose views on the world so 
amply differ from ours, it is the audience from the 20th century the one that can do “precisely 
what the Puritans themselves were unable to do - to accept the diversity of opinions, the variety 
of perceptions, the mixture of bad and good which characterize the human community” (549), 
and thus historical comparison, though its anachronistic depictions, serves an ideological 
function in Miller’s play. 
Miller’s example serves thereby to show three particularities regarding presentism that 
are normally misunderstood or directly overlooked, and which need ascertaining. On the one 
                                                          
31 Obviating of course, the fact that he was also affected personally by the Communist witch-hunt trials, as he was summoned 
by the House Un-American Committee (HUAC) and was one of the people who refused to name names. For more information 
about the influence of the McCarthy hearings in Miller’s The Crucible, see for instance Miller Budick, E. “History and Other 
Spectres in Arthur Miller’s The Crucible.” Modern Drama, vol. 28. No. 4, 1985, pp. 535-552; or Deborah Heinen’s seminar 
paper Arthur Miller’s The Crucible. A Story of Witch Hunting and the Red Scare. (GRIN Verlag, 2016).  
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hand, and as previously explained, the play was first represented in the 1950’s, which proves 
that presentism is not “a new way” of making criticism beginning in the 21st century, but its 
use originates far before, even if in an implicit, rather than openly acknowledged way. Precisely 
because, though overlooked, it has existed in the literary panorama for decades, I seriously 
doubt that presentism can become a stern threat to other movements like new historicism, as 
both have been coexistent for many years without any particularly harmful effect. Also, the 
availability of presentism as an analytical tool has tended to be restricted to the reader/critic 
use, disregarding the fact that authors can also (un)voluntarily engage in presentist features, as 
The Crucible proves. Since all these features affecting presentism and the way it is regarded by 
different disciplines, I believe it is more than necessary to include a section examining these 
otherwise common misconceptions that I would like to dismantle or, at least, introduce for their 
discussion.  
 
2.2.1-The Disdainful Misconception: Presentism is Inherently Uncritical  
Presentism seems to be a stigmatized term, imbued with a damaging connotation which 
has caused its open rejection by many scholars, particularly historians. Thus, it is possible to 
see it appearing in texts with labels such as “insidious” (Milburn 56), “perverse” (Adams 470) 
or even as “a sin” (Phillips & Boivin 379), to mention but a few examples. John Holbo (2008) 
reproaches detractors of presentism their defining the term as “the false projection of features 
of the present onto the past; obstruction of features of the past by those of the present” (1097-
1098), and accuses them of “epistemological naiveté” since, from his perspective, it is 
impossible not to see the past with a perspective different to that of the present, and concludes: 
“to study history is to commit historicist injustice” (1098). As Grady (2002) indicated: “all our 
knowledge of works from the past is conditioned by and dependent upon the culture, language, 
and ideologies of the present” (2). In this line, Valerie Rohy (2006) states that the alteration of 
history is in itself a recent invention from modernity based on the notion of past ages as not 
being continuous to modernity (68). 
Along this same lines of argument, Philip Barrish (2005) makes a distinction between 
critical and uncritical presentism. The first one conceives presentism as seeking “new ways of 
reading literature of the past not only in but with the social present…doing so self-consciously 
and… productively” (19). Valerie Rohy (2006) warns the reader not to “treat ahistorical and 
anachronistic as synonymous and thus to obscure the difference between a neglect of history 
and a violation of chronology” (66-67). To avoid being confused with careless anachronism, 
presentist readings need to be careful and transparent by keeping their methodological 
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anachronism at sight. Otherwise, we would be talking of uncritical presentism, that is, 
according to Barrish’s distinction, particular instances of presentism as blatantly ignoring –as 
in not knowing or irresponsibly contaminating-  the historical context (19). 
One handy example of critical presentism might be provided by Richard Posner in his 
essay: “Orwell Versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and Satire” (2000). Before 
offering a study of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) and George Orwell’s 1984 
(1949) that many would consider presentist, he claims that “it is one thing to require an 
understanding of political and other social issues as a precondition to fully appreciating a work 
of literature, and another to suppose that the significance of that work lies in its relation to those 
issues” (24). Indeed, during his particular analysis of these works Posner proves being perfectly 
conscious of the surroundings and the events that might have driven these authors to the writing 
of their works: by ascribing the authors to the genre of satire and its conventions, he dispels 
some of the common misunderstandings arisen when readers unconscious of the characteristics 
of this particular literary category access the texts, namely, “that the authors were trying to 
predict the future, that they were pessimists…and that Huxley [necessarily] identifies with the 
Savage (or, less plausibly, Bernard) and Orwell with Winston Smith” (9). Posner thereby 
makes clear that sometimes the context of the author can be misguiding if one ignores the 
conditions of the genre in which (s)he is working. In fact, because of satire’s close relationship 
with the social conditions in which it is usually conceived, one might think that this is not the 
most suitable genre to carry out a presentist analysis. However, this perception changes when 
one considers that sometimes the perception of what the satire is about also changes over time. 
Posner begins his essay by showing how the meaning associated to 1984 has evolved from a 
warning against the dangers caused by totalitarian tendencies, to the threats for privacy and 
freedom posed by new technologies in the name of progress and security (1). Of course, the 
novels offer both readings, but the superimposition of one meaning over another evidences the 
change of perception regarding the actuality that these concerns have in our present day.     
Posner makes it clear that he does not at all ignore the distinctive characteristics of these 
works’ genre or the context in which they were written, but he consciously overlooks them in 
favour of a presentist analysis concerning the political goals noticeable in both novels. 
Therefore, the interesting thing about Posner’s study is that he is not interested in talking about 
the context surrounding the creation of these texts but in their current reception; in the study of 
those features that make them still attractive texts. Thus, Posner elaborates the role of solitude 
of the hero in both stories, which in some way relates to the postmodern concept of 
defragmentation: both characters feel alienated in their world and unable to fit in. There is a 
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constant and asphyxiating sense of loss of privacy, which in Huxley’s case comes as a 
consequence of the rapid development of technology (6), and in Orwell’s, as a strategy to avoid 
subversive thinking (2). Technology also occupies a significant role in Posner’s essay, for it is 
through this theme that Posner establishes a comparison regarding how the authors presumed 
the world was going to be like in a near future, and what has really happened afterwards. This 
serves Posner to demonstrate that a more “historically relevant” novel does not make it more 
pertinent in present times, nor does it guarantee its success. 
Hence, in his analysis Posner effects his study by comparing what the authors depict in 
their novels as the near future in contrast to what we are experiencing now, focusing on how 
technology has helped implement or combat societal changes. Technology in A Brave New 
World is at the service of a utilitarian ideology and has resulted in intellectual and cultural 
emptiness, relentless conformism, and political passivity, albeit with a maximization of 
(artificial and many times delusional) happiness (10). For Posner, one of the things that makes 
this novel still a valuable reading today is, interestingly, the success of its predictions regarding 
technology and morality. Practically like in the book: “we consider it our duty as well as our 
right to pursue happiness right to the edge of the grave…Our culture is saturated with sex. 
Shopping is the national pastime…the major political parties are copies of each other” (13). 
Still, he differs from Huxley in envisaging this kind of society would spring from a utilitarian 
master plan. 
Conversely, in 1984 technology and scientific advancement have been stalled by the 
three superpowers (Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia) in order to impose firm domination over 
their populations. Even so, the few instances of technological advancement in the novel, in the 
form of machine production that is oriented towards warfare, help implement totalitarianism 
(14). Though Posner disagrees with Orwell’s thesis that capitalism would lead to a centralized 
economic system very much in the shape of Soviet communism, still he wonders at how 
technology (symbolized in the telescreen) can be put at the service of a totalitarian state in order 
to effect total control over its citizens by completely depriving them of their privacy. However, 
psychological and ideological dominance are still effected in the story through other 
techniques, such as propaganda, education and censorship, thus overrating the power of double-
thinking, and underrating that of television (which Posner arguably believes has proved 
valuable in increasing people’s access to information, rather than in becoming a tool for 
indoctrination) (18).  
Intriguingly, though Posner sees more weaknesses in Orwell’s work than in Huxley’s 
regarding how their prophecies have actually turned out, he believes that 1984 has become a 
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more popular work than its predecessor. For Posner, the answer lies in his subjective opinion 
that, even if the novel may be more “historically” flawed, it is still a better novel (22), 
emphasizing the artistic component of the text over the political ideology confined in it; that 
is, prioritizing the aesthetic approach over the contextualization of the work, which limits its 
reception scope.  
What interests me, though, is not Posner’s reliance on the pleasurable aspect of reading 
to explain why a given novel is more successful than another, but on the fact that his presentist 
analysis shows a deep understanding both of the generic characteristics of the works concerned 
and of the socio-historical aspects influencing the ideology immersed in the text. It is true that 
Posner’s analysis could be used against presentism, for eventually he is claiming that, 
regardless of whether Orwell’s and Huxley’s novels are significant in our current period, this 
historical significance alone does not serve to explain their current popularity. Notwithstanding 
this backlash to presentism, his analysis may be still considered presentist in the sense that he 
constantly brings the future depicted in these novels to our present day in order to prove his 
point. That is, in order to prove presentism wrong, he carries out a presentist analysis, which 
also happens to be acutely insightful, where history and contextual knowledge are amply 
acknowledged, but readily ignored. In fact, there is a moment in which Posner justifies his 
presentist analysis asserting that: 
Orwell’s satire of communism has lost its urgency, but his reminder of the political 
importance of truth, of the malleability of the historical record, and of the dependence 
of complex thought on a rich vocabulary…remains both philosophically interesting, 
and timely in an era in which history textbooks are being frantically rewritten to comply 
with the dictates of political correctness. (26, my italics) 
 
The contextualization of a literary works is important, but it might not be entirely 
essential for appreciating a text. Trying to defend new historicism, in his 2012 essay “Limiting 
History” Marshall Grossman complains that the defence of art-for-art’s sake and the new 
critics’ emphasis on the autonomy of the text entailed an understanding of literature as 
something pleasurable, but nonetheless irrelevant due to its decontextualization from the 
situation influencing its creation and further reception; and claims that one of the goals of new 
historicism is precisely to fight against this simplistic assumption: “The aim of [n]ew 
[h]istoricism was to rescue literature from the irrelevance implicit in the New Critics’ assertion 
of its autonomy” (67). As a way to demonstrate how relevant context is to text (and vice versa), 
Grossman makes a deeply interesting analysis on John Milton’s witty use of language in his 
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1667 work Paradise Lost and how Satan resembles Cromwell in some aspects while the devils’ 
manipulation of the Parliament alluded in its time to the collapse of the Presbyterian church 
and the monarchy. Grossman claims that all these aspects of the text are impossible to 
appreciate without previous instruction, since they do not come straightforward to mind if the 
reader is not fully acquainted with the historical moment in which Milton is writing. Grossman 
is right when he claims that a proper understanding of the socio-political moment which 
surrounded the crafting of this poem provides the reader with a far more insightful appreciation 
of its mastery. However, perhaps limiting the poem to its contextual moment would be 
insufficient, since, in that case, it could not be explained why, though some readers are 
completely unaware of the background surrounding the text’s production, they still appreciate 
it and enjoy it nowadays. Not only that, even though no one can deny the importance and 
usefulness of historicist accounts, they may not be enough per se to make a text completely 
understandable, precisely because no one can access the author’s mind and real intentions when 
writing it. And even if the author’s intentions, for whatever reason, are entirely clear, Umberto 
Eco (1995) still wonders whether what one finds in a text is the result of the text’s own 
coherence and underlying significance system, or what the addressees find in it based on their 
own expectations (76).  Furthermore, the complications posed by those canonical works which 
either remain anonymous or have traditionally been attributed to an author (Homer, in this 
sense, comes easily to mind) should not be ignored. 
As Terence Hawkes explains in Presentist Shakespeares (2007) presentism does not 
emerge as the ultimate school for criticism,32 but as an alternative one, together with other 
schools: “a transfer of emphasis from ‘text’ towards ‘context’ has increasingly been the concern 
of critics since Second World War… that has perhaps reached its climax with ‘[n]ew 
[h]istoricism’, ‘[c]ultural [m]aterialism’ or ‘[p]resentism’” (xi). Hawkes does not deny the 
relevance of historicism: he simply states that knowing how the context influences a literary 
piece does not imply knowing the real intentions of the author at a given moment, and does not 
at all explain why, centuries after that text has stopped being relevant to the temporal period, it 
may still be considered a masterpiece by readers who enjoy the experience and value the text’s 
significance in their lives. Because readers adapt the text to their personal situation, they rewrite 
its meaning to make it relevant to them. Hence, the fact that literature from the past still offers 
                                                          
32 Again, Grady and Hawkes always talk of presentism as a school, even though I personally consider it more a tool for 
analysis.  
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and provides current readers with a knowledge of the world which is valuable in present terms 
is undeniable. If texts did not speak to their readers, they would probably stop being read.  
In favour of presentism Julia Crockett explains that “the re-orientation in reading 
Shakespeare for the present opens possibilities for an experimental dialogue with the future 
just as radically significant as engagement with the past” (shaksper.net). Grossman is conscious 
of this reappraisal of literary works despite their decontextualization, and states regarding 
Paradise Lost: “though may be in the time and place of its production, there remains also a 
poem to be read in our time and place. The poem, to be a poem according to this definition, 
must do something more than witness the context of its own creation” (67, my italics). 
However, the fact that presentism is linked to one’s situatedness, both spatial and temporal, 
does not at all entail that it is, or should be, directed against periodization. Presentism should 
be understood as a tool to add to the shed for the study of literature and its theory, rather than 
as a method for analysis aimed at overthrowing new historicism, or any other discipline, from 
its pedestal. Eventually, presentism may or may not be used: it all depends on what kind of 
approach one prefers to take, either one more relevant to the period in which the literary text 
was conceived, or another more focused on the period in which this same text is received. 
 
2.2.2-The Unilateral Misconception: Presentism is only work-reader oriented 
That presentism can only be used by the reader/critic as a particular way to engage with 
a given text is, perhaps, one of the most important misconceptions to counterattack, precisely 
because focusing only on the reader’s perception of a text could nullify presentism’s 
decolonizing potential. This is mainly due to the fact that efforts of decolonization, when 
portrayed in literature, are normally author-work oriented; that is, they are normally carried out 
by an author consciously engaging in a narrative of resistance. If one conceives of presentism 
as a tool only at the disposal of a reader when (s)he is approaching a text, not only are its 
possibilities and scope as a tool limited, but also, its possibilities for decolonial endeavours are 
overlooked. 
 So far, presentism seems to have been shown as a practice carried out at the reader- 
work level: the individual who approaches a text from his/her present perspective and tries to 
find in it answers to his/her anxieties. However, presentism can also appear at the author-work 
level, as in the rewriting of famous myths carried out by some writers for ideological purposes 
or critiques. One good example of this is offered by British author Angela Carter, who in her 
1979 collection of fairy tales The Bloody Chamber retrieves the dark element in folk tales 
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which seem to have disappeared from current children stories. This is obvious, for instance, in 
the story (and Carter’s arguable presentist portrayal) of “Little Red Riding Hood.”  
“Little Red Riding Hood” is a well-known folk tale in the European context which tells 
the story of a careless little girl who finds herself in trouble when, heading to her sick grandma’s 
house to bring her some supplies, encounters an evil wolf that charms her in order to retrieve 
information about how to get where the sick granny lives. The two main versions that have 
survived of this popular tale belong to Charles Perrault and the Grimm brothers, and present 
two completely opposite endings. In Perrault’s the child is eventually devoured by the 
mischievous wolf, giving it a tragic note that alerts girls of the dangers of misbehaving 
(especially when males are involved in the process). The Grimm brothers, on the other hand, 
included the sudden appearance of a hunter at the end who saves both the girl and the grandma, 
thus emphasizing the need for a patriarchal figure to protect the helpless female, and providing 
the reader with a noticeably more sweetened finale through a convenient deus ex machina. 
Perrault’s considerably sourer ending, together with the lack of knowledge of previous 
versions, is one of the reasons why scholar Susana González Marín (2005) claims that, for a 
long time, it was believed that the popular story did not derive from oral folklore, but that it 
had been directly created by Perrault (14). However, though it is true that Perrault’s version is 
the first one in written form lacking in a religious goal (González 105), it seems quite likely 
that the French writer was inspired by several stories from the popular tradition; stories that, 
conversely, Angela Carter must also have known well, for she recovered some of their elements 
and incorporated them –though modified at her discretion- to her own work. 
The tradition that Perrault probably knew and quite likely used has been subsequently 
reconstructed from diverse stories gathered in the Loire region in 1885, contrasted and 
supported with additional versions coming from other parts of France and the north of Italy. 
Published for the first time in 1951 by Paul Delarue as “The Story of Grandmother” (González 
24), the tale is more openly eschatological, cruel, and abundant in explicit sexual allusions. For 
instance, when the child finally arrives to the house, the wolf urges her to drink her 
grandmother’s blood and eat her meat. Also, when the beast tells her to lay with him in bed, 
the little girl gets slowly naked, throwing her apron into the fire, for the wolf convinces her that 
she won’t “need it anymore” (Delarue 15). Because at some point the girl needs to go to the 
toilet and she refuses to do so in the bed, as the animal suggests, she is fortunately given the 
opportunity to escape the house, even though the wolf ties a woollen thread to her ankle to 
prevent her from fleeing. However, because the girl is witty, once outside she ties the end of 
the chord to a tree and runs away. This way, though it is assumed that she gets raped by the 
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villain, eventually she succeeds in her ordeal thanks to her audacity, which proves not only her 
boldness, but also her recently achieved maturity. The idea that could be extracted from the 
story is that children will unavoidably get into trouble, but what they need is to learn how to 
find solutions and solve their problems by their own means. 
Nevertheless, independently from the details that Perrault and the Grimm Brothers 
might have added in later revisions, what seems true is that the story was originally envisioned 
as a cautionary tale that, principally due to its multiple revisions and considerations, eventually 
became a story without a message, with a somehow laughable ending and completely deprived 
of any kind of erotic allusion. Some critics, like Carol and D. T. Hanks (1978), complained 
about the increasing trend during the 1970’s of protecting children’s innocence, which drove 
many translators to soften folk tales, masking or even eliminating those elements which might 
address sexuality or death, so inherent to folklore, and thus transforming tales into sweetened 
and empty containers for kids.  
This dynamic was radically contested when in 1979 Angela Carter’s The Bloody 
Chamber was published. Consisting of a collection of short stories, her tales are often 
embedded in the classification of “eroticized fairy tales,” which normally focus on the sexual 
initiation of an innocent child (Jorgensen 29). In the introduction to the 2006 edition, Helen 
Simpson indicates that this work has often been faulted as “a group of traditional fairy tales 
given a subversive feminist twist” (Carter, vii). Even though it is true that Carter emphasizes 
the feminine perspective and seems very determined to provide her characters with agency and 
independence, it must be pointed out that she was neither the first one to do it, nor the only one, 
for there are previous examples (Benson 48). Literary figures in Victorian England such as 
Jean Ingelow, Christina Rosetti and Juliana Horatia Ewing, for instance, challenged with their 
tales the male-centred vision of femininity normally portrayed in traditional folk tales by 
granting a stronger role to female characters (Knoepflmacher 426).  
On the other hand, Carter always complained that with her works she did not intend to 
create “versions,” but to recover suppressed elements already existing in popular stories and 
use them to write new stories (vii-viii). I thereby propose that Carter is not just engaging in a 
mere revision of popular tales, but rather, that her recollections could be considered examples 
of author-work oriented presentism. In fact, I suggest that it actually does not really matter 
whether she is just presenting the same story from a different perspective or recovering some 
components of folk tales long forgotten to create something new: the fact that she is using 
popular traditions to express the anxieties of her age regarding women and their sexuality still 
remains. As Jorgensen claims, many other examples of eroticized fairy tales, precisely because 
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they derive from folklore, eventually questioned female’s will and capacity to act, even if they 
were originally intended to depict the opposite idea (29). Christine A. Jones (2013) sets the 
example of 17th French folktales “Marmoisan, or the Innocent Trick” by Marie-Jeanne 
L’Héritier, “Belle-Belle or the Knight Fortuné” by Marie-Catherine d’Aulnoy, and “The 
Savage” by Henriette-Julie de Murat, all of them narrating the ordeals of female cross-dressers 
who become knights as the main plot. Regarding the erotization of these disguised-as-male 
maidens, Jones comments: “the fairy-tale model plainly implies that even sexier than a man in 
uniform is a beautiful girl in a man’s uniform doing his job. At the end of the day the cross-
dressed heroines join the court they have done battle for as its queen” (16). However, the 
presumed agency displayed by these heroines who demonstrate their ability to break with 
constrictive gender roles while exhibiting their excellency in any man’s task proves deceptive, 
as these female-knights always end up marrying the prince and abandoning their masquerade 
once their worth is proved. Few films exemplify this elusiveness of female agency as clear as 
Disney’s 1998 film Mulan, in which, after saving the whole China against the Huns’ invasion, 
the heroine kindly refuses to be appointed advisor for no other than the Emperor himself, 
claiming that her real place is back at home, presumably making tea for his incapacitated father. 
Because Carter’s recovery of the dark and sexual components of folklore is used in a 
presentist manner (to create something new rather than just amending what was originally 
there) she manages to defy the patriarchal oppression present in these stories thanks to what 
she called “moral pornography.”33 Contrary to other feminists from her period, not only did the 
English writer not censure pornography, but she also proposed to give it an ideological use by 
subverting the heteronormative, patriarchal canon distinctive of this kind of works, that usually 
displayed women as objects; and thus use pornography as a tool in the fight for women’s 
liberation (Grossman, “Born to Bleed” 151). In the case of “Little Red Riding Hood,” for 
instance, the writer gave the legend’s latent sexuality a radical twist in her three short stories 
“The Werewolf,” “The Company of Wolves,” and “Wolf-Alice,” where she restores the girl’s 
traditionally denied agency and transforms that implicit sexuality into rebellious eroticism. 
In Perrault masculinity appears as something threatening, violent, and dangerous, for 
its presence is strictly limited to the wolf, since the rest of the characters (the mother, the 
grandmother, and the child) are all women. However, in Carter’s “The Werewolf,” the wolf 
turns out to be a she-wolf, breaking with that tradition that tends to portray these hybrids always 
                                                          
33 Angela Carter claimed that pornography could be put into the service of women to challenge passive stereotypes associated 
to them. As she herself claims in The Sadeian Woman (1979): “A moral pornographer might use pornography as a critique of 
the current relation between the sexes” (19-20). 
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as male. Consequently, the granny occupies a place which has generally been attributed to the 
sexual male predator: it is not that the wolf dresses up as the granny, the granny is, literally, 
the wolf (Lau 82). This detail already sets forth the feminist tone that the rest of the stories will 
have, threatening the patriarchal dominance of the erotic popular imaginary. It might also be 
interesting to point out that, though the three stories are independent from one another, they 
have conventionally been studied together, due to the multiple re-readings that their inter-
textuality34 encourages, and the “wholeness” that they seem to achieve in their assembling. 
This is the conclusion to which Kimberly J. Lau arrives at when she indicates that the fact that 
they appear one after the other in The Bloody Chamber brings as a result that every tale is read 
in the previous one’s light, with the consequence that a revision and a new interpretation is 
increasingly achieved (82). Carter’s universe is dark and sinister, sometimes morbid and 
sadistically violent, and some other times movingly tender in her representation of the 
everlasting clash between the individual and its nemesis: that hideous ‘Other’ that constitutes 
one of the leitmotifs of her work, and that most of the times only projects the monstrosity found 
in oneself.  
Alternatively, one of Perrault’s innovations was the inclusion of a moral at the end of 
the narration. This way, the French author warned about the dangers of carnality, 
recommending young girls (especially the pretty ones), not to go near those good-looking men 
who might hide a wolf inside. In Carter’s three short stories, this monstrous Other is always a 
hybrid which interacts, either physically or sexually, with the rest of the characters. The beast 
is described as a wild animal, untamed and irrational: “of all the teeming perils of the night and 
the forest… the wolf is worst for he cannot listen to reason” (“The Company of Wolves” 130). 
However, no monster is entirely fierce, and no human being is completely meek: as Perrault 
well claimed, quite often the kindest man hides an inner beast; but Carter completes this 
dualism by implying that beasts also resent their animal condition, transforming their howling 
at night into a desperate lament for not being more human, “as if the beasts would love to be 
less beastly if only they knew how and never cease to mourn their own condition” (131). Carter 
emphasizes the animality resting in every man, but also the visible humanity of every animal. 
And this animality always develops into an unavoidable attraction between the characters, 
described almost invariably in erotic terms. 
                                                          
34 Intertextuality is a term first introduced by Julia Kristeva in 1966 (Sharma 3) to allude to the interdependence of a literary 
text with all those texts that have come before it. Part of the meaning of a work is achieved thanks to the relation it establishes 
with the tradition to which this text belongs, or through the repetition, challenging or transformation it makes of previous 
literary texts (Culler 2011, 34-35). 
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As is well-known, many times in gothic fiction the monster serves as the mirror of 
society, providing civilization with a counter-image, most often distorted and terrifying, which 
reflects the flaws and deficiencies of that society which has decided to look at its reflection. As 
Daniel Punday (2002) declares: “literary monsters serve to challenge the homogeneity of 
society by revealing its tensions, inconsistencies, and gaps” (803). The wolf in Carter’ stories 
is always monstrous, but in “The Company of Wolves” and “Wolf-Alice” this is a handsome, 
even sensual aberration, that does not go unnoticed for the rest of the characters. This way, 
Carter always leaves unsaid who the ‘real’ monster in the story is. In “The Werewolf,” for 
instance, the wolf turns out to be the very same grandma, who ends up burned alive as a witch. 
But the one who ultimately reports her to the authorities is no other than her own 
granddaughter, who becomes not only responsible for the old lady’s sentence and death, but 
also a usurper to her home, where she is said to prosper without the slightest trace of repentance 
or grief. The old lady may be a physical aberration, but her grandniece, though completely 
human is, in contrast, morally repulsive.   
Similarly, in “The Company of Wolves,” the wolf turns from a threat into a lover. The 
story starts with a description of the animal in these terms: “the wolf is carnivore incarnate and 
he’s as cunning as he is ferocious; once he’s had a taste of flesh then nothing else will do” 
(129). It is important to point out that Carter uses the term ‘flesh,’ as opposed to ‘meat’. More 
than a literal affirmation, it is a sexual metaphor, where ‘devouring the victim’ resembles more 
a rape than a feast, as the multiple allusions included in the attacks of this animal show. When 
the werewolf dangerously approaches the grandmother, the terrified lady desperately throws 
her Bible at him, and the narrator addresses her with kind compassion and states: “you can hurl 
your Bible at him and your apron after, granny, you thought that was a sure prophylactic against 
these infernal vermin” (135). Comparing religion to a useless prophylactic puts the reader in 
the trace of a symbolic consumption that has more to do more with a sexual act in the shape of 
rape than with a literal meal: it is a consummating, rather than a consuming. Later on, when 
finally devoured, the reader is told that “the last thing the old lady saw in all this world was a 
young man, eyes like cinders, naked as a stone, approaching her bed” (136). In classical 
mythology, the wolf has conventionally stood up for rape, as is the case of Dorcon35 in 
Longus’s work Daphnis and Chloe, or even Lycaon;36 and it is true that in the story of “Little 
                                                          
35 In the novel, Dorcon is a cow shepherd who pretends Chloe. At some point, unable to repress his consuming passion any 
longer, Dorcon hides in a bush disguised as a wolf to take Chloe off guard, though his scheme turns blatantly unsuccessful as 
he is attacked by Daphnis and Chloe’s dogs.  
36 In Greek mythology, Lycaon was the king of Arcadia. The versions existing of this myth differ drastically, though the most 
popular version holds that, in order to prove Zeus’s omniscience, Lycaon sacrificed one of his fifty sons, Nyctimus, and served 
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Red Riding Hood,” independently of who the author is, this simile is maintained. Yet, Carter 
always hides the true intentions of the wolf, and though the image of the rapist still prevails, as 
happens with other authors such as Warner (Propst 140), Carter refuses to present women as 
the object/victim of this symbolic rape so typical in the oral tradition, and portrays them instead 
in an alternative fashion, as active subjects who are conscious of their own sexual desire. 
González indicates that one of the best contributions made by Perrault to the story, as 
opposed to previous sources of the tale, was not only to make the girl its absolute protagonist, 
but also to give her a distinctive identity. However, because she is unable to survive adversity 
on her own, the idea that the tale eventually portrayed was that women could not subsist in 
their own without a man there to protect them, which is exactly one of the conclusions that can 
be extracted from Grimm’s modified ending (103), where the sudden apparition of the hunter 
presumes that there will always be someone to protect our kids, even if they make mistakes, or 
do not ‘follow the path’ that their parents have set for them. Carter, however, changes these 
ideas from a strongly patriarchal culture and departs from the erotic folktale tradition that, 
despite possessing a long history of women writers (the famous conteuses or female tale-tellers, 
beginning in France in the 1690’s) (Wanning Harries 5), denied female characters their power 
and their capacity to choose for themselves. Not only does Carter allow the girl to make her 
own decisions (sexual ones included), but she also eroticizes the wolf, with the result that 
sexual instinct does not become hideous, nor threatening for the characters, but just atavistic, 
instinctive and definitely attractive. In “The Company of Wolves” the girl is utterly conscious 
of her desire and decides to give free reign to her longing. Even if at first she seems 
overwhelmed and distressed by the situation she is immersed in, soon she takes control of the 
events and becomes an active subject of everything that happens afterwards. First, she freely 
gives the werewolf the kiss she had promised in case she lost the bet they had previously made. 
She then lays with him after throwing his clothes to the fire. This scene brings to mind “the 
story of Grandmother,” but Carter introduces two substantial differences: first, it is the clothes 
of the beast, and not hers that she throws to the fire, and not because she is told to do so, but 
because she wants to. And second: the girl knows that a werewolf will never become human 
again if his clothes are burned, so in doing it, she shows she is not at all interested in the human 
aspect of the beast, but in the animalistic one. She willingly chooses to lay with the monster, a 
beast which is finally tamed: “sweet and sound she sleeps in granny’s bed, between the paws 
of the tender wolf” (“The Company of Wolves” 139). The end of the short story describes a 
                                                          
his meat to the Olympian God. Appalled for what he had witnessed, Zeus punished Lycaon transforming him into a wolf. 
Interestingly, this motif of cannibalism is also present in the “The Story of Grandmother.”  
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girl who has gained experience in life (symbolized in her occupying the place of her 
grandmother, presumably the voice of wisdom, in the bed) and smiles satisfied, knowing that 
she is “nobody’s meat” (138), for she is aware that she will not be devoured physically, but in 
a sexual sense, and only after she has given herself willingly, not because she is helpless, as 
traditional folktales often suggest. Since the tale recreates a girl’s first sexual encounter as a 
consequence of her active choice, the coming of age of female characters traditionally depicted 
in folk tales in a passive sense (a girl has her first period and thus she is imprisoned in a high 
tower by an evil relative, such as is Rapunzel’s case)37 is transformed here into an active 
process deriving from the girl’s resolution to enter the world of adulthood in sexual terms. As 
Bacchilega indicates: “the girl offers herself as flesh, not meat . . . Both carnivores incarnate, 
these two young heterosexual beings satiate their hunger not for dead meat, but flesh, while at 
the same time embodying it” (Bacchilega 64/Lau 88). This way, Carter breaks with the pattern 
of eroticized tales in which female sexual desire is characterized by its passivity and the 
necessity that the other (male) characters take the initiative (Jorgensen 30).  
Carter’s illustration could be considered a feminist example aimed at deconstructing 
the patriarchal pillars upon which folktales seem to have been built, but she does so from her 
standpoint on women’s right to agency in sexual matters, and her self-acquired positioning as 
a mindful and active feminist writer developing her activity during the late 1970’s. Even if the 
reader analyses Carter’s stories as challenging fairy tales’ traditional masculinist oppressive 
vision of women, in this particular case it is the author herself who openly criticizes this pattern 
and contests it by bringing these folktales to the present light to offer a different, resistant 
perspective. Hence, Carter’s presentist stories provide us with a perfect example of how 
presentism not only derives from the meaning that the reader extracts from a work, but also 
from the meaning that the author implants in his/her work. 
 
2.3-In Need of a Better Definition: Presentism and Aesthetic Materialism 
One of the most common attacks conducted against presentism is related to the 
dissolution of historical difference that results from its practice. Yet, as Ewan Fernie (2005) 
claims, at the core of presentism’s articulation is the understanding that historicity is also time 
dependent and thereby subject to change, which is the reason why “the presence of the 
                                                          
37 This motif of Rapunzel being locked in a high tower when she reaches puberty by her step-mother appears for the first time 
in Charlotte-Rose de Caumont de la Force’s “Persinette” (1698), and is repeated afterwards in all following versions: Friedrich 
Schultz’s “Rapunzel” (1790), Johanne Gustav Busching’s “Die Padde” (1812), and the Grimm Brothers’ “Rapunzel” (1812 
and 1857).  
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historical text in the present never simply mirrors and affirms the present” (179). The text’s 
own jargon and cultural logic is what maintains its historicity, even if read in present-day terms 
(179). Because these accusations chiefly originate in the field of history, from which presentism 
should be strictly averted, perhaps it is high time to approach presentism from a perspective 
other than that which links it to history-making and purely temporal notions. Once assumed 
that presentism does not aim at objectivity (nor there is any reason why it should be), and once 
understood that some degree of anachronism is to be inevitably expected, there still are other 
parameters prompting the conceptualization of presentism that would relate it more to notions 
of reception theory and aesthetics. In fact, during his intervention in a roundtable about 
presentism organized by Hugh Grady, Cary DiPietro (2007) advocated for a “materialist 
aesthetics” to create a theoretical ground for presentism, adding:  
A presentist criticism will therefore need to re-stake its claim to literary studies by 
investing, after the modernist fashion, in the aesthetic; for what finally distinguishes our 
critical pursuit from that of historical studies more generally, is our shared belief and 
investment in literary and dramatic art. (shaksper.net) 
 
DiPietro is aware of the importance of the aesthetic value of an artwork for the sake of 
presentist analyses: for one of the premises of presentism is, precisely, that literary works are 
not dead objects but continue to live in our present. Were aestheticism to be considered a 
product of cultural ideology, then it is understandable that it is also concomitant to the 
alterations in the ideology of those who determine what is aesthetically pleasing and what is 
not, at a particular moment. Because presentism has always been contemplated in the light of 
its relation to history, objectivity, and time, it is easy to disregard that, if we disengage from 
the historiographical field in which it was first enunciated and instead understand presentism 
as an aesthetic literary tool, the inevitable anachronism which impregnates it stops being an 
impediment to become, possibly, a necessary aesthetic device. As DiPietro explains: 
If historicism employs the analogy as a rhetorical device to resituate the text in its past, 
the double-focus of presentism, by comparison, lends itself to the use of productive 
anachronism…anachronism functions to interrogate that sense of continuity which 
otherwise makes the aesthetic object a living work of art for us in the present. 
(shaksper.net, my italics)  
 
DiPietro does not deny that presentism entails anachronism regardless of the field in 
which it is used. But, following Hawkes’ playfulness, DiPietro advocates for using the 
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limitations of presentism to the critic’s advantage, using anachronism –consciously, and always 
understood as a means, rather than a result, to find those aesthetic components of a particular 
text that make it still valuable in our present day. Anachronism passes then from being an 
undesirable, sinful mistake, to become a perhaps useful analytical instrument.  
Some might argue that to envisage anachronism as an artistic component in order to 
connect presentism with the aesthetic is a rather sneaky misrepresentation, too twisted to be 
plausible, and too conveniently distorted to be taken into serious consideration. Quite on the 
contrary, through the following pages I will try to show that presentism is more connected to 
the aesthetic and theories of reception than what it might appear, thus claiming the need to re-
conceptualize the whole notion of what presentism consists of and in which field to insert it. 
 
2.3.1-Presentism and Close Reading 
Frantzen and McMahon, in their essay “And__? Using Digital Tools to Reread The 
Canterbury Tales” (2011), strongly disagree with those “literary theories that seem to replace 
close reading and encourage students to impose meaning on texts rather than discover ways in 
which meaning is achieved by language” (133). Though not mentioning it directly, they seem 
to be alluding to the practice of presentism, which for them represents a way of distorting a text 
so that it appears to say what the reader wants it to say, instead of unravelling what the text is 
really about by means of close attention to its language and the ways sentences are made. There 
are, at least, two ideas to highlight from their statement. First, it is true that it is one thing to try 
to understand what the text is saying, or focusing on how it might have relevance in current 
times, and it is a very different thing to alter or twist it in order to read from it what one wants, 
regardless of what the message may actually be. It is also true that a reckless use of presentism 
could lead to that result, although then we would be talking of an irresponsible, if not directly 
wrong, use of this tool, and the fault would reside in the way it is used, not in the tool itself.  
However, part of Frantzen and McMahon’s argument loses strength when, in order to prove 
themselves right, they conduct a close-reading analysis which consists of discovering how 
many times the conjunction ‘and’ appears in several of Chaucer’s tales to extract “undiscovered 
hidden meanings” from its presence, without even considering whether its appearance is related 
to examples of description and/or narration; as if a de-contextualized particle, studied in 
isolation, could reveal Chaucer’s intentions and real goals in those texts. Leaving aside the 
arguable opinion that Frantzen and McMahon, though unwillingly, are also imposing their own 
meaning to Chaucer’s tales, the method of close reading might prove interesting and valuable 
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for many other studies. However, perhaps a little immersion into what close reading consists 
of and how it originated may be of some help at this point. 
Many scholars find in close reading a direct opposite to presentism, for whereas the 
latter applies the text to the context of present times, the prompter can advocate, in extreme 
cases, for a total de-contextualization of the text in favour of a study in extreme depth of the 
language used in order to achieve meaning and determine its aesthetic value. The American 
school of New Criticism, which set out to produce, to the greatest possible extent, an objective 
reading of a text (Parvini 25-26), may be the best example of a school that has, since its 
inception in the 1930’s and 1940’s, championed the practice of close reading.38 As Andrew 
Dubois (2007) claims, in words of Rey Chow: “New Criticism is still invested in a kind of 
time-less reading… that circumvents temporality by the ideological projection of the work’s 
organic wholeness” (928). The problem is that, for such claim to be valid, new criticism must 
necessarily engage in a conception of the Aesthetic in terms of immanence and immutability, 
for no timeless reading would ever be possible if the whole idea of the Aesthetic that supports 
it was not subject to the same parameters. However, Joseph North (2013) makes a pertinent 
and ultimately essential distinction between the new critics’ use of close reading and the way 
close reading was originally conceived by its precursors in the British practical criticism from 
the early 1920’s, I. A. Richards and William Empson.  
Close reading initially appeared as a device to help analyse the aesthetic potential of 
texts in accordance to their reception by readers. Its founder, I. A. Richards, felt that the Kantian 
aesthetic philosophy (the art-for-art’s sake notion) was an end in itself which set up the 
“aesthetic as a self-sufficient category insulated from the rest of life” (144) and rejected the 
active role of experience and perception. His view was purely materialistic: what concerned 
Richards was not the supposedly objective aesthetic value of an artwork considered in isolation 
but the way it was accepted by the reader: “Richards’s aesthetic theory continually asks us to 
turn our attention away from the artwork ‘in itself,’ and to focus instead on the nature of the 
relationship between artworks and their audiences” (145). Hence, even though Richards 
focused on the contents of a work and the language used to convey meaning, still he envisioned 
literary texts as entities which could not be disengaged from the reader. Interpretation was 
ultimately understood in materialistic terms. 
                                                          
38 Some of the most notorious representative thinkers and publications of this movement are Cleanth Brooks’s The Well 
Wrought Urn (1947); John Crowe Ransom’s The New Criticism (1941); and William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley’s 
“The Intentional Fallacy” (1946) and “The Affective Fallacy” (1949).  
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As far as both appeal to the effect of a given text in the audience, presentism and 
Richards’ conception of close reading is linkable. The difference lies in the fact that, whereas 
Richards’ emphasis is on the form and the language used, presentism’s methodology is filtered 
by the impact of the present. Following this logic, close reading and presentism would come to 
represent two different tools at hand for the same purpose, namely, scrutinize why and how a 
text is received by an audience. The difference lies in the methodology adopted, for whereas 
close reading concentrates in the form, presentism focuses on the context: “[Richards’s] 
commitment to ‘context’ in this sense is in fact very deep indeed. For Richards ‘close reading’ 
was a way to intervene in the context of reception, which is to say, the minds of actual, living 
readers” (146). Not surprisingly, critics such as David Crouch and Jennifer Rutherford (2014), 
following Jane Tompkins’s Reader-Response Criticism, mention Richards as one of the key 
contributors of and antecedents to the theory of reception (360), which focuses on the 
individual reader’s interpretation when extracting meaning from a literary text. In fact, Hans 
Robert Jauss, who coined the term “reception theory,” envisioned his theorization of the 
horizon of expectations as a strategy to overcome the limitations in Richard’s Aesthetics of 
response (Holub 60-61).  
The problem came when the New Critics School of the United States of America 
adopted this new system of analysis proposed by Richards. The New Critics were individualists 
(148), and though Richards’ new method of study was welcomed, not so did the materialist 
theory underlying it, which they passed through the filters of their individualistic vision and 
directed back towards Kant (150) for, as North explains: 
for thinkers formed within this very particular structure of feeling [New Critics 
conservatism], it really is not quite imaginable that another thinker in aesthetics, raised 
within a very different structure of feeling, might set himself the task of questioning the 
authority of Kant. (152) 
 
Hence, adopting Kant’s categorization of aesthetics as universal and eternal, American 
new critics focused their attention strictly on language and structure, forgetting about the 
context in general, and the reader in particular, to treat the text “purely ‘in itself’” (151). This 
way, whereas the materialist component (social, as well as ideological) of I. A. Richards now 
seems largely forgotten, the resulting methodology of his aesthetic theory, that of 
decontextualized close reading, has become the preeminent practice in literary theory for more 
than two decades.  
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To claim that presentism resembles close reading as it is understood and carried out 
nowadays would be complete nonsense, if only because presentism is based in an ideology 
evidenced by the present-day anxieties encouraging textual analyses. Yet, when dealing with 
I. A. Richards’s conception of close reading, there is still some common ground in terms of 
materialism which is not to be ignored. What is frequently disregarded, though, is that 
presentism’s growth in literary criticism has been instigated by those disciplines and theoretic 
schools that are sustained by their social, rather than individual, objective. In other words: only 
when presentism is apprehended in terms of social, does its relation to the aesthetic become 
clear. 
2.3.2-Presentism and the Social Aesthetic 
The origin of presentism as shown in this dissertation is to be found not entirely in the 
field of cultural materialism, but also (and perhaps more strongly) in the realm of social and 
cultural studies, which have become a major activity since the 1990s (Culler 43) and which 
also owe much to British Marxist theory (45). To study literature from a historical point of 
view is to study those works that, for whatever reason, have been considered appropriate for a 
canon, which, as is already known, consists of an artificial selection chosen by powerful elite 
that monopolize and privilege desirable works, thus excluding those unwelcome works (from 
women writers, racial and sexual minorities, etc.) which are deprived of institutional 
preservation (Ross 24). Moreover, globalization has, in the last decades, brought to the 
forefront previously marginal voices (and their literatures), thus adding to the already literary 
heterogeneity, which understandably generates the need to create a new transatlantic ground 
for literary analyses where this new reality can be properly addressed by critical theory. 
According to Hadfield, cultural studies appeared with the ultimate goal of allowing space for 
those voices at the margins (25). Coiro and Fulton suggest that, even though cultural studies 
(and their questions of race, gender, class, etc.), are now intricately related to New Historicist 
accounts and their engaged contextualizing has resulted in a “fuller understanding of the past” 
(2), their primary apparition, more disorganized and de-contextualized, resulted in presentist 
illustrations of the past: “twenty-five years ago, the call to consider race, class, and gender in 
Renaissance literature was dismissed by some as well-intentioned, but hopelessly presentist” 
(2). 
Subjectivity is also a key concept in the notion of presentism and its disputes with 
historicist approaches. Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan (2010) defends that the Bakhtinian concept of 
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‘chronotope,’39 because it derives from history, culture and ideology, is necessarily anti-
deterministic, thus recognizing the historicity not only of literature and its genres, but also of 
the very notion of aestheticism: “If the underlying chronotope of a literary genre is produced 
by culture, history, ideology, the time-space matrix is no longer a Kantian universal, at least 
because this constitutive structure of the mind is subject to historical mutations” (174). If 
aestheticism is a consequence of a concrete historical-spatial context, and no longer an ever-
lasting universal, then it could be said that aestheticism depends on a social subjectivity; it is 
subjective because it depends on a particular conception at a given moment of what belongs to 
the field of the aesthetic and what does not; but at the same time is social because, though 
subjective, it is a responsibility held by a whole community whose ideals somehow coincide.  
To advocate for an individual subjective reading entails some risks, for it gives free way 
to claiming that any interpretation is right on the basis that ‘it means so for the one who reads 
it’, independently of whether the text supports it or not. Gary D. Schmidt (1990) on this point 
wonders “if there is any possibility in this age of criticism for an interpretation to be, quite 
simply, wrong” (117). The academy returns again to the dangers of ‘overinterpretation’ (if one 
considers it exists), and to try to enclose its limits looks like an impossible quest40, for the 
problem goes back to the very definition of literature itself –at least understood in Culler’s 
postmodern sense, in which “literature is whatever is treated as literature by a given society” 
(Culler 230). However, the extreme oppositional view, which favours objectivity (or the search 
for it) at any cost, has given rise to techniques such as ‘close reading’. Conversely, Alan 
Ackerman (2006) points out that “close reading is entirely compatible with the drive to 
historicize” (8), acknowledging that literature consists of more than just methodological purity 
and that political, cultural and historical meaning can also be extracted from “the shape of the 
signifier” (9). 
For Gary Schmidt (1990), following Michael Steig (1989), the solution to the excesses 
of subjectivity in the field of criticism is to be found in the ‘social,’ stating that “subjective 
readings… can, in a social setting like a classroom, contribute to others’ understanding of the 
work under consideration” (Schmidt 115). Academic reading becomes then a social action, 
which drives me into the conclusion that, because presentism, as it will soon be explained, 
                                                          
39 The idea of chronotope will be examined again on chapter 4. For now, it will suffice to say that the concept was first 
formulated by Mikhail Bakhtin (1937-1938), who used it to allude to the indivisibility of temporal and spatial notions attached 
to the linguistic sign in language and, therefore, in literature (84). 
40 In this light, and in order to delve into the subject, it is never out of place to read Umberto Eco’s Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation (1992).  
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might be ultimately linked to political execution, presentism could be considered, too, a social 
action. Schmidt concludes:  
All choices in interpretation are in some measure subjective, based not only upon the 
texts, but upon elements which may or may not be constructs of the reader but which 
certainly lie outside the text…but one has to wonder how far on the continuum the 
idiosyncratic vision may be allowed to proceed before it ends up dealing only with 
itself, and no longer with the text with which the critic began. (120)  
 
Schmidt, as several other scholars, was clearly concerned with the solipsism to which 
an excessively subjective reading might lead, for he was aware that a percentage of any 
interpretation was unavoidably taken from elements outside the text and could eventually 
render this original text unrecognizable. The problem was, of course, how strongly did this 
extra-textual percentage affect the reader’s interpretation, and how to put limits to it. Robert 
Hanning (2007), for instance, claimed the impossibility of reconciling the text’s autonomy with 
the conditioning subjectivity of its interpretation (263), acknowledging the necessity to engage 
the role of subjectivity in a critical manner (265), for which he suggested a “basic respect for 
the text” (268). Hamming thus enters that vast group of scholars bothered by the damaging 
threats of subjective over-interpretation, exemplifying a long line of efforts taken to make good 
criticism of texts without recurring to subjectivity, or by engaging with it in a more critical 
way.  
Conversely, Blanka Grzegorczyk (2010) explains that, between the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s some critics, however, analysed subjectivity as constituted through social and 
discursive practices, thereby connecting the subjective identity with the social one. For 
instance, in his 1988 book Discerning the Subject, Paul Smith claimed that subjectivity is 
formed by its involvement with social constituents. John Stephens, in Language and Ideology 
in Children’s Fiction (1992) establishes a correlative interdependence between individual 
subjective readings and the social relations that both produce and are produced by these 
interpretations. Conversely, Robyn McCallum in her Ideologies of Identity in Adolescent 
Fiction (1999) establishes subjectivity as equally determining and determined by sociality 
(Grzegorczyk 113). These ideas show a tendency carried out by some scholars in these past 
few years to engage critically in the inevitable subjectivity present in any text’s interpretation, 
which is deriving into criticism effected from the subjective ‘social.’ Instead of examining what 
a text means for an individual, studies focus on the meaning of texts for whole communities. 
Derivatively, presentist analyses search for elements of interest for a whole group or set of 
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individuals with common anxieties: women in gender studies, queers in queer analyses, etc. It 
may be easy to understand why, in this context, presentism has gained popularity during the 
past decades, for it is not to be forgotten that thanks to the presentist analyses of works that 
were kept in complete oblivion due to their outdated, or apparently inadequate themes –
contrary to the canon of the times of their conception- today works that were originally denied 
a place in the canon have started to be noticed. 
That presentism is not an all-purpose tool is a truism, but still, some scholars see a 
useful, productive goal for this technique. In fact, Gregory Tomso (2002) conceives reading in 
general, and historical reading in particular (whichever the perspective might be) as a political 
act. In a time of “ongoing homogenization of our political and public discourse” (par. 4), only 
the reading of past works seems to help the subject to broaden his/her mind in order to think 
differently from how the discourse of the present moment drives him/her to think. It is true that 
there is a risk of ‘politicizing literature,’ for in this case presentism would be used more as a 
political weapon, rather than as an interpretative device. However, there are many instances of 
political literature, or of literature aimed at political struggle, such as the different narratives of 
resistance to which I will allude in the following section, and of course, as I will show later on 
in this dissertation, all those examples of Chicano works aimed at decolonizing the imaginary 
imposed by a heteronormative, patriarchal and even supremacist discourse of power which has, 
quite frequently, monopolized the flow of thought of a particular nation. If, as I am trying to 
propose, presentism is ultimately a valid tool for literary analysis with decolonial purposes, 
then its political potential (or at least its ideological one, bearing in mind its rapid acceptance 
by feminist and queer theorists) must be acknowledged. Tomso conceives presentism as 
providing alternative worldview as to how knowledge is historically constructed, and how 
things perceived as stable and natural are supported by arbitrariness (par. 6). Hence, presentism 
offers the possibility of expanding people’s minds to alternative literary and historical 
discourses, instead of blindly committing to the political discourse in which one’s ideology has 
been nursed. 
Taking into consideration that the appearance of presentism is solidly linked to cultural 
materialism, and the fruitful relationship it has established with some marginal movements 
inside academia, adding an ideological scope to presentism was just a matter of time. That this 
ideological possibility is related to social, rather than individual, interpretation might seem to 
be a bit at odds with a postmodern paradigm that seems to prioritize the subject over the society, 
and to which presentism might owe a big part of its current popularity, as has been defended 
in the previous pages. However, postmodernity also witnessed the rise of the Civil Rights 
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Movements, the social involvement of the American New Left and its reformist agenda, and 
the appearance of several minority collectivities like the queer movement which, overall, 
evidence the fact that perhaps their emergence was not as conflicting with postmodernity as 
one might be tempted to think. In fact, James Liner (2016) talks about:  
a counterhegemonic current in postmodernism, one which insists on collective agency 
and utopian thinking despite the atomization and isolation of subjects accomplished by 
late capitalism and which, against all odds, remembers how to think historically—or 
better, invents new ways of thinking historically. (“Utopia and Debt in Postmodernity”) 
 
Collectivity thus appear as a rebellious strategy to cope with the helplessness and 
powerlessness arisen in the context of postmodernity. In fact, one should not forget to what 
kind of subject postmodern theory typically alludes: fragmented, disoriented, sceptical of 
reality, and constrained by his/her situatedness. The rise of postmodern and poststructuralist 
theory and their subsequent denial of grand narratives have rendered subjectivity both 
disintegrated and incoherent (Walters 839), rendering the white, heteronormative and 
hegemonic subject (differences aside) closer to experiences otherwise familiar for minority 
communities, such as those of isolation, confusion, and/or maladjustment. Hence, perhaps it 
would not be too bold to claim that, the same way that many collective movements, like the 
Chicana/o movement in the United States, were articulated during postmodernity to fight 
against economic and political injustice, the characteristically hegemonic subject finds in the 
realm of the social a response to the isolation to which his/her fragmentation and situatedness 
have seemingly condemned him/her, as coming out of the shadows of seclusion may confer 
individuals a social strength that is denied individually. 
 When used by disempowered collectivities for their political struggle, presentism 
becomes social and material. And because interpretations of past texts are effected from a 
present-day view, notwithstanding notions of anachronism and subjectivity, presentism 
becomes aesthetic, rather than historical, thus connecting to reader’s reception theories. 
Therefore, presentism, by means of its inherent anachronism and its blurring of time, should 
be understood as a tool or an instrument for literary analysis arisen in the of context of aesthetic 
materialism for ideological struggle in the arena of literature.  
Postmodernity accentuates the relevance of now, of how every single fact, notion, or 
thing, past or future, affects individuals at present and contribute to the cognitive mapping of 
their reality. Carolyn Lesjak (2013) borrows the term “universalized present” (240) from 
Alexander Kluge to talk about:  
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a present that simultaneously forecloses horizons of the past and of the future, and that 
also colonizes our very understanding of the past so that representations of the past –
like new historicist readings appear to us a little more than reflections or reaffirmations 
of the status quo and the given moment. (240) 
 
In a time where all historicity seems to have been swallowed and digested by an all-
encompassing present, presentism seems an inevitable tool, its appearance fully related to the 
historical-philosophical state of present literary theory. What seems important to highlight is 
the relevance that the texts offer at the moment of being read or studied. This way of 
considering literature emphasizes its social scope based on what it means to readers at a 
particular moment. 
Hence, though presentism derived at least theoretically and conceptually from new 
historicism and cultural materialism, the appearance of cultural studies more than two decades 
ago may have also facilitated the increase of presentist analyses, since much research 
concerning race, class, gender, etc. started to be made on canonical texts from the past in 
general, and Renaissance literature in particular. Because questions of sex, race, etc., are 
relevant now but did not attain any singular relevance at the times the texts explored were 
created, perhaps they should be understood as theoretical instruments with which to approach 
past texts. Presentism’s anachronism, subsequently, works as the aesthetic framework from 
which to adjust the present focus on past texts. As such, it becomes an additional artistic 
component, and its lack of objectivity, as well as its disrespect for temporal distance becomes 
incidental, if not irrelevant.  
Jesse Matz (2011) criticizes the propensity of some academics to look for ontological 
historical truths in literary texts, offering the alternative view “that narrative texts are 
phenomenological instruments through which to transform temporal realities” (279). As related 
to art, presentism cannot be objective, which has not gone unnoticed for some critics like 
Elizabeth Clark (2004), who claims: 
Indeed, the attack on presentism often focuses not so much on the present per se as on 
particular social and political values that the critics dispute and that are label[l]ed 
“interests” –often the concerns of feminist and Marxist historians, historians of colo[u]r, 
and those investigating the history of sexualities in times past. (19)  
 
This wide acceptance of presentism by minority sectors searching for ways of self-
expression is understandable, for, as Fernie points out, “there is an obvious but nonetheless 
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compelling reason for favouring the present over the past: it’s happening now. The present is 
where we live, and we still may intervene and alter it… Presentism is free to sue the insights 
of new historicism as a pretext for immediate real change” (Fernie 178). Because the focus is 
those events taking place in the present, only those notions that are seen as subversive today 
hold any interest, since those are the ones that can be modified. Presentism, in this line, should 
be conceived as a politically oriented technique; and that is the main reason why it should be 
kept completely at odds with historicist practices, which possess a supposedly scientific aim 
oriented towards a quest for objectivity, and which remain, at least theoretically, far from any 
kind of politicization. This last idea, that presentism is to be understood as an ideologically 
driven tool, both subjective and anachronistic, is what will serve me to defend its expediency 
for the decolonization of a supremacist history and imaginary that is being currently carried 
out inside the field of Chicana feminist theory, as I will try to explain in the following chapter.   
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This chapter is aimed at analysing the origins and meaning of Chicana Marxist historian 
Emma Pérez’s notion of the decolonization of the imaginary in her book The Decolonial 
Imaginary: Writing Chicanas into History (1999). The imaginary could be defined as the set 
of symbols, stories, objects and practices that constitute a society’s understanding of its 
individuals’ identity and role in the world (Stavrianopoulou 4). Cornelius Castoriadis, in his 
1975 Imaginary Institution of Society, distinguished between the radical imaginary, that 
happened at an individual level, and the social imaginary, which affected a whole group (qtd. 
in Stavrianopoulou 3). In this dissertation, I will always refer to this second, social meaning 
whenever talking about the imaginary.  Hence, Pérez’s project of decolonizing the imaginary 
could be described as an attempt to deconstruct hegemonic, homophobic, and male-controlled 
discourses of power embedded in history and culture. The following pages will serve me to 
introduce the context from which both the Chicano movement and the decolonization of the 
imaginary arise, in order to better understand their meanings and implications. An extremely 
brief introduction to the Chicano movement in the United States during the 1960’s and, inside 
it, the work of Chicana lesbian scholars and their process of self-representation and knowledge 
will help me insert Pérez in her socio-historical context, providing me and the readers with 
some tools to better understand her work on cultural decolonization. 
Because, as we saw in the previous chapter, presentism has normally been used in a 
completely different ideological and cultural background, more related to Shakespeare, and 
(white European) LGBT41 and gender studies, the object of this apparent digression is to 
ultimately defend that presentism could as well connect to this decolonization project. 
Therefore I will suggest the potentially beneficial effects that the use of presentism as an 
analytical tool could entail for the decolonization of the stereotypes of tradition and subjection 
associated to several female figures in the hetero-patriarchal imaginary of Chicano nationalism. 
The eventual purpose of connecting elements so apparently unalike such as presentism and the 
decolonization of the imaginary is to defend that, despite the extremely divergent socio-
                                                          
41 The initials LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) refer to a community oppressed because the sexual and gender 
identity (non-cisgender, non-heterosexual) of its members challenge traditional notions of family upon which capitalism is 
still said to depend (Wolf 11). The acronym has been in use since the 1990’s, when it appeared to replace the term gay, which 
did not appropriately represent all those individuals whom it was supposed to allude. To further recognise the inclusivity 
attached to the acronym, the initialism has been subject in the past decades to modifications and extensions, up to the point 
that the Wesleyan University, for instance, even proposed the abbreviation LGBTTQQFAGPBDSM (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, Transsexual, Queer, Questioning, Flexual, Asexual, Gender-Fuck, Polyamorous, Bondage/Discipline, 
Dominance/Submission, and Sadism/Masochism) (Mull “The Wesleyan University”). Nowadays, the shorter acronyms 
LGBTQ (Q standing for Queer) or even LGBTQ+ are some of the ones preferred to emphasize the wide spectrum of non-
heterosexual, non-cisgender identities. Still in this dissertation I will stick to LGBT, as this is the initialism most frequently 
used in academia.  
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historical circumstances surrounding their theorization, and given the unrelated fields of study 
in which they are normally applied, presentism might still become a useful tool for the 
decolonization of a male-centred and homophobic hegemonic imaginary immersed in the 
Chicano and the white Anglo-European culture. 
 
3.1-The Recovery of the Serpent God: The Chicano Movement and Chicana 
Feminist Theory42 
Because there is no universal agreement as to what the term Chicana/o stands for,43 in 
this dissertation I will stick to the description provided by Ellie Hernández in her 2009 work 
Postnationalism in Chicana/o Literature and Culture, where she defines it as the term which 
comprehends United States born residents of Mexican descent, and/or Mexican displaced 
immigrants; but also as “the political, social, and cultural movement begun in the 1960s that 
intersected historically with the United States civil rights movement” (2). It is precisely for this 
inherent displacement and racial discrimination commonly attached to the definition of 
“Chicana/o” that, as Aída Hurtado and Patricia Gurín (2004) propose, we should consider 
Chicanas/os’44 identity as subordinate, in line with those other minority groups that emerged 
politically and socially during the 1950’s Civil Rights Movement in the United States 
In their work Chicana/o Identity in a Changing U. S. Society Hurtado and Gurín analyse 
the differences between dominant and subordinate social identities. Basing their study 
primarily on Henri Tajfel (1981), they define dominant social groups as those that, when being 
compared to others, find themselves in a privileged dominant position due to the positive value 
attached, or consensually accorded, to their group (45). In contrast, subordinate social identities 
normally carry a stigma they need to work on in order to obtain a positive sense of 
distinctiveness (46). What is striking is that, precisely as a consequence of this psychological 
work and the emotional efforts made in order to gain a positive sense of the self, individuals 
                                                          
42 A preliminary (and considerably shorter) version of this part was presented as a final paper entitled “Vision and Revision 
of the Traditional Chicano Identity” for the Chicana/o History and Culture (CCS-10A) introductory course at the University 
of California Los Angeles during the academic year 2014/2015.  
43 The definitions provided elsewhere are varied as they are often incomplete or deficient. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
for instance, defines “Chicano” as any American (particularly man or boy) from the United States whose parents and/or 
grandparents come from Mexico (www.merriam-webster.com), limiting the definition to notions of ethnicity and masculinity. 
The Urban Dictionary indicates that, in order to be considered Chicana/o, the person must have Mexican descent and have 
been born in the United States, therefore excluding Mexican migrants, and Mexican-Americans who have been born 
somewhere else.  
44 In Spanish, the plural form, whether it refers to a group formed exclusively by males, or whether it alludes to both males 
and females, is made with the masculine gender. In order not to omit or silence the female presence, I will follow the example 
set by many Chicano and Chicana writers of including the suffix -a / -as whenever women are involved. 
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with social subordinate identities are more likely to transform this stigma into an intrinsic part 
of their identity. Hurtado and Gurín conclude:  
Until very recently, being white was not a subject of inquiry and many white people 
still do not think of it as a social identity… a white student does not mention her race 
(white), ethnicity (unspecified European), her class background (middle class), or the 
fact that she has the function of all of her limbs (is physically able) … she does not have 
to negotiate them to feel good about who she is. (45)    
 
It is understandable, then, that Chicanas/os’ ethnicity and their race,45 to which they normally 
allude using the term “brown,”46 become indispensable features of their social identity; that is, 
of how they perceive themselves as belonging to a particular category, and how that category 
is socially perceived by others. Acknowledging that Mexican Americans constitute a 
subordinate and subjugated group in American society (Ambrecht and Pachon 514), 
Chicanas/os take pride in their cultural heritage and refuse to be treated as second-class citizens 
(de la Garza 101). Yet, it might be important to mention how difficult it is to propose a standard 
definition of a movement and of an identity that, since it was self-proclaimed in the late 1960’s, 
has never ceased to evolve and shift. Gustavo Licón (2014), for instance, has recently 
emphasized the dynamism of a still incomplete process of self-determination subject to 
constant evolution and contestation (151).47 Part of the reason underlying this lack of an official 
definition is the movement’s ongoing acknowledgement of the necessity of becoming more 
inclusive of those members who were originally denied participation, due to their non-
                                                          
45 Whereas race is considered a biological factor which normally makes specific reference to the phenotype or physical 
features, namely, colour of skin, bone structure, etc., ethnicity is seen as a sociological factor which alludes to notions of 
culture and nationality, such as individuals’ ascendancy and/or language. Since the terms allude to different features of one’s 
identity (aspect versus roots) I prefer not to use them as synonyms, as the issues these notions imply and entail are not always 
equatable. 
46 In racialist anthropology (that is, the one which makes racial divisions according to geographical areas in terms of alleged 
skin colour), the term brown was originally used during the 18th and 19th centuries to refer to specific groups in the North and 
the Horn of Africa; West, South and Southeast Asia; and South America (though in Brazil the term ‘pardo’ was preferred). 
Though its biological value has been dismissed, some sociologists such as Edward Telles (2004) insist on the sociological 
relevance of this classification (81-84). “Brown” is still used in the 21st century in the United States to refer to people of mestizo 
origin, and the term has been appropriated by some individuals who take pride in their mixed-race origin, such as Chicanas/os. 
As Salvador Vidal-Ortiz (2008) comments, though the term “brown,” as happens also with “yellow” and “red” can sometimes 
result offensive, it has been used since the second half of the 20th century to mobilize minority communities in the United 
States (1038). Thus, because Chicanos often refer to themselves as the “brown people” I ascribe to this notion not in derogatory 
terms, but to refer to the Latino community. Also, because many Latinos can pass as white, I still refer to them with the word 
‘brown’ even if their racial phenotype proves lighter than standards normally associated with people of colour normally do.  
47 It should also be pointed out that the term ‘Chicano’ does not carry the same connotations in all the southern areas of the 
United States Whereas some people call themselves Chicanas/os with pride, for many others is still considered an insult. This 
is due to the fact that the term, which has been in circulation since the early 1900’s, was originally used pejoratively to refer 
to Mexican-American citizens of lower social standing (Navarro, 389). For more information concerning the roots and use of 
the term Chicano, read Edward Simmen’s “Chicano: Origin and Meaning” in his Pain and Promise: The Chicano Today: Vivid 
Accounts of the Reawakening of a Proud and Oppressed People (New York: New American Library, 1972). 
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conformity with the ideal notion of ‘Chicanismo’ that was originally held at the late 1960’s and 
beginning of the 1970’s. Already in 1979 de la Garza stated: “we should recognize that the 
Mexican American people are not homogeneous nor are the problems we face” (114). As 
happens with personal identity, Chicana/o social identity is also susceptible to alterations in 
both time and scope.  
The Chicano Civil Rights Movement did not appear as the consequence of a single-
voiced, unidirectional program carried out by individuals with a consensually agreed strategy, 
but as the result of multiple collectivities with the common goal of gaining social and economic 
equality in the United States Most of these socio-economic and political disparities had arisen 
with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 184848 but intensified at particular 
moments of crisis, such as during the Great Depression in 1929, when the Mexican community 
was blamed for the economic problems, and tensions led to a federal repatriation campaign 
(Vargas 213). The movement was strongly influenced and emerged together with other 
organizations (being African American perhaps the most notorious one) and mass protests 
movements against racial segregation in the southern United States that had started flourishing 
in the mid-1950’s, which later came to be known as the Civil Rights Movement.49  
Though civil rights had been initially granted to minority populations through the 
passage of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution which was ratified on July 9, 1868,50 
instances of racial discrimination were still put into practice and minority populations felt that 
segregation was still a reality they had to endure and against which they had to struggle (Brown 
172).  However, the specific origins of the Chicano Movement date back to the post-World 
War II years, when, upon their return, Mexican American war veterans expected to be treated 
with the same respect and privileges that other (white) American soldiers enjoyed (Vargas 
272). However, this proved far from the reality they actually encountered, marked by prejudice, 
                                                          
48 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was a peace treaty signed on February 2, 1848 by the United States and Mexico to put an 
end to the Mexican-American war (1846-1848). The treaty gave the United States ownership of the Northern territories of 
Mexico. The treaty also specified that residents in those areas could go back to Mexico or become United States citizens with 
full rights, but several amendments made afterwards (specifically of articles VIII and X) allowed for the expropriation of their 
lands and eventually resulted in Mexican-American population becoming second class citizens and losing most of their rights. 
49 The Civil Rights Movement comprises many national movements, such as the Puerto Rican and the American-Indian 
movements; and other social and ideological movements, such as the women, the queer, and the Anti-war movements, to name 
but a few examples. For further reading see Riches, William T. Martin. The Civil Rights Movement: Struggle and Resistance, 
published in Basingstoke by Palgrave Macmillan in 2010; or Sanders, Vivienne. Civil Rights in the USA 1945-68, published 
in 2008 in London by Oxford UP. For further reading on the rhetoric around which these social movements were articulated 
see Deborah G. Straub’s 1996 edition of Voices of Multicultural America: Notable Speeches Delivered by African, Asian, 
Hispanic and Native Americans, 1790-1995, published by Cengage Gale in Andover.  
50 The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution grants citizenship to all people born or naturalized in the United States 
regardless of their colour or race.  
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segregation at schools, and racial violence perpetrated by law enforcement officials.51 The 
large-scale deportation started in 1954 called “operation wetback” did nothing but aggravate 
Mexican Americans’ outrage and frustration, and soon many of them became involved in 
protests and started launching campaigns (273-276). Ernesto Galarza had already opened a line 
for the fight for labour rights in California by helping establish the National Farm Labour Union 
(NFLU) in 1947, which eventually led to the organization of the Agricultural Workers 
Organization Committee (AWOC) in 1959 and the National Farm Workers Association 
(NFWA) by Dolores Huerta and César Chavez in 1962 (279). Together, they fought for better 
working conditions and higher wages, which at that time did not reach the legal minimum. On 
the other hand, the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA) and the Political 
association of Spanish-Speaking Organization (PASSO) intended to educate Mexican 
Americans on political affairs and helped them register to vote (293), thus aiming at giving that 
particular sector of society a more active role in political issues and civil rights. In sharp 
contrast with these examples there was the League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC), which incorporated a more conservative and assimilationist agenda, embracing an 
American identity (thus disregarding their Mexican heritage) and adopting English as the 
official language (rather than Spanish). LULAC remained for the most part silent towards the 
injustices effected against their population during the operation wetback and the civil rights 
period (287).  
The Chicano Nationalist Movement appeared during the late 1960’s as a consequence 
of this political turmoil and social instability, and it was also multi-faceted and lacking in 
consensus. It emerged as a non-conformist strategy to defy that section of Mexican American 
citizens who, especially after World War II, embraced a desire for assimilation and despised 
the term “Mexican” for its pejorative and disdainful connotations (Lux and Vigil 94). As 
Vargas states: “Chicano nationalism provided an ideological and symbolic foothold against the 
forces of Anglo racism and cultural diffusion” (319). Chicano radical activist Rodolfo ‘Corky’ 
Gonzales founded the Crusade for Justice in 1965, which aimed at achieving community 
reform in Denver to counter-attack police brutality and institutionalized racism.  
                                                          
51 A notorious precedent of this trend is the Los Angeles Zoot Suit Riots of 1943, when Mexicans and blacks were beaten up 
by segments of the city white’s population over a ten days’ period, in which, according to historian Zaragosa Vargas, police 
officers would do nothing but laugh before arresting individuals from ethnic minorities on charges of rioting (253).  The events 
inspired Luis Valdez’s play Zoot Suit, which premiered in 1978, and became the first Chicano play ever staged on Broadway 
in 1981.  
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In March 1969, the Crusade for Justice organized the first Chicano Youth Liberation 
conference, which encouraged a total rejection of the Anglo52 culture in favour of a fast-
growing sense of pride in their Mexican racial, cultural, and historical heritage. González was 
urged by the necessity of ideological unity in a movement characterized by sharp regional and 
ideological differences, and hence with little probabilities of success (Vargas 321). It was at 
that conference that El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán (“The Spiritual Plan of Aztlán”), what is now 
generally considered the manifesto of the movement, was written, setting the ideological 
grounds of what would become the Chicano cultural nationalist movement. It was also at that 
conference that Gonzales’s poem “I am Joaquín” was read; a poem which strongly evidences 
the ongoing desires of many Chicanos during that decade to differentiate themselves from those 
Mexican-American citizens who, according to them, had adopted an assimilationist agenda as 
part of a survival strategy against racial discrimination.  
The poem could therefore be understood as the result of an ongoing frustration towards 
some Mexicans who at that time yearned to be seen as white because of the prejudice and 
discrimination associated to the brown colour, which derived from the historical relegation of 
Mexican Americans to an inferior social and racial status (Lux and Vigil 108). Understandably, 
this longing for whiteness had to do more with the privileges linked to it than with ethnic issues 
per se. Gonzales’s poem, conversely, constitutes one of the first instances in which people of 
Mexican descent manifested their satisfaction about who they were. This collective self-
asserted pride can be seen in the poem in the switch from the ‘I’ voice that marks its beginning 
to the inclusive plural ‘we’ that appears towards the end. During the first stanzas, the narrative 
voice declares: “I am Nezahualcóyotl, great leader of the Chichimecas. / I am the sword and 
flame of Cortes the despot / and I am the eagle and serpent of the Aztec civilization” (26-28). 
However, towards the end of the poem this voice has come to express a plurality exerted in its 
affirmation of “the brotherhood / which is Joaquín” (250-251). This collectivity found in the 
brotherhood expresses how, by creating a unified movement based on the ideal of 
“community,” many disenfranchised individuals could finally find a place in which to develop 
a sense of belonging and cultivate a positive notion of ‘family’ that escaped the confinements 
of consanguineous kinship, embracing all powerless individuals of indigenous descent.  
                                                          
52 Roberto Acuña, in his The Making of Chicana/o Studies: in the Trenches of Academe (1972), to differentiate between the 
citizens of the United States of European descent from other nations in the American continent, used the term Anglo-American, 
which he later shortened to “Anglo” (12). This trend has been followed henceforth by many Chicanas/os in their writings, who 
have used the loosely to refer to the white citizens from the United States of British Isles descent. 
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Still, this conception of the Chicano movement as a ‘family’ has not been devoid of 
problems. Theoreticians like Yarbro-Bejarano (2006) point out that, at the same time that 
Chicano cultural nationalism defied marginalization and oppression from the United States, it 
also propagated the same processes inside its own movement by setting the standards of an 
ideal self-image based upon patriarchal and heteronormative values that excluded those 
members with a subordinate social identity, predominantly women, homosexuals, handicapped 
individuals, or even the racially diverse,53 who were perceived as unfitting voices (225). 
José Limón, in his Mexican Ballads, Chicano Poems (1992) denounces the male-
centredness found in “I am Joaquín,” in which rejection of assimilationist claims is expressed 
through the portrayal of male heroic figures that become the spokesmen of a masculinist 
Chicano culture (128), whereas women remain noticeably absent. In fact, throughout the verses 
it is possible to count many masculine, courageous revolutionary figures, such as el Padre 
Hidalgo,54 Emiliano Zapata,55 Pancho Villa,56 and Elfego Baca,57 to name but a few. However, 
the female side of the movement appears only twice in the poem, never attached to a proper 
name, and always portraying a submissive, secondary role. First, the poetic voice mentions 
Joaquín Murrieta’s wife, who is raped and killed by the Anglos (127-128).58 Second, it 
mentions all those mothers and widows from the revolution, whose only function in the poem 
seems to be that of mourning and grieving the fallen heroes: 
sheltered beneath  
The shawl of black, 
Deep and sorrowful eyes 
That bear the pain of sons long buried or dying. (268-271). 
 
                                                          
53 By ‘racially diverse’ I mean all those other ethnicities to add to the Mexican-American one. Not all Chicanos are US-
Americans with Mexican descent, for ethnicity alone is not necessarily enough to constitute a ‘Chicano identity.’ 
54 Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla (Guanajuato 1753- Chihuahua 1811) was a Mexican Jesuit priest who, allegedly, started the War 
of Independence in Mexico in 1810 by calling the people in his parish to follow him in a rebellion against the Spanish crown 
in what is known as “El Grito de Dolores” (The Cry of Dolores). 
55 Born and dead in Morelos (1879-1919) he was a leading figure of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, supporter and founder 
of the agrarian movement known as Zapatism. Born in a working-class family, he defended the rights of peasants and low-
class villagers, and commanded the Division of the South during the Revolution, which spread northwards. 
56 José Doroteo Arango Arámbula (Durango 1878 – Chihuahua 1923) was a leading figure of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. 
Commander of the Division of the North, he robbed trains and seized lands to distribute them to peasants and soldiers. 
57 Elfego Baca (New Mexico 1865- 1945). A lawyer, politician, and gunman, who became sheriff and later on a marshal of 
the city of Socorro. Being accused of murder, and refusing to go to court, Baca reportedly hid in an adobe house which was 
surrounded by approximately 40 cowboys who started fire in what was known as the Frisco Shootout, from which Baca escaped 
unharmed.  In 1958, Walt Disney Studios turned his life into a television miniseries which was released with the name The 
Nine Lives of Elfego Baca. 
58 Joaquín Murrieta (Sonora c. 1829 - California c. 1853). Nicknamed “The Mexican Robin Hood” he is said to have been 
either a bandit or a Mexican patriot during the Gold Rush in California depending on the version one prefers to stick to. 
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Women in Gonzales’s poem are either victims or wailers, limited to praying or suffering 
the wrongdoings of the enemy. This lack of female agency distilled in the poem echoes a larger 
criticism made by many Chicana activists against the exclusion of women from the movement. 
As Vicki L. Ruiz (2008) laments: “from the early days of the student movement, women were 
not always satisfied with the rhetoric and praxis of their compañeros” (180).  
Maylei Blackwell (2003) warns us that historical accounts of the Chicano movement 
have normally erased women’s early contributions, resulting in the institutionalization of a 
nationalism based upon an over-masculinist hegemonic narrative which re-inscribes patterns 
of gender dominance, articulated around the Macho figure, when it was actually much more 
challenged at the time (59). Though some histories date the Chicana feminist movement as 
originating in the 1980’s (when Chicano Cultural nationalism was beginning to fade), instances 
of a Chicana Feminism can be traced back as early as 1968. By 1971, for instance, the student 
newspaper Las Hijas de Cuauhtémoc, founded by activists Anna NietoGomez59 and Adelaida 
del Castillo among others, had already published the three editions of their newspaper, which 
marked a historical moment in the theoretical development of the Chicanas movement (59). As 
opposed to the Chicano movement, constructed among other things upon traditional notions of 
family that consigned women to a servile and self-sacrificing role that many Chicanas refused 
to embrace, the Chicana movement embraced gender as another form of oppression, analogous 
to those of race and ethnicity (Lucero-Liu & Hendrickson Christensen 97). For Blackwell, the 
reason explaining this erasing of Chicanas’ intervention at the early stages of the movement 
resides in that, though Chicanos’ sexism and homophobia were already contested by Chicanas 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s, it was not until the 90’s that feminist scholars started to address 
the ways in which Chicano nationalism had originally been built upon notions of hetero-
patriarchal dominance (65-66). For Blackwell the marginalization of women inside the 
movement occurred on three levels: first, they were seen as auxiliary individuals, rather than 
real political members; second, they were discouraged and undermined when taking leadership 
roles, and third, they were often treated like sexual objects (2011, 65). 
Another problem was that not all women agreed as to what their contribution to the 
movement should be. Chicano nationalism envisioned the ideal woman as surrendered to 
patterns of tradition and family which followed a male-controlled, heterosexual model, and 
                                                          
59 In her early articles, Ana Nieto Gómez appeared as Anna Nieto Gómez (Ruiz 208). Since then, her name has appeared 
indistinctively as Anna Nieto Gómez (Vargas), Anna Nieto-Gómez (Padilla), or Anna NietoGómez (Blackwell). As I have not 
found any explanation as to the diverse ways in which her name appears in academic works, I stick to Anna NietoGómez, 
which is how I have seen it written in more recent publications.  
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many women were compliant with it. In fact, dissenting voices in the movement were seen as 
traitors of the race and/or assimilated to a white ideology (often referred to as “Americanized” 
or agringadas). Feminism had enormous pejorative connotations at the time which more than 
often also entailed notions of lesbianism (72), and many women organizers feared being 
referred in those terms. During her activism during the 1960’s NietoGómez (1974), established 
a distinction between “feminists” (who contested those aspects of the movement that made 
them feel alienated and ignored) and “loyalists,” who claimed that women should not be as 
selfish as to address their personal problems when the real problems of the raza60 were already 
being faced by their male counterparts, and believed that they had to stand by their men and 
have babies to help the cause (“por la causa”/“for the cause”) (Blackwell, 75). 
The fact is that, right from its inception, the movement, like Gonzales’s poem “I am 
Joaquín,” was accused of being ideologically too essentialist (Fregoso, The Bronze Screen 6); 
and because the notion of Chicano “nationalism-as-family” was constructed upon a 
heteronormative and patriarchal model of family that rejected all those members who did not 
stick to the norm, some factions considered that the traditional delineation of Chicano social 
identity needed an insightful revision in order to allow space for those individuals previously 
marginalized or relegated to a secondary status inside their own movement. In 1986, the UN 
Working Group for Indigenous Peoples (UN/WGIP) added an important correction to the 
official definition of indigeneity by stating that any individual who identified himself or herself 
as indigenous and was accepted by the group or the community as one of its members was to 
be regarded as an indigenous person (Sandberg McGuinne, “Indigeneity”). The amendment 
stresses not only the individual’s self-identification with the community, but also the 
requirement to be accepted by the indigenous community as belonging to it. The World Bank 
definition of indigeneity in 1991 also adopted as a requisite the acceptance by other members 
of a subject who self-declares part of their indigenous community (Sandberg McGuinne). For 
instance, the traditional definition of Chicano, as stated in the Plan Espiritual de Aztlán claims 
that only mestizos (people of Spanish and Indigenous descent) can belong to the movement. 
Though this close identification with their indigeneity highlights a positive self-image, it also 
presents a false and reductionist idea of miscegenation. Roberto Chao Romero highlights in 
The Chinese in Mexico (2010) that, in the development of a unified national racial identity the 
                                                          
60 La raza (which translates as “the race,” but also, “the people”) was first coined by José Vasconcelos in The Cosmic Race 
(1925), where it alluded to the birth of a new race resulting from the mixing of all previous ones. The term gained pre-eminence 
during the 1960’s when Chicano movement activists started using it to promote political unity and racial pride among people 
of Latin American descent, celebrating their mestizo origins (Schaefer 830). 
[120] 
 
idea of mestizaje was envisioned as the admixture of the European and the Indigenous races, 
disregarding other ethnicities that also had a preeminent role in the process of blood-mixing, 
like the Chinese, the Indian, the Philippine or the African (195). Romero censures texts such 
as José Vasconcelos’s work Cosmic Race (first published in 1925) that, though itself a response 
against white supremacist culture, eventually falls into the same racial discrimination it 
originally intended to condemn. For instance, Vasconcelos’s description of the Black as “eager 
for sensual joy, intoxicated with dances and unbridled lust” (22) is quite illuminating of the 
racial stereotyping and worryingly prejudicial tinges permeating the rest of the essay; and his 
project becomes eerily eugenic when he explains how the ugliest lineages, considered recessive 
and undignified, should slowly vanish to give rise to the most beautiful ones (32). 
Vasconcelos’s plan ultimately plunges when he expresses his hope that, in time, races such as 
the black and the Chinese will come to disappear: 
We recogni[s]e that it is not fair that people like the Chinese, who, under the saintly 
guidance of Confucian morality multiply like mice, should come to degrade the human 
condition precisely at the moment when we begin to understand that intelligence serves 
to refrain and regulate the lower zoological instincts, which are contrary to a truly 
religious conception of life. (19-20) 
 
Understandably, Romero complains that Vasconcelos presented an ideal vision of mestizaje 
that rejected other nationalities, particularly the Chinese, seen at that time as a step backwards 
in the search of an ideal Mexican race (89), and that this vision was somehow inherited by the 
Chicano movement its origins.  
There are many regularly unacknowledged examples of outstanding members inside 
the Chicano movement that may defy traditional notions of Chicano mestizaje. One of them is 
Paula Crisostomo, a Chicana activist, and one of the prominent figures in the famous student 
walkouts of 1968. Paula is a woman of Philippine descent: “a Chilipina,” as her father 
scornfully comments in one of the scenes of the 2006 film Walkout, based on this historical 
episode, to remind her that she cannot be a “real Chicana” because her indigenous heritage is 
different from the one ideally projected by the movement. Other notorious example is scholar 
Maylei Blackwell, a woman of Thai and Cherokee descent (and a challenge, therefore, to the 
traditional construction of ‘mestizo’ identity), who with her research and her political 
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activism61 has nonetheless done far more for indigenous people than many “typical Chicanos;” 
and whose Chicanismo, even if she does not respond to the traditional notion of Chicano 
identity, cannot be denied. One of Blackwell’s most important contribution is her book 
¡Chicana Power! Contested Histories of Feminism in the Chicano Movement (2011), in which 
she gives a voice to all those women who refused the passive role ascribed to their gender at 
the outbreak of the movement and whose huge contributions have often been disregarded. 
Blackwell points out that, as previously mentioned, if we assume that Chicana feminism 
emerged directly from the Chicano national movement, we will fail to acknowledge the long 
and rich tradition of Mexican women’s activism in the United States (48).  
In the introduction to Chicana Feminism (2003) Gabriela Arrendondo (et al.) claim that 
the Chicana social identity incorporates a political stance that confronts coloured women’s 
many ways of disenfranchisement (racial, homophobic, etc.) that result from not only the 
patriarchal heteronormative authority of the Chicano movement, but also from the white, 
middle-class, feminist movements (1). Blackwell, on the other hand, opposes her feminist 
project to Elizabeth “Betita” Martínez’s notion of the chingón, a patriarchal figure around 
which the Chicano movement constructed its leadership (Blackwell, 2011 76). The ideal 
Chicano was seen as a strong, revolutionary man who made decisions and fought oppression, 
in contrast to women, whose functions inside the movement were limited to serving as cooks, 
secretaries, and sexual slaves. Thus, the only role socially allowed to these women (the 
chingadas), was that of offering comfort to those struggling men and giving birth to the future 
successors of the movement (98).  
The origins of these protests have to do with the fact that, as Leisy Abrego defends in 
her work Sacrificing Families (2014), gender, at least for Chicanos, is a category produced 
through constant and ubiquitous processes that suggest that those behaviours deemed 
acceptable in women (namely, those ideals of submissiveness, purity, and chastity represented 
by the Virgin of Guadalupe62) are natural and customary, rather than socially constructed (9-
10). Thus, because women are limited to their biological capacity to conceive, motherhood is 
seen as the idealized form of womanhood (10), which means that, in the Chicano-as-family 
pattern, women are restricted to a virginal model of virtue, loyalty, obedience, and, of course, 
                                                          
61 Blackwell’s expertise area consists of research on the intersection of women’s and Indigenous rights within Latin America 
and the US, focusing on the question of difference, sexuality, and race; and how those differences are expressed in women’s 
organizing. 
62 The Virgin of Guadalupe, though originally a religious icon, is also a cultural archetype in Mexican and Mexican American 
tradition that incarnates the saint mother, pure and chaste. Women are encouraged since very little to emulate the virtues of 
the virgin, which must serve them as a role model of submissiveness and obedience. The implications that this figure entails 
for women will be seen in more depth in chapter 5. 
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heterosexuality. In this sense, lesbians63 were seen as the worst kind of traitors to the 
movement, for not only did they refuse to ascribe to a subdued role inside their community and 
cried out all the injustices effected against their gender and their sexuality as other feminists 
did; they were also perceived as a major threat to marriage and the values of the family, since 
they would not conceive children for the cause. Thus, even though the presence of Chicana 
lesbian feminists has been essential for the growth and survival of the movement, the truth is 
that they often found themselves isolated from both the Chicano nationalists and the Chicana 
feminists, who, though keen on ideas of women’s agency, despised the idea of being identified 
as homosexual. Overall, the Chicano Movement considered that Chicana lesbians constituted 
the worst kind of woman ever existing: a whore, the Malinche64 at its purest. 
By the 1980’s Chicana feminists had grown tired of feeling isolated from other groups 
with which they shared some commonalities but from which they were often excluded on 
account of some of their characteristics, be it either the colour of their skin, their gender and/or 
their sexuality. According to them, because Anglo-European white feminists,65 unaware of the 
privileges attached to the colour of their skin, did not acknowledge the necessities of racialized 
subjects; because gay men did not want to reject all those benefits of their male condition; and 
because Chicano nationalism eventually re-inscribed patterns of repression through a 
patriarchal and heterosexist discourse embedded in its own narrative of resistance (Yarbro-
Bejarano 2006, 225) ignoring those individuals who did not conform with the model, it soon 
became apparent for Chicana (and Chicana lesbian) theorists that they needed to define 
themselves independently from other movements that too often patronized and/or disregarded 
them (Fregoso and Chabram 2006, 28; Hernández 2006, 61). By disengaging from these other 
movements, Chicana feminists developed their own theories, which acknowledge the difficulty 
of trying to unify dissimilar and sometimes even contradictory voices and experiences inside 
their own group that are nevertheless connected by the Nepantlerism of their members. 
Nepantla, as defined by theorist and writer Gloria Anzaldúa, alludes to the liminal space that 
arises when living between (at least) two cultures, which results in a double insight: “seeing 
                                                          
63 Gloria Anzaldúa, in “To(o) Queer the Writer” (1988) states that she dislikes the term ‘lesbian’ because it ignores other 
aspects of her identity, such as her race and class, and embraces, rather, the term ‘queer,’ which is more gender inclusive, and 
less associated with whiteness (263). Though sometimes I will also use this word, in this particular case I have stuck to the 
word lesbian because I am strictly referring to women who feel sexually attracted to other women. 
64 The Malinche archetype is based on historical figure Malintzin Tenepal, a Mayan woman who served as a translator and 
mediator between Cortés and Aztec emperor Moctezuma. Because of her intermediator skills she is now remembered in 
popular culture as a traitor to her race and the first to assimilate to foreign, oppressive cultures; and thus, women who fail to 
comply with the duties traditionally ascribed to their gender are compared to the Malinche. This will be seen in more depth in 
chapter 5. 
65 The term ‘Anglo-European” is normally used in Chicanas/os writings to refer to white, middle-class, and most of the times 
English-speaking, individuals from both Europe and the United States.  
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from two or more perspectives simultaneously renders those cultures transparent” (This Bridge 
We Call Home 549). Consequently, Nepantla in this case refers to the non-belonging of all 
those coloured (and lesbian) women who claim a personal space in which to reveal their 
experiences.  
Because of the recognition of the multiplicity and complexity of their lives, Chicanas’ 
feminist struggle against the homogenization of their racial, sexual, gender and class 
experiences (Arredondo et al. 4) is organized around the scope of third world feminism. Third 
world feminism is the term usually used for a kind of decolonial feminism that addresses racism 
and how the remains of colonization in culture, economy and politics affect non-white, non-
Western women. Third world feminism appeared as a response to the implicit racism and 
imperialism of most second-wave white Western feminisms that assumed that women, by 
virtue of their gender, faced analogous subjugation (Herr 4). Hence, in 1991 Chandra Mohanty 
accused white feminists of falling into a reductionism and homogenization that led them to 
believe that gender was the primary cause of all women’s oppression and that, consequently, 
all women shared the same interests, perspectives, and goals (33). As Barbara Smith (1990) 
pointed out: “As Third World women we must define a responsible and radical feminism for 
ourselves and not assume bourgeois female self-aggrandizement is all that feminism is” (27).  
Concepts such as mestizaje, the “borderlands,” nepantlerism and, as will later be seen, 
Pérez’s decolonization of the imaginary, reinforce a consciousness of resistance and construct 
a “third space” where third world women can create theories to reclaim female agency and 
contest their marginalization from both the Chicano nationalist movement and Western 
feminism. The problem arises when a limit concerning which voices can be included in the 
movement needs to be established. Does “Chicana” include other Latin-American women, such 
as those from Mexico or El Salvador? What happens to those white women sympathetic with 
the movement; do they have to be excluded? Must all gay men necessarily be kept away from 
it? And up to what point can or cannot bridges of connection be established between Chicana 
lesbian feminists and other groups? 
Though the question of inclusion of other voices from hegemonic and heteronormative 
backgrounds had been debated since the inception of the Chicana feminist movement, 
discussions regarding the possibility of accepting other examples of feminism (Latin-
American, Asian or even the Anglo-European white one) became preeminent in 1981 with the 
publication of This Bridge Called my Back and the subsequent estrangement of their co-authors 
Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga concerning their views and the ultimate goals imagined 
for their movement. Even though at the end of her career Anzaldúa eventually conceived unity 
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as “another anglo invention” (Interviews/Entrevistas, 156), she still called for commonalities 
among women, and was keen on dialogue and mutual understanding. As she indicated in “The 
New Mestiza Nation”:  
Progressive whites who have friends from different worlds and who study different 
cultures become intellectual mestizas. They may not be emotional mestizas and 
certainly are not biological mestizas. But there can be empathy between people of 
colo[u]r and progressive, sensitive, politically aware whites. (The Gloria Anzaldúa 
Reader, 210).  
 
Moraga, on the other hand, called for an anti-assimilationist nationalism oriented 
towards Tribalism,66 not separatist in its essence, but nonetheless specific in its terms and, 
consequently, not inclusive of other kinds of feminism. She refused to collaborate on the 
project This Bridge We Call Home (2002) when she learnt that it would include gay men and 
white women, claiming that Chicana (lesbian) feminism was far from being a closed, 
completely defined movement, and thus the addition of other voices would only bring 
confusion to a still emerging group: “we had yet to effectively develop a national network of 
coalesced women-of-colo[u]r organizing” (Moraga, A Xicana Codex 123). Therefore, despite 
all the criticism she has received for this decision, underlying her reaction towards inclusion 
there lies not only a notion of incompleteness which still (un)defines Xicana67 theory, but also 
the necessity to acknowledge an autonomous Indian heritage outside the colonial imperative: 
“the road to the realization of that dream [the mestizo nation] is different for Indian and Xicano 
peoples than for non-Natives because our oppression is distinct from non-Natives and cannot 
be cross-culturally applied.” (Moraga 124).  
Because of the controversy associated with the term Chicano (Blea 5), and because of 
the differences regarding Chicanas’ age, language, place of birth, class, racialization, sexual 
orientation, etc., heterogeneity constitutes a concept that is critical if we are to comprehend the 
overall Chicana experience (Arredondo et al. 3). This heterogeneity is not only palpable in their 
academic writings, but also in their literary production, which, as Norma Klahn (2003) 
explains, adopts Chicanas’ counterhegemonic agenda by featuring a compromise with and a 
                                                          
66 Moraga uses this term to allude to her idea of a Chicano-as-family movement based on Indigenous notions on family (as 
opposed to Mexican or Anglo American ones, primarily founded on patriarchal and capitalist structures).  In A Xicana Codex 
of Changing Consciousness (2011) she states: “Indigenism… informs my feminism, my sense of lugar [“place”] in this 
planet… Ideally, it is a philosophy… of cultural autonomy and communitarian reciprocity in the twenty-first century” (31). 
67 In A Xicana Codex of Changing Consciousness (2011) Moraga spells “Xicana” with an ‘x’ to strengthen the tribal roots of 
the movement, a coming back to this Aztec past. Therefore, whenever referring to her feminist theory, I will also use this 
spelling. 
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continuity to the decolonizing practices appearing during the Civil Rights Movement (115). 
Klahn mentions autobiographical fictions by authors such as Norma Cantú, Sandra Cisneros 
and Mary Helen Ponce, which posit identity and culture as transformative parameters, 
continuously reformulated and re-contextualized according to the value that history, language 
and culture play in the process, for which it becomes necessary to ascertain the situatedness of 
knowledge (119).  
That culture and history are time dependent, and that any individuals’ limit to 
knowledge is marked by their spatial-temporal situatedness is something already seen in the 
previous chapter when dealing with some postmodern impressions influencing the emergence 
of presentism. It would be logical to presume that Chicano/a theory also delves in these 
postmodern notions, or, conversely, that there has been some absorption, even if slight, of 
minority discourses in the cultural mainstream of a nation as multicultural as the United States. 
Rosaura Sánchez (2006), however, charges against this mystification by pointing out that, 
though boundaries connote inclusion as well as exclusion, it is still possible to be culturally 
excluded from United States even if residing inside its national borders: “We remain marginal 
despite our participation as workers within the whole. The notion of pluralism… points then to 
a type of heterogeneous cohesive whole while suppressing the reality of social fragmentation” 
(381). Thus cultural isolation may be nothing but an extension of the historical and social 
marginalization felt by a racial minority that, though possessing the United States nationality, 
do not enjoy the same rights and benefits: “The notion of boundaries is thus contradictory. One 
can be within but at a subordinate level, to the point where those within feel as if they were 
outside” (382), which explains why there are currently a wide range of ethnic studies programs 
at universities, but constituted outside existing academic departments (383).  
Because in many aspects Chicana/o theory and culture has run parallel but still isolated 
from mainstream US academia, the actual reach of postmodern theory and its implications in 
Chicana/o studies have been subject to bitter debates. Paula Moya, for instance, in Learning 
from Experience: Minority identities, Multicultural Struggles (2002), accuses postmodern 
theory of silencing “the so-called ‘[O]thers’” (17) and writes: “Against postmodernist theorists, 
I show that the extreme linguistic constructivism informing postmodernist conception of 
identity impedes rather than enables the achievement of the liberatory political goals they claim 
as their own” (12). Notwithstanding its rejection by many academics that fear that an 
engagement with postmodern theory would distract attention from more sociological and 
political issues, other scholars have powerfully adapted and re-contextualized some 
postmodern features to their theories. That is the case of scholar Emma Pérez, whose theory on 
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decolonization is supported by and built upon several postmodern thinkers. She explains this 
influence by claiming: “I believe that postmodern questions provide a fresh look at Chicana/o 
history and the manner I which gender/sex is contemplated and negated” (11). Due to the 
relevance that Pérez plays in this dissertation, I believe more than necessary to briefly look into 
the presence of postmodern theory in Chicana/o studies and vice versa. Thus, in the following 
section I will briefly analyse how postmodern notions of subject fragmentation and alienation 
affect Chicanas/os as a racial and ethnic minority, and how postmodern visions of history are 
re-evaluated by Chicana feminism to offer an alternative, decolonizing view that reinserts 
women’s perspective and previously erased presence in the corpus. 
 
3.2-Postmodernism and the Chicana/o Movement 
At the opening plenary of the annual conference held by the National Association of 
Chicana and Chicano Studies (NACCS) in 2012 Reynaldo F. Macías stated: “The influence of 
postmodern studies could be felt within and outside Chicana/o Studies in approaches to 
scholarship, terminology and the topics of studies” (8). There are currently many debates 
concerning whether Chicano literature does –or might participate in the postmodern 
sensibility.68 This debate is problematized by the fact that, when analysing the multiple factors 
and precedents that lead to the conceptualization of postmodernism it is easy to oversimplify a 
movement that was neither general, nor uniform. In addition, though both notions are inter-
related, we should not mistake postmodernism with postmodernity. The term postmodernism 
makes reference to a current or trend beginning in the 1960’s manifested, particularly, in 
literature, philosophy, and the arts (with a special emphasis, perhaps, on architecture); whereas 
postmodernity could be considered a historical condition  or a world process (though the fact 
that is global does not entail that it is equal everywhere) and refers to the economic, political, 
religious, and technological forces operating in conflict in our geopolitical system (Nemoianu 
11-15). 
Assuming, then, that there is something we can call Postmodernism,69 the debate moves 
on as to whether consider it a movement of rupture or a continuation of modernism, or whether 
it is a cultural anxiety or merely an aesthetic genre. Rafael Pérez-Torres, in his essay “Nomads 
                                                          
68 See, for instance, Rosaura Sánchez’s “Postmodernism and Chicano Literature” (1987), Ramon Saldívar’s Chicano 
Narrative: The Dialectics of Difference (1990); Rafael Pérez-Torres’s Movements in Chicano Poetry: Against Myths, Against 
Margins (1995); or Marcial González’s “Postmodernism, Historical Materialism, and Chicana/o Cultural Studies” (2004). 
69 Fredric Jameson admits that the concept, far from being universally accepted, has, since its formulation, been contested and 
conflicted by contradictory theories and contributions (1991, xxii). 
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and Migrants: Negotiating a Multicultural Postmodernism” (1993-1994), makes the following 
distinction among theorists and their approaches:  
Ihab Hassan and Brian McHale (aesthetic postmodernism), Jean-Francois Lyotard 
(positively decentring postmodernism), Jean Baudrillard (nihilistically decentring 
postmodernism), Hal Foster (critical postmodernism), Andreas Huyssen (culturalist 
postmodernism), Fredric Jameson (repressive postmodernism), Jurgen Habermas 
(modernist postmodernism). (162)  
 
This gives a slight idea of up to what point scholars diverge when approaching this movement. 
But even if there is no consensus as how best to describe what postmodernism essentially is, 
and even if the social minority movements arisen during the 1960’s followed a completely 
different path to that of philosophical theorization, directed instead towards achieving the end 
of racial segregation, some theoreticians still see a connection between the activism of 
disadvantaged communities and postmodernism. For Jameson (1991), the emergence of 
minority groups, with their politics against class privileges and economic inequalities, is itself 
a deeply postmodern incident, even if these minorities reject the notion of postmodernism as a 
totalizing force when in reality it stands for a heteronormative and privileged elite (318). Yet, 
when analysing the connection between the agency encompassed by these minority social 
movements and the capitalist market which struggles to deny them this agency in the aftermath 
of postmodernity, Jameson can only come up with two possibilities, both of which he deems 
wrong: first, that social movements are a product of capitalism and thus must be understood as 
another kind of production. Second, that social movements are actually a response against 
capitalism and could be considered a small victory against neoliberalist principles. Yet, very 
much like the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, by which it is possible to know the position 
of a given electron at a given instant or to calculate its speed, but never simultaneously, 
Jameson builds upon Kant’s idea that the mind can only alternate between the world of the 
noumenon (reason) or phenomenon (experience), but never be in both at the same time, and 
defends that the relationship between minority social movements and capitalism, or rather, 
between agency and the system, can never be clarified, and resumes: “Kant showed that we 
cannot hope to use these codes together or coordinate them in any meaningful way… We were 
thereby condemned to an alternation between them: but that would seem to be the only 
conclusion to draw” (327). However, even if no relationship of cause-effect can be established 
between them, Jameson still insists that the “new social movements” are postmodern, insofar 
as they are effects and consequences of “late capitalism” (330). 
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On the other hand, due precisely to postmodernity’s close relation to the neoliberalist 
market,70 during the 1990’s many Chicana/o scholars, such as José Limón (1994) and W.B. 
Worthen (1997), rejected the idea of a “Chicano Postmodernism,” since Chicanas/os access to 
the labour market economy was then rather limited. As Raul Fernandez and Gilbert Gonzalez 
(2003) claim, however, the integration of the Mexican-American population into de United 
States market economy has increased decade after decade, up to the point where “the labo[u]r 
of Mexican Americans is present in every aspect of national life… [and] the utilization of 
Mexican labo[u]r as an integral component of the economy of the United States goes beyond 
the political borders of the nation” (xiv). Still, many critics, particularly those arising from 
minority contexts, have in fact criticized postmodernism for its detachment from critical and 
social concerns. Worthen (1997), for instance, claims that Chicano/a identity is an ongoing 
process (rather than a fixed reality) articulated by a shifting history and imaginary imbricated 
between the borders of Mexico and the United States (102). This hybridized history 
consequently entails a hybridized identity which circumnavigates the unequal power relations 
operating between nation, culture, ethnicity, and race (103). However, even if several artistic 
Chicana/o expressions use some specific postmodern features, like fragmentation, hybridity, 
or heteroglossia, for Worthen it is not possible to talk about a “Chicana/o postmodernism,” 
simply because the postmodern identity, characterized by its fragmentation, is the concrete 
result of a third wave capitalism which aims towards a “commodification of history as 
pastiche” (104) and the death of the historical referent.71 According to him, Chicanas/os’ 
hybridism is part of their history and their identity, which does not result from the socio-
economic consequences of a concrete period but, on the contrary, derives from the limited 
possibilities of access to the dominant market (Limón, Dancing with the Devil 106). In other 
words: fragmentation is part of the Chicana/o identity, rather than the consequence of a 
particular economic period, and thus all possibilities for a connection between this and the 
other, typically postmodern fragmentation are excluded. For scholars such as Limón the notion 
of postmodern "depthlessness" is concomitant to ideas of class privilege, and Worthen 
concludes: “to consume and dispose postmodern culture, postmodern identity requires class, 
status, or financial access to dominant culture” (104).  
                                                          
70 Jameson, for instance, as well as others, would even define postmodernism as the cultural manifestation of a reality shaped 
by this third wave capitalism. (Postmodernism xx) 
71 In her “The Brown/Mestiza Metaphor” Isabel Durán Giménez-Rico (2007), however, warns us to be cautious not to think 
that “this dissolution of a unitary self is all a postmodern invention” (120), as instances of it can already be found in the 
American classics of modernity such as Henry Adams’s 1907 autobiography The Education of Henry Adams. 
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However, to deduce that postmodernism has not affected Chicana/o cultural production 
on the basis of Chicanas/os’ lack of economic privilege denies the outcomes of cultural contact 
to which Norma Alarcón (1994) alludes when she declares that one cannot completely 
disengage from the sociopolitical surrounding in which our existence develops: 
“Intersubjectivity, as well as interaction with the world is always at play” (129). If we cannot 
extricate ourselves from the socio-historical context which surrounds us, it is reasonable to 
think that this same context participates, too, from Chicanas/os’ way of addressing reality, even 
if this happens in an unconventional way and adapted to their own cultural and socio-economic 
patterns. It is true that the fragmentation of one’s sense of identity cannot be equal in white, 
privileged subjects and minority individuals, if only because of the differences in status and 
the imbalanced access to the labour market. Yet, this does not necessarily entail that there 
cannot be an interconnectedness between both cultural movements (the Chicana/o and the 
postmodern), or that the aesthetic characteristics of one cannot be applied and/or influence the 
other. Of course, this interaction with postmodernity will be dissimilar, which is not at all to 
say that there is no interaction at all. Alarcón’s notion of identity-in-difference,72 for instance, 
presupposes that many minority women create their sense of self through a process of identity 
built upon difference that participates from postmodernism, even if they do not consciously 
acknowledge it (125). Indeed, these influences should be considered more as an exchange of 
ideas than as an actual reception by Chicanas/os of postmodernist terms and presuppositions. 
Thus, postmodern features in Chicano literature ought to be analysed with care, bearing in mind 
that Latinas/os limited access to the market results in a partial (and somehow, particular) 
acceptance of the postmodern aesthetic and its features.  
Part of the problem, however, might be related to the postmodern notion of ‘difference’ 
with which postmodern theoreticians explain the binary opposition between the ‘I’ and the 
‘Other.’ Finding the notion of difference to be essential to debates on postmodernity, Raymond 
Rocco (2003) complains that intellectuals such as Jameson, though allegedly sympathetic 
towards the Other, hardly ever discuss how individuals from different class, gender and/or race 
actually experience the phenomena of plurality, difference and otherness: 
The pluralism that is acknowledged by the postmodernists as constitutive of reality is 
situated above the realities of power and privilege, and the difference that they celebrate 
                                                          
72 In the “Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back and Anglo-American Feminism” (1991) Alarcón assumes the 
poststructuralist premise that language (and consequently knowledge) is divided into hierarchized opposed binaries (white-
black, good-bad, etc.) to claim that working-class brown women’s identity is a process derived from identification (with some 
women with whom they share the same class, ethnicity, sexuality, etc.) and counter-identification with other women and men 
(31-32). 
[130] 
 
is rarely acknowledged to be rooted in the structures of inequality, of class and racial 
and gender division that sustain that difference in its material and real manifestations. 
(409)  
 
Rocco finds it surprising that the Other, despite his/her physical proximity (at least in 
vast territories of the United States where minorities have come to occupy such a weighty role 
in the economic, social, and cultural framework), still remains an abstract structure. Rocco 
concludes that one the reason for this conceptual distance is that in the postmodern debates it 
is not really the Other that is being theorized, but the “decline of modern identity” (411), and 
thus the theoretical construction of the other, rather than acknowledged and celebrated, has 
been textualized as to represent “the desperation of the minimal self whose very existence 
depends upon the recognition of the [O]ther” (Friedmand, 170). Hence, one of the reasons why 
Chicano studies might not feel at all related to postmodern debates is that postmodern theory 
both recognizes and denies the presence of this racial, class and gendered Other, which is 
acknowledged only as a totalizing textual jumble where all non-white Others are included, 
regardless of the obvious cultural differences separating them (Rocco 409). Subsequently, for 
some authors, the Other becomes in postmodern and poststructuralist debates an empty 
container, an all-including category with which to theorize about difference, but only 
understood in terms of opposition to the white, Anglo-European subject, the “I.”  
Anyway, regardless of whether there is an observable relationship of interdependence 
between postmodernism and the appearance of Chicana/o studies, some conceptual links of 
connection can be easily established between both fields which leave a path open for dialogue 
and mutual negotiation. In fact, perhaps it would not be too bold to claim that some influence 
of Chicano questions and thoughts might have been transmitted, re-adapted and incorporated 
to Postmodern conceptualizations of reality. This influence does not necessarily derive from a 
Chicana/o’s ideological closeness to Postmodern views (which is not the case) but, rather, from 
Mexican-Americans constituting a rather abundant minority inside the United States. In fact, 
in 2014 the population of Latinos residing in Los Angeles exceeded that of white United States 
born citizens (Los Angeles Times),73 as well as in other states like New Mexico and Texas 
(United States Census Bureau). 74 The increasing presence of Latino population in all spheres 
of society has also been reflected in the academia, where theorists have found a space in which 
                                                          
73 Panzar, Javier. “It's official: Latinos now outnumber whites in California”. Los Angeles Times, 08 Jul 2015. 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-census-latinos-20150708-story.html. 
74 http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-112.html. 
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to develop a collective voice with which to examine their own experiences. If only because 
their scholarly work cannot be ignored, a certain degree of confluence between Chicano studies 
and postmodern theory is to be expected. Two issues in particular, related to questions of the 
alienation of the subject and views on temporality and history, are the ones that become 
particularly relevant for this dissertation. 
 
3.2.1-Fragmentation, Alienation, and Minorities 
As I commented in the previous chapter, postmodern scepticism concerning grand 
narratives and the “end of temporality” and of “periodization” eventually entail disbelief 
towards the existence of an objective truth, regardless of whether the human mind may have 
access to it. This has driven theorist Kenneth Gergen to claim that truth is another convention, 
and that individuals cannot act beyond the social prescriptions of reality. However, it could be 
added that all those individuals from minority backgrounds, whose notion of reality does not 
entirely fit those conventions that a white, heteronormative society has standardized as the truth 
(be it a historical truth, a social truth, or a philosophical truth, etc.), must necessarily feel 
alienated, because they do not participate from the social truth, or rather, they do not belong to 
the social reality in the same way that socially advantaged individuals do. For instance, Chicana 
historian Emma Pérez, whose views will be analysed in depth in the following section, 
complains that history, understood as the “truth of what happened in the past”, is another 
standardized version created by the elites; a discourse of power which has traditionally silenced 
dissenting voices and thereby contributed to the alienation of the non-white subject.  
Yet, one of the main features studied by postmodernism has to do with notions of 
fragmentation. A. Fuat Firat (1992) mentions several spheres of contemporary life that echo 
this postmodern fragmentation, such as the one affecting the media (203); the fragmentation of 
moments and events from their context and their history, as Todd Gitlin studies in his 1989 
"Postmodernism: Roots and Politics:" the fragmentation of the signifier from the signified 
(which started with Saussure but was taken to the extreme by Foucault in his 1972 The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, and Jean- François Lyotard in his 1984 The Postmodern 
Condition) and the object from its function; and the fragmentation of the centred self.75 Firat 
goes as far as to suggests a new postmodern metanarrative based upon fragmentation and its 
                                                          
75 The fragmentation of the human subjectivity and history had been already theorized by modernist thinkers, the difference 
being that for them fragmentation was considered a tragic event, and thus it was lamented and feared; whereas postmodernist 
celebrate its resulting meaninglessness and incoherence (Klages “Postmodernism”).   
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exploitation by the market (206). Interestingly, in 1987, at a conference entitled “The Real Me: 
Post-modernism and the Question of Identity,” Jamaican scholar Stuart Hal declared: 
Now that, in the postmodern age, you all feel so dispersed, I become centred. What I’ve 
thought of as dispersed and fragmented comes, paradoxically, to be the representative 
modern experience! This is “coming home” with a vengeance! Most of it I much 
enjoy—welcome to migranthood. (44, my emphasis) 
 
Though Hall does not establish a correlation between the fragmentation of the white 
heteronormative subject and the empowering of minority communities in the United States, 
authors like Angela McRobbie in Postmodernism and Popular Culture (1998) do, in fact, 
notice that both events (fragmentation and minorities’ empowerment during the Civil Rights 
Movement) are deeply intertwined with postmodernity. Acknowledging that fragmentation is 
not a property exclusive of the postmodern condition and that it can be traced back, at least, 
one hundred and fifty years, McRobbie talks of postmodern fragmentation as the end of a long 
spectre of intellectual enquiry begun with Saussure, followed by the structuralists and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and culminating in Baudrillard (28). Interestingly, McRobbie relates 
fragmentation with the “politics of empowerment” (29) of resisting (minority) communities 
who find strength in the unity of their fragmented voices on the one hand, and with 
disempowerment of Jameson’s white heteronormative subject on the other (29). Thus, inspired 
by Hall, McRobbie wonders: “Is the representation of fragmentation coincidental with political 
empowerment and liberation?” (28). This concurrence between the fragmentation of the 
postmodern subject in the United States and the ascension of ethnic, sexual, and gender 
minorities to subject status might be understood in terms of effective correlation. The 
fragmentation of the white (and should we add ‘hetero-normative’?) individual could in fact, 
though not solely, derive from the emergence of the ethnic, multi-cultural pride that ultimately 
drives the empowered elite to a feeling of isolation and uncertainty. This might in turn help 
explain why, as Geyer indicates: “following the 1968 student revolutions in the United States 
and Europe, alienation studies proliferated, at least in the Western world” (xi). By 1968 
Chicanos were deeply immersed in the famous student Walkouts with which they demanded 
equal opportunities and the end of segregation at schools. In other words: while the white, 
middle-class, hegemonic citizen was beginning to feel the impact of postmodern alienation, 
some minority communities, who had historically endured instances of economic as well as 
racial alienation, such as Chicana/o one, were beginning to gain power in their path towards 
social recognition and equal rights.  
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It is important, however, to make a distinction between the different meanings that the 
notion of alienation alludes to, for, as Geyer indicates, in the case of Chicanos it is the classical 
form of economical alienation which prevails (xxi). Classical forms of alienation, particularly 
in the United States, coexist with what I refer to as the “postmodern model.” In the postmodern 
model, and as a result of the need for consumption, the individual often finds (s)he has too 
many options available, which translates itself into the impossibility of choosing among all the 
options at hand. Contrariwise, the classical model affects mostly minority communities 
because their approach to this world of endless possibilities is radically limited by their scarce 
access to the capitalist market that shapes the postmodern paradigm. It is true that Geyer applies 
this model predominantly to Third World communities, but perhaps it would not be too daring 
to claim that it can also be applied to minority populations in the United States, regardless of 
their class and economic situation. What the classical model of alienation entails is that, rather 
than feeling estranged out of an overwhelmingly overdose of information which characterizes 
the postmodern pattern, the alienation that characterizes ethnic and racial minorities is a 
consequence of exactly the opposite: lack of opportunities, unemployment, poverty and 
exploitation which result in a lack of possibilities and segregation. Among these powerless 
individuals, Chicana lesbian feminists risk becoming one of the most alienated, on account of 
their total disenfranchisement from the economical, the social, and the ideological standards 
on the one hand, and their gender and sexual subjugation to the patriarchal relations that 
structure the Chicano movement on the other.  
However, notwithstanding the diverging origins of those two types of alienation, there 
is another crucial difference between the model of fragmentation suffered by the postmodern 
subject and the one that signals the Chicana (lesbian) feminist social identity, and it is precisely 
that Chicana feminists, as subordinated subjects, have had to dialogue with their otherness in 
order to achieve a positive sense of self that eventually leads to the acceptance of this alienation 
as an inextricable part of their self. Because it is a part of their everyday existence, eventually 
alienation becomes an essential and defining element of their social identity for, in Anzaldúan 
terms, the realizing of this alienation becomes the first step in the path of conocimiento 
(knowledge). While the dominant ruling class is not used to this estrangement, which brings 
frustration to its members and a sense of being lost, Chicanas/os (and other racial minorities in 
the United States) not only are used to it, but perceive it as a necessary step in their path of self-
identification and recognition. This is all the more true for Chicana lesbian feminists, who have 
traditionally felt alienated in terms of ethnicity, race, class, gender, and sexuality.  
[134] 
 
The alienation that results from postmodernity and the limitless access to the market 
brings upon the fragmentation of the postmodern heteronormative subject, and the expression 
of this fragmentation in literature has often been connected to disease by means of its 
theorization as cultural schizophrenia. Works such as Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 
(1965) or Paul Auster’s The Trilogy of New York (1985-1986) often portray fragmentation in 
terms of confusion and nothingness. Conversely, Chicana feminists’ fragmentation has been 
used productively in their writings as a tool to bring readers closer to their ordinary experiences. 
As John C. Ackers (1985) points out in “Fragmentation in the Chicano Novel”: “Fragmentation 
does not signal chaos or disintegration in Chicano literature; to the contrary, its development 
is a reflection of a consciously chosen path to bring readers to a deeper experience of the unique 
cultural identity of the Chicano” (124). Either way, in the end alienation signals both the white 
middle-class, and the Chicano subject’s sense of non-belonging and loss, ultimately becoming 
part of their identity, even if in completely different terms. 
On the other hand, one does not necessarily need to go too far to see the resemblances 
between the postmodern idea of cognitive mapping previously described, and what Chicana 
feminist scholar Alicia Gaspar de Alba defines as “positionality” in her 2015 work 
[Un]Framing the Bad Woman. When reflecting on the necessary methodology for her 
academic study, Gaspar de Alba acknowledges that we cannot disengage from our own body 
when approaching any given subject; a body which, at the same time, is dependent on and 
affected by the biological and social circumstances in which it operates: “We do not see 
irrespective of our bodies, nor can we see the subjects of our study… outside of the bodies that 
have produced them or of the historical, political, or cultural context in which they have been 
produced” (2-3). Positionality thereby consists of acknowledging where the discourses and 
realities shaping our ideology are grounded, in order to frame the conceptual and political 
standpoint from which any study will follow.  
Cognitive mapping could be understood as that which if obtained once individuals 
identify and analyse the effect that postmodernity has upon them, which allows subjects to 
break with the disorientation specific of this reality, and rediscover the historical-spatial 
possibilities for political action available in our current situatedness. Chicana scholars, on the 
other hand, resort to positionality in order to understand how one’s biological reality (defined 
by questions of race, ethnicity, or sexuality, for instance) and social reality (which alludes to 
notions of nationality, class, gender, religion, language, etc.) affect the way in which reality is 
understood and challenged, which demonstrates how positionality is overtly and specifically 
set towards social activism. In contrast, cognitive mapping does not necessarily need to be 
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oriented towards politics but can, conversely, be limited to a geographical and social 
understanding of reality. But if we take in mind that Chicanas’s reality is also shaped by the 
notions of postmodernism to which Jameson makes allusion, and that their ideology is also 
affected by late capitalism, power struggles, and a hetero-normative hegemony, perhaps it 
would not be too bold to claim that positionality could be understood as an already politically-
oriented cognitive mapping. In any case, that cognitive mapping is not alien to Chicano culture 
is something that can be seen in Chicana/o migrant literature, in which, as Gallego has noted, 
geographic and existential displacement results in a “perpetual sense of homelessness” (30). 
As Gallego concludes: 
Migrant literature depicts critical models of thinking that facilitate an understanding of 
totality under late capitalism. This cognitive move…toward an alternative interpretative 
model capable of sustaining a critique of capitalism’s totalizing effects is what makes 
Chicano/a migrant literature politically resistant and culturally significant. (33) 
 
Thus, even if the postmodern notion of fragmentation experienced by white, middle-class 
individuals is not exactly the same as the one suffered by minorities, still cognitive mapping 
(and positionality) appear as a conscious strategy to make sense out of a dislocating and 
typically confusing postmodern reality and lay the foundations for activism and social struggle.  
 
3.2.2-Postmodern History vs. Herstory  
In her “Reproduction and Miscegenation on the Borderlands” (2003), professor of Latin 
American and Latina/o studies Rosa Linda Fregoso echoes the shared idea that traditional 
accounts of United States history have often dismissed Latin American citizens. Fregoso 
concretely recalls her history lessons when she was at eight grade, explaining how, back then, 
the Battle of the Alamo was described by her history teacher as a confrontation between the 
noble and heroic forces leaded by Stephen F. Austin against the treacherous, barbaric and 
degenerate Mexicans, commanded by their bloodthirsty dictator, Santa Ana (326). In 1935 
prestigious historian Walter Prescott Web published The Texan Rangers, a work in which he 
unabashedly celebrated this American fighting force, which defended the Texan border against 
the “dangerous and troublesome” Indian warriors (6) on the one hand, and the alleged cowardly 
and slothful Mexican vaqueros on the other. Webb’s flattering praise of the rangers was 
effected in detriment of, among others, the Mexican community, whom he described as 
impulsive, deceitful, lazy and prompt to a cruelty born out of their Spanish and indigenous 
miscegenation. As he indicated:  
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The temperament volatile and mercurial…there is a cruel streak in the Mexican nature, 
or so the history of Texas would lead one to believe. This cruelty may be a heritage 
from the Spanish of the Inquisition; it may, and doubtless should, be attributed partly 
to the Indian blood. Among the common class, ignorance and superstition prevail. (14) 
 
The realization of the essentialism inherent in history, which, as was previously seen, 
did arise long before postmodernity but nonetheless affects the postmodern paradigm76 also 
constitutes the starting point and basic premise for cultural studies and social history. Emerging 
from French structuralism in the 1960’s,77 and influenced by Marxist theory, cultural studies 
have been a major field in the humanities since the 1990’s that aims at understanding how 
culture works and how cultural identities are produced and organized (Culler 43-45). Similarly, 
social history is a branch of history which focuses on the lives of common people and their 
everyday existence, more than often portraying the point of view of those individuals who had 
previously been dismissed, marginalized, or stereotyped by the white, Anglo imaginary. The 
aftermath of the 1960’s social movements in some ways helped understand the entrance on the 
scene of disciplines like social history, for it allows space for those voices in the margins, 
recovering perspectives from individuals previously silenced because of questions of race, 
gender, class, etc., whose standpoint had until then been erased from official accounts of 
history. 
These revisions of the roles played by previously silenced individuals contributed to a 
growing ethnic pride which was eventually projected in several narratives of resistance. One 
example of it would be Américo Paredes famous work With His Pistol in His Hand: A Border 
Ballad and its Hero, first published in 1958. This work constitutes one of the first instances of 
Chicanas/os’ ethnic pride, since Paredes was not only critical of well-known, respected 
historians such as Webb or Frank Dobie, of whom he said: “he was supposed to know more 
about Mexicans than Mexicans knew about themselves” (Calderón and López-Morín 225); he 
also showed his disapproval of those individuals from Central Mexico who considered the 
culture from the “México de Afuera” (“Outer Mexico”) inferior (“The Folklore” 5). Other 
                                                          
76 Let us not forget, for instance, Lyotard’s scepticism which eventually led him to claim that, with the end of the 
metanarratives legitimating the discourses of knowledges, history, too, became mere speculation: “True knowledge, in this 
perspective, is always indirect knowledge; it is composed of reported statements that are incorporated into the metanarrative 
of a subject that guarantees their legitimacy. The same thing applies for every variety of discourse… which guarantees that 
there is meaning to know and thus confers legitimacy upon history” (35). 
77 Roland Barthes’s 1957 Mythologies is often cited as a referent of the influence of (post)structuralism in cultural studies. In 
that work, Barthes demystifies the idea that culture is something “natural” by analysing a wide array of cultural manifestations 
to prove how these are based in fortuitous historical constructions. 
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examples would be Tomás Rivera …Y No se lo Tragó la Tierra/…And the Earth Did Not 
Devour Him (1971), which through a myriad of voices and characters transports the readers 
into the everyday experiences, fears and hopes of a Latino community; and which, among other 
themes, denounces the precarious working conditions of Mexican-American migrant workers 
and their lack of opportunities regarding education. Also, in his fictionalized autobiography 
The Revolt of the Cockroach People (1973) Óscar Z. Acosta depicts the militancy of the 
Chicana/o Students Movement in the late 1960’s in California. Thanks to his service as a 
Chicano lawyer for some of the rioters during the Chicano Moratorium in 1970, and through 
the narration of some other cases involving racial segregation and prejudice, Acosta managed 
in his novel to expose the institutionalized racism not only of political and religious institutions, 
but also of the Courts.  
It is not strange, then, that, as Sigurdur Gylfi Magnússon (2003) claims in his essay 
“The Singularization of History,” the rise of minorities in the United States served to evidence 
the essentialism inherent in a historiography which was commonly based on Western 
experience. Since minorities demanded their inclusion in the field of historiography, they soon 
embraced social history as an alternative approach to history making, contributing to the 
fragmentation of the story-line that, up until that moment, had constituted one of the 
characteristics of the grand narrative of history (703). As Magnússon writes: “the overarching 
themes and grand syntheses promulgated by past historians will not hold up when we broaden 
our perspectives to include the history of all the people who constituted American society” 
(703).  
 The Chicano Movement soon embraced a revisionist agenda that opposed the official 
historical discourse which reinforced patterns of racism and oppression of the Mexican 
American people (Busto 29). However, if history has been dismissive of ethnic and racial 
minorities in general (and Chicanos in particular) on account of their race and class, Chicanas 
(and, inside this group, lesbian Chicanas) complain that accounts of the past have been 
particularly damaging for them, since historiography not only has erased women’s presence 
from history; it has been used by a patriarchal and homophobic authority -be it that of a relative, 
a husband, or the leader of their movement  to exercise its subjugation of women to the 
virgin/whore dichotomy.   
When approaching the discipline of history and historiography, it is easy to ignore that 
our understanding of what “history” is and what it entails, may vary from society to society, 
for history is also a cultural-dependent process (Chattopadhyaya 152). Chicanas’ history, for 
instance, is embedded with mythology, oral traditions, folklore, and memory, for those are 
[138] 
 
needed in order to complete those instances where the brown woman’s presence has been 
expunged from official accounts of the past. As Marcia Stephenson (2003) claims: “The 
Chicana’s own historical and material specificity may generate discourses that do not coincide 
philosophically with Eurocentric theories of representation” (370). 
In search of their roots and their eradicated presence in the past, Chicana (lesbian) 
feminists’ history became impregnated with myth and folklore, which became essential tools 
in the reconfiguration of a past abundant in omissions and dark spots. Theirs is a conscious 
effort to present a female vision in contrast with a movement that had originally been 
formulated according to what women considered a patriarchal perspective, with which they 
could not feel identified (García 3). As Cherríe Moraga claimed in Loving in the War Years 
(1983): “Twenty-five years ago, however, there was little personal ‘me’ to read. That ‘me,’ 
Chicana and lesbian, had not been invented… In 1975, with so little ‘me’ to read, I wrote. To 
fill in the blanks” (171-172).  
For instance, the interdisciplinarity and transnational approach of Chicana feminist 
movement regarding the multiplicity (and consciousness) of its members is articulated around 
the legend of Aztec warrior goddess Coyolxauhqui, whose name could be translated as “woman 
with copper bells on her cheeks” (Espín and Nickoloff 932). The myth, as described in the 
Florentine Codex, narrates the failed attempt of this deity to kill her mother, Coatlicue, who at 
that time was pregnant with Huitzilopochtli, namely, the one who would someday become the 
god of the Sun and war. Coyolxauhqui organized a rebellion, leading her four hundred brothers 
and sisters to murder their pregnant mother and thus prevent the birth from happening. 
Huitzilopochtli, however, warned by one treacherous brother, knew of this plot before it took 
place, and at the convenient moment, was born fully armed. Not only did the god of war kill 
Coyolxauhqui, he also undressed her as a sign of humiliation, dismembered her body and threw 
her limbs down the hill of Tepeyac. Coyolxauhqui’s severed head was thrown to the sky, where 
it became the moon, whereas the brothers and sisters joined her as stars in the firmament 
(Ybarra 162).78 
In “Fighting with Femininity: Gender and War in Aztec Mexico” (1994) Cecelia Klein 
embeds the myth of Coyolxauhqui in the mytho-historical tradition of the "Enemy Woman," 
which she describes as “belligerant women… who, directly or indirectly, provoke the hostilities 
                                                          
78 In his study about the goddess Coyolxauhqui Justino Fernández (1963) indicates that, though beheaded by her brother, he 
has not found any source in ancient myths openly relating Coyolxauhqui to the Moon, indicating that the satellite is commonly 
called with other names, and thus deducing the Moon-goddess was, quite likely, a different deity altogether (45-46). Yet, in 
many mythology manuals and Chicana/o publications Coyolxauhqui is ineludibly referred to as “the moon goddess,” an 
association I will respect.  
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by attempting to deprive man of something to which he feels entitled” (225), her figure thus 
settling down the idea of treason as inherent to women. On their part, Chicana feminists 
interpret it as the starting point of patriarchy and male oppression, which ‘strips’ women, 
humiliates them, and relegates them to oblivion by splitting and suppressing their sexual and 
feminine identity (Anzaldúa, Interviews 257; Gaspar de Alba, [Un]Framing the “Bad Woman” 
132). During the exhibition “AZTEC: The World of Moctezuma,” held at the Denver Museum 
of Natural History in 1993, writer, and essayist Gloria Anzaldúa came face to face with a stone 
depicting goddess Coyolxauhqui. The chiselled image shows her severely mutilated body on a 
puddle of blood; her face, arms and legs stand unglue d, yet at a close distance to her body, 
which is also cut in half. Anzaldúa thought this scene was the perfect metaphor for a sentiment 
which had long been growing in her, as in many other feminist Chicanas. In response to the 
Chicano movement, which during the 60’s and early 70’s had tried to set very specific standards 
as to who could belong to it, Anzaldúa thought that each woman experiences her gender and 
her sexuality in a different way and, consequently, brown women needed to create an inclusive 
movement which allowed for all kinds of female experiences and perspectives: “Coyolxauhqui 
is my symbol for the necessary process of dismemberment and fragmentation… my symbol 
for reconstruction and reframing, one that allows for putting the pieces together in a new way” 
(Anzaldúa, Gloria Anzaldúa Reader 312). Moraga associated each woman with a different part 
of Coyolxauhqui’s body, entailing that all of them were necessary in order to create a unified, 
complete corpus.79 On her part, Anzaldúa transformed Coyolxauqui’s dismembered body into 
a metaphor of Chicanas split identity, claiming that, as Latina’s feminist movement, brown 
women needed to be (re)membered: “When you take a person and divide her up, you 
disempower her. She’s no longer a threat. My whole struggle in writing, in this anticolonial 
struggle, has been to put us back together again. To connect up the body with the soul and the 
mind with the spirit” (Interviews 220). But because, as I previously stated, women’s 
standpoints and presence had been silenced from history, this process of (re)membering needed 
to go back to their roots, to myth, folklore, and oral traditions, in order to fill in the gaps: “This 
sense of connection and community compels Chicana/o writers/ artists to delve into, sift 
through, and rework native imagery” (Anzaldúa, 2009 178).  
The image of Coyolxauhqui evoked in Anzaldúa a sense of polycentricity, defined as 
the multiplicity found not only in the diversity of perspectives inside and outside the movement, 
                                                          
79 By “corpus” I mean the collection or aggrupation of texts and experiences that, together, contribute to the creation of a 
Chicana feminist culture. As Anzaldúa defends: “Like Coyolxauhqui, let’s put our dismembered psyches and patrias 
(homelands) together in new constructions” (Gloria Anzaldúa Reader 314) 
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but also at an individual level: a polycentricity of the inner self, which allows the subject to 
look at things from several standpoints without necessarily focusing on a particular side 
(Vivancos 24-25). More importantly: driven by Carl Gustav Jung’s influence, the Aztec myth 
served Anzaldúa to articulate the basis of her socio-ideological conscience, arguing that 
“Chicanas and Chicanos need to return to Aztec cosmology…as the ancient culture that best 
represents polytheistic psychology and identity” (Vivancos 24). Chicana feminists’ identity 
and psychology is one that requires the myth and the folklore to be articulated, because it cannot 
be grasped with traditional views of history. 
Because Chicana feminism as conceived by Anzaldúa is articulated around the figure 
of an Aztec deity, it could be suggested, then, that the past of the movement is made out of 
mytho-historical accounts. As Moraga concludes: “This ancient myth [Coyolhauxqui’s] 
reminds Mexican women that, culturally speaking, there is no mother-woman to manifest who 
is defined by us outside of patriarchy. We have never had the power to do the defining” (147). 
That is, the traditional conceptualization of history by Anglo-European culture is not useful for 
explaining Chicanas/os severed and multiple sensibility, their border identity, and their 
conventionally ambiguous and sometimes even contradictory mindset. Also, traditional 
historical accounts do not serve to explain the origins of Chicana lesbian feminist movement, 
if only because brown lesbians have often been ignored, and their existence in the past is 
constituted by many gaps that need to be filled. In order to enunciate Chicana feminist history, 
then, other sources are needed. Anzaldúa’s strategy aimed “to incorporate the mythical and the 
spiritual as part of the political” (Vivancos 25), but I would also add: as part of the historical, 
which, as has previously been seen, belongs to the realm of the social, and thus constitutes 
another fiction where the discourse of power is imposed, but also where this same discourse of 
power can be contested.   
It could be argued that the use of folklore in order to complete the empty spaces left by 
the absence of documentation regarding women’s presence in the past might obscure or 
trivialize the discipline of history, since historiographers’ aims towards objectivity is masked 
by the playfulness and permeability characteristic of oral traditions. However, in her 2010 essay 
“Doing the Hemisphere Differently: A Response to Ralph Bauer” postmodern feminist and 
Chicana scholar Suzanne Bost claims that recent historiographers have become more aware of 
the role of the historian in the process of history writing, or rather, in the way that “the 
narratives from the past are constructed for the use of the present” (267), acknowledging the 
postmodern influence in the field, which challenges traditional views of objectivity and 
reorganizes history as a challenged, positioned, and multidirectional notion (267). When she 
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analyses Chicanas/os approach to history, Bost cannot help recognising the postmodern 
element that permeates their revisionist perspective, concluding: “Scholars in my field often 
turn to the past only in its relation to our present…We are hopeless postmoderns” (266). Thus, 
when Bost states that “Chicana/o writers turn to preconquest cultures not simply to search for 
explanatory origins but to create Decolonial knowledge” (268) she is also stating that one must 
be able to accept that blurring between past and present and the time-space compression 
concomitant to the postmodern paradigm (Odih 16; Warf 180; Rabinow 249). I am not 
implying by this that postmodernism has appropriated Chicana/o studies as well, but rather, 
that these might also participate from the postmodern views on time. 
Chicana feminist’s notion of history is thereby uplifted or completed not only with 
Native American’s mythology, folklore, and oral traditions, but also with Chicana’s personal 
stories and experiences. Yet, their history could also be considered postmodern in the sense 
that the distance between past and present is constantly blurred, since the historian often turns 
to pre-conquest times in order to decolonize their present. Chicana historians thus take as a 
premise that they cannot disengage from their subjectivity when writing history, the same way 
that they assume that the official discourse of history is patriarchal, heteronormative and 
standardized by a white, often supremacist Anglo-American culture. 
Emma Pérez’s attempt to decolonize the cultural imaginary thus appears at a time where 
history can be seen as another kind of fiction, one whose power and alleged objective value is 
given by a specific society at a particular time. But because the history of women, and most 
especially, the history of brown, lesbian women is marked by absences and deficiencies, it 
needs to be completed with other fictional discourses, such as myth and folklore, which help 
create a counter-narrative of resistance that challenges some notions of power inserted in the 
traditional canon of history developed by white, hetero-normative communities.  
 
3.3-Coyolxauhqui’s Daughters and the Decolonization of the Imaginary 
Emma Pérez (2006) states that women of colour historians not only question the alleged 
phallocentrism inherent to the field of history, but also the way in which feminism, at least up 
until the 1980’s, ignored the question of race, since, for Chicanas, gender cannot be separated 
from the colour of their skin and their class (398). Pérez shares Alma Garcia’s notion that the 
integration of Chicanas into the Chicano movement needs more than just the addition of 
women, and praises figures such as those of Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherríe Moraga or Carla Trujillo, 
who contributed during the late 1970’s and 1980’s to a more radical feminism that included 
the vision of Chicana lesbians in the field of Chicana/o studies (399). As mentioned above, 
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Chicana feminism was born out of the discontent derived from the exclusion suffered from 
both the white feminist movement and the Chicano nationalist movement, which, ironically, 
was originally conceived to fight against social and racial discrimination. Ellie Hernández 
describes it as follows:  
Early critiques against nationalism and originating from a perspective of the women’s 
movement explained that radical men were not open and willing to address the concerns 
of women. The most obvious and well-cited criticism of this was the problem of 
inclusion in a movement that purportedly was intended to liberate both men and women 
from the constraints of the dominant culture. (55) 
 
Leaving aside women’s lack of inclusion in the movement, what Hernández finds 
particularly frustrating is the fact that Chicanas’ right to self-definition and self-expression was 
being denied (55). Hence, Chicana feminism nurtures from a series of discourses intended for 
emancipatory goals through consciousness-raising methods (55), which means that it was not 
unilateral or single-voiced. In this line, Hernández admits that the realization of a Chicana 
feminist critical model is not a reality yet, but that, rather, “the production of knowledge by 
Chicanas over the years has advanced to the point that different patterns and contradictory 
views of feminist practice can now be named and recognized” (74).  
Chicana feminists’ refusal to identify with either the Anglo-American feminists in the 
United States feminist movement or their male counterparts in the Chicano Movement has 
turned into the use of different sets of tools with which Chicana feminists seek not only self-
representation, but also academic recognition: “We entered academia to…use the tools of 
history and social science and the media of literature and the arts to improve our people’s future 
and more accurately portray their past” (Baca Zinn et al. 29). Because of its relationship and 
epistemological challenge to the quest for objectivity in the academic sphere, perhaps it would 
be worth focusing on one of these analytical tools, which could also be considered an inherent 
element in Chicana feminist process of theorization itself. This conceptual tool is Gloria 
Anzaldúa’s notion of “autohistoria-teoría” (which could be translated as autohistory-theory, 
or autostory-theory, if we are to emphasize the lack the subjectivity intrinsic to one’s biography 
and, by association, to one’s perception of history).  
Hernández laments the trend over the past few years to reject identity formation as a 
valid source of knowledge production (75) when in fact, it has been one of the pillars on which 
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Chicanas’ path of conocimiento80 and base for theorization are established. Anzaldúa’s 
academic production exemplifies this method for identity construction, which she named 
autohistoria-teoría and developed mainly in her work Borderlands/La Frontera, published in 
1987. Autohistoria-teoría is defined as a relational kind of autobiographic writing in which the 
historian’s personal and cultural life is mixed with reflections on the narrative process itself. 
Therefore, biography is mingled with memory, history, narration, myth, and/or other ways of 
theorizing (Keating 319). Personal experiences become a filter through which to weigh up and 
rewrite one’s existing cultural stories, highlighting the obvious limitations in current paradigms 
of knowledge and, additionally, creating new stories of healing, self-growing, cultural critique 
and transformation. This healing is achieved through the connection between the theoretician’s 
autohistoria and its connections and similarities with many other women’s stories that, up to 
that point, might have been excluded from the official paradigm, for, while the auto-historian 
is telling her life,81 she is also telling that of many other women (319). This link between the 
auto-historian and all those women identified with her experiences is manifested through the 
process of writing, which, as previously stated, puts an end to the silencing of those individuals 
who have been traditionally kept at the margins. In this sense, Anzaldúa, establishes through 
her writing a challenge against the principle of objectivity so pursued by the Anglo-European 
academy, since she is eventually granting personal experiences and memory the same academic 
and epistemological value as history. The problem is that, though now her numerous 
contributions to the field of Chicana feminist studies have been widely acknowledged, her 
authority as a scholar was decidedly questioned during her tenure years, precisely because her 
writings (as her way of theorizing, so attached to the emotional factor) did not adjust to the 
formal and stylistic standards accepted by Western academia. Since they did not aim at a purely 
intellectual truth, Anzaldúa’s ideas were not considered professional enough. Interestingly, she 
was not considered a transgressor: for the academia, her ideas were simply wrong and 
enunciated by a person with considerable “setbacks in formal education” (Pitcairn 38).82  
Anzaldúa’s theories and analytical tools acquired the same academic stigma that is 
commonly applied to what Michel Foucault defines as subjugated knowledges in his work 
                                                          
80 In post-Borderlands’ epistemology, the path of conocimiento (“knowledge/consciousness”) is defined as the “search for 
inner completeness” (Anzaldúa, Gloria Anzaldúa Reader 292-293), a process of healing where inner contradictions, 
inconsistencies and fragmentation are acknowledged, processed, and finally accepted. 
81 Because the notion of autohistoria-teoría arises in the context of third world feminist theory and it is aimed at recovering 
the lost voices of suppressed women, whenever referring to a scholar engaging in this practice I will stick to the feminine 
pronoun. 
82 Anzaldúa did not lack formal education, though, as she obtained a BA in Art, English, and Secondary education in 1969 
and she also got a MA in English and Education from the University of Texas. 
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“Two Lectures” (1976). Subjugated knowledge is understood as all set of knowledges which 
are considered inadequate due to their presumed lack of elaboration, which makes them look 
naïve, rustic, or below the required intellectual level (81-82). Anzaldúa’s instance, and 
particularly her conceptual theorizing of personal experiences for intellectual goals, though it 
could be seen as a decolonizing method of that official way of knowledge production presented 
by the Anglo-European academy as objective, unique, and true, was perceived not as 
transgressor or merely different, but as unlearned, inconsistent, and, consequently, invalid. In 
fact, in her short essay “Epistemologies of the Wound” (2006), Chicana sociologist Gloria 
González-López examines the issue of objectivity in the field of sociological research by 
sharing her personal experience and her condition of Nepantlera in the academy, of which she 
became aware after reading Anzaldúa. Thus, González-López confesses: “I was always afraid 
of even thinking about incorporating Anzaldúa’s theorizing in my papers and potential 
publications. I feared the endless questions I would have to decipher and try to answer… ‘Oh, 
no, no, that is not truly academic, you don’t want to cite her’” (18).  
Concerning one of her studies focused on incest (particularly the one that often comes 
accompanied of violence) in México, González-López comments on the impossibility of 
maintaining her investigation inside the limits of the purely objective scope, for she feels 
inevitably involved with her enquiry as she is a Mexican woman who has grown up in a culture 
that not only ignores, but even silently accepts several ways of sexual violence, of which she 
is perfectly aware. Since González-López is eventually carrying out a research on something 
that, even if only for its cultural contiguity, affects her on a personal level, the author sees 
herself in a state of Nepantla, which she describes as a space for exploration and production of 
knowledge in the midst of complex tensions, ambiguities, and even contradictions as an 
investigator (21). Hence, González-López is submerged in a study that, even if aiming at 
objective, corroborative answers, cannot be completely detached from the emotional aspect; 
and she, a Mexican woman knowing her own culture, feels personally touched by her own 
research. This way, González-López opts for using abstract thought together with emotional 
and intuitive process in order to carry out her investigation (21), mixing the purely rational 
analysis (academically accepted) with the suggestive and spiritual element (rejected in several 
intellectual circles). She concludes: “My inner feelings of human interconnection with my 
informants… are exposing me to new possibilities to generate sociological knowledge with the 
aim of beneﬁting others” (22). Interestingly, for González-López there does not seem to be a 
hierarchy concerning the ways to acquire knowledge. As she indicates, when performing her 
investigation all the different aspects of her human condition, either affective, psychological, 
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or rational, are at the same level and have the same value as far as they help her acquire such 
knowledge (22). Thus, despite the broad spectrum of ideas, and despite the divergences in their 
points of view, what seems to be a commonality shared by all Chicana feminist scholars is, 
precisely, the idea that objectivity is a chimera and that their academic life and intellectual 
production cannot be disengaged from their personal experience as coloured women. 
Anzaldúa’s views on personal experiences as a vehicle through which to theorize about 
the Chicana feminist movement is clearly an influence on Cisneros, Alarcón and Pérez alike, 
and Pérez’s historic-theoretical project of “Decolonial Imaginary,” developed in 1999 in a book 
with the same name, makes use of this challenge to objectivity in academia. Gloria Anzaldúa’s 
The Borderlands constitutes, according to Pérez, “the progression toward postmodern, 
postnational identities for Chicanas/mestizas” (399). The reason why Pérez considers The 
Borderlands to be an instance of postmodern history is the fact that it renders history as another 
kind of literary genre, for the mestiza consciousness is eventually devised through the author’s 
personal experiences, poetry, and even myth-making. Yet, while Anzaldúa envisions the 
borderlands as the place where the mestiza oppositional consciousness is born, thus limiting 
consciousness to notions of gender and sexuality, Pérez goes a step beyond to claim the 
decolonial possibilities offered by these same borderlands, thus adding a historical element: 
“for me, the borderlands are also the interstices where the decolonial imaginary glides to 
introduce the possibility of a postcolonial, postnational consciousness” (400).83 
Pérez’s The Decolonial Imaginary originates from her concern regarding how 
colonized women have normally been ostracized from official historical accounts. According 
to Pérez, the female presence in history must be recovered, and since this cannot be made 
through historiographical texts and remains (from which female presence has been eradicated), 
other alternative methods must be established, and new ways of writing stories need to be found 
to replace the dominant hegemonic discourse. Pérez’s decolonial imaginary thus creates a new 
cultural logic for the colonized, an instance of emancipatory theories that scholars like Ellie 
Hernández support on the epistemological grounds that traditionally-deemed impartial 
methods such as scientific search for evidence, quest of objectivity, sociological cause and 
effect, etc., cannot account for the deep-rooted triumphant aspects of racialized, gendered, 
                                                          
83 It should be stated that both Anzaldúa and Pérez envision the border in rather triumphant and positive terms, seeing it as 
both a space for resistance and self-cognition, which has not always been the case. In her 2012 essay “A Mestiza in the 
Borderlands” Ana María Manzanas examines Margarita Cota-Cárdenas’s experimental novella Puppet (1985), which analyses 
the multiplicity and hybridity representative of the Chicana/o identity articulated across the cracks of a border consciousness 
and a nomadic existence (48). In her narration, contrary to Anzaldúa’s jubilant tone in Borderlands, Cota-Cárdenas focuses 
on the devastating effects of cultural, racial and particularly class mestizaje for the individual, displaying intercultural 
miscegenation in her narration as a painful quality of Chicanas/os distinctiveness (56). 
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and/or economic trauma suffered by Chicana and other colonized women (81). Pérez’s theory 
thereby allies with Anzaldúa’s claim that the personal cannot be disengaged from the purely 
rational or intellectual (81). 
The concept of the decolonial imaginary owes much to Foucault’s theories. On the one 
hand, Foucault states in Power/Knowledge: Selective Interviews (1972) that power can no 
longer be ascribed to a single individual but that, quite on the contrary, it comprises a machinery 
that no one owns (156). In that sense, the cultural imaginary constitutes a perfect example 
where power is exercised through ideological patterns of oppression that are reproduced, 
transmitted and transformed through the unconscious manifestations of culture. However, it is 
from Foucault’s concept of historiography as archaeology that Pérez finds the major source of 
inspiration for her project. In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) Foucault conceived 
history as constituted by non-linear discursive formations that covered interstitial gaps formed 
by the silenced, the unheard, and/or the unspoken (119). Archaeology was thus conceived as a 
methodology aimed at locating these silences between the interstices of historical discourse. 
Pérez departs from Foucault by claiming that “these silences, when heard, become the 
negotiating spaces for the decolonizing subject” (5), the space where third world women’s 
agency is ultimately expressed. Pérez thus commences her decolonizing project by decodifying 
the inherited meanings of words that have traditionally shaped Chicana/o historiography, which 
she considers patriarchal and homophobic (xviii). Yet, arguing that traditional historiography 
moves along a fictive past which it reproduces, eventually the subjugated Other is negated by 
a knowledge constructed upon fiction (xviii). Consequently, Pérez soon finds in the Chicana/o 
cultural imaginary the ideological space from which to decolonize a hegemonic history 
constructed upon the silencing of third world women, for the cultural imaginary is imbricated 
with history as much as it is with myth, folklore, literature and other artistic expressions. Thus, 
the cultural imaginary becomes the perfect battlefield in which to invert traditional (and 
conservative) systems of historical thought, for this decolonization can be effected through an 
array of different disciplines (historiography, literature, psychology) that evidence the 
subjectivity and colonizing patterns inherent in Western history making: “The point is to move 
beyond colonialist history by implementing the decolonial imaginary with a third space 
feminist critique to arrive finally at postcoloniality” (Pérez 125). 
Another major influence for Pérez’s theory on the decolonization of the imaginary is 
provided by Chela Sandoval’s notion of “differential consciousness” developed in her book 
Methodology of the Oppressed (2000), which imbibes from Roland Barthes’ Mythologies. Both 
Sandoval and Barthes recognize culture as an artefact, something that is not natural but socially 
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constructed, and Sandoval sees in Semiology an equivalent of Anzaldúa’s facultad (“ability, 
faculty”), or rather, a discriminating sensitivity that allows the individual to recognize and play 
with the science of signs in culture. Because the relationship between the signifier and the 
signified of the linguistic sign is the result of historical convergence, the changes in history can 
also lead to a change in that relationship. Mythology is in this way conceived by Barthes as a 
methodology for emancipating consciousness by decomposing the meaning historically and 
culturally assigned to the linguistic sign, or rather: “the method for the decolonization of 
meaning through its deconstruction” (C. Sandoval 114). By appropriating dominant ideological 
forms to transform them through the contesting of their normative pattern, the decolonization 
of this ideology is achieved. This process is what Sandoval, for her part, calls “meta-
ideologizing”, and constitutes the background for the achievement of a differential 
consciousness, built upon the deconstruction (what Pérez will later call decolonization) of the 
linguistic sign, which results, in turn, in the deconstruction of the supremacist ideology 
previously attached to this sign.  
One example of meta-ideologizing of the linguistic sign could be found in the word 
“Chicano.” Originally, it was used in the United States as a pejorative term to refer to all 
citizens from Mexican descent, and the word was considered an insult. However, from the 
1960’s onwards, during the uprising of a crescent nationalist pride, the term was re-
appropriated by these Mexican-American citizens and given a new meaning which expressed 
their pride in their mestizo identity, as can be seen in the poem “I am Joaquín,” previously 
mentioned: 
 La raza!  
Méjicano!  
Español!  
Latino!  
Chicano!  
…My blood is pure. (326-343)  
 
The process of meta-ideologizing a word for political struggle and resistance can be 
summarized in the following way: first, there was a signifier (the word “Chicano”) and a 
signified (its derogatory meaning). Over time the signifier and the signified became fused in 
the sign, becoming inseparable constituents of an ideological reality. As Sandoval states: 
“Barthes makes it clear that on the plane of experience Western human perception is usually 
unable to apprehend the Signified-concept as a separate entity, one that only finds temporary 
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expression through some kind of material object, or form” (91). Chicano nationalists, however, 
took this sign, and used it as a signifier of a new signified, which now manifested their pride 
and their defiance. They were, in other words, meta-ideologizing it.  
Pérez gathers all these arguments together and thus perceives the silences in (colonial) 
history, as she spells it, as interstitial gaps from where third world feminism emerges. For her, 
“nothing is taken for granted. Nothing is accepted as face value. Nothing is real” (xiv). The 
basis for her argument is provided by philosopher and postmodern historian Hayden White, 
who in 1980 declared that reality is made of facts, but all historical accounts of those facts 
constitute different narratives (White, “The Value of Narrativity” 8). Therefore, the purely 
impartial interpretation of these facts constitutes a task of gargantuan proportions, for nothing 
of the truth remains but the different (and sometimes diverging) accounts of it, which 
necessarily come in the shape of subjective stories. White’s simple statement brings about 
implications of rather significant magnitude, the first one being that there is no such a thing as 
‘history,’ but diverse versions of past events, or rather, stories, which themselves set up a 
fiction. Pérez subsequently claims that history is the interpretation of events by the empowered 
elite, who not only provide their own, colonial and patriarchal version of the past, but also instil 
it with a morality which aspires to teach us how to read and interpret this history. For Pérez, 
the historical canon, lineal and teleological, dismisses minority populations, and she states that 
“traditional historiography produces a fictive past, and that fiction becomes the knowledge 
manipulated to negate the ‘other’ culture’s differences” (Pérez xviii).  
As stated before, for Pérez, as for many other scholars like Rodolfo F. Acuña (1972), 
José Cuello (1999), or Louis Gerard Mendoza (2001), subjectivity in history is inevitable 
(Pérez  7), and therefore it becomes necessary to approach history with a serious and conscious 
mentality, aiming at the recovery of those voices from the margins that were erased from the 
canonical account due to their non-conformity with the standards and the challenges generated 
by their otherness: “the historian’s political project, then, is to write a history that decolonizes 
otherness” (6). It could be said, however, that if we consider history in White’s terms, namely, 
as a narration of facts that eventually reduces the unfolding of facts to fiction (or is at least 
enunciated and shaped in the same way as fiction), then there would be no use in trying to dig 
out the voices at the margins, for their history would constitute just another ‘story’ to add to 
the normative canon, with no objective value whatsoever. How could this question be solved? 
The answer might be in Barthes, a figure not explicitly mentioned by Pérez, but an essential 
inspiration for Sandoval and her project of differential consciousness. Barthes, through the 
concept of myth and its deconstruction through language in his work Mythologies, achieves a 
[149] 
 
dissenting strategy of oppositional consciousness by deconstructing the linguistic sign that 
forms the discourse of power. Pérez’s decolonization of history should not be considered a 
deconstruction of a fiction, but the decolonization of the meaning that this fiction holds for a 
particular culture through the practice of semiology of the historical ‘signs’ (or historical 
figures and events) that together constitute the language of history. In this way, history would 
become the signifier in Pérez process, and the meaning that traditionally has been conferred to 
it, the signified. Together they form what she considers a hetero-normative sign that negates 
otherness, a sign which must be decolonized, or deconstructed. Thus, even though she claims 
that her project is not based on a ‘rewriting’ of history, but on a recovering of those traditionally 
marginalized voices, it could very well be considered a rewriting of the meaning of those 
marginalized voices, once given the opportunity to ‘speak,’ that aims to the decolonization of 
women from the hetero-patriarchal and normative tradition. This idea will hopefully become 
clear with the example provided later on in the case study 1, where a sexual decolonization of 
the figure of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz is effected by Chicana scholar Alicia Gaspar the Alba 
in her 1999 novel Sor Juana’s Second Dream. 
 
3.4-“Sound and Fury” or, Are Presentism and the Decolonial imaginary 
Compatible?  
I stated at the beginning of this chapter that presentism (conceived as a tool for literary 
analysis), might be linked to Pérez’s notion of decolonial imaginary, which, as seen in the 
previous section, could be defined as the theoretical construct from which to confront those 
cultural and ideological patterns of history used to subjugate and objectify ethnic and racially 
marginalized individuals, particularly if these also happen to be coloured women and/or 
homosexuals. Pérez’s guidelines towards the decolonization of the imaginary are already 
partially sustained on the assumption that history is a standardized account of the past effected 
by a powerful elite: “history, after all, is the story of the conquerors, those who have won” (xv). 
Supported also by the fact that the past is unreachable, the project of decolonizing the cultural 
imaginary relies heavily on the present, in part because of the social and political implications 
that gaining historical consciousness entails for Chicanas’ agency acquisition. In fact, Pérez’s 
theory ultimately exposes the historical use and abuse of history that “has eluded ‘man’ for 
centuries” (2003, 401) which, due to its political implications, turns so relevant in the present 
time, as Pérez suggests when citing Ashis Nandy in The Intimate Enemy (1983): “If the past 
does not bind social consciousness and the future begins here, the present is the ‘historical’ 
moment, the permanent yet shifting point of crisis and time for choice” (62).  
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Interestingly, the temporal premises that Pérez chooses as starting point for her 
decolonizing project are, conveniently, the same ones that Grady and Hawkes take as 
foundation for their theorization of presentism, that is, the illusion of objectivity and the 
inevitable interpretation of the past though present-day attitudes and concerns. In fact, both 
Grady and Hawkes build their theory of presentism around the readers’ impossibility to 
disengage from their situatedness in the present when analysing a written text: “it is a delusion 
to think that we do anything but project the present onto the past… we should openly accept 
that all of our readings of the past are actually self-reflective readings of the present moment” 
(Coiro 11). Not only that, few people seem to notice that the past, too, may ‘contaminate’ the 
way we perceive the present (Grady & Hawkes 3), which is something Pérez emphasizes in 
The Decolonial Imaginary: “history is, after all, our understanding of the present through the 
past” (56).  
Pérez is aware that numerous events occurred in the past (or rather, the historicizing of 
those events) have tended to be preserved and presented as historical truths at the expense of 
the marginalization and isolation of minority communities in the US: “traditionalist 
historiography produces a fictive past, and that fiction becomes the knowledge manipulated to 
negate the -other- culture’s differences” (xviii). Pérez decolonial project is thus oriented 
towards these exclusionary conceptualizations of the past that have lived on in the social 
imaginary of a culture. At this point, it might not be too bold to claim that presentism could be 
a useful tool in the decolonization project effected in literary terms. In fact, both presentism 
and Pérez’s project of decolonization share some commonalities that would be worth 
emphasizing: 
- For both presentism and the decolonization of history to work, the notion of objectivity 
must be dispelled once and for all. The belief that the past is unreachable justifies presentist 
interpretative playfulness and Pérez’s decolonial attempts. Pérez’ methodological background 
is historiography, but she strongly relies on Hayden White and Peter Novick to claim not only 
that history cannot be objective; but also, that it hardly aims at being so, as it merely reflects 
the standpoint of the victors (5-6). Relying upon Foucault, Pérez, as well as (white) Anglo-
European feminists and queer theorists, envisions history as belonging to the discourse of 
power, which needs to be challenged to allow space for voices in the margins. Yet, what 
interests me is not Pérez’s challenges to official discourses of history per se (which are 
enormously relevant, but where presentism has little or no place at all), but the very same notion 
of the decolonial imaginary that she proposes. Pérez’s project is revisionist in the sense that 
she focuses on the decolonization of an imaginary to defeat the official discourse of history, 
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but the methodological tool she uses for this goal, namely, the decolonial imaginary (which is 
cultural as it is historical), is still in process of becoming a reality. It is at this point that 
presentism might become an instrument of great convenience.  
In the foreword to Shakespeare and the Urgency of Now, Hawkes declares that “history 
is made in the collective mind and not by the single percipient, is part of everyone’s experience” 
(viii), thus entailing a social aspect in the construction of history or, rather, a collective 
perpetuation of the imaginary associated to events in the past. The social component of history, 
the way it is collectively perceived and re-configurated, not only involves an element of 
creation, but also accounts for the way that different discourses are reframed and re-interpreted 
by diverse collectives. As I previously explained, in the field of literature presentism involves 
the sufficient constituents to fittingly link it with theories of reception, and aesthetic 
materialism, rather than with more objectively-driven disciplines, such as new historicism. 
However, it is precisely the collective and social aspect of presentism that might make it an 
appropriate tool for Chicana feminist theory in general, and for the decolonization of a 
phallocentric and racist imaginary in particular, as long as this decolonization is restrictedly 
effected in the context of literature. Obviously, I am not implying that the decolonization of 
the imaginary should limit its scope to literature. What I claim is that the use of presentism for 
decolonial goals should only be applied in purportedly fictional instances; otherwise a more 
adequate tool should be located. The reason why I think that presentism, understood as an 
aesthetic materialistic tool, is suitable for Chicana feminist theory is the fact that, as an 
instrument, it lacks in ideology. Ideology is later provided by the scholar that implements 
presentism in his/her study, which is the reason why presentism should not be considered an 
inherently colonizing instrument. But, more importantly, the fact that presentism engages in 
social reception theories has already facilitated its acceptance by other marginalized 
collectivities, like those of women’s studies and queer theory. If racial oppression in academia 
is the next impediment to overcome, why would not Chicanas use presentism in their struggle 
for racial, gender, and sexual recognition?    
Another commonality that presentism and the decolonial imaginary share is that both 
concepts may offer a sense of agency to an otherwise dispossessed or marginalized entity. As 
already stated, Chela Sandoval indicates that, under capitalist imperatives, the postmodern 
fragmentation of white hetero-normative individuals has, momentarily, and in a purely 
psychological level, made them lose their position as subjects in the social order: “the first 
world subject enters the kind of psychic terrain formerly inhabited by the historically decentred 
citizen-subject: the colonized, the outsider, the queer, the subaltern, the marginalized” (27). As 
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seen in the previous section, the same way that positionality is the first step towards the 
decolonization of a standardized patriarchal and hegemonic cultural imaginary, cognitive 
mapping may constitute also the first stage in the recovery of an agency which is felt as lost. 
In both cases, presentism could be understood as a second step towards the confrontation of 
historical standards of interpretation and oppressive cultural portrayals that are equally 
reinforced and challenged through literature. Hence, even though neither Grady nor Hawkes 
openly discuss it in any of their writings, presentism and the decolonial imaginary, each in its 
own terms, might help provide the subject with a sense of agency in a time and circumstances 
which seem to trap individuals in their spatial-temporal, historical and social situatedness.  
Of course, one cannot completely relate the practices effected by a Chicana 
historiographer in the context of US neocolonialism to the ideas defended by two white, 
heterosexual and male scholars from the (usually accused of elitist) school of Frankfurt without 
entailing several risks that must be otherwise acknowledged: 
a) Grady and Hawkes’s notion of presentism departed from the anti-positivist twist in 
which new historicist and cultural materialist criticism were, arguably, beginning to fall 
(DiPietro & Grady 4), but they limit the praxis of presentism to literary sources in general, and 
Elizabethan plays in particular. Pérez, on the other hand, even though applying her notion of 
decolonization to her own novels (Alicia Gaspar de Alba claims that only after reading her 
fiction is it possible to fully comprehend Pérez’s theories), moves principally in the field of 
historiography, though many of her ideas could line up with some claims made in the field of 
cultural studies. Yet, DiPietro and Grady stress that there is not one single kind of presentism, 
nor does the term label a definite critical methodology (3). Rather, it is more an array of 
potential approaches that acknowledge the irreducible complexity of reading in the present (4). 
Still, in order to successfully link presentism to the decolonial imaginary, a common ground of 
application must be found, which is, obviously, that of literature and fiction. It is precisely 
when the project of creating a decolonial imaginary is effected in the field of literature that we 
might find in presentism a powerful ally in the quest to reveal the colonial, patriarchal and 
hetero-normative ideology inherent in the Western discourse.  
b) Though Grady and Hawkes acknowledge that presentism is a practice that has been 
in place for years, they only mention how it has been used by Anglo-American feminists and 
queer theorists for their reconsiderations of texts. However, they overlook another important 
field: that of decolonial studies (though some analyses have been carried out concerning the 
character of Caliban in The Tempest). As a brown, lesbian and woman historian, for Pérez 
colonization is, understandably at the core of her theory, and cannot be ignored. However, the 
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fact that presentism has not yet been associated to decolonial studies does not entail that their 
conjunction should prove unsuccessful, which is what I will try to show in the case studies 
included in the last two chapters of this dissertation.  
Naturally, some might point out at the apparent paradox of relating presentism to the 
decolonial project of a brown, feminist, Marxist-tending historian, when I have strongly 
insisted throughout this dissertation that presentism should strictly remain in the realm of 
literature, and Pérez’s project seems clearly revisionist. The answer, however, is that Pérez’s 
notion of the decolonization of the imaginary is not revisionist, because it develops in the realm 
of the imagination, rather than in that of history. If Pérez were trying to offer a version of 
history devoid of colonial purposes, thus offering the “conquered” vision, an apparent 
contradiction would come forward. As Ellie Hernández (2003) comments: “How can one seek 
to inscribe oneself into a historical (narrative) process that has long been viewed as prohibitive, 
tainted by exclusion and silence, especially when the terms of history making itself appear 
suspect?” (158). Pérez is coherent with her own understanding of history as something 
subjective and politically contaminated, which eventually implies that any revised alternative 
(be it closer to the historical truth or not) might also be as equally subjective and politically 
oriented. Instead, Pérez’s decolonization theory is inspired by the way colonial discourses of 
history have erased the Chicana lesbian presence (the few instances in which this presence is 
acknowledged, it is always in the shape of an agentless object, lacking in desires), which drives 
her to inscribe Chicanas in the imaginary (rather than in history), thus transforming historical 
memory into a space for resistance in which Chicanas’ voice and existence is finally accredited 
(Hernández 156). Pérez does not thereby deal with purely historical facts but with imagination: 
what Pérez decolonizes is not history per se, but the recollections and memories deriving from 
official (and hegemonic) accounts of history that have long rendered Chicanas defenceless and 
objectified. Rather than purely revisionist, Pérez’s intentions are also creative, for she plays 
with the categorical identities kaleidoscopically inserted in the cultural imaginary: “This new 
category, the decolonial imaginary, can help us rethink history in a way that makes Chicana/o 
agency transformative” (5).  
 
3.4.1-Presentism is not mere Revisionism 
Gordon S. Wood (2008) criticizes those historians whom he considers not interested in 
erasing the collective memory attached to the past but, rather, in reshaping it in order to make 
it pertinent for a present cause, which has become a fruitful tendency since the focus of study 
became those individuals and societies traditionally disenfranchised and erased from what they 
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consider the hegemonic, hetero-normative patriarchal canon: “Rather than trying to understand 
the past on its own terms, these historians want the past to be immediately relevant and useful; 
they want to use history to empower people in the present, to help them develop self-identity, 
or to enable them to break free of that past” (8). This issue becomes problematic and generates 
several questions: Is the discipline of history slowly turning into a study for political 
denunciation, as Wood seems to imply? And, in case it is, can history be totally detached from 
the disciplines of politics and philosophy? Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, in his Thoughts 
Out of Season II: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life (1874) understood history as a 
discipline at the service of human life, a “means to life” (11), and complained about how an 
unmediated history that rejected philosophy in search of a scientific status not only was unreal 
but would also entail its death (31-32). Orthodox historians often attack revisionists for 
anachronism and manipulation of facts, implying they violate professional standards, when in 
fact the difference between purists and more radical approaches may be one of ideology, of 
values, or perhaps, more precisely, of point of view (Rosenberg 244) 
Even if sharing some features, equating presentism with revisionism would 
oversimplify the aims and scope of both practices. Decolonial revisionism, according to Fanon, 
consists of “giving the past its value back” (Hamilton 155). However, presentism aims, rather, 
at giving the past a value in the present. Though some could, according to this logic, dismiss 
the decolonial possibilities that presentism can entail, what has to be noted is that revisionism 
aims at subverting the distortions of oppressed people’s past by a hegemonic ideology, whereas 
presentism aims at evidencing this imperialist practice of disfiguring the past as a coercive 
measure to subject citizens. Decolonial history aims at restoration; presentism simply offers an 
exposing of the status quo. And so, whereas presentism can be applied to fictionally-true, or 
true-in-a-fiction entities (namely, mythological figures like Medea, or cultural stereotypes like 
La Chingada), revisionism is only valuable when considering a historical fact that has often 
been dismissed or manipulated by a ruling elite. When Yvonne Yarbro-Bejarano (2006a) 
describes what she understands by Chicana feminism she claims that Chicana writers re-
appropriate and re-inscribe the image of the native woman in their own feminist terms in order 
to liberate this image from the ways it has been racialized and sexualized at both sides of the 
border. Yarbro-Bejarano stresses the goal of this re-appropriation “is not to recover a lost 
‘utopia’ nor the ‘true’ essence of our being, but rather to bring into focus…the cultural and 
psychic dismemberment that is linked to imperialist racist and sexist practices” (87). According 
to this logic, Chicana feminism would be linked more to a presentist re-imagining of women’s 
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right for agency and self-evaluation, rather than to a revisionist recovery of their presence in 
history, even if these re-imagining is oriented towards revisionism.  
I mentioned some pages earlier that I did not consider Angela Carter’s (re)creation of 
fairy tales an example of revisionism because she was not so much interested in simply 
recovering the violence and sexual allusions now virtually eroded from traditional children 
tales, to get as closer as possible to how folklore might have been in its origins before it got 
disneyfied. Rather, she put her inventiveness at play in order to portray a feminist notion of 
women’s sexuality through her reconstruction of traditional stories by overtly denouncing the 
need to recover those dark elements from folk tales that had long been suppressed. Chicanas 
feminist re-appropriation of female archetypes could also be considered in this sense an 
example of presentism, rather than mere revisionism. In the first place, we are not talking of 
historical figures (even if some of these archetypes, like that of la Chingada, are partially based 
on or inspired by a person who really existed). Secondly, by re-inscribing feminist ideological 
patterns on these archetypical figures, Chicanas may not be trying to show how these figures 
should be really understood or how they were initially conceived, but to demonstrate how 
patriarchal and homophobe stereotypes have relentlessly been widespread throughout these 
images. This does not mean that presentism cannot be applied to real people, it simply means 
that its objectives are not oriented towards historical or objective recovering of a truth, but 
rather, to the manifestation of a cultural pattern that, later on, may or may not need revision. In 
other words: presentism has the potential to become a first step in the path towards revisionism, 
but presentism is not revisionist in itself, nor does it necessarily need to aim towards 
revisionism. 
Historian Gordon Wood also criticized revisionist history for distorting what he 
considers a historical reality, linking it to ideas of presentism. However, if we do not disengage 
from the literary framework in which, as I have explained, the use of presentism is sustained, 
this political denunciation finds a perfect space for functioning, for the alteration of history and 
anachronisms become purposeful, without putting historical relevance and aims at objectivity 
at risk. I therefore propose that presentism may be a particularly useful tool in the 
decolonization of a culturally and historically phallocentric and discriminatory imaginary.  
Since its inception, Chicana feminist theory has strived to find a space for identity 
shaping and configuring outside the constricts of the different movements against and inside 
which it develops: on the one hand, the Chicano nationalist movement, which ignores and 
suppresses questions of gender and sexuality; on the other, the white Anglo-European feminist 
and queer movements, which exclude notions of race and ethnicity; refusing to renounce their 
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white privilege; and  last but not least, outside the post-structuralist remarks coming from the 
Anglo-European context, which under the term “difference” situate all non-white Others under 
the same melting pot, erasing the cultural differences between cultures while objectifying them 
in the binary opposition I (subject)/ Other (object) (Edwards 17-19). Presentism and the 
decolonial imaginary share some interesting commonalities. Both notions are born out of the 
assumption that history is not and cannot be objective because the past is inaccessible. Grady 
and Hawkes’ theory of presentism and Pérez’s notion of decolonization of the imaginary are 
also similarly based in the same postmodern and poststructuralist sources (Althusser, Foucault, 
White, to name but a few), and disclose the view that history is given a bias by those who write 
it, a postulation which Pérez completes by adding that, in the process of history writing, non-
conforming voices (such as those of women, queer, and racial minorities) must necessarily be 
silenced in order for colonizers to preserve their privileged position.  
Traditional descriptions of presentism, however, even if conceding its ideological 
possibilities, normally disregard the decolonial orientation that this tool could have, perhaps 
because it is normally enunciated in an Anglo-European context in which scholars, maybe due 
to the dominant status attached to their racial social identity, blatantly embrace or accidentally 
ignore the advantages associated to their white, hetero-normative condition. The 
decolonization of the imaginary is a rather postmodern project that accepts the situatedness of 
knowledge and allows the creativity and transformativity involved in the process of culture and 
identity formation. The decolonization of the imaginary also interrogates the authority of 
accepted conceptions of history and truth (de la Mora 179) that redefines the boundaries of 
different disciplines in the humanities. As Aimee Carrillo Rowe (2011) propitiously pointed 
out: “Chicana feminism has a long tradition of ‘cultural refiguring’-leveraging history, 
ancestry, and indigenous spiritual practices not merely to remember lost histories, but to 
mobilize contemporary social movements and theoretical interventions” (128). Perhaps, then, 
the project towards a decolonial imaginary (when restricted to literary examples) could be 
described as ‘presentism with an anti-colonial goal.’ Or, conversely, presentism could be 
defined as ‘the decolonization of the imaginary of literary works regarding historical standard 
interpretations which still has not acknowledged the necessity to add race to its corpus.’ 
Whichever the approach one decides to take, still it might not be too bold to conceive 
presentism as a potential tool for the decolonization of the (literary) imaginary. 
I must also stress that I am not at all trying to impose the tool of presentism to minority 
studies (or, in this particular case: to Chicana feminist theory) simply because I am making 
allusions to a practice that, in my view, has been carried out since long ago. What I am trying 
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to do is to broaden the scope of presentism to an aspect that has traditionally been ignored in 
the field of Anglo-European theory: that of decolonization. The term or notion that I have 
chosen for this goal might be more or less adequate, but in any case, I am describing a practice, 
rather than dictating where and how it should be made. I am simply acknowledging that there 
might be some interesting results in putting presentism at the service of the decolonization of 
the imaginary. I am not trying to appropriate Pérez’s (or any other’s) theory for the white, 
hegemonic Western academia, nor am I trying to impose presentism on the Chicana/o 
theoretical corpus.  
Before moving to the study of the two examples provided to show how presentism 
might work in the decolonization of the imaginary, there are some previous considerations 
regarding presentism that need to be acknowledged. Among these considerations, one that has 
not been previously mentioned in this dissertation occupies a preeminent position, which is 
related to the spatial scope of presentism. As I will try to show, it is this spatial aspect of 
presentism that allows for a decolonization (that of Chicana/o history and culture) that is 
effected geographically as it is implemented temporally.
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4.1-Against Unidimensionality: Presentism is Not Only Temporal  
Before going into the critical analysis of the two case studies provided in this 
dissertation, I feel the need to make a brief, though nonetheless necessary halt to highlight an 
aspect of presentism that seems to go repeatedly unappreciated. Such feature has to do with the 
spatial sphere of presentism, which, even if only in passing, should be properly recognised, as 
it will prove relevant in the following literary examples, particularly in that of Helena María 
Viramontes’s novel Their Dogs Came with Them. Hence, though presentism has traditionally 
been analysed in terms of time and its influence on (or dangers for) historical matters, in the 
following pages I will try to explain and describe how there are several aspects which link 
presentism not only to time and history, but also to space, mainly through the influence that 
globalization has been exerting since the 1970’s and 1980’s. Because there is still no consensus 
concerning what globalization really is, I will ascribe my ideas to those defended by Celestino 
del Arenal, who makes a distinction between globalization (a rather concrete phenomenon 
occurring after the end of the Cold War) and Mundialización,84 which took place soon after 
Europe’s colonization of the Americas.  
Because the ultimate goal of this dissertation is to defend that presentism could be used 
as a tool for the decolonization of the cultural imaginary, what I intend to prove in this section 
is that presentism is indeed also influenced by notions of globalization, and thus it is a perfectly 
valid device to challenge the official narrative provided by one of the most evident influences 
of globalization: the third-wave capitalism with which the United States is, arguably, neo-
colonizing minority communities. I will then try to demonstrate that globalization and the rapid 
advancement of technologies have resulted in the rearrangement of spatial restrictions, leading 
to the dehumanization of physical interactions and the de-territorialisation and re-
territorialisation of previous geographical frontiers, which eventually point out at the spatial 
scope of the individuals’ situatedness (that is, our embeddedness in specific geographical and 
socio-historical parameters that determine our cultural identity). Consequently, the influence 
of globalization in presentism (or the spatial sphere of presentism) can be traced back through 
the way that people’s identity is also shaped by spatial notions, even if these are not so 
thoroughly acknowledged; and will, subsequently, have its manifestations in literature.  
                                                          
84 There is no equivalent to this term in the English language. In Globalization in World History (Pimlico, 2002), a book 
published the same year than del Arenal’s, A. G. Hopkins talks of proto-globalization. However, such a classification implies 
seeing globalization as an aftermath of this previous phase, whereas del Arenal explicitly talks of Mundialización and 
globalization as two separate realities. Because the differences between “Mundialización” and proto-globalization are too big 
to be ignored, and since Mundialización and globalization are not exactly the same, I prefer to leave the term untranslated. 
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Timothy Oakes, in his essay “Place and the Paradox of Modernity” (1997) indicates 
that: “the concept of place has been… invigorated theoretically by proponents of a new cultural 
geography who have found in place a dynamic tool for asserting geography’s importance in 
the expanding interdisciplinary field of cultural studies (509). Only lately does the spatial 
influence on identity and socio-political issues seem to have been acknowledged. This does not 
mean that notions of space had been completely ignored in the literary panorama, but only that 
it has not been until recently that all these analyses relating literary and cultural works to 
notions of space have been consciously accredited, up to the point of developing a new via of 
analysis, known as Spatial Studies. Because this admitted connection between geography and 
literature appears to have increased over the past decades, or at least it has become more 
evident, perhaps it would not be too bold to suggest that globalization may have had something 
to do in this process. As Marko Juvan (2013) claims: “In the humanities and social sciences, 
space had been considered a shaping force well before the expression “spatial turn” was coined 
but… the role of geographical influences on biographical and socio-cultural developments had 
been interpreted within the dominant historical narrative” (2).  
Because globalization has sometimes been used as an umbrella term to indicate 
different realities, it may be necessary to specify what globalization will entail in this 
dissertation. There are many instances in which people wrongly allude to globalization when 
they are, in fact, talking about Mundialización.85 Because there are some substantial differences 
between these two notions that more than often create confusion in scholars, I would like to 
make a brief pause in order to compare and contrast them, and thus establish what I understand 
by globalization, to avoid misunderstandings and thus incorporate a definition by which I will 
conduct my study. In order to do that, I will focus on the ideas of Celestino del Arenal (2002), 
who states that: “the second half of the 20th century has brought a deep transformation in the 
International society, bearing a progressive conformation… of a new international global 
society” (7, my translation), thus making a distinction between and ‘old’ international society, 
which ended after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ‘new’ 
international global society (22-25) in which we are submerged now, and to which 
globalization, together with the latest technologies, has deeply contributed. 
                                                          
85 In English, both the Spanish distinction between mundial and global translate as “global.” Some could point out the existence 
of the English “world-wide,” but this term entails a notion of universality that is not shared by neither Mundialization, nor 
globalization, which, as it will be seen, are not universally spread. If I were to offer a tentative translation of the term 
Mundialization, I would propose the use of “Worldism.” This Worldism, though, should not be misunderstood with the notion 
of Third-Worldism, which refers to an ideology which sought to find unity among those nations during the Cold War who 
could not support neither the Communist Russia, nor the Capitalist United States.  
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Although globalization is a widely-spread concept, many times it is used as an all-
including word that encloses ideas not always completely related to each other. Due to the 
many features the term globalization can encompass, many authors find it suitable to reshape, 
enclose and detail what it is understood for globalization in each instance. To ensure 
transparency, del Arenal makes an interesting differentiation between what he calls 
“Mundialización” and globalization, notions which should not be understood as two different 
stages of a unique process, but as two different and independent processes, both in nature and 
effects (7). Thus, Mundialización, which apparently originated during the 15th century, is 
defined as: 
 the dynamics which shifter from a world characterized by the existence of different 
and particular international societies, even without any contact with one another, to the 
existence of an international worldwide society, through a process of expansion which 
culminates at the beginning of the 20th century, with the dominance of the West. (8, my 
translation) 
 
One of the most important consequences of this process is the restructuration of 
universal notions such as time and space with aims at measuring them in a unique and planetary 
way. In other words: from a world shaped by different stories (and, consequently, different 
strategies and concepts to conceive time and space), we come to a world governed by an 
international measuring scale of space and time, that interestingly corresponds to those used in 
the Western world, which at that time started to become the cradle of imperialistic and 
colonizing nations. This does not entail, though, that there no longer existed other means to 
measure reality, but these alternative means often endured in the margins of an 
internationalized world (8). Yet, though maybe a bit extreme, this condition could be explained 
in terms of a kind of “international colonialism” resulted in different colonized nations that, 
even though still allowed a culture and national independence, are nonetheless shaped and 
constricted by the standards of a dominant power which corresponds to the Western culture.  
On the other hand, del Arenal claims that globalization is a quite recent phenomenon, 
beginning in the 1970’s. The global society is characterized by a multicentrality derived from 
a system (that of neoliberalism) which is no longer restricted to the operating power of 
independent states, even if these have not yet ceased to exist. Moving thus between 
multicentralism and state-centrism, such a society is, accordingly, more unpredictable and 
unstable regarding its structures and dynamics, where states are not always the key actors of 
the system, nor can they assure the security and wellbeing of its citizens. In other words, 
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globalization is characterized by the volatility, changeability and unsafety arisen when world 
power distribution and market economy is no longer circumscribed to single states (Del Arenal 
27). 
As far as it affects a cluster of different processes at different planetary scale, and it 
involves acting in some conditions far beyond the spatial and temporal dimensions, in which 
distances are covered immediately, globalization, according to del Arenal, keeps direct 
relationship with: 
a) the transformation experienced by the capitalist system at the beginning of the 
1980’s (16), and   
b) the revolution in the field of information and communication. 
The latest advances in technologies have played a notorious role in the development 
and spreading of globalization and, therefore, also have their reflection in our current 
relationship and conceptualization of space. Javier Echeverría (1999), for instance, has 
proposed up to three environments for the developing of social interactions. The first one would 
be the natural, which revolves around human beings’ natural setting: the body, language, the 
family nucleus, the tribe, etc. (28-29). The second environment would be the industrial, which 
develops in the urban (and also rural) landscape in which social and cultural interactions, such 
as those determining dressing codes, economy, industry, nation, power, economy, religion, etc., 
take place, and where industrial society reaches its climax (42). It is the third environment, 
however, which Echeverría refers to as “Tercer Entorno” (“third environment”), the one that 
best expresses the alteration in the relationship between men and time while reaffirming the 
spatial variable (Huguet Santos 51). Though still in process of development, the third 
environment is artificial and made possible thanks to the rapid technological advances. 
Echeverría claims that the main characteristic of this environment is that it is distal, that is, the 
proximity between agents, objects and activities is no longer necessary, for there is a new kind 
of space of interaction: that of virtual reality (65-66). Human beings do not need to change 
their location, nor to be physically present in a tangible place in order to interact with other 
people or work with objects. What matters is the information being exchanged, and not the 
entities transmitting it (73).  
In the field of literature this relation of human beings with technology has been deeply 
explored. In fact, the contextual frame of a late capitalist society is what serves David Brande 
(1994) to talk about cyberpunk in general and William Gibson’s novels in particular as “staging 
the modes of symbolization characteristic of a technologically advanced capitalist society” 
(510). “Johnny Mnemonic” (1980), for instance, constitutes an interesting example of this 
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distinct relationship between a human being and his/her technological surrounding in an era 
governed by huge macro-corporations and the market. The story deals with dilemmas resulting 
from technology and the way it may affect not only the body but also the very concept of 
humanity. The reader is introduced to the adventures of a data trafficker from a close future, 
Johnny, who has implemented his brain storage capacity thanks to the implantation of a chip 
in his head.  
Johnny, who is human by nature, enjoys being technical and having implants, because 
that makes him feel superior, at least in the sense that thanks to them he has managed to adapt 
perfectly to the circumstances of his environment. At the beginning of the story Johnny defines 
himself as “a very technical boy” (1) and in a quite ironical description of himself he adds: “I 
am… a nice meatball chock-full of implants where you can store your dirty laundry” (2). This 
does not mean, however, that he is not conscious of the sacrifices he has had to make in order 
to achieve his privileged status. In fact, at some point he shows a sense of emptiness derived 
from his absence of control over his mind: “I’d spent most of my life as a blind receptacle to 
be filled with other people’s knowledge and then drained, spouting synthetic languages I’d 
never understand. A very technical boy. Sure.” (9); and later on, in a burst of sincerity, he 
confesses: “When I looked out across the Killing Floor…I saw how hollow I was. And I knew 
I was sick of being a bucket” (10). His apparent dehumanization is more deeply explored in 
the 1995’s film adaptation by director Robert Longo, where Johnny at some point confesses 
that he has sacrificed his childhood memories to allow space for the installation of the chip 
device. 
Eventually, the problem Johnny has to face is related to adaptation: if he is to find his 
place in his surroundings, a late-capitalist dystopia, he is forced to undergo a series of 
abnegations in order to fit. Johnny is the result of evolution as far as one understands it in a 
Darwinian sense, namely, as a “better fit in the environment” which does not necessarily entail 
something positive for the individual’s psyche. Interestingly, Johnny’s evolved state is not the 
result of natural genetic mutation. Technology has made possible to alter the process of natural 
selection, compensating Johnny’s biological deficiencies and limitations with an asset that 
makes him valuable according to market needs. That is, Johnny’s lack of control over his 
cerebral functions would, in an ordinary environment, make him a regression in evolutive 
terms, but what could be considered an organic malfunction becomes his best quality in a 
society that is no longer controlled by natural laws.  
Johnny is aware that in the capitalist market that controls the economy of his 
surroundings, dealing and trading with information is his only chance to participate in the 
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system and obtain benefit from it. Johnny becomes an interesting subject for the Yakuza 
because of the information he stores in his brain, but his value as an individual is trivial and 
superfluous. That is, in Echeverría’s terms, Johnny is useful because of the data deposited in 
his brain, but his physical entity is completely disposable. In order to ‘evolve’ Johnny has had 
to undergo an ongoing process of de-humanization, for it is noteworthy that he has no access 
to the information he keeps in his brain, thus becoming de-familiarized with that part of his 
cognitive system associated to working memory. Keeping Echeverría’s notion in mind, it could 
be said that it is the technological society in which Gibson’s story is set what really 
dehumanizes Johnny Mnemonic: he is not less of a human being because of his brain implant; 
the problem is that in the futuristic society in which he lives, this device seems to be more 
valuable than his own self. He is reduced to a simple object which is just useful for the 
appreciated information he carries from one place to another.  
Interestingly, the technological environment not only is de-humanizing in this way, but 
for Huguet Santos (2011) it is also de-territorialised and transnational in the sense that the 
parties taking place in this new form of interaction are no longer restricted to real, tri-
dimensional spaces with frontiers. Quite on the contrary: geographical coordinates are nullified 
(52). Huguet Santos takes this idea to claim that, in the global society, thanks to a technology 
which is assumed to have taken control over individuals or, more likely, is influenced by this 
globalization and its effects in human interaction, the almighty self-regulating power of the 
nation-state has led way to a multinational society in which different parties and systems 
interweave in a relationship of interdependency (52). In other words: because the globalization 
achieved in part thanks to technology has, among other things, contributed to the de-
humanization of human interactions thanks to notions of ubiquity and instantaneity which also 
bring the nullification of geographical frontiers (for real space and tri-dimensionality are no 
longer conditioners of human communication), Huguet Santos concludes that the dictatorship 
of the neoliberalist market is no longer constricted to designs of nation-states. Hence, the 
effects of technology on human understanding of the world and human interaction are not felt 
only temporally (as Baudrillard claimed with the appearance of a ‘real time’ which broke up 
with the linearity and circularity of history in his 1981 philosophical treatise “Simulacra and 
Simulation”); but also spatially, one of the most outstanding results being the spreading of a 
neoliberalist engulfing market which is no longer restricted to spatial frontiers and to which 
individuals need to adapt following the same patterns.  
As Brande (1994) notes, globalization is: “less a view of the territory than a staging of 
the forces of ‘de-territorialisation’ and ‘re-territorialisation’ constitutive of a late-capitalist 
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economic order” (533). The principal consequence derived from globalization and the crucial 
development of new technologies which contributed to its appearance is that ubiquity and 
instantaneity are now a reality, and thus space and time are no longer determinants of human 
activity, losing part of the importance they once could have had. This has a relevant temporal 
manifestation: with the presence of globalization it is possible to observe how different nations, 
which do not belong to the same ‘historical time,’ shift and merge; places where the concept 
of nation is recently born clashing or interacting with places where nation is a dusty, old-
fashioned notion, and even the appearance of new kinds of nationalisms, such as the Chicano 
one,86 not restricted to spatial frontiers delineated by traditional conceptions of nation-states. 
Gayatry Spivak (2004) insistently defends that “changes in the subject are neither isotemporal 
nor isomorphic with institutional change” (73), and adds: “when we describe globalization as 
seamless unification of the globe achieved, we describe the dream of globalization as achieved” 
(76), which outlines the importance of being aware that globalization is still an on-going 
process, rather than a fixed, universal reality. 
It may be worth noticing that del Arenal places the origin of globalization –as opposed 
to Mundialización- at the end of the 1970’s and beginning of the 1980’s, thus coinciding with 
Simon Gikandi (2001), who also marks this date as the origin of “the transformation of political 
and economic relationships in a world that seems increasingly interdependent and with 
boundaries becoming fuzzy” (627). The difference is that Gikandi also includes literary 
manifestations of this new reality by means of decolonial studies: “The debates on globalization 
and postcolonialism are now so universal in character, and the literature on these topics is so 
extensive, that they are difficult to summarize or categorize” (627). What might be important 
to emphasize here is that, for Gikandi, literature became essential in the discourse of 
globalization for two reasons: 
-First, according to Gikandi, during the 1980’s many scholars started to believe that 
debates on globalization had become imprisoned in the discourse of modernity, whereas the 
real signs of globalization were to be found primarily in the field of culture in general and 
literature in particular: “A new narrative of globalization, one that would take us beyond 
modernity and colonialism, could be identified and experienced” (633). Yet, because society 
has traditionally been conceived inside the parameters of nation-states which no longer seem 
to be ascribed to the current global reality, Gikandi claims that a new theory of globalization 
                                                          
86 Chicano nationalism is considered cultural and ethnic, but it is not attached to a geographical nation, even though they claim 
primordial rights of ownership over the lost land of Aztlán, constituted by all the Northern territories of Mexico which were 
given to the United States as part of the agreement reached after the Mexican-American war (Trujillo 20-21).  
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needs to be found, one that goes beyond typical notions of nation-states and traditional claims 
of sociology and cultural studies. As will later be seen, Gikandi believes that in this process 
“literary culture comes to occupy an important role in the rethinking of globalization outside 
its traditional home in the nation-state” (634). 
-Second, with the emergence of postmodernism in the 1980s some key concepts in 
theories of modernization were called into question by cultural and literary theorists in the 
United States, such as the idea of modernization itself, the authority of the nation-state, or the 
notion of culture as an embodiment of symbolic hierarchies like patriotism and citizenship. 
This reconsideration was the direct outcome of bringing to the forefront the existence of an 
extensive array of decentred narratives and transnational movements which challenged the 
notion of nation-state (634). The principal one or at least one of the most celebrated of these 
decentring disciplines is that of decolonialism. In her essay “Reading Dialectically” (2013) 
Carolyn Lesjak, through Carolyn Steedman’s analysis of the textual historical archive,87 points 
out at how minorities tend to be traditionally ignored in the literary canon. The archive is 
conditioned and subdued to the state power and authority (241), so, consequently, it is all but 
democratic. The literary canon of a given society is the canon made by those who have the 
power, and everything opposed to or differing from it is, logically, disregarded. Decolonial 
literature, then, could be a source for making readers aware of the lack of democracy underlying 
any culture’s canon, by giving a voice, an agency, and a presence to all those communities 
ignored. Not only that, these minorities’ voices and views have also been retrieved via gender 
and queer studies through presentist revisions which strive to give a voice to all those who had 
previously been silenced. In all of these decolonial literary practices, presentist examinations 
have had a privileged position, not only in terms of time, but also in terms of space, for 
eventually globalization also results in the anxiety of asserting one’s identity in a place no 
longer defined by spatial borders or cultural projections constricted to territorial limits.  
On the one hand, it could be suggested that presentist literary analysis allows minority 
writers and readers to question their socio-political and geographical history (by means of 
cultural and de-colonial studies) and offer an alternative view. Not only that, they might also 
allow the reader to become acquainted with texts and works different from those deriving from 
                                                          
87 In her collection of essays Dust (2001) Carolyn Steedman, inspired by (though in complete disagreement with) Derrida´s 
essay “Archival Fever,” acknowledges that historical archives are physical places where the past manifests itself (Tollebeek 
239). However, Steedman debunks the fantasies often ascribed to the idea of archive, namely, a) that archives put the historian 
in direct and unmediated contact with the past (the Romantic fantasy) and b) that through archives, all documents from the 
past can be reached in one single place (the scientific fantasy) (Tollebeek 244). 
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the political canonical discourse of a homogenizing power, as I will try to show later on with 
some examples.  
 
4.2-Globalization and Decolonial Studies 
As it has been suggested before, in order to understand presentism and its 
characteristics, it is necessary to go beyond the traditional views on time and space, and this 
comes in the way of ‘instantaneity’ and ‘ubiquity’ (the possibility of being virtually present in 
different places at the same time). Space is no longer tied to the State and its territory, which 
is why, together with globalization, there comes a de-territorialisation of traditional spaces of 
power and their re-territorialisation according to new criteria. These territorial restructurings 
bring as a consequence the weakening of state frontiers and the uprising of new limits or 
frontiers of a religious, ethnic, cultural, national, economic and/or social nature (Arenal 21). 
Paul Jay, in his study “Locating Disciplinary Change” (2006), refers to this new reality as 
“afterlife”, or in other words: “the moment that has decentred the truths, practices, and even 
institutions that belonged to a time that could still believe in the identity of some conception of 
humanity and universality with a Eurocentric endowment” (176-177). Paradoxically, 
globalization seems to have nurtured the realization that concepts like “universality” are no 
longer sustainable, precisely because what it has unveiled that what has been understood as 
universal is nothing but a Eurocentric Mundialización.   
In this line, Gikandi mentions the existence of ‘world texts’ whose frame of reference 
is no longer the nation-state but a broader, wider entity (632), but that, surprisingly, still need 
to be engaged to the nation-state in which they were created, with its cultural patterns, 
mythologies and ways to see the world, in order to give those texts a complete reading. It seems 
as if globalization were a reality that could only be applied to small segments of literature 
whereas the ‘old’, devaluated notion of nation-state (which apparently seemed to be completely 
overcome) not only still survived, but was completely necessary to the understanding of culture 
and, therefore, of literature. Perhaps one of the reasons for this endurance of the idea of nation-
state derives in part from patterns of neocolonialism, as defined by Shaobo Xie in his 1997 
essay “Rethinking the Problem of Postcolonialism.” 
The same way that some critics claim the impossibility for a reader to isolate 
himself/herself from the background in which (s)he has been raised in order to approach a 
literary work from a different context, Xie mentions some critics who, in the field of decolonial 
studies, defend that the idea of “an ‘uncontaminated’ or ‘indigenous’ postcolonial theory” is 
highly improbable (7). For Xie, as well as for other scholars, there are at least two different 
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stages in a process of colonization: the first one involves imperialism; the other one appears 
after the ‘colonized’ nation has been declared ‘independent’ but still suffers from hegemonic 
colonization, with the imbedding of Western ideological, ethical and technological culture, and, 
more importantly, the implantation of its mode of production, namely, capitalism (11). What 
particularizes this latter example of occupation is that not only it is often not openly fought or 
rejected by the ‘indigenous’ individuals but, on the contrary, it is tacitly accepted or even goes 
unnoticed. Globalization appears then as an alternative word for ‘neocolonialism’ or the 
hegemonic phase of colonialism; and for Xie decolonialism arises consequently, as a way to 
fight it in the field of literature and culture: 
Postcolonialism represents an urgent need and determination to dismantle imperial 
structures in the realm of culture. The postcolonial does not signify the demise or 
pastness of coloniality; rather, it points to a colonial past that remains to be interrogated 
and critiqued. It admits an indebtedness to the past and a responsibility to the future 
(15). 
 
Whereas Mundialización brought upon the remodelling and re-shaping of universal 
notions and conceptual terms according to the hegemonic power perception of them, the arrival 
of globalization has evidenced the dynamics of power of a now outdated reality shaped by 
notions of nation-states. Therefore, globalization seems to imply a need to revisit those 
standards and concepts which might not be as exact or correct as they have traditionally been 
granted to be. That is the reason why decolonialism “is also an act of rethinking the history of 
the world against the inadequacy of the terms and conceptual frames invented by the West” 
(Xie 10), to which I would also add notions of space. Gikandi thus writes: “although English 
literature has become the most obvious sign of transnationalism, it is continuously haunted by 
its historical –and disciplinary- location in a particular national ethos and ethnos” (632-633).  
Yet, if globalization is really a product of mass media and technology developed in a 
capitalist world, what happens with those places where this same technology and media is not 
as widespread as it is in the capitalist, most developed world? It might be important to mention 
that globalization seems to be more a concept from the First world,88 rather than a universal 
                                                          
88 The world classes (first, second, and third) have no official definition, though there are some guidelines established 
according to the economic position of a nation/state. First world alludes to those capitalist, industrial countries that, after World 
War II, became aligned with the United States, with allegedly similar economic and political interests. Second world refers to 
previously communist/socialist, industrial countries. Finally, the Third world is formed by developing countries in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, regardless of their political views (they can be both capitalist or communist) and their economic success 
Saudi Arabia is a rich country, but because it is still developing and it is heavily dependent on industrialized nations, it is 
normally considered to belong to the Third World (Arnold 30). 
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construct; and, as such, it does not necessarily apply to other cultures and places in the world. 
As Hayden White comments: “the global appertains only to that part of the world covered by 
the World Wide Web” (732); globalization does not affect all the corners of the world likewise. 
Following this line, Krishnaswamy (2002) claimed that:  
Not all postcolonial critics believe globalization empowers the multitudes by creating 
a decentred world overflowing with insurgent energies… globalization, instead of being 
opposed to nationalism or leading to the dissolution of the nation-state as so many 
believe, actually “takes the form of the dismantling of subaltern nationalisms by 
developed nationalisms.” (117)  
 
Globalization, then, consists of the expansive force of neocolonial powers, and, in that sense, 
it should not be understood as a rupture, but as an evolution of the colonizing process started 
by nation-state societies, the only difference being that power is now concentrated on the range 
of the neoliberalist market. In other words, Mundialización has not yet been completely 
overcome by globalization, and, simultaneously (or perhaps because both world orders are 
coexisting), globalization does not imply the end of spatial frontiers, nor is it a finalized 
process.  
Seeing globalization as a new kind of market imperialism carried out by current nation-
states might help explain why, even though some “world texts” cannot be restricted to and 
delimitated by a specific nation, they still need to be studied from the point of view of the 
nation-state where they were created, for globalization does not dissolves borders: it just 
diffuses and rearranges them. Nonetheless, in those parts of the globe where, as Gikandi claims, 
there no longer seems to be a connection between localities and cultural practices, no equivalent 
relationship between social realities and their cultural representations, that is, in those 
globalized areas of the world, decolonialism appears as the solution to that severance between 
artistic representations and states, for it valorises the imaginary (that is, culture) over a global 
neocolonial reality (638).  
Through technology and globalization, and the resulting relevance acquired by notions 
such as ubiquity and instantaneity, many individuals have acknowledged the arbitrariness of 
an apparent internationalist unifying conceptualization of reality (and its manifestations in 
cultural patterns) that very often in America has been exerted by imperial nations upon minority 
communities since the conquest of the continent. Among the possible implications derived by 
this realization comes the acknowledgment that postmodern situatedness, then, is not only a 
temporal and cultural notion, but also a spatial one. Our spatial situatedness comes delineated 
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by the geographical limits of our reality, regardless of whether our culture can be completely 
aligned to the territory drawn within nationally expanding borders. 
I claimed previously in this dissertation that presentism could be conceived as a strategy 
defying postmodern situatedness, for it allowed the individual to play with temporal realities 
that usually make him/her feel constricted. If we thereby assume that situatedness is also 
strongly tied to geo-political influences affecting the individual’s configuration of identity, then 
perhaps presentism might also help in the reassembly of an otherwise fragmented spatial 
identity. If globalization eventually outlines that universality does not exist and reveals the 
neocolonial realities of an enlarging neoliberalist market, perhaps presentism could be used, in 
the field of decolonial literature, as a strategy to study how spatial representations affect 
marginalized communities arisen in a global context (such as the Chicana/o one), and to 
examine the challenges portrayed by these minority groups to a global reality. 
 
4.3-Spatial Decolonization and Presentism 
There have been strong debates concerning the relationship and influence of 
globalization in Chicana/o studies. Despite Chicanas/os constituting a rather marginalized 
minority community inside the United States, they still belong to a country led by third-wave 
capitalism at the head of a globalized market and a rich affluent of immigration. In his 
“Response to José E. Limón” (2008) Richard Rodríguez explains how some scholars, such as 
José and Ramón Saldívar, have long studied the effects of globalization in Chicana/o cultural 
studies. Recently, however, José Limón (2008) has criticized how rushed studies on the global 
have resulted in incomplete and short misreadings of what is really happening at a local level, 
insisting that regionalisms, instead, need a more attentive study in their interaction with the 
global (“Border Literary Histories” 164), and thus acknowledging the effect that place plays 
on space (167).89 At the core of this debate there might lie the problematic arising when talking 
about the influences of globalization on a movement of resistance (that of Chicanas/os) that is 
trying to separate itself precisely from what it considers imposed colonizing patterns of 
conceptualization on Chicanas/os perception of space. However, precisely because the spatial 
constituent of Chicano nationalism, posited through the notion of Aztlán, has been widely 
explored and used in the movement’s literature, perhaps some considerations should be 
included. The notions of globalization indirectly embedded in the notion of Aztlán is what 
                                                          
89 In A Companion to Social Archaeology (2004), editors Robert W. Preucel and Lynn Meskell define space as the physical 
setting where things occur, and place as a social construct derived from the process of valuing space, or, rather, the result of 
transforming space into a humanised landscape by means of emotional assessment (215). 
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eventually will help me try to show that presentism could also be used for the decolonization 
of an imaginary settled in spatial notions, related to displacement and conquest. 
Traditionally, Euro-American theorists have, at least since Positivism, been more aware 
of history (be it as a temporal concept, a discourse of power, or as a mere recording of the past) 
than of space, even though, since the 1960’s spatial studies have become a major field of study 
in the academy (Tally 159). In contrast, Mary Pat Brady claims in Extinct Lands, Temporal 
Geographies (2002) that in Chicano literature (and most especially, in Chicana feminist 
literature and theory) space has traditionally occupied a preeminent role, not only in 
geographical terms, but also in ideological ones (9). Brady defends that ever since Chicano 
literature was first conceived, it resisted capitalism mainly in its spatial sphere; particularly that 
which naturalizes supremacist ideologies of gender, race and class through space and 
geographical policies; challenging these notions and enactments through different strategies 
that served to emphasize the performative qualities of space and how it can be directed towards 
social change (6). Chicana writers thus reject the old-fashioned idea of space as a rigid notion, 
emphasizing its potential malleability: “Chicana writers are quick to twist realism as a 
representational strategy that too easily solidifies oppressive spatial alignments by hiding the 
processual quality of space” (7).  
The relationship of Chicanos with space might be easily understood if one bears in mind 
that the history of the American continent is one marked by colonization and imperial 
impositions. While European nations expanded throughout the globe they enforced their own 
ways of measuring and understanding reality, hence giving way to Mundialización. The Native 
American tribes were, in turn, coerced into a new way of conceptualizing the world which was 
intricately related to geographical questions, for this conceptual enforcement was implanted 
following the displacement of indigenous communities to allow space for the new settlers. This, 
in some way, is related to Edmundo O’Gorman’s idea that America was not discovered, but 
“invented.”  
In his 1958 book, La Invención de América, O’Gorman defends that the history of the 
Americas is not based on alleged objectivity, not even in the quest for it, but on a kind of 
representation that favours more powerful nations, which is why very often the continent is 
represented as an object tacitly waiting to be found by others, its agency being denied both 
temporally and spatially. Thus, after the conquest, in the hegemonic Anglo-European cultural 
imaginary, the American continent has traditionally been re-inscribed in terms of conflating 
and changing space, assuming the role of a passive, static topography waiting for European 
nations to expand, spread and re-articulate its limits on a continent which frontiers and spatial 
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barriers became an issue of political nature. Thus, while Europe adopts an active, disseminating 
role, the Americas remain paralyzed and agentless. Consequently, because, as Brady suggests, 
“displacement and dislocation are at the core of the invention of the Americas,” there seems to 
be a strong co-relation between the conquest and the de-spacing of the original inhabitants of 
the American continent (9). Because the continent was occupied by foreign nations, its 
invention (or its ‘inception’ in Western terms) forcefully implied the pushing out and down of 
the original inhabitants’ way of conceptualizing reality, together with their dislocation from the 
space they once occupied; thus, there is a strong bond between cultural disempowerment and 
the idea of de-territorialisation, or rather, the deprivation of the lands these indigenous 
communities inhabited when the conquerors first arrived.90 Consequently, because the 
indigenous de-spatialisation coincides with a particular temporal moment (the arrival of the 
European empires), and resulted in radical cultural changes, for many communities a change 
in time must also forcefully entail a change in space. For a mestizo society as attached to their 
indigenous origin as the Chicanas/os are, this pattern of re-territorialisation and colonialism, 
which has repeated itself since the settlers first put their foot on the American continent, notions 
of time and space are intricately connected, which somehow reminds of Bakhtin’s notion of 
chronotope. In his 1937-1938 essay “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” 
Mikhail Bakhtin postulates that semantic units in literature cannot be subjected to temporal and 
spatial determinations because they constitute objects from our abstract cognition. It is in the 
process of assigning meaning to concepts where these notions become inscribed into concrete 
spatial and temporal parameters: “We incorporate [all phenomena] not only into the sphere of 
spatial and temporal existence but also into a semantic sphere” (257). Yet, because time and 
space are intricately connected to meaning, they become inseparable parts of the signified, and 
thus cannot be untied from the signifier. This indivisibility of the temporal-spatial expression 
of abstract thought is what Bakhtin refers to as chronotope: “We will give the name chronotope 
(literally, ‘time space’) to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that 
are artistically expressed in literature” (84). Thus, the motif of the Conquest, because of its 
indissoluble attachment to notions of time and space, could be considered a chronotope in 
                                                          
90 Of course, it should be noted that there were instances of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation before the European 
conquerors arrived at the continent: many of the different Indigenous tribes existing prior to Colon’s arrival, such as the Mexica 
tribe, were expansionist and annexed several lands through the conquest of other tribes (Johns 186). However, the Spanish 
Conquest meant not only the absolute dispossession of the Indigenous tribes from the territories they once occupied, but also 
their exploitation, punishing and treatment like virtual objects at the mercy of their owners (Johns 187). It is understandable, 
then, that the Conquest has survived in the imaginary of Latin American communities more intricately related to ideas of 
disempowerment and racism. 
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Chicana/o literature, and any presentist examination of the Conquest as a theme must forcefully 
be able to address colonization in terms of time as well as space. 
On the other hand, the subjugation of indigenous culture to the requirements of a global 
neoliberalist market encourages Santiago Castro-Gómez and Óscar Guardiola Rivera to 
wonder what place do subaltern knowledges occupy in this new world order. According to 
them, decolonization is marked by a need not to be engulfed by a canonical, global way of 
understanding reality that silences their otherness:  
“Globalization generates a whole set of counter-hegemonic movements enunciated by 
individuals who feel ‘affected’ by the way in which their local ways of seeing, knowing, 
and feeling the world are subalternized by an abstract discourse legitimized by 
‘universal knowledges’ such as economy and law.” (188, my translation)91  
 
For this reason, as previously stated, many Chicano writers have often fought against 
their disenfranchisement by challenging the most oppressive results of capitalism and United 
States neocolonialism not only in terms of time, but also in terms of space. One pertinent 
example of how the neocolonialist expansion of the United States is effected in spatial terms 
could be provided by the existence of maquiladoras in the Northern territories of Mexico. 
On January 1, 1994, Canada, the United States and Mexico established the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Signed by president George Bush (and ratified 
by Bill Clinton), Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney and Mexican president Carlos 
Salinas, the agreement was intended to eliminate barriers to trade and investment between these 
three countries, approving, among other things, “[the elimination of] barriers to trade in, and 
facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the territories of the 
Parties” and the “[promotion of] conditions of fair competition in the free trade area” (NAFTA, 
chapter 1, article 102). One of the immediate consequences of the NAFTA was the blooming 
of maquiladoras in Mexican border territories. The definition of maquiladora is complicated, 
for the word alludes to a process that has evolved since first put into practice (Kopinak 7), but 
generally, maquiladoras consist of factories that take in imported materials on a duty-free basis 
and without tariffs, and produce assembled, processed and/or manufactured goods for export 
at a very cheap labour cost (sometimes back to the raw material’s country of origin) (Kopinak 
4).  
                                                          
91 “La globalización genera toda una serie de movimientos contra-hegemónicos por parte de sujetos que se sienten ‘afectados’ 
por el modo en que sus formas locales de ver, conocer, y sentir el mundo son subalternizados por un discurso abstracto 
legitimizado por “saberes universales” como la economía y el derecho.” 
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Maquiladoras started as a program launched by the Mexican government in the late 
1960’s to solve the problem of increasing unemployment along the border once the Bracero 
program in the United States came to an end and working migrants had to return to Mexico 
(Coronado 90). However, after the implementation of NAFTA the growth of maquiladoras 
surged, and by 1996 they were the second largest industry in Mexico, spreading to areas in the 
inner parts of the country, even though the vast majority of plants are still near the border 
(Louie 69). Though maquiladoras allowed for the rapid growth of some non-border 
metropolitan areas, like those of Puebla and Toluca, the export of factories to the other side of 
the border resulted in paying workers approximately one-sixth of the US hourly rate, with no 
health care and no environmental or pollution controls, or pension plans. Maquiladoras often 
prefer the employment of young women workers, as they are capable of working longer hours, 
show great dexterity and higher levels of patience, and can be paid less than their male 
counterparts (Martin et al. 143). Maquiladoras are a straightforward example of how macro-
corporations labour force is often de-centralized from the superpower’s centre of operations, 
settled instead in “third world” communities such that of El Paso/Ciudad de Juárez, in the 
Mexican district of Chihuahua, which borders Southern Texas. Maquiladora workers, often 
victims to exploitation under unsafe and unhygienic working conditions, provide extremely 
cheap work for products that will eventually be sold in the US at disproportionate prices. 
Conversely, Raúl Homero Villa and George J. Sánchez (2004) defend that the spatial-
temporal events taking place in cities like Los Angeles during the past centuries require us to 
be aware of the importance that place has for the individual’s formation of identity (500); which 
Lisa Marie Cacho (2001) echoes by claiming that notions of race, gender, class and nation help 
constitute place as much as place affects and modifies such concepts (380). Therefore, place 
acquires a rather significant role concerning issues of social identity formation. It should not 
be surprising, then, that for the most disenfranchised individuals even inside the movement, 
like homosexuals and women, or lesbian feminists, space accordingly acquires a leading role 
and an indispensable function in their works. Brady thus suggests that narrative also entails 
different ways of conceptualization ascribed to spatial forms (8) and concludes: “Chicana 
writers have deployed an acute spatial analysis as part of the repertoire of what Chela Sandoval 
calls technologies for ‘decolonizing the social imagination’” (10). 
This spatial analysis with decolonial goals is often brought into the frontline through 
the notion of Aztlán, which has, since the rise of the Chicano movement during the late 1960’s, 
played a significant role inside the Chicano imaginary. Aztlán makes reference to the legendary 
homeland of the Mexica tribes during pre-Columbian times and often serves to claim 
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primordial right upon the land, establish bonds with their indigenous heritage and bring unity. 
Its conceptualization owes much to public speaker and movement leader José Ángel Gutiérrez, 
who helped found the Chicano political party, La Raza Unida, in 1970, a party which struggled 
to demonstrate that Chicanos were no longer dependent on Anglo power, and aimed at better 
socio-economic conditions through alternative, and sometimes rebellious, strategies (Parra 7-
8).  In order to give unity to the movement Gutiérrez often relied on the concept of Aztlán, 
which linked Chicanos with their Aztec ancestors and provided the movement with a mytho-
geographical space, while claiming primordial right upon the land from which they had 
originally been expelled and from where they were now considered immigrants: “with our 
lands stolen and now in their hands, the whites have the ability to profit from our land, our 
labo[u]r, our consumption of goods, our tax payments, and our presence as ‘illegals’” 
(Gutiérrez 23). Atzlán, or the mythical homeland of the pre-Columbian Mexican civilization, 
became a symbol for the Chicano Nationalist Movement during the 1960’s and 1970’s, even 
though it has been claimed that the actual place never truly existed or cannot be located: 
“Aztlán… like the mythical Atlantis, has never been pinpointed in geography” (Leal 10).92 In 
fact, part of the territories now ascribed to it originally belonged to Native American-Indian 
tribes which were not Aztec in their origin (Bruce-Novoa 140). However, during the Chicano 
revival movement the ideological and the political connotation Aztlán acquired made it deeply 
meaningful for a movement which demanded a room for their political as well as cultural roots, 
and became a symbol of their moral and primordial rights to the land in question, once Northern 
Mexico. So, even if the place itself was never real in the way some Chicanos insisted on 
remembering it, Aztlán developed a solid political significance, and it even acquired an 
unofficial flag, used during the late 60’s and early 70’s by Chicana/o activists in Denver and 
San Diego. This flag recovers the green, white and red colours used by the Mexican flag, and 
presents the image of a head with three faces, which alludes to the Spanish (on the left), the 
Indigenous (on the right), and the result of their miscegenation: the mestizo, in the middle. 
Hence, though the territory does not and may have never existed physically, it still possesses a 
great strength in the ideological construction of Chicano identity, or in other words: Chicano 
identity is strongly concomitant with its mytho-spatial location.  
                                                          
92 For geographical reasons, it may be important to distinguish Aztlán as a symbol, and Aztlán as a myth. In the Nahuatl 
mythology, Azltán often refers to a paradisiac island from where the Nahua people was said to have descended, but no physical 
evidence remains to proof the existence of this place. Conversely, and as previously said, as a symbol in the Chicano rhetoric 
and imaginary Aztlán corresponds to those former Mexican territories ceded to the United States after the Mexican-American 
war. 
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Yet, because Aztlán is a place that, in case it existed, it only did before the conquest 
took place, alluding to it is challenging not only in terms of space, but also in terms of time. 
Brady notes that Aztlán provides the movement with an alternative cartography that defies the 
dominant portrayals of space that traditionally dislocate and disassemble Chicanos and their 
culture (139). But Brady sees this challenge not only as a reclamation of a land that was 
supposed to belong to indigenous pre-Columbian societies, but also as a questioning of the 
condition of ‘natural’ which is customarily applied to the spatial frontiers that constitute 
nations: “The call to claim Aztlán also provided a stunning critique of the formation of U. S. 
boundaries and borders. By questioning the legitimacy of the national border on moral and 
legal terms, the invocation of Aztlán cast doubt on reigning economic and social relations” 
(145).  
In our global era, or at least in those nations affected by globalization, like the United 
States, the spatial barriers that separate countries or nations are no longer completely 
meaningful constituents of the delimitations of particular communities, which are increasingly 
becoming more dependent on other ideological, political, and/or religious factors. However, it 
might be important to emphasize that, as José Limón notes, the fact that nation-states cannot 
longer be understood in terms of stable spatial delimitations, or restricted to physical frontiers 
does not entail, at all, that the concept of nation has ceased to exist, and thus the critic must be 
aware that “between the local and the global, there is still ‘the national’ as a category requiring 
continual analysis” (“Border Literary Histories” 162). Limón builds upon Robert Livingston’s 
critical assessment of globalization in terms of ‘agency’ and ‘place,’ articulating the notion of 
the “glocal” as the intersection between the global and the local, which sets these constituents 
into immediate opposition (Livingston 147; Limón, “Border Literary Histories” 177-178). In 
this sense, perhaps it would not be unreasonable to claim that the Chicano community is placed 
in this interstice constituted by the ‘glocal,’ where the effects of a growing globalized world 
are felt upon the local communities that populate the Southern territories of the United States.93  
Nonetheless, though many could claim that by articulating the Chicana/o “nation” upon 
a mythical and ideological space, the Chicana/o Nationalist struggle might become an idealized 
desire articulated in terms of fantasy, instead of in terms of plausibility, and thus too 
romanticized to be taken seriously. The enunciation of Aztlán might ultimately reinforce the 
                                                          
93 It must be pointed out, though, that the term “glocalization” is a concept from the field of market, defined by the Oxford 
Dictionary as the practice of conducting business in both local and global considerations (oxforddictionaries.com). 
Glocalization normally refers to the adaptation of global products to the particularities of the culture of the place in which they 
are sold (Roudometof 4-5) 
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arbitrariness underlying the formation of borders and spatial demarcations of nations such as 
the United States, whose perimeter has undoubtedly varied since the signing of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.94 Consequently, perhaps it could be claimed that there is, in fact, a 
connection between globalization and Chicano studies (even if this relationship is indirect), 
and dependent on spatial influences, for eventually the Chicano movement appeared in a nation 
fully affected by the global era. That is, Chicano studies are related to globalization through 
the conceptualization of the glocal, for their nationalist ideals are eventually promulgated upon 
a territory where the forces of the imperial global and the non-conformist local collide. 
Conversely, this relationship usually involves a variety of narratives of resistance against the 
United States neoliberalist empire and its often-alleged exceptionalism (Limón, “Border 
Literary Histories” 161). That is, Chicano literature could be said to participate from the global 
era, but most of the times it does so from an oppositional position aimed at contesting, rather 
than reasserting, the consequences of a multinational economic world. 
Culture is currently not completely bounded to a fixed geographical space. James 
Fredericks (2007) explains it in this way: “Cultural systems are being freed from their 
connection with space in such a way that the notion of ‘community’ needs to be rethought” 
(54), and, some lines later, he adds: “The emerging incoherence of the nation-state as imagined 
community facilitates the rise of alternative social networks: regional, ethnic, and religious… 
[which] can be either subnational or transnational” (55). This last idea could be related to the 
ideas defended by some theorists of postmodernism, who seem to agree at least on this: that 
the dominant culture has been occupied with a history-conflating time and a deflating space, 
as Fredric Jameson puts it – (qtd. in Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. 29)- Aztlán originally makes reference 
to a spatial landscape conceived by the mythical imaginary of a minority community, but 
though it can be placed in a map (and thus, it possesses a cartographic identity) its existence is 
still substantially tied to the imaginary history as well as to the imaginary space. That is, 
because it makes reference to a pre-conquest time in history but it is used for current affairs 
and is given a present-day relevance, its different historical constituents become fused (or 
temporally conflated), while its spatial aspect seems to lose relevance, becoming deflated.   
The concept of Aztlán might exemplify how, eventually, as Fredericks and Canclini 
believe, the ideas of ‘territory’ and ‘community’ are ultimately social constructions, “works of 
the imagination” (56); but both serve political goals. But, most importantly, spatial 
                                                          
94 Notorious is the example of the border between Mexico and the state of Texas, whose frontier was delineated by the riverbed 
of the Rio Grande river. Following a flood in 1933, the river bed became 12 feet higher, and there was a strong controversy as 
to whether or not modify the frontier separating the US from Mexico (J. R. V. Prescott 90). 
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delimitations are powerful because their arbitrariness is hardly ever acknowledged, and thus 
they can both produce and perpetuate meaning by making it appear ‘natural.’ As Brady 
concludes: “space sediments identities because it is considered outside of or beyond or distinct 
from temporality” (146), and thus Aztlán becomes a bold idea because it highlights that even 
universally recognized frontiers are nothing but consensual conventions. What I would like to 
emphasize, though, is that, probably due to their concept of Aztlán, the notion of globalization 
in the case of the Chicana/o community develops spatially as well as temporally (Brady 144), 
for in their case, as I have tried to show, because of historical factors (mainly, the conquest), 
both are closely intertwined. Thus, because Aztlán also addresses important historical matters, 
Emma Pérez also alludes to it in The Decolonial Imaginary, claiming that, though not an 
empirical space, the whole poetics of Chicana/o Nationalism have been encoded and 
manifested through the idea of Aztlán (59). As Pérez writes: “Aztlán, the mythic homeland… 
is longed for, constructed, and rewritten through collective memories. Time is traversed, and a 
mythic past entwines with a future where a decolonized imaginary has possibilities” (78). What 
Pérez might be suggesting, then, is that the decolonization of the imaginary affects space as 
well as time, and that the spatial constituents of myth (and history) should not be overlooked 
if a complete decolonization of the patriarchal and hegemonic imaginary wants to be achieved.  
I propose then that Chicana/o studies’ relationship with globalization could be 
understood in ‘glocal’ terms, where the global and the local clash; being this connection 
articulated and ultimately challenged in literature through, among many other possibilities, the 
mytho-geographical, insubordinate notion of Aztlán. Hence, Aztlán is often used to decolonize 
a Western, supremacist imaginary (at present deriving from the existence of a capitalist wave, 
but imposed centuries ago by European colonizing powers) through space. This challenge 
becomes particularly clear through the resultant highlighting of the unnatural condition and the 
arbitrariness of conventionally accepted spatial frontiers between nations, which eventually 
become as fantastic and as mythical as the notion of Aztlán itself. Consequently, the 
decolonization of the imaginary should not only be effected through time, but should also be 
reinforced through space; and the use of presentism could be considered one of the decolonial 
artist’s many tools.  
Because decolonization also implies moving away from Western systems of knowledge 
and categorization, Third World feminism and differential consciousness aim at finding their 
own system of constituency, according to their own parameters and with their own words and 
meanings; a system which allows them to break free from being defined by traditional 
heteronormative imperialistic terms that, they consider, have often characterized them as the 
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Other, the Victim, and inferior; and have ultimately entrapped them in a patriarchal 
‘virgin/whore’ dichotomy. Mignolo emphasizes that decolonial options must be focused not 
only in liberating oneself from dominating choices, but also “from current Western liberating 
options” (25) which ultimately participate from the Western discourse of power. Because of 
this, some could claim that the use of presentism as a decolonial instrument is not valid, for, 
though potentially a liberating tool, it was first articulated inside what is considered the Western 
paradigm of knowledge, and thereby risks becoming another method with which to establish 
neocolonial patterns of domination. However, if one understands presentism as a tool, as 
opposed to a concept or even a school of thought, one finds that it lacks in ideology, since 
ideology is ultimately provided by (s)he who uses it as an instrument for analysis. Because it 
lacks in intrinsic meaning, I would not consider the use of presentism for decolonial goals as 
an example of imperialistic appropriation, simply because presentism does not innately belong 
to any given ideology; it is, simply, an empty container which can be used both to impose 
normative canonical discourses and as a tool for anticolonial purposes depending on how the 
subject is approached. In fact, as I will try to show, in the second case study provided in this 
dissertation, namely, Viramontes’s Their Dogs Came with Them, presentism is (successfully, I 
believe) used to show how salvation (and decolonization) can also be effected through space. 
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5- “NOT TO EITHER STATE INCLINED”:  
 
ALICIA GASPAR DE ALBA’S SOR JUANA’S SECOND DREAM 
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5.1-Some Preliminary Questions About the Phoenix of Mexico95 
In the year 1600, Italian poet and advocate for women’s rights Lucrezia Marinella 
argued for women’s superiority in her work The Nobility and Excellence of Women, claiming, 
in allusion to man’s and woman’s creation by God, that a rib was unquestionably nobler than 
mud (54). Paula Findlen (2002) explains Marinella’s conviction that a body as beautiful as that 
of women necessarily had to reflect their perfection and the superiority of their souls, for men’s 
constant contemplation of women would otherwise be incomprehensible (186). Interestingly, 
acknowledging that only few women had contributed to the field of knowledge, Marinella 
resolved that it was indeed men’s jealousy of women’s superiority of intellect which had driven 
them to erase their female counterparts’ accomplishments from the historical record (81-83). 
 In her essay “Queering the Borderlands” (2003) Emma Pérez alludes to the same 
problem when she acknowledges the difficulties in decolonizing history when historical 
research concerning queer mestizos is not abundant. For Pérez part of the problem lies in the 
fact that queerness has only recently become endorsed (128), and therefore, in order to find 
queerness in official records that have historically and uninterruptedly negated groups on the 
margins, one has to learn to read these documents differently: “I am arguing for a decolonial 
queer gaze that allows for different possibilities and interpretations of what exists in the gaps 
and silences but is often not seen or heard” (129). Pérez, for instance, confesses that one of the 
reasons why she writes fiction is because she grew tired of not finding historical antecedents 
of Chicana lesbians in historical texts and archives. Bored by not discovering any “queer 
vaquero from the mid-nineteenth century whose adventures include fighting Anglo squatters 
and seducing willing señoritas [“ladies”]” (122) Pérez finally concludes that she had to invent 
one, which became Micaela Campos in her novel Forgetting the Alamo, Or Blood Memory 
(2009). 
For the decolonial imaginary to work in lesbian history and queer studies, Pérez defends 
that one must henceforth confront and reorganize his/her mindset to privilege certain 
relationships outside the inherited colonial, white and heteronormative way of reflecting and 
knowing (124), which is exactly what Alicia Gaspar de Alba does with the figure of Sor Juana 
Inés de la Cruz in her novel Sor Juana’s Second Dream (1999). This fictionalized biography 
describes the life and deeds of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, considered the major lyric poet of 
                                                          
95 A preliminary version of this entire chapter was turned in as a final research paper entitled “Sor Juana’s Third Cage: or the 
Imprisonment of Passion” for the UCLA graduate course CCS-253, The “Tenth Muses” of Chicana Theory, taught by prof. 
Alicia Gaspar de Alba, in the academic year 2014/2015. 
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colonial Spanish America (Wallace 183), and a figure recovered by feminists since the 1970’s 
as a proto-feminist model: “Quintessence of the Baroque, bridge to the Enlightenment, Sor 
Juana Inés de la Cruz has also been celebrated as the ‘First Feminist of the New World’” 
(Merrim 7). To prove how presentism works in the sexual decolonization of this figure, I need 
fist to show how Sor Juana has survived in the colonial memory as a mytho-historical figure 
and how, by portraying Sor Juana through a presentist mindset, Gaspar de Alba achieves a 
decolonization of a traditionally historical supremacist and homophobic gaze. For her 
decolonial project Pérez claims: “How do we train the eye to see with a decolonial queer gaze 
that disidentiﬁes from the normative in order to survive? … To disidentify is to look beyond 
white colonial heteronormativity to interpret documents differently” (124). Gaspar de Alba 
thus thoroughly relies on historical records and Sor Juana’s remaining poems to recognise in 
her a proto-lesbian and feminist woman whose sexuality and femininity have traditionally been 
denied. Yet, because no one can re-inscribe Sor Juana in history as a homosexual, unless new 
concluding evidence is found, Gaspar de Alba must resort to literature. Some could thus deduce 
that, because Gaspar de Alba’s instance of decolonization ultimately resides solely in the realm 
of fiction, this decolonization is made impossible. However, I will argue that, by using 
presentism strategically, and though working in the field of literature, her decolonization is still 
made possible because her work ultimately makes the reader conceive Sor Juana as a plausible 
homosexual in a time in history where the question of lesbianism was not even considered. 
Thus, in order to carry out my analysis I will first include a short biography of Sor Juana, 
alluding to the scarce documentation available on her existence. I will then analyse Sor Juana’s 
perhaps most famous poem, known as Primero Sueño (“First, I dream”), which serves Gaspar 
de Alba as source of inspiration for her novel. Finally, I will show how the figure of the nun is 
eventually decolonized from a patriarchal heteronormative view, and how presentism assists 
in the process. 
Juana Inés de Asbaje y Ramírez de Santillana, for that was her original name, was born 
between 1648 and 1651 in New Spain, what today is considered Mexico. Her mother was a 
criolla and her father, Pedro Manuel de Asbaje, a Spanish Captain that apparently soon 
deserted the family. Juana Inés’s presumed illegitimacy, however, is a controversial matter, for 
all data available concerning her origins are contradictory. The only baptismal record found in 
the archives around that period consists of an entry belonging to a child Inés Ramírez, 
“daughter of the Church,” which was a euphemism for illegitimate. However, Juana Inés 
always referred to herself as a legitimate daughter, though that in itself would not say much, 
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for had she been an illegitimate child, she would not have been able to join a convent, as she 
did later on in her life. (P. Kirk 18-19)  
A woman of undeniable talent for poetry, she was raised in her grandfather hacienda, 
where she would spend most days in the library he owned, learning to read and write by herself. 
Since women were not allowed to attend university, she continued her studies privately. From 
a very early age, and due to her passionate inclination towards culture and the arts, she learned 
the forms of classical rhetoric, literature, law and theology. At seventeen she became the lady-
in-waiting of the Vicereine Leonor de Carreto, the Marquesa de Mancera, with whom she 
developed a close friendship. Her life in court, however, barely lasted two years, and because 
Juana Inés refused to marry, as she seemed not at all interested in men, eventually she decided 
to join a convent at the age of nineteen, presumably to pursue further education. After an 
unpleasant experience in the community of the Discalced Carmelite nuns, whose discipline 
seems to have been too strict for a young Juana Inés, the scholar ended up in a Hieronymite 
convent, which had a reputation of being more relaxed. It was there where she became known 
as Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz. 
Throughout her life two volumes of her poems and plays were published (plus a third 
one published posthumously), and she collected a library of more than 4000 volumes, scientific 
gadgets and musical instruments. She became known as “The Tenth Muse,” an epithet given 
to her by the Condesa de Paredes, a Vicereine who, together with her husband, became her 
patron, and with whom Sor Juana kept a life-lasting friendship. The muses were nine ancient 
Greek goddesses who embodied knowledge and inspired poets, scientists and artists. In an 
epigram of the Palatine Anthology attributed to Plato ancient poet Sappho, from Lesbos, was 
praised as the ‘Tenth Muse’ for the quality of her pieces and her lyricism. It must be stated, 
however, that the epithet “The Tenth Muse” might not have been exclusively applied to Sor 
Juana and to Sappho. The Puritan poet Anne Bradstreet (1612-1672) was the first female writer 
from the British colonies in North America to be published, and her collection of poems, 
printed in 1650, had the title: The Tenth Muse, Lately Sprung Up in America. Ivy Schweitzer 
(2009) sees this as an example of European pretention implying their reservation when 
assuming that the Americas could be a “fertile soil for avatars of western classical and literate 
culture” (407). One logical deduction, then, could be that the association of American authors 
to the Western European classics through the nickname “Tenth Muse” might have served as a 
strategy to dignify and validate the quality of the literary works composed by women in the 
Americas, deemed inferior by questions not only of gender, but also of ethnicity. Yet, it is 
interesting to note that, by nicknaming de la Cruz “the Tenth Muse,” the Condesa de Paredes 
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not only was complimenting Sor Juana’s talent and art, but, at the same time, de la Cruz was 
being associated to the ancient Greek poet, whose name now alludes to lesbianism. This aspect 
will be seen more in depth later in this study. 
The Condesa de Paredes was also the one who had Sor Juana’s writings published in 
Spain, which eventually made her win the epithet of “The Mexican Phoenix”96 (Grossi 125). 
Her vast knowledge, together with her astonishing talent for poetry and her fine intelligence, 
combined with the fact that, as a woman, she was not at all expected to pursue an academic 
career, generated disquiet as well as jealousy inside the convent and out of it, not only among 
her spiritual sisters, but also to the bishop of Puebla, Manuel Fernandez de Santa Cruz. In 1690, 
the bishop of Puebla commissioned Sor Juana to write a critique of a sermon by Portuguese 
Jesuit preacher Father Antonio of Vieyra; a critique which was not intended to go public. 
However, under the pseudonym of “Sor Filotea,” the bishop published Sor Juana’s critique 
with the title “Carta Atenagórica” (“Atheneian Letter”), knowing that its content would be 
considered heretical. An enraged Sor Juana wrote a response letter in her defence, known as 
“Respuesta de la poetisa a la muy ilustre a Sor Filotea de la Cruz” (Answer to the Most 
Illustrious Sor Filotea de la Cruz”), an extensive autobiographical letter in which Sor Juana 
tried to excuse herself for her intellectual activity while advocating for women’s right to 
education. Unfortunately, her plea was unsuccessful, and the religious authorities, headed by 
Archbishop of Mexico, Francisco de Ajiar y Seijas, made her undergo penitence. In 1694 she 
signed a document in which she promised to stop writing and dedicate her life to God, which 
she signed in her own blood with the sentence: “Yo, la peor de todas” (I, from all women the 
worst”). Her library, and everything contained in it was confiscated and sold. On 17th April 
1695 Sor Juana died after taking care of other sick nuns during a plague.  
Georgina Sabat de Rivers (1985) reminds us of the seduction the Mexican nun has 
exercised upon women and men alike from all confines of the world, which has pushed them 
to study and analyse this figure and her place in universal literature (417-418). This group of 
theorists specialized in the literary corpus of Sor Juana is normally referred to as the 
Sorjuanistas, which are defined by Stephanie Kirk (2016) as an international community of 
scholars whose works and discussions focus on the findings and interpretations of Sor Juana 
Inés de la Cruz’s life and writings (1). Gaspar de Alba, however, envisions her novel as a 
                                                          
96 In Greek mythology, the Phoenix is a legendary bird which is constantly reborn from its ashes. Though it has traditionally 
symbolized the sun, time, the Empire, and/or regeneration, it has also been used to entitle exceptional men or, in this case: a 
woman (Van der Broek 9). The epithet could also refer to Spanish Baroque poet and playwright Félix Lope de Vega, a key 
referent in the Spanish Golden Century, who was nicknamed “The Phoenix of Wits” by Miguel de Cervantes. 
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departure for the traditional views on Sor Juana expressed by Octavio Paz and the Sorjuanist 
discourse he has come to embody, which she accuses of homophobic (Second Dream 460), 
much in the line of scholars such as Ivy Schweitzer (2009), who claims the necessity of a 
revisionist criticism that acknowledges and accepts difference as an inherent and essential part 
of minority writers: “we await new feminist readings of early American literatures that are 
historically grounded, are nonjudgmental, and expand the definition of literature in order to 
recognize and factor in the ethnicity, class, gender, and sexual orientations of those who 
produce it” (410)   
Gaspar de Alba’s accusation regarding the homophobia intrinsic in the sorjuanista 
discourse is grounded in the fact that, among the many issues of Sor Juana’s biography 
addressed by the Sorjuanistas’ discourse, one of the aspects of her poetry that has attracted the 
most attention from scholars are her love poems, always addressed to women in general, and 
to the Marquesa de Mancera and Condesa de Paredes in particular. Her predilection for these 
two figures, who served also as her patronesses, has created numeral debates concerning her 
sexual orientation (Velasco 4). Yet, as Daniel Altamiranda claims in Who’s Who in Gay and 
Lesbian History (2001), since there are insufficient data to clarify the nature of Sor Juana’s 
feelings, both the hypothesis that her love poems ultimately express her lesbian desires and the 
explanation that these poems belong to the tradition of platonic love writings are equally 
admissible (111). Still, in Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz o las trampas de la fe (1982) Octavio Paz 
relies on Freud’s psychoanalytical theory to indicate that the passionate love poems composed 
by Sor Juana to la Marquesa de Mancera and la Condesa de Paredes answered to the idleness 
resulting from an excess of libido (286), while insisting that erotic poems of that time had to 
be addressed to women to avoid scandal in describing a masculine body (299).  
Paz and his followers often emphasize that the nun was not aware of her desires, as if 
wearing a habit obliterated the reality of her body. In this respect, Stephanie Merrim (1991), 
when analysing the use of the neuter grammatical gender in some of Sor Juana’s poems, claims 
that this device derives from Neoplatonic ideology, in which the soul is androgynous and, 
consequently, has no sex (22). Thus, when in the romance “Reply to a Gentleman from Peru” 
the poetic voice states: “I know only that my body, / not to either state inclined, / is neuter, 
abstract, guardian / of only what my Soul consigns” (106-109),97 she is recognizing herself as 
a desexualized individual, alluding to the androgyny of her soul, and by association, also of her 
                                                          
97 “y solo sé que mi cuerpo, sin que a uno u otro se incline, /es neutro, o abstracto, cuanto / sólo el Alma deposite” in the 
original. I have used the translation made by Margaret Sayers Peden, which I will continue using from now on whenever citing 
extracts from Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz’s poems, unless otherwise stated. 
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gender.98 Licia Fiol-Matta (2003) concludes: “Sor Juana is able to create a space of sexual 
indifference through writing, and this indifference is presumably not policed” (348). However, 
to assume that her body is neuter because of the neutrality of her soul entails that she is only a 
spirit incarnated in an empty carcass, thus depriving her from her physicality and her plausible 
yearnings.  
It would seem then that, as Paz seems to credit, the religious condition (a condition she 
only unwillingly accepted because she considered she had no other option, as she herself 
confessed in her “Answer to the Most Illustrious Sor Filotea de la Cruz” (50)) nullified 
everything else. The fact that she denied being a woman (Paz 497), which, as will later be seen, 
for Paz evidences de la Cruz’s never overcome Oedipal complex, does not entail that her body 
lacked in desires; and that is what Chicana scholar Alicia Gaspar de Alba holds on to when she 
claims that: “through her habit, she died to the world as a body; through the Sorjuanista 
discourse, she dies as a woman” ([Un]framing the Bad Woman 267). The fact that Sor Juana 
desexualized her figure does not necessarily mean that she desexualized her body, or that she 
could no longer yearn for pleasure. In fact, the reasons underlying her decision to neutralize 
her femininity probably had more to do with her wishes to be seen as an intellectual rather than 
as a woman, as in the period Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz lived being a woman and being a scholar 
were mutually exclusionary, since women at her time were not expected to pursuit an academic 
career, and ascribing to gender roles at that time forcefully implied marriage and motherhood, 
experiences she absolutely refused (“Answer” 50).  
On the other hand, there is an interesting detail in Sor Juana’s “Anwer to Sor Filotea”99 
which might be important to point out. A common practice for early women writers was to 
include a long list of illustrious women from the past in order to justify their literary skills. In 
her “Respuesta a Sor Filotea” Sor Juana mentioned more than influential forty-two women 
considered praiseworthy, thus calling for women’s right to follow an academic vocation. It is 
noteworthy, as Nina M. Scott (1994) points out, that, among all the influences Sor Juana claims 
as sources of inspiration and remarkable women in her reply, Sappho is notoriously absent. 
Among the possible reasons why Sor Juana chose to conceal a figure obviously known to her 
might have been to avoid suspicions. Scott believes that her intimate friendship with the 
Countess of Paredes might have prevented her from mentioning a classic Greek poet so 
associated with lesbian tendencies (209). Gaspar de Alba echoes this suspicion in her novel, in 
                                                          
98 Because Sor Juana constantly alluded to the neutrality of the Soul, I will always use the neuter pronoun “it” even though in 
the translation of the poem by Margaret Sayers Peden the soul always appears as “she.”  
99 From now on, just “Answer.” 
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which the fictional Sor Juana thoroughly meditates who to mention in her answer: “She omitted 
Sappho, Joan of Arc, and Santa Librada on purpose, the first because she wanted no sexual 
allusions and the last two because they had both been put to death as a result of their respective 
rebellions against the Church” (356). 
Concurrently, with her novel Gaspar de Alba aims at offering an alternative version of 
the Tenth Muse, different from the hetero-patriarchal vision developed by Octavio Paz and the 
Sorjuanistas, who often focus on the intellectual sphere of the nun overlooking her corporeality, 
and denying not only her desire but also her awareness of it (Gaspar de Alba, [Un]Framing the 
“Bad Woman” 265). As Ricardo Vivancos (2013) explains, Gaspar de Alba deployed Juana’s 
awareness that, in order to be seen as an intellectual, it was necessary not to appear as a woman, 
for that would immediately entail being deprived of any brainpower: “Inés desexualizes her 
figure in order to rebel against gender dressing codes at the palace, and to protest against her 
impossibility of becoming a scholar” (125). 
Throughout her novel Gaspar de Alba employs Sandoval’s technique of meta-
ideologizing (namely, the process of taking dominant ideological forms and subverting them 
by questioning their normative pattern), but in this case not to decolonize language, but to 
decolonize the patriarchal (and homophobic) vision of Sor Juana that has survived to this day. 
Thus, she rewrites Sor Juana from a feminist, lesbian perspective, always acknowledging that 
her portrayal answers to “her own” vision of the Phoenix from Mexico: her own interpretation, 
which is, on the other hand, the only thing that we can offer from our current perspective 
([Un]Framing the Bad Woman 250). As previously seen, Emma Pérez defends that the 
imperative version of history is nothing but the colonial portrayal from a patriarchal standpoint, 
for those who write history are those who have the power (xv). What could be inferred from 
this statement is that the standardization of a particular version of history does not grant it any 
objectivity, and, consequently, Paz’s version of Sor Juana does not have more authority than 
that rendered by Gaspar de Alba. As a feminist lesbian Chicana, she participates in the 
decolonization of what she considers a patriarchal, homophobic canon which presents Sor 
Juana Inés de la Cruz as an idle woman with a disproportionate libido, subdued to the 
conventions of her time, and unconscious of her erotic desires.  
Gaspar de Alba’s decolonization of the imaginary is built upon her own theory of 
(re)conocimiento, mostly developed after Gloria Anzaldúa’s “path of conocimiento” 
([Un]framing the Bad Woman 258-259). But, whereas Anzaldúa covers the different steps in 
the process of knowing oneself, the (re)conocimiento alludes to the recognition of oneself in 
the Other. Because of her queerness, Gaspar de Alba considers that: “it is this repressed 
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identity, this hidden Other within herself, the outlawed lesbian, that I recognize in my re-
conocimiento of Sor Juana” (260).  
Among Sor Juana’s major works, the poem Primero Sueño (First Dream, or First I 
Dream, as it has been translated by Margaret Sayers Peden), first published in 1962, constitutes 
her most personal work, for it was the only one which was not commissioned, and currently it 
constitutes one of the most celebrated pieces of literature from the Spanish Siglo the Oro (“The 
Golden Age”). In its 975 verses, the poetic voice describes the long and frustrating journey of 
the soul at night in order to apprehend knowledge.100 Freed from the prison and the limitations 
of the human body, the soul accesses the universe in its totality, but it is ultimately unable to 
grasp the wholeness of knowledge, which results in grief and dissatisfaction when the day 
comes and the poetic voice wakes up.  
Georgina Sabat Mercadé established in 1969 an interesting and complete temporal 
linearity explicating the meanings and associations encompassed by the term of “sueño” in 
Renaissance and Baroque Spanish literature from the Golden Age. Alluding first to the 
polysemy that the word sueño has in the Spanish literary tradition (which can refer to “dream,” 
“sleep,” and even “sleepiness” in English) (171), Mercadé explains that the term was insistently 
used after the Renaissance, during the Spanish Golden Age, to refer to many notions and 
figures. Thus, sueño appeared in figures such as Boscan, Garcilaso de la Vega and Lope de 
Vega as synonym of love: the dream as making all the poet’s erotic fantasies truth; but also, 
the one that leads to deception by showing the poet how (s)he had been fooled by this oneiric 
illusion when waking up to reality (172). Sueño could also represent discovery, as making the 
poet finally aware of an unexpected truth, as happened in Garcilaso de la Vega’s Eclogue I, or 
as the cause of inner peace and rest as it appears in his Eclogue II (173). Fray Luis de León 
recovers this element of Sueño as bringing peacefulness to the troubled poet, but eliminates all 
erotic references that it had previously had. What Fray Luis adds, however, as would later do 
Quevedo, is the incorporation of the theme of Sueño as death, by referring to it as sombra 
(“shadow”) (175). Of special notoriety is Fray Luis’s “Ode to Francisco Salinas” (composed 
during the second half of the 16th century), which follows the structure of resting, death and 
oblivion that characterizes all poetic compositions dedicated to the subject of dreaming (which 
was already present in Marcus Tullius Cicero’s “Scipio’s Dream”). This is an ascension poem 
                                                          
100 In the mystic poetry of the 16th century in Spain, the soul’s abandonment of the body in search of spiritual transcendence 
and God’s love was a common trope, being perhaps St. Teresa de Ávila and St. Juan de la Cruz the main two representatives 
of this literary movement. For further reading see Swietlicki, Catherine. Spanish Christian Cabala: The Works of Luis de León, 
Santa Teresa de Jesús, and San Juan de la Cruz. U of Missouri P, 1986. 
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in which the soul of the poet, inspired and driven by the dream evoked by music, finally reaches 
and rejoices in the immensity of God. Mercadé points out at the elements of the three powers 
of the soul, namely, memory, understanding, and will, that appear in Fray Luis’s poem and that 
are later on recovered by Sor Juana. This common element, together with other common tropes 
in these two authors, such as the paradoxical idea of dream as death-in-life but also as life-giver 
(for it brings the poet closer to God), and the poet’s disappointment when waking up, is what 
makes Mercadé claim a direct influence of the Agustinian friar over the Mexican nun (176-
177). 
Mercadé also states that it is in Francisco de Quevedo where all the clichés associated 
to the trope of dream that precede him finally seem to coalesce, and thus, in different 
compositions from his poetic production it is possible to see the sueño as the illusion of love 
that reality denies, as deception, as death, as resting, and as ambiguity between what is real and 
what is imagined (185-186). When Sor Juana finally immerses herself in the tradition of sueño, 
she maintains the basic structure of previous compositions, which repeat the pattern of outer 
peacefulness that encourages sleep, dreaming, and waking up (192). Mercadé enumerates the 
multiple predecessors to whose obvious influence is palpable in Sor Juana’s own composition, 
like Fray Luis de León, or Jorge Manrique and Gómez Tejada de los Reyes, from whom she 
recovers the idea of dream as death, and thus, as equalizing all human beings (193-194). 
However, in Sor Juana the dream appears as a more active materialization of the poet’s 
ambitions, which Mercadé understands as Sor Juana’s unquenchable thirst for knowledge that 
cannot be reached, not even in dreams (195). Interestingly, this new meaning to the notion of 
dreaming constitutes a novelty to the trope of dreaming in poetry, in which, always according 
to Mercadé, the Sueño is completely disengaged from ideas of love and mysticism, and appears 
instead as pure intellectuality (195).  
De la Cruz’s poem is certainly unique in several aspects which are worth being pointed 
out. In the poetic mystic tradition, the soul finds joy and infinite pleasure in its union with God. 
Sor Juana’s poem, however, is hopelessly infected by an aura of endless frustration and an 
eagerness which is never fulfilled. The soul in Sueño does not find anything, nor is it able to 
rejoice in the incommensurable knowledge it encounters, which the soul finds unable to grasp. 
What the poem follows, however, is the line of those poets devoted to a platonic love, who find 
in their dreams solace for their suffering heart, a place where their erotic fantasies are finally 
fulfilled, only to wake up to the realization of the impossibility of such expectations. The soul 
in Sor Juana’s poem seems to be a victim of that same deception and disenchantment when the 
body wakes up, but paradoxically, the dream only serves to emphasize the unfeasibility of the 
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soul’s desire, a desire which is not at all related to erotic love, nonetheless, but to an 
unquenchable thirst for wisdom. Or so it seems. Gaspar de Alba’s fictional biography on the 
nun inverts the situation, seeing in Sor Juana Inés’s verses an erotic quest which needs to be 
acknowledged and which traces Primero Sueño back to the tradition of frustrated love.  
The poem Primero Sueño serves thus as a source of inspiration for Gaspar de Alba’s 
novel, in which the corporeal limitations and the frustrations these entail are the result of a 
thirst for acknowledgement (rather than for knowledge) regarding Sor Juana’s sexual 
orientation and homoerotic desires.101 It is important to note that some scholars such as Sabat 
de Rivers, insist that the adjective primero (“first”) must have been an addition made by editors, 
since in her “Answer” de la Cruz alluded to this poem merely as “a trifling they call the 
Dream,” which might demonstrate that it was intended to be just one, and not the first of a 
never completed succession. That the numeral was a later addition might also explain why in 
Calleja’s biography of the Hieronymite nun the poem always appears mentioned as just 
“Sueño” (421). Gaspar de Alba, however, used “Second Dream” as the title for her fictionalized 
biography, for in it the Chicana scholar provides an alternative reading to the customary 
interpretation of Primero Sueño in which Sor Juana’s sexual desires prime over her intellectual 
ones, thus depicting her plausible physical needs and inner struggle. Thus, by using de la Cruz’s 
only poem which was not commissioned as the heart of the hurricane of her beleaguered 
existence, Gaspar de Alba decolonializes the sexual orientation of a poet, intellectual and 
feminist historical figure from what she considers a traditionally patriarchal and homophobic 
discourse. The point of departure, as has been seen, is historical, but Gaspar de Alba’s portrayal, 
as I will try to show, is decolonial thanks to a presentist mindset.    
Apparently structured as an autobiography, Sor Juana’s Second Dream narrates the 
character’s sexual awakening, and her ongoing lesbian awareness in a time and place where 
women’s sexuality was not only denied, but also conceived in heteronormative and patriarchal 
terms by which women could only serve their men or God. For Gaspar de Alba Primero Sueño 
becomes the way through which to express a deviant sexual longing towards other women 
which de la Cruz could not openly express in any aspect of her life other than poetry. Hence, 
Gaspar de Alba identifies in de la Cruz’s writings a proto-feminist lesbian scholar, perfectly 
conscious of her desires; and thus she develops her own vision of the nun around one the poet’s 
most famous poem and certainly one of the most important: Primero Sueño. 
                                                          
101 In order to make a distinction between the author and the character, I will from now on use de La Cruz, when referring to 
the historical figure, and Sor Juana when alluding to Gaspar de Alba’s novel. 
[195] 
 
Gaspar de Alba understands the poem in a slightly, but still substantially different way. 
As previously seen, a complex and exceptionally baroque poem of 975 verses, Primero Sueño 
could be summarized following scholar Diego Calleja this way: “At night I fell asleep. I 
dreamed I wanted to understand all the things the Universe is composed of at once; I could not, 
neither by studying its categories, nor by seeing it as a whole. Disappointed, the day dawned 
and I woke up” (Paz 471, my translation, my italics).102 For Gaspar de Alba, however, the plot 
is not exactly the one just provided, and she summarizes as: “in the darkness, she seeks 
knowledge and freedom, a solitary journey guided by a spirit that is enemy to daylight, a quest 
for the dark truth within the universe and within herself that ends in failure, in waking up to 
the light of reason” ([Un]framing the Bad Woman 45, my italics). The most outstanding 
difference between Calleja and Gaspar de Alba is that, whereas the former understands the 
poem as an impersonal quest for scientific knowledge, the latter sees in Sor Juana’s quest 
something else than the pursue of unravelling the mysteries of the universe; namely, to also 
understand herself. Thus, only for the latter does this dream constitute a potential path of 
conocimiento, for this passion for knowing all the secrets of science and the Universe also 
drives Sor Juana into knowing her mind and her (lesbian) desires; but because the poem, 
according to Gaspar de Alba, has been traditionally understood in terms of hetero-patriarchal 
hegemonic values, it is necessary to create a Second Dream in which to openly portray this 
other aspect of the nun’s psyche.  
In the introduction to Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz’ Poems, Protest, and a Dream (1997), 
Ilan Stavans describes Primero Sueño as “a dream about the limits of knowledge… the 
antagonism between faith and reason” (xxxviii). According to Stavans, then, Primero Sueño 
should be understood as the clash between Sor Juana’s necessity to believe in God, and her 
acknowledgment of the implausibility of his existence. It is understandable, then, that he 
understands the abrupt ending of Sor Juana’s waking up as a growing scepticism (xxxix). 
However, in her Respuesta (written in 1691), Sor Juana had clearly stated that the religious life 
was quite against her desires (50), so whatever her views on God were, it is highly unlikely 
that the inner forces struggling in her poem (and in her mind) had solely to do with a clash 
between faith and reason; a concern, that of God’s uncertain existence, which does not seem to 
correspond to the times when de la Cruz was writing anyway. Rather, it is a question more 
likely expected in the 19th century, after Darwin’s theory of evolution resulted in the emergence 
                                                          
102 “siendo de noche me dormí; soñé que de una vez quería comprender todas las cosas de que el universo se compone; no 
pude, ni aun divisas por sus categorías, ni aun sólo un individuo. Desengañada, amaneció y desperté.” 
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of naturalism and determinism. Conversely, it has to be pointed out that, from all the poems 
she wrote, this is, as previously stated, the only one which was not commissioned (Respuesta 
46), so perhaps it would not be too bold to claim that, being as it was her most private and 
personal work, as Gaspar de Alba implies in her novel, Sor Juana could be undergoing her own 
path of conocimiento, which forcefully required the presence of the written word in the process. 
If this was the case, then, what could these inner forces struggling in the poem represent? 
Gaspar de Alba recognizes in Sor Juana’s confession a “negra inclinación” (“a dark 
inclination”) something deeper than just a desire for knowledge, as many critics insist. For her, 
this disposition also has to do with sexual desire: “It is in her love poetry to the two vicereines 
that we discover the true nature of what she calls her ‘negra inclinación’” ([Un]framing the 
Bad Woman 249). Therefore, when Sor Juana depicts in her poem the clash between the Dark 
Queen of Night and the Sun, what could be inferred is that the real clash taking place in her 
heart involves her passion, embodied in a female, dark force; and its counterpart the sun, which 
functions as the embodiment not only of reason, but also of male power103 and which eventually 
wins the fight. What I find particularly interesting is that this victory seems to bring 
disappointment and grief, manifested in the last verse: “quedando a luz más cierta / el Mundo 
iluminado, y yo despierta” (“an affirmation that left the World illuminated, and me awake.”) 
(Primero Sueño 974-975), as if a little part of her had expected the Dark Queen to emerge as a 
victor. However, as Américo Larralde Range (2011) indicates, a remarkable shift occurs and 
at some point, the narrative voice identifies herself with Phaeton, a god who tried to ride the 
chariot of the sun and died because of his arrogance and narcissism (31). Could it be that Sor 
Juana was predicting her own fall because of her passion for books and knowledge? Or could 
it be, perhaps, that she was predicting her own destruction if she let herself deny that dark 
inclination in pursuit of her own “neutralization” and complete refuge in reason and 
knowledge?  
In Sor Juana’s Second Dream, the fictional Sor Juana finds herself in some trouble 
when working over the imagery of a disconcerting dream that has inspired her to write her 
Sueño. At first, she resorts that the clash between light and darkness corresponds to the fight 
between women’s wisdom (represented by the moon, whom Sor Juana relates to goddess 
                                                          
103 In Spanish “Sun” is masculine, so if it were to be used as an embodiment of power, it would be easy to relate to male 
power. The dichotomy sun/logic, moon/passion follows, additionally, a long tradition which stretches all the way back to 
Greek and Roman mythology, where a male god would often serve as an embodiment of the Sun and reason, whereas the 
Moon and the dark forces of the night tended to be represented by a female deity. This pattern is also observable, interestingly, 
in the Nahuatl mythology, with Huitzilopochtli being the warrior God of the Sun, and Coyolxauhqui the warrior goddess 
consigned to the realm of darkness, and also, the Moon. 
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Athena) and men’s power (represented by the Sun), which necessarily allude to her own 
situation in a patriarchal world that denies her a right to knowledge. However, after a night of 
insomnia devoted entirely to work over her poem, Sor Juana suddenly understands that she has 
been mistaken in her interpretation of the symbolism appearing in her dream, and concludes:  
If the moon represented passion rather than wisdom and the sun reason rather than 
power, it would make sense that the Sun God should triumph over the Moon Goddess, 
for she like a dark empress... tyrannizes my nights and I find relief from that tyranny 
only when the light of reason illuminates my heart. Otherwise I would go mad, and be 
plunged, like Phaeton or Lucifer from glorious heights of the cold currents of doom. 
(276) 
 
When analysing de la Cruz’s Primero Sueño, Jacqueline C. Nanfito (1991) already 
establishes that Night’s attempts to win the battle are altogether futile, as shown by the epithet 
“vanos” (“pointless”) that the poet uses when describing the battle of the Dark Queen of Night 
against light, thus making clear that the Dark Queen is, right from the beginning, bound to lose 
(426). Nanfito resumes by stating that Night “must exercise its power within the confines of 
the sphere of air, which is, coincidentally, the sphere of sound” (426). That is, the Dark Queen 
must reign in silence, the boundaries of her queendom confined by secrecy. Perhaps it would 
not be too bold, then, to relate the Dark Queen to Sor Juana’s own repression of her feelings, 
which she must confine in the shape of short diary entries kept in secret in a little wooden box. 
Because she cannot utter her passions out loud, she is only allowed to give free reign to her 
desires in clandestineness, when no one else is watching, just as the reign of the Queen of Night 
is confined to those spheres unreached by male power and reason. In fact, Gaspar de Alba 
claims that the Dark Queen in Primero Sueño is no other than Sor Juana herself, the Moon 
Goddess that in Sor Juana’s Second Dream is blended into a piece of chess: the Onyx Queen,104 
symbolizing the “warrior goddess of nightly passions” which fights and eventually loses to the 
world of reason represented by the Sun ([Un]framing the Bad Woman 286). 
 However, in deep contrast with de la Cruz’s poem, Gaspar de Alba offers in her novel 
an alternative version to the Primero Sueño’s unsatisfactory ending, or rather, she shows the 
reader what might have happened had the Dark Queen won the battle. Therefore, she depicts 
                                                          
104 The way the novel is structured imitates a chess game, in which the White and Black pieces symbolize reason and passion, 
respectively. Sor Juana, who has a chessboard made out of onyx, feels particularly attached to the queen of Black, which she 
calls “The Onyx Queen.” Thus, Gaspar de Alba joins Sor Juana and the Dark Queen from the poem First I Dream through the 
piece of chess. 
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the victory of passion over reason, the success of that dark inclination embodied by the Moon 
Goddess (286). Yet, because passion in this work is intricately associated with homosexuality, 
Gaspar de Alba effects a doubly-oriented decolonization. First, she decolonizes Sor Juana’s 
body, rescuing her from the claws of “the master narratives of the Sorjuanista colonial 
imaginary” ([Un]framing the Bad Woman 285) which have traditionally depicted it as senseless 
and lacking in cravings. Secondly, Gaspar de Alba decolonizes Sor Juana’s desires, for she 
does not identify Sor Juana’s guilt with her lack of religious vocation (as Paz does), or with the 
diminishing of her faith on account of a growing intellectuality (as Stavans concludes), but 
with a growing consciousness of her homoerotic desire (Vivancos 118). 
On the other hand, and as previously stated, there are some hints which prompt me to 
believe that Gaspar de Alba sees in de la Cruz the sparks not only of a proto-feminist, but also 
of a proud proto-Chicana who, because of her daring to write in a time in which the possibility 
that women might not have a soul was still in the air,105 becomes empowered. In her book 
[Un]Framing the Bad Woman (2014) Gaspar de Alba writes: “[Sor Juana] was viewed 
simultaneously as a prodigy and an aberration” (248). Here de la Cruz is being associated with 
the dangerous beast, the woman who, through quill and paper, refuses to comply with an 
imposed silence enforced over her sex and her gender (both physical and psychological). In 
fact, she states: “I propose to reconfigure Sor Juana, not as a Hispanic, but as a Chicana lesbian 
feminist” (47), the “‘foremother’ of the dangerous beast” (Vivancos 117), being the dangerous 
beast, in Anzalduan terms, that woman who refuses to remain silent and writes down her 
anxieties. In the novel, only when Sor Juana states on paper the real intricacies of her soul and 
her desires do these desires become apparent and real for her. Before that, they constituted only 
an intimation silenced before even uttered or rationalized; but once captured on paper, the truth 
manifested in those letters works as a mirror that returns the real image of the dark beast lying 
inside her psyche, and she can only acknowledge it as her own, as herself: “In that time she 
had, she thought, managed to embalm what was left of her heart in a shroud of rationality, not 
                                                          
105 Though it appears not to be true that the Catholic Church ever considered that women might not have a soul, it is true that 
women’s inherent evil and inferior value was a concern during the Middle Ages, as proved by works such as the Malleus 
Maleficarum (1448) “the Hammer of Witches”, which was a treatise on witch-hunt and Satanism published for the first time 
in Germany in 1487. Apparently, it is an urban myth that in the Council of Trent (1545-1563) the issue of women’s soul was 
ever discussed: Michael Nolan, in “The Myth of Soulless Women” (First Things, vol. 72, 1997, pp. 13-14), states that the 
accusation may have its roots in St. Gregory of Tours, who in History of the Franks (book VIII, chapter 20) explains how, at 
one of the synods of Mâcon, France (occurred in 584 or 585) one bishop wondered whether the Latin word homo, as used in 
the Old Testament, included also women or made exclusive reference to men. However, Allen Sherman in The Rape of the 
APE (American Puritan Ethic) (Putnam Publishing Group, 1973) and Meg Bowman in Why We Burn: Sexism Exorcised (Hot 
Flash P, 1984) hold the opposite view: that in this Council of Mâcon, forty-three Catholic bishops and twenty men took a vote 
on whether women had souls or not, and women were declared human by just one vote. 
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allowing herself to write too much in Pandora’s Box lest the temptation to express feelings 
creep up on her unaware” (Second Dream 318).  
Similarly, when Sor Juana is deprived of her writing materials, she suddenly feels 
disposed not only of her voice, but also of all her other senses, and even her capacity to reason: 
“Each one of my faculties is tied to my quill. Without it I am blind and deaf and mute and 
insensate. My thoughts twist around like worms in my head. My mind rots in this silence, my 
spirit becomes ash. I’m completely empty. I’m completely alone without my voice” (377). 
Worse than that, when Sor Juana is prevented from writing, she starts losing her own identity, 
which is almost fused with her ability to write. Not being able to put her thoughts into words, 
to analyse her deeds and feelings through her poems and her diaries, Sor Juana is devoid of her 
very own nature, her knowledge of herself, which eventually results in the loss of her memory, 
her identity and her history:  
She started forgetting things: the words to a prayer or a chant, the names of her nieces 
and nephews (even Belilla’s name, for a day, was lot to her), the titles of her favorite 
fictions. Once, she picked up her copy of Castalian Inundation, read her own name as 
the author, and could not remember having written anything in the book, much less 
having felt any of the emotions that blossomed on every page. (378) 
 
However, Gaspar de Alba’s novel not only revolves around the idea that women need 
to write in order to acknowledge their experience and maintain their voice recorded in history: 
the path of conocimiento also requires a private space where Sor Juana’s inner self can feel 
liberated and evolve. This need for a private space follows Virginia Woolf’s idea that, in order 
to develop her skills a woman needs a room of her own. 
In 1928 modernist fiction writer Virginia Woolf was asked to take part in a series of 
conferences about “Women and Fiction” which eventually resulted in the publication of “A 
Room of One’s Own” in 1929. In her essay, Woolf discussed male institutions that had 
historically excluded women, criticizing women’s lack of access to education, wealth and 
private property. Advocating for the literary quality of many women writers that were forced 
to overcome numerous obstacles if they wanted to see their works published, Woolf asked for 
women’s inclusion in intellectual circles and concluded: “A woman must have money and a 
room of her own if she is to write fiction” (1). Rather than financial solvency per se, with 
money Woolf referred to the independence that only an accommodated position could bestow 
on women; while the room of one’s own alluded to the privacy and solitude required to create 
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good quality work, something unimaginable for those female writers who were constantly 
interrupted by their husbands and children, and who had to attend their daily house chores.  
Though Woolf’s essay was openly criticized for referring exclusively to women who, 
like her, were in a comfortable economic situation and could afford a private creative space, 
what interests me is the idea that some degree of privacy is required in order to create. In Gaspar 
de Alba’s novel, Sor Juana’s class position and money opportunities are somehow limited, but 
she does enjoy the kind of privacy Virginia Woolf suggests in her essay, as she is granted long 
periods of solitude and seclusion. In fact, she is often granted special permissions to miss 
services so that she can write commissioned, which generates outrage among her sisters, as an 
envious Melchora complains: “She failed to attend our sacred Offices for a week. And it was 
Holy Week at that. She didn’t even show up to the rosary on Good Friday or to the Mass on 
Easter Sunday. That should qualify as a severe irreverence” (Second Dream 289-290). 
Cloistered spaces hence become a refuge for Sor Juana where to cultivate her intellectual and 
sexual desires, paradoxically turning a secluded room (that of the library when she is a small 
child, and that of the convent once she grows up) into a place of freedom and self-exploration. 
Thus, according to Gaspar de Alba, Sor Juana’s thirst for knowledge, both intellectual and 
sexual, is the ultimate underlying reason for her erudition and isolation, which radically 
contradicts Paz and his followers’ explanation for de la Cruz’s learnedness, as will become 
clear below.   
 
5.1-How to Build a Proto-Feminist, Lesbian Character Through Space 
Even though de la Cruz seldom mentioned her father throughout her life and, most 
importantly, even though Paz admits the discreetness of the Hieronymite nun concerning her 
personal life (108), he builds a complex and convoluted theory around her alleged feminine 
Oedipus complex.106 Thus, according to Paz, the little girl, nostalgic and resentful of her 
father’s abandonment, projected a fantasy of her neglectful parent to fill in the emptiness of his 
real absence, an ideal image born out of her aggrieved but still “deep spiteful admiration” (111, 
my translation). For Paz, these feelings of veneration and resentment encouraged her to 
metaphorically “kill” her father and occupy his place, which constitutes a digression from 
                                                          
106 Sigmund Freud always talks about the “feminine Oedipus complex” or “the negative Oedipus complex” in his 1905 book 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The “Electra complex” was a term coined years later by psychoanalyst Carl Gustav 
Jung in his The Theory of Psychoanalysis (1913). However, I prefer to stick to Freud’s nomenclature, for I personally find the 
myth of Electra unsuitable to describe the complex to which Jung makes it allude. This is due to the fact that the myth of 
Electra describes her attempted matricide to avenge the death of her beloved father, but at no point is an erotic paternal-filial 
relationship mentioned, as does happen in the myth of Oedipus, where the young prince unknowingly kills his father and 
marries her mother.  
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Freud’s elucubrations107 regarding the feminine Oedipus complex, by which, as he asserted at 
the 21st Conference of Introduction to Psychoanalysis (1916-1917) in a first stage the little girl 
idealizes the father and rejects the mother: “I have just portrayed the relationship between the 
little male with his mother and father. With necessary modifications, things are mostly similar 
in the case of the little girl. The tender attitude of dependence towards the father, the need to 
eliminate, due to her superfluity, the mother, and occupy her place…” (Freud 262). De la Cruz, 
by ascribing to the masculine model of the Oedipus complex and behaving as would be 
expected from a young male, seems to be, always according to Paz, strategically inhabiting a 
masculine sphere in the symbolic, as she is in reality constricted by a feminine sex she spitefully 
rejects.  
De la Cruz’s symbolic elimination of the figure of the father would, for Paz, explain 
her “masculinity,” (a word by which he means de la Cruz’s intellectual ambitions and rejection 
of marriage and motherhood). However, this masculinity would be endangered with the arrival 
of her step father Diego Ruiz Lozano. His real masculine presence, according to Paz, 
constituted a threat to her ideal masculinity, which eventually led to her cloistering in different 
closed spaces (such as the convent) and books, as a way to continue to occupy the masculine 
sphere that she wanted for herself, but that had been appropriated in the real world by the 
usurping figure of her mother’s new husband. For purposes of clarity, I quote the paragraph at 
length: 
Juana Inés buckles under the stepfather and isolates herself. In this instinctive inwards 
movement, the cell of the convent and the solitude among books become prefigured. 
To cope with her father’s ghost, Juana Inés releases her fantasy. In this outwards 
movement she deploys her attitude towards the paper in which she draws, with letters, 
the figures of her desires and speculations. Both attitudes… are the seed of the 
disproportionate growing of her mental faculties –speculation and imagination –at the 
expense of her corporal ones. (114, my translation)108 
 
                                                          
107 Freud always found female psychology more cryptic as investigations regarding women’s sexuality were hardly 
unavailable. It seems Freud was never convinced of his own theories of the feminine Oedipus complex, as he once admitted: 
“Unfortunately, we can only describe these constellations regarding the little boy: we lack in intellect regarding the 
corresponding processes in the little girl” (Freud 263, my translation). 
108 “Juana Inés se repliega frente al padrastro y se encierra en sí misma. En ese movimiento instintivo hacia adentro ya están 
prefiguradas la celda del convento y la soledad entre los libros. Frente al fantasma del padre, Juana Inés despliega su fantasía. 
En ese movimiento hacia afuera ya está perfilada su actitud ante el papel sobre el que dibuja, con letras, las figuras de sus 
deseos y especulaciones. Una y otra actitud….son el germen del desmesurado crecimiento de sus facultades mentales –la 
especulación y la imaginación- frente a las corporales.” 
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Paz assumes that a) de la Cruz’s interest for knowledge and culture is necessarily the 
result of a masculine influence, and b) that because of her curiosity and learning, all her 
corporal needs automatically disappear. Additionally, according to Paz, writing poems allows 
de la Cruz to accomplish her maternal (and feminine) instincts, for in the world of ideas where 
she dwells, she gives birth to a poetry with which to perpetuate her legacy (instead of giving 
birth to real children). However, Paz’s interpretation is, if not directly misogynistic in his 
assumption that desire for knowledge needs to be explained and/or associated to masculinity, 
at least too speculative, bearing in mind the scarcity of biographical data concerning both de la 
Cruz’s life and her psychological issues. 
Gaspar de Alba also alludes to the image of the book as a child and the writer as the 
loving parent who has given birth to it: “after weeks of looking at my book I still cannot believe 
I’m an author. Now I understand a mother’s pride in her firstborn, how she must hold it 
constantly, stare at it, caress it, wonder at its presence, for surely this is the product of the fertile 
loins of my own mind” (Second Dream 328). However, in the novel this simile works more as 
a comparison of the emotional attachment felt towards the work of one’s own rather than as 
the result of an emotionally unstable and disorderly mind. For Paz, the intellectual ambitions 
of “the Phoenix of Mexico,” together with her hiding in different cells and closed spaces, are 
necessarily the product of an injured ego,109 and the consequence of a male influence (even if, 
as is the case of her father, this influence is paradoxically absent from her life).  
For Paz, books are an extension of masculine virility, not because in Spanish the word 
has a masculine gender, but because, for him, they represent a “purified [and masculine] 
sexuality” which, contrary to the life that real men can engender, creates a reality that does not 
fade away (116-117), and therefore, for Sor Juana they represent an alternative to “the carnal 
fecundity of her mother and the aggressive sexuality of men” (117, my translation). 
Accordingly, probably following Ludwig Pfandl’s suggestion that Sor Juana suffered from a 
masculinity complex,110 for Paz curiosity and an open desire for culture just evidence the 
longings of a woman to occupy a masculine sphere in the ideal world, and thus cope with an 
                                                          
109 It seems that, in his first works, Freud used the term ego (“das Ich”) with some ambiguity to allude both to the notion of 
the “self” as to a specific part of the psyche with very determinate functions of repression and self-preservation that help the 
individual cope with reality (Strachey 8). 
110 The Lacanian psychoanalyst Juan David Nasio, in his work El edipo: El concepto crucial del psicoanálisis (2010), claims 
that, at some point during her child development, the girl suddenly realizes that she lacks the phallus she had always assumed 
she owned, and that the power she had taken for granted has not been given to her. Nasio here distinguishes between penis and 
phallus, for whereas the first term simply alludes to the male sexual organ, the second one incarnates the symbol of authority 
that this organ represents for children. Thus, since the object of power is kept in the body of ‘the other,’ namely, the body of 
the male, it is believed that girls enter a phase of masculinity complex, where they desire to be men and have the privileges 
attached to their phallus (64). Pfandl affirmed that de la Cruz possessed a masculine mind in a feminine body (Pfandl 181). 
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Oedipus complex she seems unable to overcome; whereas her cloistering in dark, isolated 
rooms entails a survival strategy against the threat to her ideal masculinity posed by a real 
masculine figure inside her household. Hence, this self-imprisonment and absolute withdrawal 
from the outside world seems more the suicidal strategy of a frightened creature incapable of 
facing reality, than the determined decision of a strongminded and wilful individual. 
Gaspar de Alba, on the contrary, breaks with what she considers a male-centred, 
homophobic tradition (that is, she decolonizes it), and transforms these cells and Sor Juana’s 
voluntary isolation in secluded spaces into a desperate quest for a “room of her own,” where 
she can give free reign to her intellectual and physical desires, which are in no way influenced 
by an appetite for masculinity. Not only that, in Sor Juana’s Second Dream Sor Juana, after 
reading Aristophanes’ speech regarding love in Plato’s Symposium,111 briefly comes to terms 
with her homoerotic desires: “Juana, on the other hand, had descended from the Female sex, 
which is why she felt this inborn attachment to la Marquesa and why she expressed her love 
and desire through a poetic impulse and an inclination for learning” (53). Interestingly, Sor 
Juana’s inclination to write is not explained as an unresolved Oedipus complex which drives 
her to occupy a masculine role, as Paz and his followers seem to imply, but as a result of love, 
her love for women and her love for erudition.   
Conversely, because Juana Inés cannot completely escape from the precepts of her time, 
in the Second Dream, this private room of one’s own is at the same time a shelter and a cage. 
The freedom she feels in these cages, together with her frustration at trying to break with the 
conventions which limit her as a woman and as a scholar, put her in a constant state of Nepantla, 
that bewildering transitional space (Keating 180) which in her case is born out of the necessity 
to both maintain and break these cages/borders that are the source of her relief but also of her 
grief. On the one hand, when utterly despaired by the limitations of her condition, she can only 
express deep exasperation at being cloistered: “At night Juana wrote in Pandora’s Box and 
composed verse after verse of vapid poetry that only reflected her frustration at being caged” 
(109). Yet, eventually the source of her most profound despair is also the only place which 
                                                          
111 Aristophanes had a theory explaining why human beings felt complete once they had found a partner. He claimed that, 
originally, human nature had consisted of three sexes: men (the sons of the sun), women (the daughters of the earth), and the 
union of the two (the children of the moon, which is made up of both sun and earth), and that human beings were round, with 
a head with two faces, and two sets of arms and legs. Attempting to reach Heaven, they attacked the gods, and Zeus cut them 
in half to diminish their strength, threatening to cut human beings again were they to continue their rebellion. Hence, humans 
were condemned to look for their other half in the world to be whole again. This discourse appears in Plato’s famous 
philosophical text Symposium, dated between 385-370 BC. The whole story can be consulted in Dover, Kenneth, editor. Plato: 
Symposium. Cambridge U. P, 1980.  
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grants her some protection, as la Marquesa realizes: “I understand now that your solitude is a 
shell you have drawn around yourself” (113).  
Sor Juana’s seclusion is a source for both satisfaction and chagrin, thus placing her 
constantly at the borderlands between the sexual and moral conventions of a time too limited 
for her genius, and the rebelliousness born out of her intellectual uniqueness. Vivancos, in fact, 
claims that Gaspar de Alba’s goal is to offer a narrative, or a story of border identity in the 
figure of Sor Juana (113). As Gaspar de Alba claims: “Perhaps…I have simply invented a 
‘mythohistorical’ lesbian past for Sor Juana” ([Un]framing the Bad Woman 270). Thus, she 
gives de la Cruz the status of ‘mythohistorical’ figure,112 because, despite her real persona, 
what survives of her is not who she really was but what she represents for a whole community 
in the present. That is, for Gaspar de Alba de la Cruz becomes not only a proto-feminist, but 
also a proto-lesbian Chicana. Sor Juana’s Second Dream then, becomes an instance of 
presentism at its purest, not only because Gaspar de Alba is presenting de la Cruz under the 
current light of proto-feminism and proto-chicanism, but also because the analytical tools and 
notions she is using to rediscover the nun as a lesbian belong to the Chicana lesbian feminist 
theory, whose existence is traceable to the last decades. It is not surprising, then, that for 
Vivancos the nun represents the state of Nepantla at its most: “in between reality and myth” 
(114).  
However, de la Cruz is a nepantlera in many other aspects: she is a nepantlera because 
she occupies a liminal space between her gender and the social role ascribed to it, between her 
sex and the biological impositions ascribed to it, and also between her sexual desires and what 
society at her time claimed correct or permissible. Gaspar de Alba writes: “she had renounced 
her gender and her sex; she did not live ‘in the world,’…her body was reduced to a condition: 
of servitude, obedience, abnegation.” ([Un]framing the Bad Woman 51). De la Cruz’s body is 
in Nepantla because it does not belong anywhere: first, Sor Juana does not consider herself a 
woman, as she explains when answering to a gentleman from Peru who has accused her of 
having to many masculine attributes: “The etymology of the word woman, which is uxor, [is] 
the name given in Latin only to married women. As I am not married I am not a woman.” (88), 
but neither is she physically a man. Her non-belonging is also expressed by her knowledge and 
scholarship, which are not recognized among scholars, even though no one would conceive her 
as a nun, either. Sor Juana does have desires, but these must remain silent.  
                                                          
112 By ‘mythohistorical’ I mean all those historical figures who have been mythologized and now represent more an archetype 
than a real person. 
[205] 
 
All these apparent paradoxes regarding de la Cruz’s nepantlerism result in her double 
consciousness, a term coined by W.E.B. DuBois in his 1994’s work Library of Freedom to 
refer to all those African-American citizens who had to conform to white privileged 
mainstream’s standards. This process, according to DuBois, leads to the development of a 
dissociated mentality in which one part of the individual feels proud of his/her American 
heritage and believes in the foundation of the country as (s)he has been told: based on freedom 
and life; whereas the other part realizes (s)he has not been granted the same privileges that 
other individuals have, and thus (s)he is forced into “a position of inferiority-induced servitude” 
(Sahid 6). As González-López (2006) states, this double consciousness, also known as a kind 
of “cultural schizophrenia,” can be felt racially, culturally, and in matters of language and/or 
gender (“Gender and Sexuality” 192), as is the case of Gaspar de Alba’s Sor Juana. However, 
this confusing process of cultural schizophrenia can also lead to an emancipating and 
empowering state of border consciousness, that is, an all-inclusive and integrative way of 
thinking and acting that assumes and accepts the possible contradictions and ambivalences 
resulting from inhabiting a border space (between nations, races, genders, etc.) (Keating 321). 
It could be said, then, that all of Sor Juana’s crises in the novel constitute a passage from 
cultural schizophrenia to border consciousness (Vivancos 120).  
Sor Juana’s preference for private, dark, closed spaces contrasts with her outstanding 
presence in the public sphere (through the publication of her writings), at that period mostly a 
man’s privilege; and it is precisely in these closed spaces where her nepantlerism is developed 
and where her path of conocimiento blooms. Thus, through the symbolic meanings attached to 
space, Gaspar de Alba, as will be seen, breaks with a patriarchal and even homophobic tradition 
which presents de la Cruz as an oedipal victim who resorts to isolated rooms in order to develop 
an ideal masculinity that she lacks in the outer world. 
 
5. 2.1-The Social Cage: The Nun in a Convent 
The most straightforward cage in which Sor Juana is secluded is the social cage, 
represented by her life as a nun in the convent, where she enters because gender roles of the 
time ruled that this was the place for women who did not want to marry: “She had a full year 
in which to change her mind, but why would she do that when it was clear that the convent was 
her only haven from a life dictated by her gender rather than her mind?” (71). In Primero Sueño, 
after the battle that takes place between the night and the day, the Dark Queen, wounded and 
acknowledging her defeat, must forcefully retreat to let the Sun rule that part of the world where 
she has previously casted her gaze, and:  
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the umbrageous, rebellious empress  
again connived  
to don her crown and rule the darkened  
realm the Sun abandoned. (963-966)113 
 
The Dark Queen of Night can only reign in those spaces where the stifling and merciless 
presence of the masculine Sun is absent, or rather, the female knowledge is relentlessly attacked 
and wounded by the patriarchal rule, and in order to endure, it can only flourish in the secrecy 
of those spaces that the sun, Helios (or He-lios), cannot reach. In the Second Dream those 
(feminine) secret spaces where to cultivate knowledge are constructed around the metaphor of 
the cell as cage, that will chase Sor Juana throughout her life, from her birth in a cell to her 
death in a convent: “‘The Cell.’ Her mother had given birth to her in that room, and eight years 
later, her grandfather had died there” (Second Dream 19). Though for her the cell eventually 
reminds her of death and isolation, manifested in her grandfather’s decease, it also entails 
notions of life: it was the place where she was born, and it is also the only place where her 
intellectual ambitions and erudite goals may grow (or at least, the only place where they can 
be nurtured). In fact, the more she can cultivate her mind inside these cages, the more 
sentimental value these will have for her. 
In Gaspar de Alba’s reimagining of de la Cruz’s life, the first secluded space where Sor 
Juana finds shelter is her grandfather’s library, which she always remembers kindly because of 
the moments of joy it offered to her and the many books she had access to. However, as years 
go by, her self-confinement will increasingly become more a desperate necessity than a chosen 
commodity, and the pleasure found in her seclusion will decrease. When employed as a lady-
in-waiting for La Marquesa de Mancera, and because life at palace seems like a circus to her, 
she resorts to hiding from the constant noise and gossiping, since they annoyingly distract her 
from her study. Amazed, at some point La Marquesa exclaims: “When I gave you this little 
room…I didn’t realize it would become your cell, Juanita. You’ve an entire palace in which to 
roam, and yet you cloister yourself in here!” (29).  
Conversely, in the novel the last of these physical cells: the convent, will feel like a 
prison for her. It is true that it is also the only place where she can continue studying and writing 
poetry, but the more other nuns’ jealousy increases around her, the more the opportunities 
offered by this private sphere decrease. As time goes by, the secret space where the Dark Queen 
                                                          
113 “en la mitad del globo que ha dejado / el Sol desamparada, / segunda vez rebelde determina / mirarse coronada.” 
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could reign becomes an asphyxiating cloister where Sor Juana’s moves are constantly 
monitored. The convent will eventually become nothing but a jail of religious constriction, and 
the conventional duties ascribed to both her gender and her being a nun entrap her more than 
liberate her. Not only that: contrary to what one might expect, that feminine space will not 
bring understanding and support from other women, but only their envy and hatred. Sor Juana 
must face the constant threat of other nuns who constantly enter and ‘violate’ her private 
domain, which exemplifies how, even though she is surrounded by women, the threat of 
violation and rape is still present. It is not a sexual threat, as it was when first left alone with 
her uncle, who physically abused her, but an emotional one, for the envious sisters are 
continuously monitoring her moves and searching into her things, reading her papers, and 
looking for evidence of those inner –and according to them perverse- feelings with which to 
provoke her fall:  
[I] dreamt there was an earthquake in the city and that Melchora and Rafaela had 
excavated Pandora’s Box from the rubble of my cell…I must be more anxious about 
being gone than I realize. It would be easy for the Three Graces to get into my study. 
The thought of their snooping through my things makes my head throb. (295) 
 
Thus, though her cloistering could seem at first a refuge, eventually the convent 
constitutes just a reformatory institution which turns Sor Juana into a penitent for the faults of 
her psyche, those which she thought she could protect by not marrying a man. Hence, as her 
enemies grow more numerous and the social constrictions become more asphyxiating for her 
as a woman and as an intellectual, less shelter will she find in the several cages she is 
imprisoned in, and the “space of her own” will turn into a fatal confinement of both her illusions 
and her freedom. 
The system of vigilance exercised upon Sor Juana’s by some of her agitated and equally 
resentful spiritual sisters in many ways resembles Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, namely, an 
architectural figure envisioned as the ideal prison, where all inmates would be isolated from 
one another, confined in individual cells forming the structure of a circle. In the middle of the 
circle, a remote tower would be erected, from which guards would be able to spy their prisoners 
at any given moment. The success of this device consisted, precisely, of the fact that no convict 
would never know whether (s)he was being watched, which would induce them to behave at 
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the risk of being caught.114 Foucault (1979) praised the inventive of said mechanism, which 
rendered power visible but unverifiable: “it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power 
has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, 
surfaces, lights, gazes” (203).  
Without constantly witnessing the authority being effected by a dark and mysterious 
tower, still Sor Juana, confined in her cell, lives in a constant sense of being watched: “It was 
a conspiracy, no doubt. Sometimes she even suspected Belilla” (399). Her paranoia is 
nourished by the fact that she knows herself to be spied upon: 
I sense that someone has been going through my things. No, I’m certain of it. Have 
been inspecting everything and I find that two of my quills are blunt and there’s a 
different kind of ink…Dear Mother of God, has someone been making copies of 
“Primero Sueño” while I’ve been away? (313-314) 
 
It is not clear whether Sor Juana’s sisters act clumsily and carelessly, or if they do 
indeed want Sor Juana to know she has been spied on; but what is clear is that her enemies are 
constantly scrutinizing each and every movement she makes. Foucault claims that all 
authorities exercising individual control do so by means of procedure which is twofold: first, 
the division into binary opposites classifying and separating that what is considered good from 
that which is seen as evil: ill/healthy, dangerous/ safe, normal/abnormal, Self/Other, etc.; and 
second, the coercive assignment regarding how to treat and in which way to monitor that 
potential peril lurking the community (198). Foucault states that, underlying disciplinary 
projects, the image of the plague is the one that represents all forms of confusion and disorder 
(197), but this plague could symbolize anything endangering the wellbeing of a community, 
any potential threat that might drive the well-functioning of a hierarchized group to chaos and 
uncertainty. Such a threat might derive from something physical or tangible, like an illness or 
a rebellion; but it might as well come from something unknown or against the rule: the menace 
posed by an intelligent and cultivated woman who refuses to stick to religious strict rules, or, 
in the case of Sor Juana, the menace of a clever and learned woman who also happens to desire 
other women and dares to write about it: “the passion displayed in those poems was anathema 
to her sex and her vocation” (Gaspar de Alba, Second Dream 368). Unfortunately, there is 
nothing Sor Juana can do to prevent these sneaky intrusions, for the intricate system of 
                                                          
114 Bentham´s work Panopticon: Or, The Inspection-House was first published in 1791 by T. Payne, although he continued 
refining his idea throughout his life. 
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hierarchical relations established in the convent in fact supports these intromissions, being as 
it is that nuns are not supposed to have privacy, for that would mean they have secrets to keep, 
as is the case.  
 
 
5. 2.2-The Corporal Cage: Woman’s Body, Woman’s Restrictions 
The second cage developed in Second Dream is demarcated by and pertaining to the 
female body, which leads to women’s restrictions. As previously seen, de la Cruz did not 
consider herself a woman, for there was a strong divergence between her ambitions, and the 
limitations ascribed to her gender and her sex. For her, thus, her female condition was utterly 
useless, since it limited not only her possibilities but also her desires. In her “papelillo que 
llaman El Sueño” (“a trifling thing they call the Dream”) (Answer 97)115 Sor Juana describes 
how the soul evades the body as a liberating experience:  
The Soul… transmuted into   
beauteous essence and discarnate being…   
judging she is nearly free of all   
that binds her, keeps her from liberty,  
the corporeal chains  
that vulgarly restrain and clumsily  
impede the soaring intellect that now,   
unchecked, measures the vastness of the Sphere. (293-302)116 
 
Eventually the soul is the prisoner of a body that is still necessary to give tangibility to 
that soul. The problem is that, precisely because of the gender of her body, Sor Juana is at a 
disadvantaged position in which she sees herself subject to institutionalized exclusion from the 
intellectual sphere, as she acknowledges with frustration: “‘This is outrageous!’ Juana fumed. 
‘Masculine penmanship. Masculine studies. Masculine conversation. Masculine verses. Why 
is everything that edifies the mind ascribed to masculinity?” (209). In Second Dream Sor Juana 
is well aware of the limitations of her female body, and she states her vexation at having been 
born with the underprivileged sex: “At times like this she detested her female body. For what 
                                                          
115 As translated by Electa Arenal and Amanda Powell. 
116 “[el alma] convertida / a su inmaterial sér y esencia bella / …y juzgándose casi dividida / de aquella que impedida / siempre 
la tiene, corporal cadena / que grosera embaraza y torpe impide / el vuelo intelectual con que ya mide / la cuantidad inmensa 
de la esfera.” 
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it did. For what it could not do. For the fact that her subjection was rooted in that body of 
mammary glands and bloody womb” (420). 
For Sor Juana, the female body is another cage, for her biological condition condemns 
her to a life of motherhood and/or servitude to men. When, once deprived of all her powerful 
allies, she learns she is going to undergo a “public confession” (which is an excuse for a public 
humiliation), she hears a man on the other side of the convent wall who is trying to sell birds: 
“a man was calling out the names of the caged birds he was selling. For an instant, a 
conversation she had had long ago about the caged lot of womanhood filtered back to her” 
(402). The nun cannot help but to feel identified with those winged creatures, vulnerably 
exposed and trapped in a circus of public consumption and constant observation, realizing she 
has always been a bird of exotic plumage, a rara avis, persistently stared at and exposed to 
public judgment, as when she acknowledges that, despite being a nun committed to monastic  
vows she is still expected to offer an amusing show: “even here I feel as though I must entertain 
everyone with stories of convent life” (293). 
The constrictions of her gender make Sor Juana feel like a slave of her own body, 
feeling somewhat surprised at other women’s inability to perceive such confinement. For 
instance, when her servant and scrivener Concepción complains about a cimarrona117 who has 
been imprisoned in the convent, the young girl exclaims: “They’ve got her locked up and 
chained. Ankles and wrists. They say she’ll have to work in the fields with those chains on. It’s 
so cruel, Madre!” to what Sor Juana replies: “I’m sure it is, Concepción, but that’s the way life 
is for most of us” (158-159). However, as opposed to Concepción and her friend Aléndula, 
who escape physically from the convent, Sor Juana escapes through her writing (Rueda 
Esquivel 85). Similarly, when praising the virtues (and the flaws) of her beloved Marquesa the 
then soon-to-be-nun reflects: “She’s an artist trapped in a woman’s body. I understand her. I, 
too, feel trapped in my body” (38). This reflection will be echoed when La Condesa de Paredes 
goes through a difficult pregnancy and a dreadful motherhood she does not seem to have 
wished, and Sor Juana reminds her: “you pointed out in a previous letter that women are bred 
to believe in the supposed joy of childbirth” (260). Here, Sor Juana speaks out the unpopular 
idea also defended by psychoanalyst Norma Ferro (1991) that the maternal instinct, more than 
a biological reality, is a social construct (134). 
                                                          
117 In the context of the novel, the word cimarrón alludes to any independent community formed in the Americas from escaped 
slaves of African origin. In Sor Juana’s Second Dream, the fictional character of Aléndula is a cimarrona wrongfully 
imprisoned in the convent, whom Concepción later on helps escape, fleeing with her.  
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On the other hand, the body is not only a cage for Sor Juana because of her female 
condition, which limits her choices and entraps her. The body is also a cage because of the 
social status it represents. We have to remember that the Spaniards developed an intricate caste 
system during the conquest which established a “rigidly race- and class-stratified society” 
(Vargas 6). The top of the hierarchy was occupied by the so-called Pensinsulares, people of 
European descent born in Europe, and more specifically: the Iberian-born Spaniards. 
Peninsulares were immediately followed by the criollos, who were also Spanish, but born in 
the colonies, and though normally privileged, their blood was considered less pure. However, 
because the caste system was so complex, and miscegenation in the Americas so widespread, 
it was stipulated that any individual with one eighth or less of Amerindian ancestry could still 
be considered a criollo/a without losing privileges. Hence, the offspring of a castizo (that is, 
the child of a mestizo -half native, half Spanish- and a Spaniard) and a Peninsular was also 
considered to be a criolla/o.  
Inside that intricate system of castes, Sor Juana is a criolla and thus she occupies a 
relatively privileged position; but at the same time, because of her illegitimacy (derived from 
her father not recognizing her as his own), her life choices are strongly determined and 
restricted, something she unsuccessfully tries to make Concepción understand: “It’s a cage, 
don’t you see? This cell is the cage of my destiny. Because I’m a criolla, I had two cages to 
choose from, this one or the one most criollas choose, which is marriage and childbearing, but 
that one would have gone against my nature” (Second Dream 231-232). Thus, the freedom 
shown in Primero Sueño, when the soul finally abandons a motionless carcass, corresponds to 
a soul not only free from the burden of the body, which finally can access all the corners of the 
universe in its quest for knowledge and understanding. It is also the escape from a body that, 
because of the social status attached to ‘the purity of her blood’ is a prisoner of destiny, 
condemned to servitude: “Is birthplace, then, I asked, enough to determine status? Has the 
society in which you grew up, in which you learned your skills and values, nothing to do with 
who you are? (27-28). But, ultimately, it is the escape from a body that, because of its sex, is 
destined to either praying or birthing: “She had a full year in which to change her mind, but 
why would she do that when it was clear that the convent was her only haven from a life 
dictated by her gender rather than her mind?” (71). 
 
5.3 The Emotional Cage: Lesbianism in Pandora’s Box 
The third and last cage portrayed in Second Dream would be the emotional one, or 
rather, the nun’s at first repressed homoerotic feelings:  
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Dear God, dear Virgin of Sorrows, is there no remedy for this feeling that aches like an 
affliction and yet produces such illicit pleasure? Did Eve taste the apple of her own free 
will, or was it something in the nature of the rib that formed her which made it 
impossible to resist the snake? (30) 
 
In Sor Juana’s Second Dream, when la Marquesa de Mancera complains that her lady-
in-waiting is constantly cloistered in dark, isolated spaces instead of participating from the 
spectacle of palace, what she cannot realize is that Juanita is not only seeking for refuge 
physically, but also emotionally; and the little box that she gives Sor Juana as a present will 
only become an extension of this shrouding. De la Cruz names her present “Pandora’s box,” 
which makes reference to the Greek myth in which this box (which was actually a jar),118 hid 
all the illnesses and the horrors that later devastated the Earth. By successively placing the 
written confessions of her lesbian orientation and sexual inclinations inside this container Sor 
Juana makes it clear that, for her, at the beginning of the story her homoerotic desires are 
immoral and terrible, and must therefore remain hidden from the light. However, the box not 
only turns into the place where she encloses her most inner feelings and doubts, but also the 
place where she hides them from the outside world, and even from herself.  
The problem is that her feelings, when rationalized, become sinful for her, as she 
painfully describes in an imaginary letter to her confessor: “Bless me, Father, for I cannot keep 
from sinning, deep and terrible sins that flourish like poisoned mushrooms in my dreams” (37). 
Sor Juana needs to negotiate the appreciation of her feelings, because the patriarchal and 
heteronormative hegemonic discourse that (un)successfully tries to colonize her psyche clashes 
with her self-understanding of the purity and honesty of her love: “There is love in my heart, 
Father, but it is a vile love, an unnatural, unnamable love, and yet, so deep, so pure it feels 
almost holy” (38). This process of decolonization, though, is as gradual as it is emotionally 
wrecking. Sor Juana needs to decolonize the hegemonic cultural imaginary of her time, but this 
process takes time, and needs the secrecy that only Pandora’s Box seems to offer, which is 
certainly ironic. Ironic because Pandora, who functions as another Eve119 (that is, a despicable 
                                                          
118 The only remaining version of Pandora’s myth is in Hesiod’s Work and Days, in which the author uses the word “pithos” 
to refer to the containment. A pithos is a large jar with a lid which was often used to store liquids such as wine, oil, or grain. 
M. L. West claims that it was Erasmus of Rotterdam’s mistranslation of the story which generated ulterior confusion, for he 
rendered the word pithos as Latin “pyxis”, a word meaning “box” (Meagher 56). Interestingly, the pythos was womb-shaped 
and represented Earth as mother (Meagher 56). Hence, the association of the pythos with Pandora as the deliverer of evil into 
the world (much in the biblical Eve´s fashion) acquires a new meaning. 
119 Eve is considered the first (and perhaps worst) kind of Malinche, for not only is she a bad woman who treasons her race 
and family: she treasons the whole humanity. Since a woman pursuing culture is seen as a kind of malinchismo, Sor Juana is 
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immoral woman who condemned humanity because of a treason to God), was commanded not 
to open the box under any circumstance but, driven by an uncontrollable curiosity, she opened 
the lid which allowed all horrors to escape from the vessel. As I previously stated, the fact that 
Sor Juana uses this name to refer to her little space of relief could suggest that she considers 
all the secrets of her soul and her feelings to be horrible creatures that deserve to be kept away 
from the outer world. However, eventually there is a breach in the reader’s horizon of 
expectations, for Pandora ultimately opened the box, but Sor Juana manages to make it 
disappear from sight. Not only that: as the novel progresses, the character’s increasing 
acceptation of her homosexuality makes her stop considering herself a sinner, and Sor Juana 
ultimately acknowledges the beauty and the purity of her love: “Juana realized that it was dawn 
and that she was finally, at the age of thirty-nine, waking up to her true self” (310). Thus, the 
contents in her box stop being shameful to become clean and splendid, something beautiful 
that must be kept from the outside to avoid its contamination by the greed and envy which 
surrounds her everywhere she goes. 
Eventually, the box safeguarding her confidences will not constitute a cage, but a refuge 
that protects her purest and selfless declarations of love from the vice, the jealousy and the 
ugliness of the (convent)ions that surround her, which will lead to the corruption of the Box, 
but not of its content:  
My poor Pandora’s Box has gotten scratched and dented in its hiding place, and the 
scent of sandalwood that used to emanate from the wood has now been replaced by a 
mossy smell. I suppose I could have left the box in the hidden compartment of my desk, 
but having Rafaela installed in the priory again tells me it’s saver out here. (286) 
 
On the other hand, it is obvious throughout the novel that Sor Juana is, at first scared 
by what she considers a sinful nature of her feelings: “She pinched herself under the table for 
all of the time she had wasted ruminating about her sinful desires when she should have been 
memorizing theology” (Second Dream 32). However, she also wants to give a name and some 
liberty to her desires, that is, she is eager to know, but not only at an intellectual level: “I don’t 
want this to mean anything. Not yet. Not ever. I want only the taste of it, the smell of it, on my 
fingers, and nothing more. Is that possible?” (222). Her desires, as she herself describes them, 
are merely physical, removed from any reasoning or rationalization; she just wants to taste, to 
smell and to touch, but her mind plays no role whatsoever in this process, nor is it intended to 
                                                          
necessarily another Malinche, thus it is logical that her most private object: the box, alludes to another bad woman, either 
Pandora or Eve, since the object is as sinful as its owner. 
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play it at any time; namely, she just wants to enjoy the pleasures of the flesh, and pleasure 
becomes in this statement both the goal and the means to achieve it. Thus, this knowledge is 
the knowledge of the night, the instinctive and secretive knowledge transmitted by the Dark 
Queen that flees away when rational Helios takes control of the day. 
In Greek mythology Helios was a titan, son of Hyperion and Theia, considered the 
personification of the Sun. From the 3rd century BC onwards, Helios came to be associated 
with Apollo, the Olympian god of light and knowledge, which would explain why, for both de 
la Cruz and Sor Juana the sun represents male reason. Selene, for its counterpart, was the sister 
of Helios, and the divinity embodying the moon, who was later fused with Apollo’s own sister, 
Artemis, the Olympian goddess of hunt and the forests. Interestingly, in contrast to other 
mythologies, like the Babylonian, where the sun-god was female, and the moon-god was a 
male, for the Greeks the moon, and thus the queen of the night, was represented by a woman. 
However, in Gaspar de Alba’s novel Sor Juana breaks with the axiom that postulates that, if 
the Sun represents knowledge and light, then the Moon, appearing as its antithetic reverse, must 
necessarily symbolize darkness and ignorance. Thought this definitely is a possible 
interpretation for de la Cruz’s Primero Sueño, in Sor Juana’s Second Dream the Queen of 
Night, rather than embodying illiteracy, becomes a representation of female knowledge, which 
is as powerful as to confront the Sun itself. A battle that the Moon goddess is condemned to 
lose, as Sor Juana lives restrained and confined by a deeply patriarchal system, but a battle, 
nonetheless, that she fights with defiance and dignity. 
Another aspect worth pointing out is that, in de la Cruz’s Primero Sueño, the poet 
follows a long tradition of mystics and religious poets who, in the ecstasy of their dreams, feel 
how their soul abandons their body and rejoices in God’s grace, feeling complete, loved, and 
hopeful when they awake. Sor Juana follows the tradition, but her dream only brings emptiness, 
frustration, and grief. Not only does her soul not find God (if we assume that this was the 
purpose of the quest, which is not clear), but neither does it find knowledge; and when she 
awakes Sor Juana is conscious of her human limitations, which derive not only in her being 
human, but also in her being a woman. This disappointment, which for Gaspar de Alba is both 
sexual and rational, is a powerful link connecting the first and second dreams, and, 
consequently, the break of expectations portrayed by Pandora’s Box eventually decolonizes 
both the homophobic image traditionally transmitted of the nun and the canonical portrayal of 
the poem as the ultimate expression of an intellectual woman lacking in any physicality or 
desire. In Second Dream Pandora’s Box subsequently becomes Sor Juana’s only real “room of 
her own,” but it also serves to exemplify one out of the many cages that Juana Inés de la Cruz 
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found throughout her life; cages which came to impose a strong restriction to her wishes but 
also a way to cultivate her erudition.  
Interestingly, the secluded isolation that for Paz only meant a strong desire for 
masculinity is eventually the place where Gaspar de Alba’s Sor Juana works on her homoerotic 
desires. Challenging the pattern established by the other cages as spaces which will ultimately 
condemn and bring Sor Juana her ruin, in the case of Pandora’s Box, the cage will provide her, 
finally, with a rest. This will be the only victory of Sor Juana during the novel: the victory of 
her soul over both the rationality of her time and the limitations of her condition: the triumph 
of the Onyx Queen,120 the queen of secret knowledge and passion.  
Summing up, in Second Dream there are, at least, three important cages for Sor Juana: 
the social cage (or the cage of duty), the physical cage (or the cage of womanhood), and the 
emotional cage (or the cage of desire). While the two first cages will only bring her frustration 
and despair, despite all her different strategies developed by Sor Juana to escape them, only in 
the last one will she find a shelter, in deep contrast with Primero Sueño, where the pattern is 
inverted. Sor Juana, then, is a nepantlera, because she forcefully has to negotiate her position 
and possibilities, flowing in and outside the borders and limits marked by the social, physical 
and emotional constrictions of her life and her desires for other women. Furthermore, these 
yearnings can be understood both as her intellectual ambitions (limited by her female 
condition) and as her homoerotic sexual longings.  
Gaspar de Alba’s re-conocimiento of de la Cruz’s lesbianism encourages her not simply 
to decolonize a mythohistorical figure, but specifically a mythohistorical figure silenced by the 
traditional heteronormative and patriarchal discourse of power. Interestingly, the word 
“lesbian” never appears in the novel, as Gaspar de Alba is aware that said identity is a rather 
recent discursive reality ([Un]Framing the “Bad Woman” 256). In fact, when in Second Dream 
Sor Juana is pondering her feelings, she can only describe them as follows: “But what, after 
all, am I? It is not the same as sodomy to love another woman. Adultery, perhaps, coveting the 
wife of my neighbour, but not the sin of the Greeks. Or is it?” (314). Throughout her work, 
Gaspar de Alba keeps a historically accurate intention: “Nearly all of the characters here are 
historically ‘true,’ that is, they lived under their own names and were related to each other as 
                                                          
120 In the novel, Sor Juana is given a chess game by the Viceroy, with pieces carved in white marble and black onyx. There is 
a clear correlation between the black queen of her game and the Dark Queen of Night in her poem, since in Sor Juana’s dreams 
the chess piece adopts a human figure, and will later serve as an inspiration for Sueño: “In the dream she was sitting across the 
chess table from the Onyx Queen, who had metamorphosed into human size with a human face, though she retained the form 
and colour of an onyx chess piece” (Second Dream 274). Similarly, the novel is structured as a chess game that Sor Juana, 
symbolizing the black queen, is doomed to lose. 
[216] 
 
shown” (459), to show that, though aiming at decolonizing the patriarchal renderings of de la 
Cruz’s historical figure, one does not need to disengage from the nun’s biography, even if 
fictionalizing it. However, as immersed in the realm of literature, Gaspar de Alba adds: 
“Whether their character were as I depicted is another story, as this is my interpretation of 
them, a writer’s license into the realm of imagination and possibility” (459). Gaspar de Alba’s 
revisionist agenda could, therefore, be completely nullified by her own admission that she, as 
an author, is entitled to dramatize characters and events as she pleases, for she is not merely 
compiling data for a chronicle, but writing a novel. However, I propose that Gaspar de Alba’s 
Sor Juana’s Second Dream is not a revisionist work (one cannot aim at historical objectivity 
through a work of fiction, leaving aside the fact that there is no evidence of de la Cruz’s real 
feelings towards other women). Gaspar de Alba’s achievement is subtler, but nonetheless 
powerful: through her presentist portrayal of Sor Juana she allows the reader nor only to 
envisage de la Cruz as a lesbian, but to conceive of de la Cruz’s lesbianism as perhaps an 
unacknowledged plausibility. What she is decolonizing is not the history of Sor Juana Inés de 
la Cruz, but the historical imaginary that has depicted her in patriarchal and homophobic terms. 
Emma Pérez (2003) declared that the colonial imaginary, white and heteronormative, 
has traditionally defined how critics, researchers, and historians ignored marginal populations 
who behave outside the normative patterns and systems, advocating instead for “a decolonial 
queer gaze that allows for different possibilities and interpretations of what exists in the gaps 
and silences but is often not seen or heard” (129). In her novel Sor Juana’s Second Dream 
Gaspar de Alba presents a fully aware individual whose quest for knowledge is the result of an 
honest curiosity, and not, as Paz claims, the result of the trauma caused by an absent father; 
whereas the nun’s hiding in closed spaces answers to a strong will to read and learn, and not to 
a desperate stratagem to develop a frustrated masculinity. In Second Dream, Sor Juana 
undergoes a path of conocimiento and dis-identification with the hegemonic discourse which 
has traditionally portrayed her feelings as sinful and hideous. While in Primero Sueño this 
passion is repressed and ultimately destroyed by reason, in Gaspar de Alba’s novel constant 
reasoning only convinces Sor Juana of the purity of her love, and this will constitute her final 
victory, the triumph of the Dark Queen, who ultimately rejects the blinding rays of rationality. 
Yet, Gaspar de Alba, in her reconfiguring of Sor Juana as a “Chicana lesbian feminist” 
([Un]Framing 47), is perfectly conscious that she is offering “her own version” of the historical 
figure of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, of whom we ultimately know very little: “as a subject of 
scrutiny or an object of critical praise, [de la Cruz] existed not as she was, but as her critics, 
biographers, historians, defenders, or chroniclers wanted to imagine her through their/our own 
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discourse… a reflection of our times and our own identities” ([Un]framing the “Bad Woman” 
270). This detail is relevant because it cannot be ignored that Sor Juana’s Second Dream is the 
rewriting of a mytho-historical figure in present-day terms, in which a historical person is 
analysed through a current prism, with tools taken from a very concrete field (that of Chicana 
lesbian feminist theory) that did not exist in the 17th century New Spain (nor did it in the rest 
of the world). Notions like nepantlerism, cultural schizophrenia and, eventually, the path of 
conocimiento, allow for the decolonization of the traditional heteronormative and patriarchal 
construction of Juana Inés de la Cruz; but the process through which this decolonization is 
effected requires the re-conceptualization of a character from the 17th century with tools and 
notions existing only from the second half of the 20th century onwards that eventually tie her 
to a movement, that of Chicana lesbian feminism, to which she does not belong. In other words: 
to decolonize hegemonic portrayals of de la Cruz it is necessary to establish a presentist 
analysis by bringing the historical figure back to present day, submitting her deeds and writings 
to our current discourse by means of contemporary tools. Perhaps it would not be too bold to 
claim that the decolonization of the imaginary, in order to be effective, beneficiates (if not 
directly needs) from the practice of presentism. Therefore, even if presentism was born in the 
context of a white, European postmodern setting, it can still be related to and used by Chicana 
feminist scholars in their path for the decolonization of the imaginary, simply because, as 
previously said, presentism in itself does not have an ideology, which is supplied by the 
critic/reader. To emphasize this claim and prove the usefulness of presentism in the 
decolonization of a patriarchal supremacist imaginary, I will provide another study in the 
following section.  
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As previously defended throughout my dissertation, the aim of this study is to 
demonstrate the validity and the possibilities offered by presentism as a tool in the literary 
decolonization of the imaginary, for which I have chosen Helena María Viramontes’ novel 
Their Dogs Came with Them (2007). I propose that this novel could be considered an example 
of a counter-hegemonic narrative for decolonization effected in temporal as well as spatial 
terms. As will be seen, space plays a relevant role in the configuring of the characters’ psyche, 
and becomes a powerful tool to contest the subaltern status of the Mexican-American 
population inside the United States during the mid-1960’s and 1970’s, and to challenge patterns 
of subjugation. On the other hand, I suggest that the decolonization carried out in the story is 
achieved through a presentist revision of the Spanish conquest of Mexico, which is brought 
back to the 20th century to condemn instances of Anglo-American neo-colonization which the 
characters in the novel must confront.   
In order to prove how presentism works in Viramontes’s work, I will first place this 
novel in its contextual corpus, namely, that of Chicana feminist theory and literature, which 
will provide me with the socio-political background needed to understand both the novel and 
my study. Special attention will be paid to three female archetypes which have traditionally 
served to categorize Mexican-American women into a passive, obedient role inside their 
nuclear sphere and their community (Anzaldúa, The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader, 178). These 
figures are la Malinche, which symbolizes “the bad woman;” la Llorona (“the weeper”), which 
stands for motherhood, normally understood in terms of suffering and sacrifice; and la Virgen 
de Guadalupe, which represents an ideal of virtue, purity and submissiveness that women are 
encouraged to emulate (Cisneros 176). Through the feminist revision of the typical 
representation of these archetypes, many Chicana theoreticians and artists have achieved a 
twofold goal. First, their writing has allowed them to talk for themselves about themselves, 
thus breaking with a long practice of forced silence. Second, by offering their own vision 
instead of accepting description by others, they have also tried to decolonize what they consider 
a patriarchal mindset that simplistically sees them as either virgins or prostitutes. Because in 
Viramontes’ work the main characters are women and the instances decolonization effected in 
this novel (understood in this context as the undoing of hegemonic practices and patterns 
carried out by a ruling elite that silences and oppresses brown -and lesbian- women and their 
sexuality), have in part to do with the gender roles ascribed to their sex, I consider this 
introduction relevant for my subsequent analysis.  
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6.1-Archetypical Women in the Chicano Cultural Imaginary121 
In her dissertation “Rewriting Myth: New Interpretations of la Malinche, La Llorona, 
and la Virgen de Guadalupe in Chicana Feminist Literature,” Patricia Elise Nelson (2008) 
offers an insightful analysis of the work of four feminist Chicana writers: Sandra Cisneros, 
Cherríe Moraga, Ana Castillo and Gloria Anzaldúa, concerning their personal vision and 
politically oriented revision of three archetypical feminine figures in the Chicano cultural 
imaginary, namely, la Malinche, la Llorona and la Virgen de Guadalupe, which epitomize three 
roles to which Chicana women have traditionally been ascribed: La puta, la madre, la virgen 
(“the whore, the mother, the virgin”) (1). As Aimee Carrillo (2011) points out: “Chicana 
feminism has a long tradition of ‘cultural refiguring’…. not merely to remember lost histories, 
but to mobilize contemporary social movements and theoretical interventions” (128). With 
their works, many feminist Chicana writers attack the conventions and social constructions that 
see and treat women more as prototypes than as individuals by reconfiguring the same myths 
and archetypes used to subdue them. In other words: they meta-ideologize (or re-appropriate 
the meaning ascribed to) these archetypes, decolonizing the patriarchal system attached to the 
imaginary from which they derive. Accordingly, they condemn the flaws of a male-structured 
society that rejects and punishes any woman who does not fit into these three roles ideally 
conceived for them: “revising myth allows Chicana authors to maintain a link to the traditions 
and stories that they associate with Mexican culture while still asserting a female or feminist 
perspective” (Nelson 10).  
Among these three archetypes, perhaps special relevance is given to la Malinche, whose 
roots can be traced back to the 16th century and the arrival of the Spanish empire to Mexico. In 
1993 Mary Louise Pratt pointed out at the similarities connecting the dominant-subaltern 
relationship established between 16th century Spanish colonizers and indigenous women, and 
that same relation of imbalance existing in the 20th century between Anglo-American men and 
Mexican-American women (862). This comparison might constitute a presentist association 
between two historical moments that do not seem to share much other than the social (and 
economic) inequality of the individuals affected by it. As a result, many could easily criticize 
this association on the basis that it does not take into account neither the historical reality nor 
                                                          
121 Part of this chapter was presented at the 11th International Conference on Women’s Studies: Gender Studies and 
Transatlantic Visions and has recently been published in a printed volume called  Estudios de género: visiones transatlánticas 
/ Gender Studies: Transatlantic Visions (compiled by Isabel Durán, Rebeca Gualberto, Noelia Hernando, Carmen Méndez, 
Joanne Neff and Ana Laura Rodríguez, and published by Editorial Fundamentos in 2016) under the title “Gendered Territory 
in Chicana Feminist Literature: Helena María Viramontes’ Their Dogs Came with Them.”  
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the socio-political context surrounding these two periods. Nonetheless, despite its apparent lack 
of accuracy, it might be interesting to analyse why this analogy is made, to show that what 
Pratt is ultimately criticizing is the patterns of subjugation of brown women which were already 
in place during the Conquest of Mexico. Interestingly, this criticism is achieved thanks to a 
presentist exposition of a decolonial practice in the cultural imaginary associated to the figure 
of la Malinche.  
Pratt, following the line suggested by authors such as Enríquez and Mirandé (1978), 
understands that the common element shared by indigenous women in the 16th century and 
Mexican-American women from the 20th century is the figure of la Malinche, and the ideas of 
assimilation it has come to enclose in popular culture. La Malinche (also called Malintzin, or 
Doña Marina, as she was known for the Spanish though her real name was Malinalli Tenepal), 
was a Mexica noble-woman offered to Cortés as a sexual slave upon his arrival who eventually 
served as translator for the Spaniards during the years prior to the Conquest of Mexico. Because 
of her role as mediator between the Spanish empire and the Aztec indigenous people, she has 
traditionally been blamed for the massacre of native populations at the hands of the conquerors 
and the defeat of the Aztec empire. Since her role was decisive for the Spaniards, her name has 
become the epitome for betrayal; and thus, as Julia Maria Schneider (2010) points out, since 
the Conquest of Mexico women have been regarded as the cause of evil and treason. Schneider 
adds: “La Malinche serves as the female scapegoat for Mexican society. Her relationship with 
Cortés was neither befitting the social rules nor legitimized by the church, which additionally 
admonishes Mexican women not to follow her model” (26). However, it was not until Octavio 
Paz published his acclaimed work Labyrinth of Solitude (1950), that a connection was made 
between this mytho-historical figure of la Malinche and the figure of the Chingada (the “fucked 
one”), who is normally used when swearing to insult someone’s ascendancy. In the chapter 
titled “The Sons of la Malinche,” Paz claims that this “fucked” woman is no other but la 
Malinche, forced by the Spaniard Cortés. Thus, he depicts Malintzin not only as the traitor to 
the indigenous race, but also, as a consequence of her rape by Cortés, as a passive and 
dishonoured whore-mother of a new bastard offspring: that of mestizos (79). Paz concludes 
stating: “The Chingada… is Nothingness. And yet she is the cruel incarnation of the feminine 
condition” (“Sons of la Malinche” 86).  
Conventionally, any woman who is perceived to deny her indigenous origins and 
become assimilated to the white culture is seen as a traitor. This notion of ‘assimilation’ 
comprises apparently simple actions like marrying an American white man, or understandable 
ambitions, such as seeking formal education, which are seen as abject examples of 
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malinchismo. Thus, any woman acquiring or ‘assimilating’ values other than the constricting, 
hetero-normative and patriarchal ones typified by the Mexican views on family and gender 
roles is a vendida (a “sell out”), and a traitor to her culture (Anzaldúa, The Gloria Anzaldúa 
Reader, 28). Therefore, colonialism installed by Spanish rule and the subsequent malinchismo 
associated to female alliance with the conqueror is used by Pratt to also include notions of 
“‘internal colonialism’ suffered by the Chicano people (both women and men) within the 
United States” (Pratt 862), which is also understood in terms of female betrayal.  
Because what is perceived as the assimilation of women to white culture in the 20th 
century is directly related to a figure existing in the 16th century, it could be suggested that we 
are dealing with an example of presentism effected by the domineering masculine elite, who 
manages to subdue women to a passive, docile role, out of fear of being compared to la 
Malinche and despised for it. By meta-ideologizing her figure (that is, by deconstructing the 
patriarchal ideology enclosed in the symbolic meaning attached to the figure of la Malinche 
and transforming her, instead, into a victim of male authority) not only do Chicana feminists 
re-configure a new vision of this mytho-historical character, but also use presentism as a 
decolonizing tool. Interestingly, the reinterpretation of the figure of la Malinche is effected 
upon an already presentist male-oriented construction, which has pervaded in the cultural and 
historical imaginary for purposes of women’s submission. 
Another example of the decolonization of this archetype is provided by Mexican poet 
Rosario Castellanos, who attempted to decolonize the patriarchal, sexist views propagated 
through this figure of la Malinche, in a poem with the same name, published in her 1972 
collection Poesía No Eres Tú (“Poetry is not you”). Throughout its 45 verses, the poetic voice, 
who is no other than the same Malintzin, narrates how, when she is still a little girl, she is sold 
as a slave to the Mayans by her own mother who, after she re-marries, seeks to prevent her 
daughter from inheriting the family wealth. While sailing away the girl can overhear the 
laments of her mother, who claims her daughter is dead and pretends to be overcome by 
sadness. Malintzin wretchedly accepts that, even though she is alive, the fate awaiting her does 
not much differ from death. Castellanos tries to retrieve an agency traditionally denied to both 
Malintzin and other women, by transforming her into the narrator of her own story, instead of 
being depicted by others. Conversely, the poet emphasizes la Malinche’s role as a victim, for 
in this poem she is not the traitor to her race, as has often been claimed, but the one who has 
been betrayed by no other than her mother: “Expelled…from the palace and warmth / of her 
who gave honest birth to me / and who despised me because I was her equal” (42-45).  
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Rather than Cortés’s mistress and a perfidious confabulator, latest research and feminist 
revision have seen in Malintzin more a cunning strategist and a victim of circumstances, who 
just carried out the tasks she was expected to do, since she was first offered as a gift to Cortés 
by those who were supposedly her own people. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that 
much of the conquest’s effectiveness derived, rather than from la Malinche’s skills as a 
translator, from disloyal natives from other tribes (such as the Tlaxcalans) who, in order to put 
an end to their subjugation to the Aztec empire, changed sides and supported the Spaniards in 
their endeavour to overthrow the Mexica Empire (Russell 24). Because Malintzin is both a 
historical and a legendary figure, her feminist reconfiguration revolves simultaneously between 
historical revisionism and presentism. Nevertheless, la Malinche is a good example of how, 
thanks to feminist revisionist criticism we are now aware that she might not have been the great 
traitor to the nation she has repeatedly been accused of being but, at most, one among thousands 
of indigenous who changed sides, intending to gain power in that strategy. 
In direct opposition to la Malinche stands la Virgen de Guadalupe. La Virgen de 
Guadalupe incarnates the archetype of the saint mother, pure and chaste: “the good woman,” 
in contrast to the whore-mother represented by la Malinche. Since the beginning of her worship 
during the 16th century, Guadalupe has become a paragon of Mexican religion and culture. The 
legend started after the Catholic faith was established as the religious authority in Mexico in 
1531, forbidding other indigenous religions, and states that it was around this time that the 
Aztec peasant Juan Diego witnessed the apparition of the Holy Mother in the hill of Tepeyac. 
Since his testimony was later doubted, the bishop Juan de Zumárraga asked him for proof. The 
Virgin appeared again and told the peasant to gather the roses that had miraculously blossomed 
in the hill (for it was winter), which he proceeded to collect in his poncho. However, when, 
once back at the church, he let the flowers fall, the image of the virgin, with coloured skin and 
indigenous features, appeared stamped on the linen of his garment. This tale appears in the 
“Nican Mopohua,” a chapter from the Nahuatl work Huei Tlamahuizoltica, written by Luis 
Lasso de la Vega (though traditionally attributed to indigenous Antonio Valeriano). The first 
version in Spanish was published in 1649 by priest Miguel Sánchez, in his work Imagen de la 
Virgen María Madre de Dios de Guadalupe, (“Image of the Virgin Mary of Guadalupe Mother 
of God”), which contributed enormously to the spreading of both the legend and the devotion 
to this virgin. Throughout the history of Mexico, the image of Guadalupe has customarily been 
used as a national symbol of cohesion, her name recognized as the traditional emblem of the 
Mexican Catholics. In fact, in 1999, the Church proclaimed her “Patron Saint of the Americas, 
Empress of Latin America and Protector of unborn children”. 
[226] 
 
Other more viable versions of this legend relate it to Spanish Catholicism. Conqueror 
Hernan Cortés was from Extremadura, a place in Spain which has traditionally been devoted 
to the virgin of Guadalupe, considered to be the patron saint of the city. It is said that she 
miraculously appeared to a peasant, asking him to dig in a specific place, where the man found 
a wooden statue of the virgin. One of the most outstanding characteristics of this figure was its 
skin, which was considerably darker than that of the conquistadores, whose skin tone tended 
to be whiter than that from Native Americans. The golden-brown colour of the virgin might 
have made it the perfect icon for missionaries following Cortés to convert these populations to 
Christendom (Herrera-Sobek, “Virgin of Guadalupe” 1130), for it might have helped natives 
feel more related to an icon whose skin usually (though not necessarily) matched theirs. On the 
other hand, some authors such as Rosario Castellanos, Denise Chavez, Felipe Ehrenberg, 
Clarissa Pinkola Estes or Rosario Ferre in Ana Castillo’s edition of Goddess of the Americas: 
Writings on the Virgin of Guadalupe (1996), believe that the origins of la Virgen de Guadalupe 
are to be found in Indigenous deities of fertility and the Earth which were eradicated after the 
conquest. In fact, the hill of Tepeyac was the setting of a temple dedicated to fertility and 
mother goddess Tonantzin. Some even claim that the name “Guadalupe” could be a 
deformation of an original and now unknown name pronounced in Nahuatl, such as 
“Coatlallope” (“she who smashes the serpent”) or even “Coatlicue,” an essential deity in the 
Aztec pantheon, related also to Tonantzin. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the image of 
Coatlicue has been linked to that of la Virgen de Guadalupe in Chicano and Latin American 
art since the 1960’s, since both the Aztec divinity and the virgin represent highly powerful 
feminine figures, one from ancient times and the other from the 16th century onwards: 
“Reconnecting the Virgin of Guadalupe to the prehistoric figure of Coatlicue… disrupts 
established premises of thinking and patterns of power” (Köhler 129). 
Together with la Malinche, Guadalupe was, and still is, the Mother of Mexico, but 
whereas the former represents the ‘whore’ mother of the mestizo race, raped by the conqueror, 
a sinner, and a traitor to her people, the virgin has become a spiritual shelter, and a role model 
of submissiveness and passivity. In “Guadalupe, the Sex Goddess” (1996), Chicana writer 
Sandra Cisneros denounces an inhibitive cultural and religious education received in the 
Mexican/ Mexican-American households that causes Latina women to see their sexuality with 
guilt and embarrassment, and which made her resent la Virgen de Guadalupe for the principles 
it represented in Mexican culture: “I was angry for so many years every time I saw a la Virgen 
de Guadalupe, my culture’s role model for brown women like me. She was dangerous, an ideal 
so lofty and unrealistic it was laughable” (176). Tired of the denial and shame surrounding 
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women’s sexuality, Cisneros deviates from traditional interpretations that link the Virgin to 
Catholic religion, and focuses instead on another of the different origins attributed to her: that 
of Aztec sex deity Tonantzin. 
Cisneros explains that, during her childhood, she was taught that sexual pleasure was 
sinful, and anything related to her body had to be kept private, being religion and culture the 
two main sources with which to condemn carnality. Cisneros claims that women’s subjugation 
is to a great extent related to that ideal image portrayed by the virgin, compliant and obedient, 
which they are compelled to admire, and she wonders why women have to aspire to be the 
virgin in contrast to the greater freedom which is normally conferred to men, especially 
regarding sexual aspects: “Did boys had to aspire to be Jesus?” (176). Cisneros sees in the 
origins of la Virgen de Guadalupe a complex intermingling of many different factors that 
delegitimize the customary binary division between good/bad, Catholic/Indigenous; and uses 
it to claim that, accordingly, women cannot be defined by a specific, simple, and static 
archetype. 
In order to subvert the male control that has traditionally oppressed female’s sexuality 
through the image of la Virgen de Guadalupe, Cisneros has preferred to see in her the result of 
multiple rearrangements, each one effecting its authority upon the Chicana race:  
Coatlicue, Tlazolteotl, Tonantzin, la Virgen de Guadalupe. They are each telescoped 
one into the other, into who I am. And this is where la Lupe intrigues me…the one of 
the 1990s who has shaped who we are as Chicanas/mexicanas today, the one inside 
each Chicana and Mexicana. (177)  
 
Thus, she recognizes in la Lupe the primitive fertility deity Tonantzin, whose figure was 
substituted by that of the Extremaduran virgin, pointing out that among the multiple origins of 
the virgin is that of the goddess of sexuality. Thus, Cisneros goes back to the myth, to the Aztec 
roots existing prior to the conquest, and, following the example of those who previously 
occupied the territory and destroyed indigenous symbols and cults, she claims that women’s 
sexuality has been denied and constricted by an authoritative patriarchal society. 
In opposition to the Spanish Catholic Church, which has conventionally portrayed 
Guadalupe as a prototype of purity, chastity and servitude for Mexican women, Chicana writer 
Sandra Cisneros links her to the mythical Aztec goddess Tonantzin. This way, she rejects 
patriarchal social constructions that denied women’s right to sexuality and pleasure by 
addressing the sexually active aspects already existing in the origin of the virgin figure (176-
177). Again, because we are dealing with a religious/mythical figure which has been preserved 
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in the cultural imaginary as a pattern for female submissiveness, this association between the 
Virgin and the goddess Tonantzin could be considered presentist (rather than revisionist). 
Supporting this claim is the fact that Cisneros goes back to one of the many possible sources 
of la Virgen de Guadalupe, namely, Aztec mythology, and reinvents the meaning embodied by 
this archetype in order to fit a present reality: that of women’s subjugation to gender roles. 
Leisa Kauffman (2013) uses this example to show the deconstruction and further re-
construction of mythical and traditional figures (that is, of the imaginary) as part of a necessary 
process for women’s emancipation. Kauffman seems to accept presentism as a kind of 
deconstruction aimed to further decolonized re-construction, and concludes: “[Cisneros] 
refuses to be boxed into either constructing or deconstructing but communicates, instead, in a 
two-word non-sentence- ‘Deconstruct, construct’- that both must be and are done, one after the 
other” (63). This could be related to Sandoval’s meta-ideologizing of the linguistic sign and, 
as previously seen, of the ideology attached to it, in the pursuit of a differential consciousness 
aimed towards the formation of a third world feminism. Cisneros’ deconstruction-construction 
procedure could very well be understood as a decolonization of the patriarchal imaginary 
through a presentist revision of its feminine archetypes. 
Ivonne Yarbro-Bejarano claims that: “The appropriation and redefinition of 
Coatlicue122 [is done] in the service of creating a new mythos” (“Gloria Anzaldúa’s 
Borderlands/La Frontera” page). The objective of this revision is clearly ideological, but 
perhaps we should not ignore that, at least in Cisneros’ conceptualization of Guadalupe, coming 
back to the myth in order to denounce unfair imposed patterns of conduct does not show a 
completely decontextualized manipulation of history (or in this case, of the imaginary). Quite 
on the contrary, it shows a partial recovery of motifs and details which at their time were 
disregarded due to their scarce conceptual interest for the dominant elite who first made use of 
these myths. The fact that these motifs are not normally accredited does not entail that they are 
absent from the mythical source from which these myths arose. Presentism and decolonization 
appear then not as fabrications but as partial recuperations of mythical elements to which new 
meanings are consigned. 
Another useful example, more directly connected to Viramontes’ work, as will be later 
explained, is Cherríe Moraga’s play: The Hungry Woman: A Mexican Medea (2001), which 
constitutes a revision of the myth of la Llorona, which serves Moraga to claim her rights as a 
                                                          
122 In the Nahuatl mythology, Tonantzin seems to have been a form of reverential address often translated as “our revered 
mother” and traditionally associated to Coatlicue, the Mother Earth, among other divinities (Griffiths 68). 
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queer Chicana. In the Mexican folklore, la Llorona is the tormented spirit of a woman who 
roams in forests at night, looking for her murdered children, whom she drowned when learning 
of her husband’s infidelity.123 The legend is often used by mothers to warn their children not 
to go too far from the house at night, as la Llorona is said to take away all the kids she 
encounters in her roaming, thinking they are her lost children. 
The exact origins of the figure of la Llorona are unknown. Some, like Bacil F. Kirtley 
(1960) see clear influences from the Greek mythical Medea, who kills her sons when 
acknowledging her husband Jason has been unfaithful to her.124 The story could have traversed 
the ocean with the Spanish conquerors, and been transmitted together with other ideological 
and religious impositions. Others, however, like Miguel Leon-Portilla (2005), relate it to the 
Toltec goddess Cihuacoatl, a deity associated with fertility and motherhood, later on 
appropriated by the Aztecs.125 Cihuacoatl, who served as the patroness of midwives, was said 
to have abandoned her son Mixcoatl at a crossroads, but came back to pick him up after 
regretting her deed, only to find out that the child was no longer there. The legend concluded 
that the frustrated mother could be heard moaning at nights, her shrieks often taken as warnings 
or bad omens (Read and González 147-149). 
Moraga may have been aware of the multiple versions of this archetype for, as I will 
explain later, she depicts both in The Hungry Woman. The play is set in a post-apocalyptic 
future where, after the eruption of a civil war, separate racial and patriarchal societies have 
been established, Medea is a homosexual woman who lives in exile with her lover Luna and 
her son, Chac-Mool. When her former husband, Jasón, reclaims custody of their child, Medea 
fears his son will be brainwashed to perpetuate the patriarchal system Jasón has founded in 
Aztlán, from which she had had to escape.126 Killing Chac-Mool, then, appears as the only 
alternative for Medea, who is caught between her love towards Luna, which is disintegrating 
because of Medea’s emotional distress, and her ideological conflict. In order to fully grasp 
Medea’s inner struggle, Nelson emphasizes the importance of the socio-political context 
underlining the configuring of Moraga’s play, for in order to understand la Llorona’s role in it, 
it is necessary to previously acknowledge the unprivileged position in which women in general 
                                                          
123 There are multiple versions of the story of la Llorona with substantial differences in the story narrated. As this is a legend 
which has predominantly been transmitted in oral form from mothers to daughters, it is particularly difficult to find written 
versions of it. Besides, each family adds or subtracts little details, making the story different in each household. 
124 Kirtley, Bacil F. “‘La Llorona’ and Related Themes.” Western Folklore 19.3 (1960): 155-68. 
125 Leon-Portilla, Miguel. Visión de los vencidos: Relaciones indígenas de la conquista. México: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 2005. 
126 It is worth noticing that Moraga’s applying of the Greek myth of Medea and Jason to the context of post-apocalyptic Aztlán 
in her anti-patriarchal and decolonizing play, she is also being presentist.  
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are restricted within a male-oriented society which denies them their rights to sexuality and 
physical pleasure. Thus, there are at least three realities that many Chicanas have to face 
regarding their culture with which the reader must be familiar in order to understand Moraga’s 
work: 
-First, the tendency of Chicano families to be structured around patriarchal values, 
being thus governed by and centred on males. Moraga (1983) complains about how sons are 
often privileged over daughters, and encapsulates this tendency in the motto “putting the male 
first” (93). Conversely, women who fail to maintain or defend this familiar structure are often 
seen as Malinches and traitors to their race, for they are considered to have adopted values 
characteristic of Anglo-American society, instead of preserving the Mexican-American 
traditional views on family and gender roles. Dismissal of women in favour of men inside the 
family nucleus entails, at least for Moraga, the subsequent treason of women against other 
women, and the figure of la Malinche re-appears as an enemy not only to her race but also to 
her gender: the woman/mother who abuses and despises other women in favour of men, in this 
case her own sons: “The Chicana’s loyalty depends on ‘how ardently she defends her 
commitment, above all, to the Chicano male’ –often at the expense of daughters or sisters” 
(Nelson 34). 
-Second, but related to the first instance, Moraga charges at the Chicano Nationalist 
Movement arisen during the 1960’s, which strongly discouraged women from taking any 
leadership role, precisely for this perception of women as inferior and subordinated to men: 
“women were encouraged to participate ‘actively’ by taking a background role in the 
revolution…serving as cooks, maids and sex objects to the men who were the voice of the 
movement” (Nelson 35). In its origins, the Chicano movement, on the other hand, perpetuated 
a pattern of behaviour already present in previous historical instances like, for instance, during 
the Mexican Revolution of 1910.127 
-Finally, Moraga claims her place both as a feminist and as a lesbian inside the Chicano 
culture, which she accuses of traditionally ignoring women (104). She specially charges against 
the movement’s rejection of lesbians, seen as the worst kind of malinchistas because of their 
repudiation of traditional values and their threat to fixed gender roles: “lesbianism is seen as 
an insidious white phenomenon, a way to engender the breakdown of the patriarchal family, 
                                                          
127 Mariano Azuela’s The Underdogs (1915) gives a rather accurate portrayal of women’s submissive role during this historical 
episode, while also acknowledging the ostracizing of some female revolutionary figures who decided to take a more active 
role during the revolution. 
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and with it the breakdown of Chicana/o culture through an interruption of normative sexual 
roles” (Nelson 36). 
Hence, in order to criticize the pillars that structure a sexist society which scorns her 
both as a woman and as a homosexual, but at the same time without turning her back on her 
culture and Indian heritage, Moraga projects her claims and disapproval in the figure of la 
Llorona, whom she approaches from a presentist/decolonial point of view. In The Hungry 
Woman this archetype is described in terms of a Mexican Medea, for both mythological figures 
eventually murder their own children to take revenge on their partner. The difference is that 
Moraga’s Medea does not act driven by a thirst for revenge, but on the contrary: she conceives 
her action as a sacrifice aimed at preventing her son from settling into the same kind of 
patriarchal society she has for so long fought to prevent.  
Interestingly, in order to create her modern Medea, Moraga finds support in two Aztec 
myths, that of the hungry goddess Tlaltecuhtli and that of Coatlicue’s daughter, Coyolxauhqui 
(Nelson 38). The first one describes a goddess everlastingly craving for food, with mouths in 
each inch of her body. For the main character of the play, this hunger alludes to her frustration 
regarding her self-denial as a woman, as Medea is aware that she has been silenced by a 
patriarchal society. But this hunger also refers to her appetite for freedom and her right to a 
womanhood she has abandoned in order to cope with a suffering and wearisome motherhood 
(38). Having a mouth equals having a voice, and this means being able to speak, to protest and 
to confront injustices; that is, having a voice expresses a refusal to be silenced. As will be 
analysed in the following pages, this rejection has a connection with some of the characters in 
Helena Viramontes’s novel Their Dogs Came with Them.  
The second myth, as previously explained in chapter 2, narrates the attempts of the 
goddess Coyolxauhqui to kill her mother Coatlicue when she finds out that the latter is pregnant 
with a boy who will later become the god of war. Moraga understands this as a despaired 
attempt “to stop the beginning of patriarchy that will arise with the birth of the son” (Nelson 
39). Thus, in her play, la Llorona is presented as a lesbian mother who desperately seeks to fit 
in a society which has denied her a place, while the murdering of her son represents a desperate 
deed against the perpetuation of a heterosexist and constraining male-structured society 
(Nelson 40): “with [his son’s] murder, Medea attempts to halt the patriarchal society which 
came into being with the God of War” (45). The example of Moraga’s rewriting of Aztec myths 
shows that what some might perceive as a presentist distortion of the myths being revisited is 
not a de-contextualization but a recovery of the roots of a community, and their inclusion into 
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both history and ideology, which aims to encourage political struggle and to decolonize 
patriarchal hegemony.  
In Loving in the War Years (1983) Cherríe Moraga claims that when she was young 
she could never feel part of any movement or association, simply because these did not exist: 
“Twenty-five years ago, however, there was little personal ‘me’ to read. That ‘me,’ Chicana 
and lesbian, had not been invented… In 1975, with so little ‘me’ to read, I wrote. To fill in the 
blanks” (171-172). Chicana lesbian feminism began to be articulated principally by Moraga 
herself and Gloria Anzaldúa, and it helped to give a sense of belonging to those “butches of 
colo[u]r” (Moraga, A Xicana Codex 186) who, like them, felt lost and disoriented in a world 
where their identity was not accepted. Moraga realized that in order to recover those aspects of 
her identity that, because of the conventions of a suppressive society, she had repressed for so 
long, she needed to create a new ‘history,’ (a herstory) independent from the patriarchal, 
hetero-normative standards. Thus, the gaps and blanks had to be filled, necessarily, with other 
elements of their culture, which in this case are taken from indigenous mythology: 
Moraga, Sandra Cisneros, Ana Castillo, and Gloria Anzaldúa… rewrite the figures of 
La Malinche, La Llorona, and La Virgen de Guadalupe in part by excavating their 
indigenous roots to expand their meanings. Through their new understanding of the 
myths, these authors critique ideological structures that confine women, break down 
dualistic thinking, and create female icons that are complex and relevant to the lives of 
contemporary Chicanas. (Nelson 76)  
 
Interestingly, myth becomes for Chicana feminism another discourse with which to fill 
in the gaps left by colonial history, thereby acquiring the same ontological value granted to 
history. Though in Western academia disciplines like mythology, philosophy, and literature 
have not traditionally been bestowed the same prestige for approaching the past, it must be 
emphasized that for scholars such as Pérez neither history nor mythology can escape 
subjectivism, be it straightforward of subtler. Hence, as part of her (and other writers’) project 
of decolonization of the imaginary through the use of Foucauldian anthropology (Pérez, The 
Decolonial Imaginary 5), both of myth and fiction are equally valid to complete the blanks.  
Therefore, if the figures of la Malinche, la Virgen de Guadalupe and la Llorona, whose 
origins might go back to pre-Hispanic times, were been originally rewritten and reshaped along 
history to make them concur with a male-oriented society, Chicana feminist writers return to 
these same sources in order to offer a different vision that emphasizes women’s right to agency, 
pleasure and freedom, decolonizing the (male) accepted canon. In other words: a masculinist 
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and hetero-normative presentist vision, modelled in homophobic and bigoted readings of 
mythical figures and long accepted as ‘the norm,’ is overthrown by another, non-canonical 
instance of presentism fostered by Chicana (lesbian) feminists during in these few past decades. 
It could be suggested, then, that cultural colonization is counter-attacked with diverse instances 
of presentism which debunk the supremacist ideology inherent in Western history and culture, 
resulting in the decolonization of the imaginary.  
 
6.2-Presentism in Viramontes’s Their Dogs Came with Them 
The same way that myths can be rewritten in order to portray new ideas or depict them 
through a different focus, real events extracted from history can also be used as a link to current 
anxieties and political dispute, as is the case of Helena María Viramontes’ novel Their Dogs 
Came with Them (2007). Set between 1960 and 1970, the plot focuses on the lives of four 
Mexican-American girls in an impoverished barrio in East Los Angeles.128 The book delves 
into the emotional and physical struggles of the neighbourhood, on the one hand isolated due 
to an unsuccessful urban renewal planning which has destroyed the barrio and displaced its 
citizens, and on the other monitored because of curfews and police controls effected by a 
Quarantine Authority during an epidemic of rabid dogs. Ermila is an orphaned child who lives 
with her controlling grandparents, while her political conscience is slowly developing. Turtle 
is a gang member who dresses and acts like a boy in order to fit in his brother’s gang, for she 
feels that only then will she be accepted by her admired brother, who resents her for being a 
girl. Tranquilina is the daughter of two missionaries, whose faith has begun to waver as a result 
of rape; whereas Ana is devoted to her schizophrenic brother, Ben, who is traumatized by guilt 
for being considered a hero when he is, in fact, responsible for the death of a child. 
 Since this work presents two major themes, I will divide the study into two different 
sections in order to show how a presentist analysis for decolonial goals can be carried out in 
this text, eventually leading to political denunciation. One of these main issues has to do with 
neocolonialism and the subsequent struggle against domination by the United States, which is 
achieved through a rewriting of the Spanish colonization of Mexico. Hence, because of its 
                                                          
128 Raúl Homero Villa (2000) explains that the spatial manifestations of dominant social relations in the United States, marked 
by intercultural conflict, racial segregation, unfair federal legislation and patterns of white subjugation, have resulted in the 
establishing of specific spatial formations named barrios. Barrios allude to impoverished neighbourhoods, residentially and 
socially segregated where the Mexican-American population tends to concentrate. Chicano barrios are considered to have a 
geographical identity, providing dispossessed and underprivileged individuals with a sense of community, of “being at home” 
(5), something essential for those whose social identity is so powerfully linked to the “experience of being displaced in multiple 
ways from a perceived homeland” (1). Still, the poverty level and the crime and illness rate are extremely high in these barrios, 
thus generating ambivalent feelings among their settlers (5). 
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relation with history, the issue of neocolonialism will be analysed in terms of temporal 
presentism. The other major issue has to do with notions of globalization and displacement. 
Therefore, a study will be provided about how decolonization can also be achieved spatially. 
 
 
 
6.2.1-The Use of History for Neo-Colonial Denunciation 
Viramontes’ Their Dogs Came with Them concentrates mainly on the emotional and 
physical struggles of four women, which gives the idea that sex (or rather, traditional visions 
of gender) plays an important role in the novel. Thus, it might be suitable to have a brief look 
at the usual representation of women in colonial and postcolonial literature and start the study 
from there. Amanda Nolacea Harris (2004), in her essay “Imperial and Postcolonial Desires: 
Sonata de Estío and the Malinche Paradigm”, states that in colonial literature the conquered 
territory tends to have a female body or be metaphorically represented by a feminine character 
who subjects herself to the charismatic and charming figure of the male conqueror: “this 
narrative practice of the feminization of the territory is not uncommon in the chronicles of the 
Conquest” (244). This way, narratives of colonialism often become translated into an idealized 
romantic relationship in which the feminine character always adopts a submissive role and 
gives herself away to the dominant masculine figure. Julie A. Charlip and E. Bradford Burns 
(2002) describe this surrender in terms of “the conquest of a virgin territory” (61) which 
becomes translated into a metaphor for the conquest of an often-virginal woman. This surrender 
can be voluntary, as in the archetype of the ‘Indian princess,’ absolutely bewildered by the 
astonishingly exotic and brave ‘conquistador,’ as Pocahontas; or reluctant, as Jean Rhys’ 
Antoinette in her novel Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), where she is practically sold out to the 
English Rochester, their relationship soon turning into a concatenation of misunderstandings 
due to their inability to adapt to each other’s lifestyle. 
Conversely, in Chicano literature –which adopts the point of view of the conquered 
victim,129 the territory often becomes a masculine embodiment of oppression. This is even 
                                                          
129 Due to their awareness that, traditionally, Mexican-American citizens have been unfairly treated in the United States after 
the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which eventually led to land expropriation and segregation. Racial 
tensions have remained a constant since then. For instance, in 1915, in the lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas, Tejanos (Texas 
Mexicans) started a revolution under what was known as the Plan of San Diego, a manifesto proclaiming the revolution of 
Tejanos to reclaim the Southern territories of the United States (former Mexico). Their violent insurrection against Anglos 
triggered a wave of violence which resulted in the death of over 5000 Tejano men, women, and children in response to the 
revolt (Vargas 185-186). Also well-known is the Zoot Suit Riots, which was a violent episode between May and June 1943, 
where attacks were committed indiscriminately against Mexican-American youths by Anglo servicemen and civilians in Los 
Angeles, California (Vargas 253). 
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clearer in works by feminist Chicana writers, where the subjugation of women and the privation 
of their rights to autonomy and pleasure is exposed in all levels of narration, commonly 
depicting a female figure constricted not only by a patriarchal authority inside the familiar 
sphere, but also by a patriarchal society founded in a territory defined by masculine parameters. 
The distinctive vision of the mythical territory of Aztlán depicted in Moraga’s The Hungry 
Woman constitutes one of the most celebrated examples of this. However, this representation 
of the land as a masculine oppressive force is not necessarily restricted to works focusing on 
Latina’s fight for a place inside the Chicano culture, as Moraga does. Quite on the contrary, it 
can also depict the more general struggle of Chicana/o culture inside another suppressive and 
generally overbearing nation, that of the United States, which results in the isolation, oblivion 
and marginality of those who are economically less favoured. Conversely, this same struggle 
carried out by women who demand not only freedom but also a more active role inside their 
own culture can serve to embody a major fight undertaken by the whole Chicano community 
against a supremacist, heteronormative and white majority in the United States –men and 
women alike- which ostracizes them and disregards their rights. 
In Their Dogs Came with Them, Helena María Viramontes establishes a clear 
relationship between the neglected characters of a peripheral barrio in East Los Angeles, 
personified in four female figures, and the ferocity exercised by the territory they inhabit, 
described in terms of an amputated body epitomized by a freeway system: “Viramontes depicts 
the freeway construction as a form of bodily disfiguration, the result of the earthmovers’ 
vicious bite” (Wald 73). This can be found on Tranquilina’s mum’s reflection concerning her 
hometown: “But now the freeways amputated the streets into stumped dead ends, and the lives 
of the neighbours itched like phantom limbs in Mama’s memory” (Viramontes 33). Yet, this 
viciousness with which the construction of the freeway leaves its imprint in the barrio can be 
understood in terms of masculinity, as some parallelisms are established between the derelict 
state of people’s shacks because of the demolition plans and the violence suffered by women 
in the private sphere of their home by their male counterparts. This association is made by 
Turtle, who compares the wretched state of her house because of the freeway construction to 
the effects of her father’s beatings in both her and her mother:  
Turtle didn’t want to remember how careless they were to the house and each other. 
Broken windows, veined with duct tape, Amá’s broken bones, tiles eroded and fallen 
to the ground like teeth, Luis’s locura, paint peeled, Frank’s explosive temper and the 
stink of a thousand regrets like an old discarded refrigerator lingered in their rented 
house. (221)   
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Though abandoned before completion, and despite its derelict state, this half-built 
freeway still displays a tyrannical control over its inhabitants, particularly the female ones, 
through whose eyes the story is narrated. Conversely, as will be seen later, this violence against 
women also exposes the Chicanos’ struggle inside their barrio and their often problematic 
relationship with the rest of the US territory, which in this particular case is encapsulated in the 
city of Los Angeles.  
Sarah D. Wald (2013) mentions Bridget Kevane’s claim that the abundant sexual 
assaults and harassments performed to women along the novel symbolize the violence operated 
by the Spanish colonizers of Mexico, which in present-day terms comes to reflect how the 
Mexican-Americans are being culturally colonized in the United States (77). Thus, the territory 
is subjected to colonization, namely, the Chicano barrio is covered up and ripped by a freeway 
system conceived to favour only middle-class population, as only people who can afford a car 
are able to enjoy it: “Four freeways crossing and interchanging, looping and stacking in the 
Eastside, but if you didn’t own a car, you were fucked. Many were, and this is something Ermila 
always said in her head: You’re fucked” (176). Yet, in the novel this territorial colonization is 
ultimately embodied in four women who are marginalized, mistreated, bullied or even molested 
or raped as a way to represent how Chicano culture is being slowly engulfed by a bigger, 
economically superior power. 
In fact, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that Viramontes had the historical 
episode of the Spanish conquest on her mind when writing the novel, since the narration starts 
with a quotation taken from Miguel Leon-Portilla’s The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of 
the Conquest of Mexico (1962), which describes the indigenous impression when first 
encountering the Spanish colonizers: “They came in battle array, as conquerors, and the dust 
rose in whirlwinds on the roads….Their dogs came with them, running ahead of the column…. 
They raced on before with saliva dripping from their jaws” (41). 
“Their dogs came with them,” states Leon-Portilla, “and they are still here,” seems to 
answer Viramontes, pointing at the rabid dogs’ plague ravaging the barrio, which has brought, 
as a consequence, the appearance of a Quarantine Authority (QA) which both monitors and 
constrains the population with curfews and prohibitions. Wald points out at the Janus face of 
this official force which is supposed to protect its inhabitants but at the same way establishes a 
strict, suffocating control over their movements: “While the QA is officially charged with 
protecting the Mexican-American community from rabid dogs, it places the neighbo[u]rhood 
under siege, policing the characters’ movements in and out of their communities” (78). It could 
[237] 
 
be said that the rabid dogs, with “saliva dripping from their jaws,” (Leon-Portilla 41) run ahead 
the new conquerors. But on this occasion, instead of Spaniards equipped with spears and coats 
of mail, these conquerors will come in the shape of policing institutions which will constrict 
the people’s freedom of movement. Tranquilina establishes a clear relationship between the 
rabid dogs and the colonizers by perceiving one of them as a knight armed with shield and 
sword, drawing back the image of the Conquistador that this animal has come to metaphorically 
precede: “[The rabid dog’s] whole body took on a shield of defence with its tail erect like a 
sword” (Viramontes 214). Interestingly, “erect” and “sword” are traditional phallic symbols 
that denote a masculine control over feminine bodies at a metaphorical and subconscious level. 
The conquistador will emerge on the scene right afterwards, in the shape of a rancher’s son-in-
law who will hit her from behind with a shovel; his rape exemplifying the devastation of 
indigenous territory (again embodied in a female body) by the Spanish colonizers. 
For Bridget Kevane (2008) the dogs represent several things: from “the man who raped 
[Tranquilina]…, to the conditions of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles, to the ills of their 
society” (33). The presence of the dogs can be taken, then, as a bad omen; but at the same time 
there seems to be a strong bond between these hounds and the girls portrayed in the novel, in 
the sense that both feel threatened by the authorities of the United States, and even sometimes 
their fate follows a similar path. This is the case of Turtle, who at the beginning of the narration 
sees a dead dog’s carcass lying on a puddle of bloody water. Turtle immediately identifies the 
hound as female, and will eventually be killed like a rabid animal, her body turning into another 
empty carcass collapsed on a pool of water:  
At the end of the storefront block, a bloodied dog’s carcass from last night’s search 
littered the street, ground raw into the pavement by car tires. Rust-col[u]ored water 
surrounded the carcass. It must have been female, Turtle judged, because purple droopy 
teats fell to one side. (29, my italics)  
 
It is noteworthy that Turtle’s impression of the dog is not limited to its deceased 
condition, for she also pays attention to its sex, perhaps because it is a female like she is 
(independently of how much effort she puts into hiding it). The image of a dead bitch’s body, 
surrounded by “rust-coloured water” will be mirrored when Turtle is shot dead by the same 
authority which is supposed to protect her, and which has previously gotten rid of the rabid 
dog: “Although she stood in the shower of rain, her face flamed something fierce. She dropped 
to her knees, quietly, into a puddle of oily water” (324, my italics). While standing on all fours, 
her fierceness and position remind the reader of the rabid dog. The rain witnesses both killings, 
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their dead bodies collapsing into a pool of blood and water. Tranquilina culminates this 
association with her screaming: “We’rrrre not doggggs!” (324). 
Wald also associates the epidemic of rabid dogs with the bulldozers and earthmovers 
which are removing the people from their houses to allow space for the freeways (74). This 
connection is soon established in the novel: “the bulldozers had started from very far away and 
slowly arrived on First Street, their muzzles like sharpened metal teeth making way for the 
freeway” (Viramontes 6). Here the bulldozers are in fact described as dogs with sharpened 
teeth that arrive from distant lands, like those which preceded the arrival of the conquistadores 
to the territory. The freeway is thus seen as something alien to the barrio inhabitants, for it is 
associated to a kind of invasion. In order to support this idea, a close look at the urban context 
of the city of Los Angeles, where this story is set, might be of great value.  
In 1978 Reynolds Farley, Howard Schuman, Suzanne Blanchi, Diane Colasanto, and 
Shirley Hatchett conducted a study related to residential segregation in Detroit, though, as they 
claim, the results “may be generalized to many of the nation’s large metropolises” (320).  They 
wondered why most large metropolitan areas still deployed patterns of residential segregation, 
in which cities were mainly occupied by coloured minorities, while suburban areas remained 
predominantly white. Overall, their study proved that segregation is still an issue, and that the 
pattern of chocolate cities and vanilla suburbs130 continues to spread in main urban areas, as is 
the case with Los Angeles.  
Cultural historian Eric Ávila (2014) believes that World War II was key to initiating 
this pattern of decentralization of public resources and private capital (5), so characteristic of 
the city of Los Angeles.  The reason underlying this is that, during the beginning of the 1940’s, 
the federal government vigorously encouraged the decentralization of the industry so that, in 
case of an air attack, the military-industrial infrastructure, which was beginning to bloom, 
would not be dangerously affected (5). However, despite strategic reasons Ávila emphasizes 
that the urban crisis that arose during this period was more social than economical, for the war 
increased patterns of racism and racial violence. Ávila clarifies the reasons underlying this 
racism by explaining that during those years, minority populations, such as blacks and Latinos, 
started migrating to the centre of Los Angeles in search for jobs, creating great hostility among 
local whites, who felt their employment threatened by this massive immigration. At the same 
                                                          
130 “Chocolate cities” (and vanilla suburbs) was a pop tune popularized by Motown singers (and later by a 1975 album by 
funk band The Parliament) which was adopted in the academia to describe the increasing pattern of city occupancy in Los 
Angeles and other areas, characterized by a metropolis chiefly inhabited by citizens of colour, embedded in a white, and often 
isolated suburban ring. This pattern typified a perpetuated trend towards racial residential segregation. 
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time, the creation of entities like the Federal Housing Act (FHA) in 1934 and the Homeowners 
Loan Corporation boosted the market of housing construction by “shifting the focus of urban 
development away from the inner city and toward the suburbs” (6).  Consequently, many white 
citizens moved to suburban areas, and this mobilization of both white and minority populations 
eventually resulted in above mentioned pattern of “chocolate cities and vanilla suburbs.” Ávila 
adds: “in this shifting geography of wealth and poverty, race displaced class as the discursive 
basis of social conflict” (8).  
Perhaps one of the clearer examples to help understand how urban planning and renewal 
could lead towards exclusion may be found in the Chavez Ravine episode occurred during the 
decade of the 1950’s, an event crucial in shaping the collective imaginary of the Chicano 
community in Los Angeles. The Chavez Ravine was an area of Los Angeles inhabited mainly 
by three working-class, Mexican-American communities: Palo Verde, La Loma, and Bishop. 
Due to the increasing population’s expansion in the city, during the 50’s a public housing 
project was commissioned under the Housing Act of 1949. The authorities, commanded by the 
Federal Housing Administration, proceeded to clear the area to enable the construction of the 
“Elysian Park Heights.” Mexican-American homeowners residing there were urged to sell their 
properties, 131 while those who refused to leave were eventually forcefully expelled from their 
homes. Sarah Schrank (2008) claims that sometimes the city used police officers to remove 
inhabitants from their houses (280). However, after the passage of a public referendum 
prohibiting the housing proposal and the subsequent election of a conservative mayor who also 
opposed the idea, the project was finally cancelled. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the land 
would be intended for public purposes and in 1958 it became the official emplacement for the 
Dodgers’ baseball team stadium, a project which was financed by the Dodgers’ private funds.  
Viramontes does not allude directly to this episode, which remains powerfully alive in 
the Chicano community’s memory, but the setting of her novel works as a metaphor in which 
a Latino barrio is also being savagely severed in order to ensure an urban project, though in 
this particular case urban transformation comes in the shape of a road network designed to 
connect the most economically productive areas of the decentred city of Los Angeles. As she 
stated in an interview held by Chicano writer Daniel Olivas (2007): “[the coming of the 
freeways] devastated, amputated East L. A. from the rest of the city. The bulldozers resembled 
                                                          
131 Very often it is declared that these were “voluntary purchases”, but many times householders would reluctantly accept to 
sell their properties after being promised that they would be able to choose a house of their liking in the new public housing 
community, which never happened (Parlow 844). This is due to the exercise of ‘eminent domain,’ which is another name for 
expropriation, and relates to the power of the government to turn a private property into a space for public use with small 
compensation for the owners, which is what happened in this case (845). 
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the conqueror’s ships coming to colonize a second time” (para. 11). Raúl Homero Villa (2000) 
claims that it is commonly believed by local residents that the jumble of freeways that divide 
and dissect the East of Los Angeles answers to a strategy carried out by police agencies to 
isolate Anglo citizens from Mexican-American ones, and, even though according to him there 
is no explicit evidence to prove this, what is true is that, in popular Chicano culture, freeways 
have come to stand as the most characteristic symbol of occupation, re-shaping the 
communities’ historical geography (83). 
At this point it might be interesting to go back to Shaobo Xie’s idea of the double-
phased process of colonization, divided into a first moment of territorial occupation, and a 
second, subtler period of ideological, technological and cultural invasion, which culminates 
with the implantation of the imperial mode of production: capitalism. This cultural and 
technological invasion is what Xie refers to as “neo-colonization” (11). The novel portrays this 
second process with the presence of the bulldozers and the disrupted freeway, which reminds 
the citizens of the still real presence of a dominant agent, even though this may be physically 
absent, accentuating the devastating effects of its ‘after-the-siege’ remains. As Wald states:  
[the novel] connects transportation geographies to older forms of conquest and 
colonization and to newer modes of neoliberal economic development. By emphasizing 
the ways violent colonial pasts haunt these newer forms of economic control, the texts 
attend to the relationship between older and newer forms of spatial control and the 
relations between both mundane and spectacular forms of oppression. (70).  
 
In other words, Viramontes makes use of a historical event: that of the colonization of 
the Mexican territory during the 16th century (or rather, the literary rewriting of this event in 
words of Leon-Portilla), to unearth a present anxiety: that of the cultural colonization. The 
author retrieves a historical fact which has lost its immediate urgency (though its consequences 
are still noticeable and deeply felt) and rewrites it in terms of a problematic present, the one 
derived from the cultural and economic imposition over a disadvantaged and damaged minority 
population. Thus, the novel could be understood as a fight in the arena of literature of four 
female figures against this imposed mode of neo-colonization; a process which both Wald and 
Kevane understand as a “decolonization of imagination” (80) that easily reminds of Emma 
Pérez’s notion of a decolonial imaginary. On the other hand, as Edward Soja (1989) explains, 
Los Angeles constitutes one of the most industrialized metropolises in the world, so it becomes 
necessary to count on a powerful network of freeways to perpetuate this capitalist order shaped 
by a certainly “decentralized urban morphology” (195). On this breeding ground the decision 
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of using East Los Angeles as the setting for this narration proves to be a success, since the 
freeway system becomes an important perpetrator and perpetuator of this neoliberal market 
perceived as a ghastly form of neo-colonization, both in terms of history, and of space. 
On the other hand, what most disconcerts Xie in this latter example of occupation is 
that not only is it not openly fought or rejected by the ‘indigenous’ individuals but, on the 
contrary, it is tacitly accepted or even goes unnoticed. In the novel, older factions of Mexican-
American citizens seem not to realize the strong policy of repression that the Quarantine 
Authority is effecting, to great concern and frustration for younger generations, who futilely 
try to open their eyes:  
Lollie translated the pamphlet to her parents, who spoke little official English, and they 
had reacted like everyone else: they believed and obeyed. Ermila’s own grandparents 
were convinced that the curfew and the shooting and the QA all contained the rabies 
epidemic. (Viramontes 55) 
 
Conversely, this same sense of police restriction and state of control is felt by Ermila 
in her own home, up to the point where she imagines her grandmother has placed a violent dog 
in her bedroom to prevent her from sneaking away, a dog that bites her on a night she has 
planned a clandestine meeting with her boyfriend: “The shadow of the dog yawned wide, rose 
on all fours, then leisurely arched its back…Grandmother had threatened her with something 
like this, to protect her” (75). Ermila justifies the sudden intromission of the aggressive hound 
remembering that she has often been menaced with similar schemes by her grandmother, who 
alleges she wants to safeguard Ermila from bad influences. Yet, the truth is that Ermila’s home 
is becoming a prison for her, and the feeling of control over her life at the private sphere of the 
household is ultimately projected in the image of a dangerous dog threatening her in the only 
place where she has a little privacy: that of her room. The dog inside her bedroom equals the 
rabid dogs outside controlled by the curfew and the Quarantine Authority: the same lack of 
freedom the barrio is suffering outside, on the streets, Ermila is suffering in her own flesh. 
Thus, Ermila’s grounding could exemplify her subaltern position inside her own community: 
not only is she watched outside by government institutions such as the Quarantine Authorities 
and the Police forces, she is also controlled at home, where her grandma tries to prevent her 
from sneaking out at night: from being a ‘bad woman’ (or in other words: becoming a 
Malinche). This example illustrates how a given situation, suffered individually by a female 
character in the private sphere, actually embodies on a minor scale the isolating conditions 
afflicting a whole community. 
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Other examples of these characters’ oppression inside their own community can be 
found throughout the story. During the first years of her life Ermila does not utter a word, and 
though no explanation is given to justify this, what is sure is that the reasons are neither related 
to a physical incapacity nor to unfamiliarity with the language. Ermila knows and understands 
the language, as she is able to speak in her youth. Her silence during her childhood may be 
related to an absence of a political voice: Ermila is silenced up until her adolescence, when she 
starts to be politically involved in the comings and goings of her community. In fact, the reader 
is aware that Ermila can (and does) talk in the same chapter (number 4) where her feminist 
consciousness and her interest in politics are said to be growing. This also happens to another 
character, Lucho, who suffers from a strong stammer. Dale Pattison (2014) has remarked: 
[Lucho’s] loss of voice reflects the loss of political agency experienced by the community in 
the years following the construction [of the freeway]” (131). In fact, one important feature of 
the novel is the importance of having a voice. For John Alba Cutler (2015), Their Dogs Came 
with Them is an ambitious novel focused on the self-sufficiency of language as a strategy for 
recovering authenticity from the remnants of historical trauma (205). According to Alba Cutler, 
literature, especially through language and imagination, becomes in this novel a site for mutual 
recognition and authenticity, were historical and cultural wounds may be healed (Ends of 
Assimilation 209). This perception of language (either the one used by the characters, or the 
one produced by Viramontes’ writing) as a tool for recovery connects to Anzaldúa when she 
claims that only through writing can the “wound” of historical trauma, which she describes as 
“wounds of genocidal colonization and marginalization that have never formed scabs” (Keating 
284-285), be cured. This need to repair wounds, a process which Anzaldúa calls “the 
Coyolxauqui imperative” (Gloria Anzaldúa Reader 312) is essential for women’s acquisition 
of a differential consciousness, and is mainly achieved with the disentanglement from of a 
previously silenced identity, that comes with the empowerment obtained through writing, that 
is, with language: “to write… you’re opening up those wounds, and hopefully the air will start 
healing them as they are out in the open. Of course, writing is concealing, too” (Keating 196). 
Though it is true that Lucho is not a woman, he is described as a homosexual 
traumatized by a violent and cruel father. Lucho is one of the various examples of what 
Christina Marie Buckles (2012) has noted: that domination and submission in the story are felt 
not only by women, but also by all the masculine characters in the novel who present feminine 
characteristics or are kind to women (34); whereas “men are cruel and unredeemable figures 
who exhibit a violent masculinity that has lasting effects on those around them” (39). Turtle’s 
uncle is the only one who shows concern and kindness towards her and, presumably, ends up 
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in jail. Ermila’s cousin, Nacho, who likes fotonovelas, helps with the house chores, and is the 
only one who sincerely worries about his cousin’s well-being, is eventually murdered. In fact, 
Nacho is killed by a befuddled Turtle, who stabs him with a screwdriver, a clear phallic symbol 
which represents her final immersion and acceptance in the male gang from which she had 
previously gone AWOL after her brother left to fight in the Vietnam War. This precise moment 
will mark her ultimate disembodiment from her female nature, in part produced by the effect 
of drugs in her organism: “This was a hard-core jump and another Turtle, the one not her, pull 
out the screwdriver” (321, my italics).  
The instant in which Turtle has gotten rid of her feminine side only brings violence. It 
is Turtle as a boy, and not Antonia as a girl (for that is her real name), who displays all his rage 
and viciousness upon Nacho, a character who has previously been described as feminine (as 
suggested by the fact that, whereas Ermila’s bed blanket depicts a lion, her cousin sleeps under 
“a floral iris-printing sheet” (75)) and who, in front of Turtle, acquires the woman’s role. This 
moment illustrates how in this novel violence is almost always conducted by males towards 
women. Turtle’s action of grabbing the screwdriver that, so far, she has kept as a way of self-
defence answers to the necessity of behaving the way the male authority embodied in the gang 
expects her to do, and her crime will signify the death of the woman inside her; the death of an 
identity which comes expressed through the absence of a voice: “Turtle clenched her jaw 
because she no longer had a mouth to speak… And Turtle lunged at the boy with all the 
dynamite rage of all the fucked-up boys stored in her rented body” (322, my italics). When she 
finally realizes what she has done and when, reprimanded by a horrified Tranquilina, she is 
asked the reasons for perpetrating an act so atrocious, she can only explain it by acknowledging 
the fact that the person she is now has nothing to do with the woman she once was, a woman 
who no longer exists and perhaps never really did: “Turtle didn’t know why. She didn’t make 
the rules. Why? Because a tall girl named Antonia never existed, because her history held no 
memory. Why? Go ask another” (324).  
It might be necessary to pause here and reflect on the importance of having a ‘history.’ 
Turtle’s frustration is related to her realization that she “no longer has a mouth to speak” (322), 
and consequently, does not have a history to tell. As previously seen in Moraga’s play The 
Hungry Woman, the presence of the goddess Tlaltecuhtli symbolized female hunger for 
freedom and self-expression, emphasizing the need of women to have a voice through which 
to challenge the silence and exclusion traditionally imposed on Latina women. Tlaltecuhtli has 
her body filled with mouths and is always hungry, but for Moraga, this also implies that she 
has many cavities through which ‘to speak.’ Turtle lacks this mouth, and, consequently, cannot 
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say anything: she cannot shout, she cannot cry and she cannot fight. The fact that she finally 
comes to the conclusion that her history holds no memory is only a consequence of the fact 
that she does not have a mouth with which to create that history (or, perhaps more accurately: 
to create a story) and, therefore, she lacks in political agency, which, as stated before, might 
also be the reason underlying Ermila’s silence during her childhood, and Lucho’s stammering. 
In sharp contrast to Turtle’s muteness the reader finds Ermila and her girlfriends’ vivid 
and creative ‘talkstories,’ which consist mostly of anecdotes (either real or, most of the times, 
invented) and fantasies, that the girls use to cover the gaps in their fragmented memories and 
identities. Mitchum Huehls (2012) comments on the personal loss that each girl in Ermila’s 
group has had to cope with, and how their ‘talkstories’ help them heal the wounds resulting 
from this absence (161). For instance, after putting the scattered pieces of an unresolved family 
conflict together, Ermila’s friend, Lollie, feels inexplicably close to her aunt Concha. Lollie 
discovers that her aunt had apparently put up an unlicensed restaurant only to cover the bail 
bond of an imprisoned contrabandist with whom she was deeply in love, who eventually got 
out of jail only to abandon her. The story, full of gaps, is distorted by Lollie’s parents to 
reconvene their daughter to behave, but Lollie sees in these gaps the tragic story of a woman 
fooled by a man and neglected by her family, which encourages Lollie to connect with Concha: 
“The bits and pieces not only refused to come together, but for Lollie, the story also revealed 
glaring absences or no-fault inserts exploited by her parents. The tail of loving sacrifice inspired 
Lollie to develop an immediate bond with her aunt” (Viramontes 185). 
Ermila and her friends talk constantly, that is, they refuse to remain silent, even if these 
stories are more often fantasies than actual recounting of lived experiences. Still, Huehls 
defends Viramontes against those who could accuse her of naïveté by claiming that the Chicana 
writer is perfectly conscious of the little potential value that these stories have when related to 
the physical dispossession and displacement suffered by other characters, such as Chavela. 
However, in that disjointed surrounding of material loss, stories ultimately become the girls’ 
“only property.” (61) Thus, Huehls distinguishes between two kinds of dispossession: those 
embodied by Ermila and her friends, related to personal and historical loss, and those 
represented by Turtle, which allude to material things like a house, money, and food (Huehls 
161). Stories cannot make up for physical lack of material needs, but they might have their 
function when the loss is historical and emotional, for they serve the girls to address injustices. 
For instance, Mousie spends her afternoons telling and retelling memories and anecdotes about 
her older brother Yoyo, who was killed during the Vietnam War when he was only nineteen 
years old: “Mousie took it upon herself to cross-stitch him together to recapture his soul. Her 
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friends understood. She mentioned him at least once a day, so that no one, least of all her, 
forgot that he lived until his nineteenth year” (Viramontes 61). His presence is so vivid for the 
girls that, when learning that her friend Rini has been sexually abused by her mother’s partner, 
Mousie comments: “YoYo would kick his ass” (196). The fact that Mousie uses the 
conditional, rather than a past time, acknowledges that, though deceased, Yoyo is still very 
much alive in Mousie’s memory, which allows her to fantasize about having a male figure 
whom they can trust and who would protect them from danger. In this sense, it could be 
suggested that ‘talkstories,’ which is how the girls call their little chat sessions, become the 
recourse with which Ermila and her friends can cope with the emotional distress derived from 
traumatic experiences in their lives, a recourse that, unfortunately, Turtle does not have: 
“Stories can heal the girls’ losses, but they cannot fill up Turtle’s pockets” (Huels 161).  
On the other hand, because these stories are designed to fill in the gaps of the split 
memories deriving from the girls’ personal loss, it could be said that these anecdotes become 
the metaphorical freeways connecting a past as severed as the neighbourhood serving as setting 
for this novel. Interestingly, the material used to fill in these memory blanks originates not in 
a long-forgotten history, but in stories, which intermingle with Ermila and her friends’ recalling 
of reality. History and story consequently acquire the same level of importance, and both seem 
to appear as equally relevant in the configuring and understanding of community’s identity. 
The only difference between the girls’ fantasies and history is the notion of history as static, in 
opposition to the contingency of these stories, which opens a new whole catalogue of 
possibilities: “Contingency can be as dangerous as it can be empowering, but it does 
successfully escape the tendentiousness of historical determined meaning and value” (Huels 
176). I mentioned in a previous chapter that Pérez, drawing on White, protests against the 
reduction of literature to the sphere of the “imaginary” whereas history is normally granted to 
contain reality, being as it is that both require of a narrativization process (xvii). Viramontes 
seems to place both history and stories to the same level, thus challenging traditional notions 
of objectivity in history by fictionalizing it, at the same time that she elevates fiction to the 
realm of plausibility. 
In her novel stories seem to be more valid than history because they are potentially 
more likely to change and adapt to the moments and situations, becoming meaningful for the 
characters which enunciate them. Viramontes takes a real historical fact (the colonizers arriving 
to the territory accompanied by their dogs), and transforms it into a story, namely, the account 
of what happens, centuries later, when the colonizers have apparently disappeared, but their 
dogs, (both the real ones and those embodied in the earthmovers), still remain. This is not to 
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say that history and historiography lack in relevance, but only that one should be aware of the 
subjectivity that they are bound to contain, if only because they are expressed through narrative, 
and narrative (as anything that is enunciated through language) cannot escape subjectivity, no 
matter how elusive. Thus, history cannot be changed, but Viramontes transforms it into a story 
that fits well in the current problematic, and can relate and speak to those still affected by 
historical injustice; whereas the chronological limits of historically contrasted events become 
blurred. As T. Jackie Cuevas stated in a chapter of her dissertation To(o) Queer the Chican@s 
(2010) dedicated to Viramontes’ Their Dogs Came with Them: 
Unclear time serves as the modus operandi for this novel… By showing the urban decay 
of 1960’s East LA and referencing the arrival of the Spanish into ancient Mexico, it 
becomes uncertain which moment of colonization the characters are experiencing” 
(134-135). 
 
This way, Huehls mentions the examples of ‘talkstory’ used by Ermila and her friends 
to reconfigure their past and their present by believing (or wanting to believe) the stories they 
tell. This does not mean they are not aware of their lies, but they seem to help them deal with 
an otherwise unbearable reality and carry on with their not-always-easy existence. They 
transform their history into stories of what could have happened, or of what they would like to 
happen. Their history remains the same, but their stories help fill in the gaps of possibilities. 
As Huehls indicates: “Viramontes rejects the naïve notion that stories –Turtle’s ‘if-onlys’- can 
fill up our pockets and replace material loss, but she does not entirely abandon story as a way 
to address the injustices that the earthmovers represent” (162). Thus, stories accomplish two 
necessary functions: first, Viramontes seems to highlight these stories’ potentiality to be used 
for political denunciation. Second, they help complete and connect the characters’ fragmented 
identity, broken by social inequality and geographical dislocation resulting from the freeway 
construction. 
Another example that clearly shows how unimportant for the subject matter history is 
can be found in the discernible lack of temporal coherence in the novel. Huels notices that, 
though the main plot takes place in a couple of days (in which the characters coincide, interact, 
and clash, sometimes even without being aware of it), the concrete period of time is different 
in each case, in such a way that, in order for the story to make chronological sense, there is one 
day missing in Ermila’s story, or one extra day in Tranquilina’s and Turtle’s (173). Huels 
hardly believes this to be the result of an unintentional mistake, bearing in mind that it took 
Viramontes fifteen years to complete the novel, and some particular details in the text prove 
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that she was extremely methodical as to overlook something as allegedly relevant as the 
temporal linearity. This way, it would not be logical to suppose that Viramontes was oblivious 
to the fact that physical time does not coincide in all the stories while at the same time making 
some distinct elements meticulously converge in all the four girls’ plotlines (Huels 174), 
interconnecting their stories. For instance, the dead bitch carcass that Turtle contemplates one 
morning belongs to the dog that Ermila watches die the night before, when the helicopters are 
patrolling the barrio: “The bitch zigzagged across the pavement of First Street…I gotta do 
something soon, Ermila thought” (Viramontes 77). Similarly, Ana’s troubled and long 
disappeared brother, Ben, suddenly appears in Tranquilina’s house during one of the family’s 
charity events. Yet, at some point we learn that Ben always wears a brown beret that he was 
given as a present by a Chicana activist: “the young woman shouted at his back, A gift for you, 
hermano. Ant then ran up to him removed her beret and placed it on his head” (118). Thus, 
when at the beginning of the story Turtle spots a “Che Guevara wannabe” (17) with a brown 
beret, sitting at the bus stop, the reader learns that Ben was encountered by Turtle soon before 
Tranquilina discovers he is back in town.  
The story Viramontes tells makes sense in spite of its fragmented style and its 
chronological irregularities. However, because of the temporal lack of correspondence between 
Ermila’s plot line and the rest of the characters’, the ‘talkstories’ the girls use as an escape 
mechanism remarkably become more real (and thus, more plausible) than the ‘history’ in 
which they are immersed. The apparent anachronism present in the novel’s plot might thus 
serve a purpose and could be used to support the author’s rejection of those characteristics 
customarily associated with history, such as that of linearity or invariability, but also the notion 
of objectivity that has, since the positivist debate and its remnants in historicism, instigated so 
much debate and controversy among scholars.  
Yet, Viramontes’ rejection of history’s consistency is not only addressed in terms of 
chronological dissonances. John Alba Cutler (2009) mentions the influential notion of 
‘multiplicity’ regarding Chicano identity, as opposed to ideas of “authenticity founded on 
racial, national, or sexual terms” (165) which could also be applied to their history. As 
previously stated, multiplicity, in the context of Chicana/o theory, refers to the array of 
personalities which derives from belonging to and acting between racial, sexual, gender, and 
class borders, what Anzaldúa described as “making faces” (Making Face xv). Edwina Barvosa 
(2011), explains that Chicana feminism’s specific ideology is, in part, built upon this 
acknowledgement of the multiplicity of the inner self, which Gloria Anzaldúa in Haciendo 
Caras calls the “mestiza consciousness”: “As mestizas -biologically and/or culturally mixed- 
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we have different surfaces for each aspect of identity, each inscribed by a particular subculture” 
(xv). Hence, because individuals present “multiple faces,” it could be deduced that their 
theorization of history might also be subject to several interpretations, or rather, that its 
comprehension is also conditioned by this multiplicity. That is, because the notion of “Chicano 
community,” though standardized, is subject to constant re-evaluation and modification due to 
the inner (and outer) multiplicity of its members, the history of Chicanos/as might also be 
exposed to the same variation. In conclusion, because the notion of “Chicano” is not static, but 
on the contrary, it varies with time, Chicano history is also likely to change according to the 
acceptance of ‘multiple’ standpoints deriving from the diversity of the movement’s members.  
Because decolonizing the historical imaginary requires the assumption that history is 
not objective, Viramontes presents us with a temporal plotline which changes depending on 
the character on which the narration is focused at a particular moment. This does not necessarily 
mean that Viramontes did this on purpose to object historical presumed objectivity; but the 
extra day in Ermila’s story could perfectly be interpreted as a strategy illustrating how time is 
perceived differently by each character and how all their stories can still be credible even if 
they do not comply linearly with standards of temporal chronology. Therefore, it could be said 
that Viramontes breaks with the notion of temporal linearity by presenting a sequence of events 
which shifts from character to character. Still, for the story narrated to have meaning (namely, 
to avoid breaking with the horizon of expectations132), the reader must accept this sequential 
irregularity, where linear objectivity and consequently, causality of events, becomes, 
eventually, an illusion. If even chronology is multiple-sided, it is to be inferred that any account 
of the events taking place in a definite temporal portion ought to be subjective too.  
Summing up, Viramontes establishes a historical parallelism between the Conquest of 
Mexico during the 16th century by the Spanish empire, and the present day Neo-colonization 
deriving from third-wave capitalism in the United States The presentist connection between 
these two events is effected through the appearance of rabid dogs (be them real, or a 
metaphorical allusion to the earthmovers ravaging a Mexican-American barrio) which results 
in the subjugation and de-territorialisation of a minority community. This strategy could be 
considered presentist in terms of its apparent anachronism, if only because the author seems 
not to bear into mind the differences in the socio-political contexts surrounding these two 
historical periods. Yet, I propose that in Their Dogs the association between two different kinds 
                                                          
132 “The horizon of expectations” was first formulated by Hans Robert Jauss in a conference held in 1967 at the University of 
Constanza, which would result in his Theory of Reception, and it is defined as the presuppositions with which a reader receives 
a particular work (Selden and Widdowson 53). 
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of colonization serves to emphasize the devastating effects of a conquest which seems to have 
evolved, rather than ended, and is thus still present in several (though most of the time 
unacknowledged) ways, leading subsequently to the same results: the eradication of the original 
population from their territory, disenfranchisement, and monitoring of those in political 
disadvantage. 
However, more than just a denunciation regarding the established configurations of 
physical, ideological, or economic neo-imperialism in the United States, the novel might also 
embody an attempt to decolonize not only historical patterns of subjugation, but also patriarchal 
views on gender roles and identity. Interestingly, this decolonization is transferred to the spatial 
sphere, in the sense that it is through the interaction between the geographical territory in which 
the story is set and the different characters operating in it that a deconstruction of traditional 
hegemonic and masculinist patterns attached to that space is achieved. As will be seen in the 
following section, the land plays an essential role in the characters’ configuration of identity 
and political agency, and thus any attempt to decolonize must, forcefully, happen in the spatial 
arena. 
 
6.2.2-The Use of Space for Displacement Denunciation 
Despite the generally pessimistic tone of the novel, it could be argued that there is also 
space for redemption in Viramontes’ work. This redemption, which might be oriented towards 
decolonial purposes, derives, paradoxically, from one of the major issues developed in this 
story, which is the sense of displacement that strongly surrounds and emanates from the text. 
Raúl Homero Villa and George J. Sánchez (2004) defend that the spatial-temporal events 
taking place in Los Angeles during the past centuries require us to be aware of the importance 
that place has for the individual’s formation of identity (500); which Lisa Marie Cacho (2001) 
sums up by claiming that notions of race, gender, class and nation help constitute place as much 
as place affects and modifies said concepts (380). Therefore, place acquires a rather relevant 
role concerning issues of social identity formation, not only because geographical surroundings 
can modify the subjects’ conceptualization of their own selves, but because social identities 
can also be reflected in spatial terms, in the territory they occupy. There is a reciprocity between 
people’s self-formation and the space in which this happens. As I will try to show, because 
dislocation in Their Dogs disengages individuals from their spatial and temporal framework, it 
also has the potentiality to free them from the values, conventions and ideologies attached to 
the spatial-temporal setting which surrounds them, and thus a possible decolonization, if not 
achieved, is at least envisioned. 
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Displacement in the novel comes in a variety of ways, depending on the characters who 
suffer from it. On the one hand, it can be both physical and ideological as is reflected in the 
episode of Chavela’s house removal: “Displacement will always come down to two things: 
earthquakes or earthmovers…Now you go home…at least you have one” (8). Chavela 
manifests her grief and desolation when acknowledging her home is going to be destroyed in 
order to leave space for the new roadblock: “Nothing was left, I tell you. Nada. I cried for so 
long that if my grief had been a volcano, it would have torn the earth in two” (8). Still, in her 
despair she suddenly remembers the ruins of Aztlán lying underneath the earth, as a way to 
reinforce Chicano’s primordial right upon the piece of land from which she is now being 
detached: “And under all the rubble, under all that swallowed earth, the ruins of the pyramid 
waited” (8). Her actual home is not the shack she inhabits but the earth upon which it was built, 
what she later names tierra firme (“solid earth”) (247). When she states that the earthmovers 
and the bulldozers are devastating the earth, she is not only referring to her hovel, but also to 
the ruins of Aztlán which await buried in that ground. The machines, conceived for the 
construction of a freeway system, are not only getting rid of the barrio’s housings but also of 
their ideological and spiritual home: the mythical territory of Aztlán. Consequently, any 
plausible sense of community is wrecked because it lacks a physical space where to become 
ingrained, and with no geographical territory where to settle the roots for any prospective 
mestiza/o (or any other political) consciousness disappear together with the rubble of the 
citizens’ houses. With the ruins of Aztlán the bulldozers are also removing any chance the 
inhabitants of the barrio may have of developing a social identity, the demolition process also 
leaving them scattered and drifting.  
Chavela’s warning seems to be prophetical when she cautions young Ermila: “I’m 
trying to tell you how it feels to have no solid tierra under you. Listen to me! Where could you 
run?” (7), for she is not alluding simply to the lack of a place to sleep but to the lack of a sense 
of collectivity, of a spiritual home, and of hope. All these absences derive into a deep sense of 
non-belonging after being uprooted from one’s physical and ideological homeland, that of 
Aztlán, which eventually results in political inactivity. Subsequently, when Chavela moans 
about “the ruins of the pyramid awaiting,” what she is really grieving for might be the lack of 
political agency when Aztlán is being removed together with their homes. Years later, in a 
moment of distress, Ermila will be the only one who will remember Chavela’s words: “Just as 
Chavela had predicted, Ermila’s world was beginning to crack from under her. No solid tierra 
firme to stand on, nothing to hold on to” (247). Unrooted from their indigenous past, and 
physically deprived of a home, the inhabitants of the barrio are ultimately alienated from their 
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homeland; and the new freeway system, by its random demolishing of shacks and houses, is 
establishing a new borderlands, by chaotically dividing and separating its members of the 
barrio from the rest of the community. It is then understandable that Ermila’s world is starting 
to crack because, though a Mexican-American citizen, she is still feeling the spatial dislocation 
effected by the border. 
As previously stated in chapter 4, in 1995 Fernando Pedro Delgado defined Aztlán as 
an ideograph, because of the politically and culturally symbolic meaning which was ascribed 
to the word by a whole community (447). Consequently, the mythical homeland embodied in 
the name Aztlán has traditionally been used to claim primordial right upon the land (while 
challenging traditional views of territorial boundaries as something ‘natural’) and to connect 
to an indigenous heritage, even if most of this heritage has now been lost, thus establishing a 
spiritual link through a spatial notion. However, Delgado believes that the notion of Aztlán 
provides the Chicano movement with just the illusion of freedom. Because it is, eventually, 
merely a symbol, this freedom is unreal: “the possibility of freedom is illusory and Aztlán 
remains a contestable space full of meaning and hope but ultimately without substance” (452).  
This idea is somehow expressed in Their Dogs Came with Them, as I will try to show 
later on this analysis, but is also something that can be appreciated in John Rechy’s 1991 novel 
The Miraculous Day of Amalia Gómez, with which a comparison could be established. The 
plot comprises the recounting of the life and deeds of its main character, Amalia, while she 
spends a whole day caught between her desire to believe in a sign from the Virgin she believes 
she has witnessed, and her doubts concerning the plausibility of this miracle. Authors such as 
Walter Mignolo (2011) and as José David Saldívar (2011) consider this novel an example of 
narrative of resistance aimed at decolonizing not only the spatial, but also the cultural paradigm 
upon which Chicano literature is inserted. However, this resistance, far from being passive, is 
caustically directed towards effective action. This idea, as I will try to show, is partly 
transmitted via the graffiti “Aztlán is a fable,” which is incidentally mentioned in the novel, as 
if it were a vague anecdote to add to the main character’s day. Nonetheless, the assertion 
comprised in that sentence might be understood as a bold statement ultimately aimed at 
breaking with a misleading illusion: a false idealism that, just for the sake of believing in it, 
will not bring change to the community to which it alludes, which somehow relates to the way 
Viramontes presents Aztlán in her novel.  
In The Miraculous Day of Amalia Gómez (from now on Amalia Gómez) the reader 
learns that, during one of her many walks with her growing-up son, Amalia has started to elude 
a mural that deeply disturbs her because of its content: “She avoided a mural that had startled 
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her recently: A tall, plumed Aztec held a bleeding, dying city boy in his arms. Amalia had 
clutched Manny’s hand” (56). This mural is mentioned in passing and could easily fall into 
oblivion, in part caused by the main character’s rapid musings. Her constant turning back to all 
the events in her life that have driven her to where she now stands could make this scene appear 
as a dispensable triviality. Still, the message portrayed is powerful, and might help unravel the 
narrative’s ultimate critique. The dead city boy could very well represent all those Mexican-
American teenagers, dwelling in the poorest barrios, who end up killed by rival gangs or the 
police, youth seemingly unaware that, eventually, they are killing their own people for no 
reason other than allegiance to randomly-founded gangs, as Amalia cannot help but notice: “It 
was as if nothing but that existed… nothing but the knifing of a stranger nick-named Chuco, 
who had killed another stranger named Indio…Las gangas, las gangas malditas” (81). 
Viramontes seems to echo this preoccupation with the eventual murder of Nacho by Turtle’s 
gang, and the constant rivalry between the McBride Boys and the Lote M Boys which takes 
place on the streets. 
Interestingly, Amalia seems to completely forget about that mural until, years later, 
when passing again by that place she notices a graffiti painted on top of the image which states: 
“AZTLÁN ES UNA FÁBULA” (70).  Amalia remembers having heard the word Aztlán 
somewhere, finally acknowledging that it was mentioned by an old man who had talked to her 
about the Chicano movement and their crusade for social justice when he was young. 
Complaining about the indignity with which they were treated and the abuse they had to cope 
with during those turbulent years, the man sadly comments: “We rioted... But nothing’s 
changed” (46). The fact that Amalia vaguely remembers the word, not even being able to 
understand what it really stands for, reinforces the disappointed lamentation of her interlocutor, 
whom the reader knows nothing about, and becomes as invisible as the struggle he has come 
to embody. 
Aztlán is described by the old man as “our promised land of justice” (45), but because 
in the graffiti it is associated with a fable, John S. Christie (1998) understands this anecdote as 
evidential of the author’s scepticism regarding the connections of the Chicano community with 
an ideal indigenous past (109), showing that Aztlán is nothing but a chimera which proves 
useless in the violent, criminal and imbalanced world that conforms the day-to-day in Amalia 
and her family’s life (109). Christie exemplifies this uselessness in the words of Gloria’s 
boyfriend, Mick, when he blatantly blurts out to Amalia: “Where’s all that pride bullshit got 
you?... What are you? Just another fuckin’ Mexican maid” (Rechy 181). In Amalia Gómez 
Aztlán is a fable: it does not exist; but the reason why it is not real is because no one in Amalia’s 
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community is seriously fighting for it. If they really have primordial right upon the land in 
which they live, then, why are young gangs killing each other upon it? Why are undocumented 
workers deported without anyone taking any action? Rosario uselessly tries to make them see:  
Estúpidas! Don’t’ you care about what happened to Jorge just now? Don’t you care 
about the women who work next to you? –arrested and sent back without even their 
wages! For God’s sake, don’t you see your own sons shoved around by cops only 
because they’re Mexicans? Don’t you wonder why they join the terrible gangas, and 
take drogas?... And then they turn into killers of their own people!... Don’t you care? 
Don’t you see? (54). 
 
But none of them do; not even Amalia, who, perhaps driven by her desire to distance herself 
from the rest of the sewing sweatshop co-workers, and to look committed to the eyes of her 
admired friend Rosario, pretends to develop an activist conscience that she actually lacks. 
However, though it could seem that the message provided by Rechy is far from decolonial and 
strictly pessimistic, still another reading is possible.  
The original mural to which the book makes reference was painted in 1974 by Chicano 
artist Manuel Cruz in Ramona Gardens, and even though, as Catrióna Rueda Esquibel (2006) 
informs us, it was not named, it is commonly referred to as “Homeboy” because of the original 
motto appearing on top, which reads “to ace out a homeboy from another barrio is to kill la 
Raza” (50).  
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The image depicted constitutes a revision of the warrior Popocatépetl and the princess 
Iztaccíhuatl,133 where the latter has been substituted in the composition by a young, dead 
Chicano with blood emerging from his chest. According to Rueda, the presence of Popo serves 
as a critique to all those gangs who see themselves as warriors. By juxtaposing the image of 
the great Aztec warrior with what appears to be a victim of gang violence, the muralist seems 
to be pointing out at how violence is ultimately effected by Chicanos against members of their 
own community. Rueda concludes: “rather than continue the tradition of the Aztec warrior, 
they are in fact exterminating him” (50).  
Rechy, however, decided to include a different caption, made with a red-paint graffiti, 
which states “Aztlán is a fable.” One of the definitions of ‘fable’ provided by the Merriam-
Webster English Dictionary defines it as “a story or statement that is not true” (merriam-
webster.com), so we could interpret the motto as a vindication of Aztlán as a fallacy, or a lie. 
Bridget Kevane (2008), on the other hand, gives a different insight concerning the implications 
that the world ‘fable’ might have in the story. Kevane notices that the community described in 
Rechy’s story is one marked by passivity, self-centred in their distress and lamentations, while 
at the same time waiting for a heavenly miracle to happen and settle their grievances, without 
really engaging in an active attitude aimed at changing the status quo of their society (13). 
Hence, fable could be associated with naïve conviction, rather than with fallacy. In addition, 
the impassiveness effected by the notion of fables has its echoes in the social sphere too. As 
previously stated, Aztlán is not only significant as a symbol of land expropriation and the  
Chicana/o’s currently subjugated status in a neo-colonial land –that of the Southwest-, but also 
as a symbol of Chicano identity constructed through and by space. The mural Rechy uses as 
background for his graffiti message is one that alludes to their indigenous roots, embodied in 
the figure of mythical Aztec warrior Popocatépetl. Yet, the replacement of the figure of the 
Aztec princess Iztaccíhuatl by that of the young dead man highlights that the annihilation of 
the movement (manifested in the violence exerted against the community), the one that Rechy 
could be complaining about, is not only coming from United States police forces and 
institutions, but on the contrary, it derives from gang violence, effected by Chicanos against 
                                                          
133 Popocatépetl and Iztaccíhuatl (Popo and Ixta) are the names given to two volcanoes from the Valley of Mexico. The legend 
tells that Popo was a brave warrior to whom the hand of princess Iztaccíhuatl was promised if he returned victorious from the 
battle. However, knowing that survival was impossible, and refusing to marry anyone else, the princess ended up committing 
suicide. Upon his return, Popo took the corpse of his beloved to the top of a mountain thinking that this could bring her back 
to life. Instead, he froze in the process, and the bodies of both lovers were transformed into mountains. There are a lot of 
popular representations of this legend which normally depict a beautiful woman dressed in white lying in the arms of an Aztec 
warrior (Sherman 365-366).  
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their own Raza. In that sense, Aztlán is a fable because it cannot endure in a community who 
is destroying itself.  
Similarly, in terms of time and symbolic struggle, Aztlán acquires a reinvigorated 
meaning when understood as the utopic future for a community which, personified in the 
character of Amalia, seems to have forgotten its utopic possibilities of decolonial struggle and 
positive self-identity formation. As Avery F. Gordon (1997) states: “we need to imagine living 
elsewhere before we can live there” (5), or, namely, in order to talk of about Aztlán (which 
symbolically stands for a Chicano’s territorial utopia) as a possibility, it is essential first to 
envision it. The mural strengthens the necessity to remember the past, so as to prevent it from 
turning into a fable. The problem is that many inhabitants have already forgotten what Aztlán 
stands for, and thus the need to remember it becomes urgent. Not only does Amalia not 
recognize Popo in the image but, as previously stated, she also ignores what Aztlán is when 
she reads the graffiti: a word which she is aware of having heard somewhere, in the past, but 
does no longer recall. The problem, then, is that in the barrio that Rechy portrays in his novel, 
fable has substituted memory, subsequently eliminating any possibility for effective action. 
Conversely, the notion of “fable” can only be resisted with the recovery of memory of what 
Aztlán meant when first enunciated, and how it must be actively pursued, instead of passively 
awaiting its coming. Aztlán es una fábula because it is impossible to claim primordial right 
upon the land and pride in indigenous heritage when the Raza are killing each other for reasons 
of territorial gang rivalry upon the barrio. 
Though The Miraculous Day of Amalia Gómez and Their Dogs Came with Them are 
two rather different novels, still some similarities can be drawn between them. In Their Dogs, 
the rage and frustration derived from dislocation and exclusion are ultimately released through 
acts of extreme aggression and violence effected against members of the same community who, 
eventually, feel as displaced and lost as those who attack them. Gang rivalry is, perhaps, the 
clearest example, especially with Turtle’s meaningless killing of Nacho, whom she did not 
even know, and who is murdered in the end because of Ermila’s boyfriend jealousy. In Amalia 
Gómez Aztlán cannot endure in a community in which Mexican-Americans fight against each 
other rather than unite against the ostracism derived from globalization and capitalism. In the 
same way, Aztlán cannot endure in a barrio like the one depicted by Viramontes, in which 
individuals seem not to be able to get over the displacement produced by the roadblock 
construction and the ravaging of their neighbourhood, and must numbly find shelter in faith, 
for credence seems the only possible alternative. However, this blind faith in God, as well as 
naïve hopes in a utopic future envisioned through Aztlán, will not bring the justice so 
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desperately needed in a place marked by exclusion and disempowerment. Faith alone does not 
save Amalia from having to confront the mistakes made throughout her life, and faith alone 
does not provide Tranquilina with the answer she is so desperately seeking for to understand 
the senseless suffering she witnesses around her. Faith does not offer reassurance, unless this 
faith is oriented towards action.  
Bridget Kevane (2008) compares this disenchantment regarding what Aztlán represents 
and the potentiality of religious beliefs in Rechy’s novel as well as in Their Dogs, particularly 
through Tranquilina’s own reflections on faith and political action. Thus, at the beginning of 
the story, the character is said to be undergoing a religious vocational crisis, which Kevane 
summarizes by stating: “there is a palpable disengagement toward God, most clearly 
exemplified in Tranquilina, because of the hopeless surroundings in which the community finds 
itself and her own experiences” (29). However, even though she is going through a period of 
spiritual uncertainty, and though her beliefs seem to be constantly threatened by an 
overwhelming reality, still Aztlán and the Aztec elements which appear sprinkled throughout 
the novel usually function as the haven of rest for the Chicano inhabitants in opposition to what 
they conceive as tyrannical control exerted by the United States.  
Tranquilina is raised in the belief that she comes from a lineage of ‘voladores,’ just like 
her father is claimed to be: “Since the first sun, she [Mama] told Tranquilina, the Azteca priests 
singled out men like her father to be voladores. Strong but balsa-wood light, the chosen men 
held hefty faith in the wind to cradle their bodies on the breath of its sighs” (44). Even if she 
seems to deny the alleged Aztec roots her mother is constantly reminding her of, the girl has 
listened once and again to the story about how her parents fell in love and how they managed 
to escape from the ranch where they were being exploited thanks to her mother’s faith in God, 
and his father’s ability to fly, or in other words, thanks to his connection to an Aztec past: 
“since the first sun…the Azteca priest singled out men like her father to be voladores” (44). 
Thus, these Aztec roots appear as a shelter and a liberation from the oppression practiced 
against the Chicano population, if only because her father uses them for action: his faith is not 
blind, his faith gives him the push necessary to escape; his faith helps him levitate. Tranquilina 
will experience this right at the end of the novel, when an act of despair will bring her back to 
the only refuge possible: levitation, just like her father did when all hope was lost. Surrounded 
by the police, who start firing their rifles uncontrollably, Tranquilina spreads her arms like 
wings waiting for the thrust necessary to flee from the turbulent situation in which she is caged: 
“Tranquilina raised her chin higher, as Mama had told her time and again, to fill up with the 
embrace of ancestral spirits” (325). It is a moment of pride, reflected in the confidence and 
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even defiance expressed through her body language, but it is also a regression to what her 
mother has taught her, to her presumed Aztec origins and her ancestral culture. Tranquilina 
recovers her lost faith, and her beliefs give her the agency needed to fly away: “Two inches, 
four, six, eight, riding the currents of the wilding wind. Riding it beyond the borders, past the 
cesarean scars of the earth, out to limitless space where everything was possible if she believed” 
(325). It is true that Viramontes leaves open the possibility that Tranquilina is shot killed by 
the authorities: what is described as propulsion could very well be the relief felt by someone 
who is dying. The reader, just as Tranquilina, is invited to believe that she is a voladora, 
because only the stories her mama has told her during her childhood can liberate her from the 
ugly reality she is facing. Paradoxically, faith –as opposed to rationality, is the only thing that 
will set her free. However, as Kevane emphasizes, faith does not constrain characters to a 
passive role, patiently waiting for the situation to change. Instead, it helps them find the courage 
necessary to act: “the community still needs to find its strength in a viable faith” (23). But, in 
order to be viable, this faith needs to be freed from the canonical doctrines established by the 
Church, exemplified by Tranquilina’s mother blind faith in miracles and her fanatical praying, 
which has no more effect than a placebo for its practitioners: “Tranquilina knew right then that 
their ministry was no better than another bottle of Thunderbird wine, a quick fix of heroin, 
another prescription drug for temporal relief” (97). In order for faith to be useful for the 
community, religion must also be decolonized from its constraining and dogmatic precepts, 
which restrict believers to the role of victims, patiently waiting for a miracle, a salvation 
coming from above. Through the figure of Tranquilina, Viramontes might be encouraging a 
decolonization of religion aimed at conducting this faith towards resistance, rather than stoic 
endurance. Decolonizaton which this character exemplifies at the end of the novel, and which 
had only been possible thanks to Tranquilina’s emotional and spiritual dislocation.  
Mitchum Huehls (2012) also sees the political implications underlying the ideologies 
expressed in spatial terms, and uses the examples of Tranquilina’s faith, and that of Chavela’s 
idea of stability attached to spatial property (in the shape of Aztlán), to highlight their political 
significance:  
Mama’s faith, Chavela’s “tierra firme,” and Tranquilina’s earth resonate not only 
spiritually, but also politically. Deeply concerned with borders, boundaries, and the 
historical acts of dispossession they have enabled, a nationalistic brand of Chicano 
politics…also uses the earth to assert a historical continuity between past and present 
that supersedes the colonial and imperial privatization of space that has occurred in the 
interim. (Huels 163) 
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Huels claims that Viramontes compensates for “the loss of private property and the 
reorganization of spaces in a way that reinforces state control over marginalized populations” 
(160) with the utilization of some magical realism which is connected in the story with a 
supposed Aztec past. The end of Their Dogs, with Tranquilina’s magical levitation, exemplifies 
this leap of faith oriented towards political action in literature. Viramontes seems to be pointing 
out that believing is not enough, that expecting a miracle of salvation will not bring redemption 
of any kind, for it is the individual who must become that miracle, and thus faith needs to be 
oriented towards agency and political activism to change the status quo. In this way, 
Viramontes redefines Chicano identity by going back to its Aztec roots and showing the 
potentially liberating options derived from the decolonization of religion. 
So far, I have only focused on how displacement in the novel is displayed in physical 
and ideological terms. However, as previously said, these are not the only ways in which the 
characters’ dislocation is reflected in Their Dogs Came with Them. Displacement, in fact, can 
also be related to questions of gender. Turtle constantly tries to hid her female sex under a 
boy’s disguise with the aim of being accepted by one of the various male gangs populating the 
barrio, and most especially by her brother, who despises her because she is a girl: “Shut up, 
Luis snapped, because he had a girl for a brother and he profoundly resented it” (25). In her 
case, disguising like a boy answers to multiple survival strategies. First, it helps her cope with 
the violence effected against her in the home setting, and thus avoid her mother’s constant 
attacks and beatings: “Luis Lil Lizard challenged Amá…Luis took a pair of manicure scissors 
and sat Turtle down on the toilet seat and cut Turtle’s hair, asking, What she gonna grab now?” 
(25). Secondly, as T. Jackie Cuevas (2014) has noted, it also helps her move through the streets 
and manage herself “in a neighbo[u]rhood where might makes right” (Viramontes 20). Turtle 
comes to depict “one of the ways Viramontes dismantles borders…by including queerly 
gendered characters” (Cuevas 111). That is, Turtle is placed at the borderlands of gender, 
rejecting and queering her sex, but incapable of completely getting rid of her female nature, as 
she is constantly reminded she is a woman by the rest of the characters. Her brother, for 
instance, deeply resents her: “[Luis Lil Lizard] had forgotten he had a pussy for a 
brother…Turtle was someone he hoped never to become” (Viramontes 230-231); and her 
family criticizes her for her manliness. The situation is worsened when the girl is sexually 
molested by a storekeeper, who fondles her when discovering she is not a boy: 
At first he believed what he felt on her chest were not breasts but stolen apples, hard 
and concealed, and he clamped his big man fingers on her flesh under her loose T-shirt 
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to make sure. This boy had tits, this boy was really a braless girl with growing, firm 
chi-chis, her big brown nipples just there, under the shirt for him to pin in utter disbelief. 
Then he did it again. (24) 
 
Sickened by what she is and aggravated by what she wants to be but never will, Turtle’s 
displacement is better understood in psychological and emotional terms. Turtle is at the 
borderlands of gender: her dysphoria is the result of someone who is reluctant to comply with 
the generic conventions and dispossession associated to her female body, which adds to her 
existing physical dispossession, as she is homeless.  
The instances of displacement that the characters suffer (be it emotional, physical, or 
psychological) might in fact be a projection of a common feeling among Chicano inhabitants 
concerning their state of isolation and rejection from the rest of the economically more 
favoured city of Los Angeles. Historian Kevin Starr (1997) states that: “Los Angeles, after all, 
had been seized from Mexico in 1846; and the sense of displacement felt by the evicted families 
remains an element in the Mexican imagination as it contemplates the lost Mexico north of the 
Rio Grande” (para. 6). In the novel, this displacement finds its most sublime means of 
expression in the planning of a freeway construction which necessarily requires the destruction 
of some housing units and of homes and that, once the urban project is suspended, stands half 
ruined. The derelict roadblock seems to constantly remind the citizens of the house removal, 
but, what is worse, its state of incompletion serves to highlight that their unwilling eviction has 
been effected for nothing.  
Timothy Oakes (1997) has recently indicated that: “the concept of place has been… 
invigorated theoretically by proponents of a new cultural geography who have found in place 
a dynamic tool for asserting geography’s importance in the expanding interdisciplinary field of 
cultural studies (509). However, spatial analysis in Their Dogs has another, complementary 
function: the effects of space on the characters and their identity formation also provides them 
with an arena in which to deconstruct patterns of temporal, ideological and gender colonization 
enclosed and reinforced in that space, a space which becomes the showground for Viramontes’ 
critique. Hence, Alicia Muñoz (2013) claims that the characters in Their Dogs, though shaped 
by this same geographical space, make use of topography for further development of a 
decolonized racial and class-related identity. Thus, decolonization is also possible, 
paradoxically, through the effects of displacement that come with the destruction of their 
homes, and the subsequent disengagement from all the values connected to them:  
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The novel presents multiple experiences of the city, which reveal not only the way the 
geography impacts the community it contains but also ways the Latino community can 
resist the erasive consequences of race and class by forming independent spatial 
meaning. (Muñoz 24) 
 
In his 2013 work Spatiality Robert Tally, Jr. claims that “the map is the most powerful 
and effective means humans have to make sense of their place in the world” (2). If human 
beings resort to maps in order to make sense out of the reality of their environment, then it 
follows that, in Viramontes’ work, settled in the surroundings of a half-built, now abandoned 
freeway system that stands in ruins on a disjointed territory where the Chicano barrio was 
originally situated, displacement is the only thing which can follow. Not only that, subject to a 
permanent state of geographical dispossession and territorial disassembling, one finds that the 
characters must necessarily feel dislocated and unable to develop any sense of place, because 
the territory they inhabit is unmappable. However, far from simply regretting this unsettling 
situation, Viramontes uses it not only to de-territorialise the physical space the characters 
occupy but also to unsettle the questionable customs and traditions in which Chicanismo has 
been shaped, and reorder both a segmented space and the intricate perceptions of societal roles 
that have been set up in that space. Perhaps the most straightforward example of this is provided 
through Turtle. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in their work A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1980) develop the concept of ‘nomads’, whom Tally, Jr. describes as “forces 
of deterritorialisation, unsettling to a greater or lesser extent the metric ordering of space that 
is subject to the power of the state” (136). Serazer Pekerman (2012) analyses Deleuze and 
Guattari’s idealisation of the figure of nomads, and explains that, due to their refusal to settle 
and their ability to adapt to nature despite its severe conditions, they remain in  constant 
mobility inside the state apparatus, but also apart from it (122). Deleuze and Guattari see in 
nomads the embodiment of de-territorialisation at its best, but conclude that they exemplify the 
perfect warrior against “all kinds of oppression applied by any majority and any authoritarian 
discourse” (122). As Pekerman states: “the nomad de-territorialises existing systems of 
oppression in order to prove that there might be alternatives to them” (122). Up to some point, 
the nomad could be considered as yet another upgrading of the figure of the “flâneur,” (stroller, 
loafer), which Teresa Arozena Bonnet (2009) describes as a moving observant immersed in an 
also moving and constantly changing reality (117). First appearing during the first half of the 
19th century, and theorised mainly by Charles Baudelaire in his 1863 “The Painter of Modern 
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Life,” the figure of the flâneur was rediscovered by Walter Benjamin, whose work was 
published posthumously under the title “The Flâneur” in 1967. As opposed to the idea of the 
idle wanderer that the term originally alluded to, Benjamin saw in the flâneur the witness of 
the unreliability of façades, the ultimate exposer of a hidden (and often dark and ambiguous) 
reality (Bonnet 173). As can be seen in Viramontes’ novel, Turtle functions as a literal and 
symbolic nomad, someone who, through her wandering on the streets, exemplifies the psycho-
spatial de-contextualization of her barrio. Turtle does not own a physical house, for the shack 
she inhabits at the beginning of the story is eventually demolished; and her itinerancy through 
the streets could very well denote the isolation and sense of loss experienced by those Chicanos 
who feel they do not belong in the geo-social space they live in. Besides, Turtle also lacks in 
an emotional ‘home,’ for her family rejects her and, after her brother enlists in the army, she 
ends up abandoning them. However, though it could be claimed that she is subject to spatial 
unrest, precisely because she lacks in these spatial and familial identity markers (that for her 
and her individual self-assertion result constricting and oppressive) she also lacks in the 
patterns of behaviour and gender roles which are traditionally framed spatially and 
ideologically in this idea of ‘home’ and ‘family,’ and with which she would have had to comply 
otherwise. 
On the other hand, through her cross-dressing Turtle also becomes a gender nomad who 
occupies the liminal space not only between sexes, but also between gender expectations 
attached to them, as she refuses to stay at home and do the household chores to join a strictly 
male gang and carry out a lifestyle traditionally associated to men. For instance, during a family 
visit her aunt, ironically called Mercy, despises the girl’s physical appearance, accusing her of 
being a malflora, a lesbian (167-168), but nothing in the novel could positively drive the reader 
to this conclusion. If Turtle is a homosexual, that is a part of her personality we are not allowed 
into, for throughout the novel she simply does not seem to be interested in sex, either with men 
and/or women. Still, what is more important is that her obsession with disguising as a boy could 
also be understood, not as a survival strategy, as she concedes: “Turtle recognized… the 
practice of coming out of your body, so that the pain wasn’t yours, that’s how you outlast them 
all” (234), but as an act of rebellion: the rebellion of a woman who rejects the social parameters 
ascribed to her sex, and occupies a sphere to which, in theory, she should have no access. It is 
true that the consequences are disheartening, for they lead to her death, but at least she has had 
the chance to break with traditions and conventions in order to fight for the place in society she 
wants for herself. Viramontes seems to claim that displacement can also mean ‘creation’, since 
it offers the opportunity to deconstruct and re-map the frontiers of both cultural and territorial 
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conventions. It is then obvious that Turtle is the best placed character to unbalance the 
parameters of traditional sexual and gender roles. There is also redemption for her as there is 
for Tranquilina, who rejects the limits of plausibility to connect with her Indian heritage in an 
act of resistance. Therefore, for some characters, redemption has to do with using faith actively 
to connect with their roots; whereas for others, it comes with a physical and emotional de-
territorialisation understood in sexual/gender terms. Whatever the case, this redemptive 
rebelliousness opens prospects for decolonizing cultural and ideological patterns firmly 
embedded in the imaginary. 
As explained in chapter 2, third world feminism appeared in the United States as a 
response to white, middle-class feminist movements that ignored the concrete struggles carried 
out by low-class, coloured women who could not extricate their race and their class from their 
gender. Anna M. Sandoval (2000) claimed that Viramontes, as a third-world feminist, has a 
strong political commitment towards women’s life and struggle against exploitative and 
patriarchal structures and systems, and thus in her works she depicts women’s daily resistance, 
and “recognizes the common experience with colonization and struggles against patriarchy that 
her characters share” (79). However, in this case the struggles of third world women, coloured 
and underprivileged, that Viramontes captures in this novel encapsulate another major problem 
related to neo-colonization, and the fight against patriarchy echoes the fight against a capitalist 
and oppressive empire. Viramontes denounces the situation of displacement suffered by 
women inside their homes and barrios to allude to the state of isolation and poverty the Chicano 
population is forced to live because of some United States policies and urban projects that 
disregard them. Nonetheless, there is still room for hope. Redemption in Their Dogs Came with 
Them appears more as a potentiality than a reality, for there is still a long way to go; but while 
Ermila and Turtle decide to rebel against imposed norms, Tranquilina has faith, and so seems 
to have Viramontes. 
As stated at the beginning of this analysis, the four main characters in Their Dogs Came 
with Them, namely, Ermila, Tranquilina, Turtle and Ana, function not only as the bodies 
through which to fight for female agency and the deconstruction of some restraining, 
patriarchal values which have been historically perpetuated. Because, as women, these 
characters acquire a subaltern position in society an in this story, their subjugation can also 
serve to depict the subjugated position that the Chicano community occupies in the 
Southern/Southwestern territories of the United States This metaphor is portrayed by 
Viramontes through a comparison with the Spanish conquest of the indigenous tribes existing 
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in America in the 16th century. Hence, a presentist connection is established, and with it 
Viramontes alludes to instances of current neo-colonization in the United States.  
In addition, in Viramontes’ work, patterns of suppression experienced by a whole 
community are symbolized in female characters through the spatial setting of the novel, 
namely, a Latino barrio being ravaged to leave space for roadblock construction. However, it 
is possible to see a redefinition of geographical notions concerning Chicano territorial ideology 
and sense of (non)belonging, which in the novel ultimately lead to the deconstruction of a 
suppressive and constraining imaginary, be it ideological, religious, or geographical, thereby 
engaging in a project of decolonization aimed at the recovery of a denied agency and the 
creation of new, decolonized spaces.  
Thus, through the overwhelming presence of the figure of the Conquistador and his 
dogs, and through the emphasis on a disintegrated identity and neocolonialism derived from 
the re-shaping of the freeway system, it could be suggested that Viramontes makes use of 
temporal presentism sustained by a geographical background in order to achieve a kind of 
ideological decolonization that is eventually portrayed in spatial terms. Hence, the novel 
exemplifies a decolonization of space and of the values enclosed by it, and, in order to do that, 
a presentist revision of the Spanish conquest is made to make the reader aware of the still 
tangible presence of (neo) colonization. This novel could exemplify, consequently, the 
potential qualities that presentism may hold as a tool for the decolonization of the imaginary. 
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From all the plays included in the Shakespearean canon, Romeo and Juliet undoubtedly 
occupies a significant place. From Prokofiev’s ballet adaptation (which includes a happy 
ending for the lovers and rather experimental music134), to its multiple film versions (George 
Cukor in 1936, Franco Zeffirelli in 1968, or Alvin Rakoff in 1976, to give a few examples), 
the inspiration provided by this tragedy seems to be endless, although the degree of fidelity to 
the original text varies. In 1996, for instance, Baz Luhrmann adapted Romeo and Juliet to the 
screen by portraying the characters and their conflicts in present-day terms, the result being a 
quite flamboyant vision of the traditional story of the two lovers. In Romeo + Juliet armours 
are substituted by party dresses, swords are upgraded to guns with the family name engraved 
on the barrel, and long-time rivalling families become street gangs on the tropical setting of 
Miami-like “Verona Beach,” whose name reminds suspiciously of Los Angeles’ Venice Beach. 
Interestingly, despite the liberties taken concerning props, setting, costumes and 
staging, the dialogue in verses remains relatively loyal to the one found in the original 
Elizabethan play, thus imbibing from the original source but remaining in every other aspect 
radically different. The film is thereby encrusted in a kind of a-temporal (or dis-temporal) loop, 
where characters express themselves in a strikingly archaic fashion, but still are depicted in a 
coetaneous style, which makes the audience both feel identified and drastically far from the 
people appearing on screen. Yet, precisely because the original verses are retained, some 
anachronisms take place without anyone noticing them.  
When the film starts, the Montague street crew, dressed in Hawaiian shirts and 
carelessly driving a car among the ramified road network, coincidentally encounters the 
Capulet boys at a gas station, where their squabble begins. After an interchange of grimaces, 
Sampson scornfully bites his thumb at Abra, who, infuriated by the gesture, starts a road chase. 
Something similar happens in Shakespeare’s play, where the servants of both the Montague 
and Capulet households start a fight. In Shakespeare’s times, however, biting one’s thumb at 
someone was a well-known gesture used to insult people (Collett 378-379), which perhaps in 
current day terms could be comparable to showing the middle finger, or giving the V sign. 
When the Elizabethan audience witnessed this scene, they would immediately understand the 
affront signified by that gesture, whereas nowadays the meaning attached to it is now 
practically lost. Thus, when 1996’s Sampson bites his finger at Abra, the only signifier serving 
as a clue as to what is really going on between the characters is Abra’s offended reaction, which 
                                                          
134 Its syncopated rhythms and its apparently uncommon orchestration made the dancers complain that it was “undanceable” 
(Bennett 320). 
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helps the viewer understand he has been bitterly disrespected. Hence, because the audience can 
only reach this conclusion through the context surrounding the dialogues, it could be said that 
the thumb-biting moment remains highly anachronistic in an otherwise strongly presentist 
updating of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet tragedy. The attentive observer might have also 
realized that the characters use the word swords when referring to their weapons, as guns did 
not exist when the play was written; but to avoid antonomasia (that is, using a proper name to 
refer to a general idea), the guns used in the film are amusingly branded “Swords.” 
Because of its histrionic tone and its kaleidoscopic imagery, Luhrmann’s Romeo + 
Juliet did not go without some negative reviews, such as that of Roger Ebert, who claimed: 
“I've seen Shakespeare done in drag. I've seen Richard III as a Nazi…I've seen Prince Hal and 
Falstaff as homosexuals in Portland… but I have never seen anything remotely approaching 
the mess that the new punk version of ‘Romeo & Juliet’ makes of Shakespeare's tragedy” 
(rogerebert.com). Still, the film had an overall positive reception, with $147.5 million raised in 
box office (over its initial budget of $14.5 million) and a decent pass grade on FilmAffinity of 
6.3, which shows that, despite its shocking style and its anachronistic atmosphere, the film was 
generally liked by the public.  
Conceivably, underlying some of the critics’ dissatisfaction towards Luhrmann’s 
flamboyant experiment there might lie a profound annoyance at the director’s demystifying 
updating of a canonical play such as that of Romeo and Juliet: “Baz Luhrmann’s 1997 
adaptation, Romeo + Juliet, is not for those purists who regard any tampering with the text or 
updating of the setting as a gimmicky attempt to reach a young mass audience by using instant 
pop culture” (Morris 10). Seen under the severe light of a more traditionalist perspective, the 
film can evidently appear disrespectful in its bizarreness. Yet, a more compassionate view can 
attest that, by democratizing the play (by which I mean presenting it under a more popular 
standpoint, far from an atmosphere and a setting completely disengaged from our period and 
our understanding of the world) Romeo + Juliet prompts yet another rereading more 
concomitant with the idiosyncrasies proper of the times we are now living. The core of the 
problem regarding how Luhrmann’s film has been reviewed by more traditional critics might 
be connected to the sternness of their preconceived expectations when first encountering 
Luhrmann’s Romeo + Juliet, rather than with the film itself, which leads to its rejection without 
considering the popularity that Shakespeare’s play did actually regained for some time after 
[269] 
 
the film was released.135 Carrying this example to the grounds of literary interpretation, the 
purpose of this dissertation has been to consider presentism under a more merciful prism, 
seeing what can be gained from its insertion in literature, rather than condemning it on accounts 
of the historical aberrations it is accused of bringing. In other words, my aim has been more 
descriptive than critical, analysing the effects of presentism in some works, or how it can be 
used by the author, rather than focusing on the supposed damage it may cause to other 
disciplines in Humanities.  
Because of the polysemy of the word and the different fields where it appears I have 
tried to consistently stick to presentism understood in literary terms. If the reader remembers, 
the term presentism has been in circulation for almost a century now, though it appeared first 
in the fields of philosophy and history with dissimilar although not completely separate 
meanings, as all are interrelated by temporal notions transmitted by the signified. Philosophical 
presentism is a branch of theory which holds that neither the past nor the future exist (Balashov 
16), for only the present time is real. At the other end of the spectrum of philosophical 
presentism there is eternalism, which defends that all points in time (past, present, future) are 
equally real and extant, which entails that the past is not over and the future is already there 
(Balashov 16). Eternalism is supported by the special theory of relativity has shown that the 
idea of simultaneity is not universal, as each observant has its own temporal frame of reference 
(Dunningham and Vedral 140). Conversely, in the field of history presentism has often been 
used to refer to those instances of anachronism in which the past gets contaminated by the 
present: “A presentism that simply imports contemporary modes of understanding and frames 
of reference to the past produces anachronistic interpretations of history” (Villaverde et al. 
326). 
In opposition to those two previous instances, the notion of presentism appearing 
throughout these pages has been confined to the realm of literature and literary theory. The 
presentism analysed in this dissertation thus refers to the one appearing in the late 1990’s and 
beginning of the 2000’s, thanks in part to Frankfurt scholars Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes.  
                                                          
135 It would be unfair, however, to praise Luhrmann as the only enhancer of this apparent Shakespeare’s revival. During the 
1990’s and early 2000’s Kenneth Branagh, for instance, released a series of film adaptations of Shakespeare’s texts, beginning 
with Henry V in 1989 and ending with As You Like It in 2006. Combined with Luhrmann’s Romeo + Juliet, perhaps we could 
talk of a new generation of filmmakers interested in the Elizabethan playwright. For more information on this, see Coursen, 
Herbert R. Shakespeare: The Two Traditions. Associated UP, 1999; Crowl Samuel. Shakespeare at the Cineplex: The Kenneth 
Branagh Era. Ohio UP, 2003; Croteau, Melissa, and Carolyn Jess-Cooke, editors. Apocalyptic Shakespeare: Essays on Visions 
of Chaos and Revelation in Recent Film Adaptations. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009; or Bloom, Harold. 
William Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Bloom’s Literary Criticism, 2010.  
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This kind of presentism is defined as the analysis of past literary works with a present-day 
mindset or, as Barrett Watten (2011) puts it: “the interpretive practice in which object and 
interpreter are not historically framed” (125). Presentism has also been considered a result of 
postmodern views on temporal notions: “In terms of the postmodern critique, the present 
becomes co-extensive with the past and with the future. There is therefore no past but simply 
a present past, a present future, and a present present” (Henrietta Moore 53); and, as also seen 
in this dissertation, to postmodern ideas of situatedness, fragmentation of the subject and the 
consequent appearance of cognitive mapping. Yet, my view of presentism notably differs from 
more canonical assessments, going in line with theoreticians like Cary DiPietro, who has 
started in the last decade to glimpse a different scope of action of presentism, more related to 
notions of reception theory and aestheticism. 
Emerging in the context of cultural materialism, presentism has often been related to 
new historicism, though normally placed in direct opposition, where presentism is usually 
introduced as an alternative movement, as Neema Parvini, quoting Ewan Fernie, claims: 
“Presentism posits a completely different orientation, which exists ‘to challenge the dominant 
fashion of reading Shakespeare historically’” (139). This association can be easily explained, 
as new historicism and cultural materialism share some common ground and sources such as 
(post)structuralist thinkers Foucault and Althusser. However, there are some outstanding 
variances between new historicism and presentism’s assumptions and goals which might be 
worth considering, and which I have tried to address in this dissertation: 
A-New historicism, as well as cultural materialism, often focus on the socio-historical 
context surrounding a given work at the time of its creation. Emphasis is thus put on the author 
and the framework; whereas presentism is only interested in the text reception in the present, 
shifting the focus to the context of the reader. Even then, what matters for presentism is not the 
circumstances motivating the reader’s interests or anxieties, but, rather, the interpretation made 
by this reader, given his/her interests and anxieties. That is, rather than studying the political, 
cultural and geographical circumstances that make the reader favour one interpretation over 
another, presentism sets its goals in the text’s reception per se. Coming back to Baz 
Luhrmann’s interpretation in Romeo + Juliet, what matters may be not why he has chosen to 
depict the Capulets as obviously Latino machos, with massive sideburns, leather jackets and 
metal-heeled shoes. What is interesting are the ideas and themes his presentist reading of 
Romeo and Juliet brings to our cultural understanding of the classical play, and how 
Luhrmann’s work is received by the audience. Perhaps the hatred between Capulets and 
Montagues, obsolete and idealised as it is, is better understood in the violent present-day terms 
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of racially diverse rival gangs in the context of a highly criminalised and drug-driven city such 
as Miami.    
B-Presentism is (or should be) overtly subjective and anachronistic. But, in contrast to 
new historicism and cultural materialism, anachronism is not an impediment for a good 
presentist analysis. Quite the opposite: anachronism serves a purpose, because it points out at 
notions that might have passed unnoticed in the past, but that, in our current times, they 
constitute a concern worth considering. Perhaps a good example of this anachronistic re-
evaluation of the past can be given by the reconsideration of hysteria made by feminist studies 
during the Second Wave of feminism in the late 20th century, which, according to Cecily 
Cevereux (2014) “brings into relief a body of writing and a feminist politics whose engagement 
with hysteria is indexical of social and cultural conditions experienced by women at the 
moment this writing flourished” (23). That is, the redefinition of the clinical disorder known 
as hysteria, which in 1980 began being considered a conversion disorder136 (Cevereux 20) also 
resulted in its redefinition in terms of patriarchal oppression by the feminist academic corpus, 
where works like Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic: The 
Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (1979), or Elaine Showalter’s 
The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830-1980 (1985) began to 
flourish (Devereux 32). Through these texts, an anachronistic adjustment in the study of 
traditionally-deemed hysteric figures in literature (such as Mr. Rochester’s first wife in 
Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre (1847), or Ophelia in Shakespeare’s Hamlet) gained prominence 
in the field. It might not be too bold to claim, then, that presentism anachronism might have 
influenced its positive reception by scholars from feminist theory and queer studies: “Feminist 
and gender studies also have clear [p]resentist principles -both of these critical methods make 
use of contemporary theory and sensibility ot re-illumine the works and cultural assumptions 
about sexuality and gender of the past” (Grady, Shakespeare and Impure Aesthetics 238). Yet, 
due precisely to presentism biased and anachronistic characteristics, and its emphasis on the 
reader’s understanding, rather than on the text itself, presentism should disengage completely 
from other fields in which objectivity (or the quest for it) constitutes a mandatory premise, and 
might be better associated with theories of reception and a material aestheticism, rather than 
with new historicist and cultural materialist views that tend to focus more on notions of 
objectivity and distancing from the past.  
                                                          
136 The conversion disorder is defined in the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5) by Donald W. Black and Jon E. Grant (2014) as “one or more symptoms of altered voluntary motor or sensory function” 
(208) which cannot be explained by any physical illness and must therefore be associated with psychological factors” (209). 
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As seen in both cases studies provided, Gaspar de Alba’s Sor Juana’s Second Dream 
and Viramontes’s Their Dogs Came with Them, presentism is not exempt of ideology, be it that 
of the author engaging in a presentist reconsideration of a classic text, or the reader compelled 
by a presentist interpretation of a canonical work. Most of the times, as Gregory Tomso claims, 
presentism can be and is used for political purposes. Thus, Gaspar de Alba’s presentist 
depiction of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz aims, for instance, at disembodying the scholar’s mytho-
historical figure from the allegedly patriarchal and heteronormative imaginary in which de la 
Cruz has traditionally been immersed by presenting her in lesbian, proto-feminist, and proto-
Chicana terms. Conversely, Viramontes denounces the havoc wreaked by a neo-colonial 
economic empire over the more disenfranchised segments of society through a presentist 
parallelism established (temporally and spatially) between a third wave capitalist Los Angeles 
in the 1960’s and 1970’s and the Spanish Conquest of Mexico during the 16th century.  Because 
of presentism’s clear ideological charge shown in these two examples, I have tried to prove 
through both studies that presentism might be better defined according to theories of reception 
and material aestheticism, with which it shares some worth considerable similarities. 
In this dissertation, I have also tried to emphasize that presentism should be seen as a 
tool for literary analysis, and not as a school, least of all a movement. Advocating that 
presentism is a school for literary criticism would entail that presentism is valid for any kind 
of work and/or any kind of period and culture, which is not the case. On top of that, conceiving 
presentism as a movement might also give the idea that all literary artefacts can be analysed 
through the lens of the present, thus elevating the present time to a privileged status which it 
should not have. One thing is to be unable to completely extricate ourselves from our present 
understanding of the world, and a very different one, to venerate this impossibility.   
Instead, presentism might be better seen as a tool for literary analysis, in the line of 
other instruments like close reading (with which, as previously seen, presentism keeps some 
commonalities, at least when going back to how close reading was when first conceived by I. 
A. Richards). Because it is a tool, the scope of presentism is limited, nor should it be seen as 
the ultimate strategy to overcome the limitations and flaws presented by all other tools available 
in the field of theory. That idealistic and naïve vision of presentism would overlook its own 
limitations, as well as obviate the benefits that other techniques, such as the above-mentioned 
close reading, provide to the field of literary analysis.  
Another key idea stressed in this dissertation is that presentism should better be applied 
to literary works, despite how much these may share with historical portrayals of the past. As 
often repeated throughout these pages, presentism is not a new concept, but it has indeed 
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acquired prominence in the past decades, probably facilitated by postmodernist views on reality 
and the subject. In fact, I have suggested that it is precisely the fragmentation of the postmodern 
subject, and the disorientation and powerlessness caused by his/her temporal and spatial 
situatedness in the postmodern reality what may have caused the flourishing of presentism as 
a key instrument in what Jameson has called the cognitive mapping. However, the scope of 
presentism should be limited to the field of literature, regardless of the ideologies brought up 
to the arena of interpretation. In the case study of Helena María Viramontes, for instance, 
though at the background of the events taking place in the novel, historical colonization of 
Native American populations plays a significant role in the cultural and ideological imaginary 
of the characters, who remain colonized without their even noticing it, or at least consciously 
addressing it. Yet, this struggle against marginalization and racial segregation is addressed in 
symbolic terms, and though visibly displaying a current problematic derived from a historical 
reality, the work remains overall fictional. That is, though the situation of Mexican American 
citizens is powerfully denounced, no historical revisionism is intended. Had Viramontes’ work 
been a historical treatise, the consequences would had been radically different, and no one 
might have taken her text seriously, as the author, by transplanting the narratives of the Spanish 
Conquest into an impoverished barrio in East Los Angeles, embraces anachronism (purposely, 
I may add) as part of her metaphorical and symbolic analysis of neo-colonization. Therefore, 
whereas anachronisms become a piece of atrezzo in presentist works, which eventually aid in 
the message to transmit by (s)he who engages in a presentist practise, in the field of history 
anachronisms do not serve other purpose other than impede and invalidate theories, which 
proves the otherwise truism that anachronism in the field of history is highly damaging for the 
discipline. 
Because it is subjective, the use of presentism in the field of historical revisionism might 
be detrimental, for any revisionist claim would be automatically nullified on accounts of its 
bias and lack of detachment. This subjectivity, inextricable from presentism, is to be taken into 
account, precisely because, due to this inherent partiality, the application of presentism in the 
decolonization of the imaginary is only valid when this decolonization is effected in purely 
literary terms. Pérez’s project takes a step further, since she is a historian, and her goals are 
oriented towards a revision, not of the historical canon (for she is aware that this, too, is 
impregnated by the interests and transgressions of a ruling elite), but of the imaginary 
embedded and established by this historical canon, which perpetuates and validates patriarchal, 
homophobic and racist patterns of cultural behaviour. In this line, presentism in the field of 
decolonization does not necessarily aim at recovering elements of history long forgotten or 
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suppressed, but, rather, at denouncing this historical suppression of marginal voices. This goal, 
however, even if politically oriented, is not historical: it is artistic as it is social, and should 
therefore stick with the field of arts, where social and ideological change -yet not historical- 
can also be effected, and where, as I have tried to show, the fact that presentism is ultimately 
subjective and anachronistic does not invalidate its potential for decolonization.  
It must be stated, though, that I am perfectly aware that I might receive much criticism 
when addressing Gaspar de Alba’s Sor Juana’s Second Dream by saying that its goal is not 
revisionist, as the author has often declared she sees a lesbian in Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, and 
my interpretation in presentist terms might (mistakenly, in my humble opinion) be regarded as 
an invalidation of Gaspar de Alba’s ultimately purpose (since a literary instrument like 
presentism cannot aspire to historical validation). Up to this point, however, no historical 
unequivocal evidence has been found regarding Sor Juana’s real sexuality. That is the reason 
why I claim that Gaspar de Alba’s novel cannot be revisionist in a purely historical way, as all 
we have in her favour are decidedly plausible conjectures. What Sor Juana’s Second Dream 
does, however, is to decolonize the patriarchal sexual imaginary that has confined Sor Juana 
Inés de la Cruz’s sexuality to a strictly heterosexual view, all through a presentist portrayal of 
the nun. If the reader can imagine the Mexican poet as a lesbian, a door is open for more open-
minded visualization of de la Cruz, far from the standard interpretations of what the real Sor 
Juana might have actually been like, and her figure is recovered for feminist and homosexual 
interpretations. Yet, because this decolonization is effected in purely literary terms, I do not 
esteem it can be given historical value, notwithstanding that, between historical and literary 
value, none is better or more important that the other: they are simply different, as they belong 
to separate realms. The decolonization of a patriarchal imaginary, however, is still achieved, 
which I deem a significant achievement. 
Both cases studies provided in this dissertation have been oriented at showing how this 
process of decolonization is taking place in the artistic realm of fiction, and how literature 
serves as vehicle for the defeating of discriminatory patterns. More importantly, through both 
cases studies I have tried to show how presentism can be used, successfully, I believe, in this 
active process of decolonizing a supremacist imaginary. Nonetheless, this dissertation is not 
without some deficiencies, some of which I am perfectly aware and find thus obliged to 
address. For instance, some could (rightfully) argue that I have not stuck to a particular line of 
thought or theory, making my dissertation look like a crucible of philosophers, scholars and 
concepts which might make it look perhaps less solid or well-rounded. Throughout these pages, 
I have based my ideas in authors and ideas that sometimes contradict one another, mainly those 
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arisen in the field of poststructuralism (Michel Foucault), structuralist history (Althusser), 
postmodern history (Hayden White), the aesthetic views held by the Heideggerian/Frankfurt 
School (Hugh Grady), Chicana feminist theory (Pérez, Anzaldúa, Sandoval) and even theories 
of reception (I. A. Richards, Cary DiPietro). Personally, I consider it hardly impossible to 
completely adhere to just one author or a single discipline, since scholars tend to modify their 
own views during their life career, and even when belonging to the same school, some 
noteworthy differences on opinions can be perceived in different theoreticians. What I have 
tried to do, rather, is to look for those ideas that support my vision or provide me with an 
insightful notion for my defence of presentism, ignoring the fact that the authors of those ideas 
might have eventually changed their minds and started defending a complete opposite view, 
and disregarding also, the fact that sometimes I mention authors from differing, opposing 
schools. In other words, I have paid more attention to ideas, detached from those voices which 
first articulated them and the background in which they often arise, rather than on the 
consistency of these notions inside the paradigm to which they belong. The reason why I have 
done it is simple: ideas can be valuable even after their authors have dismissed them. If an idea 
is stimulating on its own, should it be rejected just because the one who first enunciated it has 
now changed his/her mind? If we were to stick to this premise works such as Anthony 
Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange (1962),137 Virgil’s Aeneid, which the poet apparently asked to 
burn (Otis 1), or thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, who at some point in his career rejected 
his previous works (Proops 382) would not even be read, which might have resulted into 
considerable losses. I believe ideas, if flawed, should be transformed or examined before being 
completely rejected, and that is exactly what I have done with the notion of presentism in this 
dissertation, and what I have done with the texts I have used to support my statements.  
It is also true that I sometimes rely on postmodernism (or some postmodern notions and 
tools) to defend the impossibility of reaching objective truths, and thus as an excuse for the 
validity of presentism. This might not be a problem in itself, but some could claim that I 
nonchalantly use postmodernism when it helps me support my views on the impossibility of 
grasping an unadulterated vision of the past, and then criticize these same postmodernist views 
by claiming that some limits must be set to its extremely relativistic positioning. The answer is 
partly founded in the fact that I use postmodern notions merely to explain the socio-cultural 
situation that might have caused the popularization of presentism in the past decades. This does 
                                                          
137 In the prologue to the Penguin 1996 edition of A Clockwork Orange (first published in 1962), Blake Morrison explains 
that Burgess believed that this novel was far from being his best piece, and resented the success it gained after Kubrick’s 
adaptation in 1971 (vii). 
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not necessarily entail that I personally agree with all the concepts and treatises arisen in the 
postmodern period, nor that presentism can uniquely delve inside postmodern theory. 
Postmodernism should not, in any case, be considered a uniform and consensual movement. 
As previously defended in this dissertation, the truth is that it is us, as observers, who articulate 
and rationalise facts, as postmodern historian Hayden White (1978) declares in his Tropics of 
Discourse (84-84) does not at all mean that facts do not happen independently from the 
observer, which is what can be extracted from postmodern thinker Derrida, who claims not that 
reality does not exist outside language (as it is popularly believed), but that “it is not possible 
to distinguish categorically between what is within and what is outside” (Currie 52). Though 
both theories have been enunciated in the field of postmodern theory, there is a huge gap 
between acknowledging our impossibility to perceive reality unadulteratedly and claiming that 
reality is an illusion, a gap which I have considered necessary to point out. Ultimately, what I 
have tried to illustrate is that there are some postmodern notions which throw some light on 
presentism’s current status in academia, which is not to say that absolutely all postmodern 
notions account for this popularity. This is the reason why I have considered essential to 
address postmodernism, but at the same time set limits to its influence on presentism.  
On a different note, Gloria Anzaldúa once said:  
Progressive whites who have friends from different worlds and who study different 
cultures become intellectual mestizas. They may not be emotional mestizas and 
certainly are not biological mestizas. Bet there can be empathy between people of 
colo[u]r and progressive, sensitive, politically aware whites. (Keating 12)  
 
As a white, heterosexual, middle-class, European woman, I could not be further from 
being a Chicana queer, but somehow, I feel I understand their strife, even if it is at a purely 
emotional level. I am aware of the plausible accusations I might receive from Chicana feminist 
scholars regarding my arguable imposition of a concept (that of presentism) whose theorization 
comes from a white, colonial, cisgender and patriarchal Anglo-European context, upon 
Chicana decolonial theory. Yet, I have envisioned this dissertation as a further study of a culture 
other than my own, with aims at a more acute understanding of their message. My position 
throughout these pages has been that of someone who sympathises with the cause or, in other 
words, that of a prospective scholar delving into the process of becoming an intellectual 
mestiza. Though my theorization of presentism as a tool for decolonial analyses in the literary 
field might be viewed as another instance of a white scholar trying to reappropriate and control 
the ideas emerging from a minority academic field to which (s)he does not belong, I must 
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declare this was not at all my goal when starting this dissertation. I have tried to remain aside 
from the field of history precisely to avoid interfering in revisionist causes which I deem 
otherwise necessary, but that I feel utterly incapable of doing, as I do not have the expertise 
required. Had I tried to apply presentism in the area of historiography, I would understand 
criticism in that regard. I believe that literature, which is open to diverging interpretations and 
further discussion, without aiming at those impartial and neutral aims set by the discipline of 
history, can also be critical of unfair socio-political situations, and thus presentism, with its 
inherent anachronism and partiality, can be easily applied to literary artefacts without 
interfering in the Chicana civil and political rights as an outsider. It is important to remember 
that presentism has no inherent ideology, with which it is provided by the author/critic 
afterwards. 
Besides, since presentism already existed (that is, I have not created a new idea), I am 
not inventing a term or a tool to apply to an academic ground so far and different from my 
socio-historical context. I am rather describing, or theorising about a notion which only in the 
past decades became an object of interest in academia, but which has long been used (by white 
and minority scholars alike). What I have tried to do is to add the decolonial potential that 
presentism might have, and that has often been ignored by Anglo-European scholars, even 
though some instances of it can be found in many Chicanas’ literary production. Denise 
Chávez, for instance, in what she has named the Novena Narrativas y Ofrendas 
Nuevomexicanas (“Novena138 Narratives and New-Mexican Offerings”) denounces the 
realities of many women through the restoration of traditional folkloric figures retrieved from 
the practises of storytelling and popular religious performances (Herrera-Sobek, Chicana 
Creativity 30), which she mixes with contemporary female figures found in everyday life and 
now transformed into literary archetypes. Thus, we find monologues starred by the spinster, 
the foster child, or the bag lady, together with those of the factory worker and the wife of a war 
veteran, putting history and fiction in dialogue. This way, through the reconceptualization (or, 
perhaps, the presentist updating) of the religious and folk traditions, Chávez informs the reader 
of the struggle of poor Chicanos in the barrios, the sexual abuse suffered by many 
disempowered women at the hands of their close relatives, the disconnection between 
institutional religion and its adherents, and the oppression to which young working girls are 
subjected (Herrera Sobek, Chicana Creativity 31-32). Similarly, the figure of la Llorona is 
often re-inscribed in what could be considered presentist terms as an embodiment of women’s 
                                                          
138 Novenas is the name given to those religious plays which used to be performed during the nine days before Christmas. 
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acquaintance with an incipient feminist conscience, as happens in Sandra Cisneros’s “Woman 
Hollering Creek” (1991), or in Mónica Palacios’s “La Llorona: The Other Side” (1991). These 
examples could serve to point out the presence of presentism in the process of decolonization 
already at work by many female Chicana writers. 
Lastly, because a dissertation is always constricted by a limited number of pages, and 
partly because I have tried not to deviate from my original focus, there are some ideas that I 
considered developing, but which I have not been able to include. Unfortunately, all I can do 
is to simply list them for their hypothetical further study, which I hope I will be able to carry 
out at some point in the near future, if they are not already doing it:  
-I have dealt mainly with temporal presentism, whereas spatial presentism, though part 
of my analysis, has taken second priority in my study. In many aspects, spatial presentism, 
related to ideas of spatial situatedness and cognitive geographical mapping, bears some 
resemblances with Walter Benjamin’s concept of the “flâneur,” which I have suggested but not 
developed, but which might be interesting to expand. Because of the postmodern features that 
influence presentism (that is, the end of metanarratives, the fragmentation of the subject, and 
the end of real time) and postmodern emphasis on space rather than time (Smethurst 35; 
Jameson, Postmodernism 154) a deeper and more accurate study on the impact of spatial 
notions over presentism might thereby be valuable.   
-Also, I have always talked about presentism in relation with the past, but I think there 
is a lot of potential in the study of presentism in relation with the future, and its application in 
futuristic science-fiction works, like those enclosed in the genres of post-apocalypse and 
dystopia. Such a study might have, at least, a double orientation: 
A-On the one hand, to study how our present anxieties and concerns are projected on 
our predictions and foreshadowing of how the future might look like, rather than using past 
works to address current concerns. 
B-On the other hand, it might be worth studying the effect of those dystopic works 
which were set in a future time when published, but which has already become our past. George 
Orwell’s 1984 (1949), set in 1984, and Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
(1968), set in 1992, are examples that easily come to mind. Later editions of Dick’s novel set 
the events in 2021 (Kratky 4), probably to maintain this futuristic atmosphere and its dystopic 
underpinnings. Interestingly, any presentist reading of these works is effected, not on a past 
present (that is, on a text in which the action narrated took place in what was then the present, 
or an even more remote past), but on the futuristic projections of a past work (in which the 
action no longer takes place in a past ‘now,’ but on an envisioned ‘someday’). As one 
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encounters that those projections never took place, it may feel as if the reader had gained access 
to the vortex of a parallel reality, a truncated slant depicting what could but never came to be; 
in essence, a never reached future which, remarkably, still reflects an anguish with which the 
reader can sympathize. 
I would like to finish by including a quote taken from Jamaican poet and fiction writer 
Olive Senior, during a speech delivered at the Bocas Literature Festival in Trinidad in 2013, 
which powerfully englobes the reasons which have ultimately pushed me to undertake this 
project: 
We are all enmeshed in politics because we are all citizens of somewhere – even writers 
– and we cannot escape being shaped by political decisions, big and small. So instead 
of asking the question "Should literature be political?," I would rephrase it as a 
statement: Literature is political because we, the creators of literature, are political 
animals; it is part of accepting our responsibility of being human, of being citizens of 
the world. (“Should Literature Be Political?”) 
 
Senior claims that human beings are political animals, and thus their artistic production 
must necessarily mirror this aspect so integral to human nature. That literature may be a 
reflection of politics does not at all imply that literature should be at the service of politics. Yet, 
the literary corpus of a social identity characterized by its marginalization from a standard 
white, hegemonic culture such as that of Chicanas/os, and inside it, the downgrading of 
(lesbian) brown women from the ideals depicted by the Chicano Nationalist movement, is 
necessarily politically aware, and oriented towards justice. Consequently, any instrumental 
contribution to the field of Chicana/o studies, be it presentism or any other tool that may come 
to mind, must necessarily echo Chicanas/os political involvement, bearing in mind, also, that 
literature is eventually a human manifestation, and therefore it is reflective as it is meaningful, 
but above all, it is human, deeply human.   
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